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chapter 1
Introduction: Towards a Trans-Cultural History  
of Muslims in Interwar Europe
Bekim Agai, Umar Ryad and Mehdi Sajid
The study of Muslims in interwar Europe is a rising and intriguing field of 
research. With the exception of two edited volumes, Islam in Interwar Europe 
by Nathalie Clayer and Eric Germain and Transnational Islam in Interwar 
Europe by Götz Nordbruch and Umar Ryad,1 the history of Muslims in Europe 
during this period is still fragmented into various fields of study as a side aspect 
of other issues. Some of these works deal with Muslims in interwar Europe as 
part of Middle Eastern and Asian history, colonial studies or briefly as related 
to European migration history.2 Other historians deliver nationally focused 
narratives of the Muslim presence in western, central, and eastern European 
territories focused on specific countries, framed within a national history.3 
1 Nathalie Clayer and Eric Germain (eds.), Islam in Interwar Europe (London: Hurst & Company, 
2008); Götz Nordbruch and Umar Ryad (eds.), Transnational Islam in Interwar Europe: 
Muslim Activists and Thinkers (New York: Palgrave, 2014).
2 See, for example, Martin Seth Kramer, Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival: The Politics of Ideas 
in the Middle East (New Brunswick, nj: Transaction Publishers, 2011), 103–111; William 
L. Cleveland, Islam against the West: Shakib Arslan and the Campaign for Islamic Nationalism 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014): Juliette Bessis, “Chekib Arslan et les mouvements 
nationalistes au Maghreb,” Revue historique 526 (1978): 467–489; Stéphane A. Dudoignon, 
Hisao Komatsu, and Yasushi Kosugi, Intellectuals in the Modern Islamic World: Transmission, 
Transformation, Communication (London: Taylor & Francis, 2006); Manuela Williams, 
Mussoliniʼs Propaganda Abroad: Subversion in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1935–1940 
(New York: Routledge, 2006); Gilbert Achcar, The Arabs and the Holocaust: The Arab-Israeli 
War of Narratives (London: Saqi, 2010).
3 See, for example, Alexandre Popovic, L’Islam balkanique: Les musulmans du sud-esteuropéendans 
la périodepost-ottomane (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1986); Alexandre Popovic, The Turks of 
Bulgaria (1878–1985) (Society for Central Asian Studies, 1986); Nathalie Clayer, “La Ahmadiyya 
lahori et la réforme de l’islam albanais dans l’entre-deux-guerres, in Véronique Bouillier & 
Catherine Servan-Schreiber,” De l’Arabie à l’Himalaya. Chemins croisés en hommage à Marc 
Gaborieau (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2004), 211–228; Humayun Ansari (ed.), The Making 
of the East London Mosque, 1910–1951 (Cambridge University Press, 2011); Humayun Ansari, 
“Between Collaboration and Resistance: Muslim Soldiers’ Identities and Loyalties in the two 
World Wars,” Arches Quarterly 4 (2011): 18–29; Humayun Ansari, “ʽBurying the Deadʼ: Making 
Muslim Space in Britain,” Historical Research 80/210 (2007): 545–566; Humayun Ansari, “The 
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The present volume puts the trans-cultural perspective on Muslims in interwar 
Europe into focus. It is the outcome of an international symposium entitled 
“Islam in Interwar Europe and European Cultural History,” which was held at 
Leiden University (13–14 December 2012). It was organized by the three editors 
Woking Mosque: A Case Study of Muslim Engagement with British Society since 1889,” 
Immigrants & Minorities 21/3 (2002), 1–24. Gerhard Höpp, Arabische und islamische 
Periodika in Berlin und Brandenburg 1915 bis 1945: geschichtlicher Abriss und Bibliographie 
(Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1994); Gerhard Höpp (ed.), Mufti-Papiere: Briefe, Memoranden, 
Reden und Aufrufe Amīnal-Ḥusainīs aus dem Exil 1940–1945 (Berlin: Schwarz, 2001); Gerhard 
Höpp, “Arab Inmates in German Concentration Camps until the End of World War ii,” in 
Wolfgang Schwanitz (ed.), Germany and the Middle East, 1871–1945 (Madrid u.a.: 
Iberoamericana, 2004); Gerhard Höpp, “Zwischen Entente und Mittelmächten: arabische 
Nationalisten und Panislamisten in Deutschland (1914 bis 1918)”, Asien, Afrika, Lateinamerika: 
Zeitschrift des Zentralen Rates für Asien-, Afrika- und Lateinamerikawissenschaften in der 
DDR5 (1991): 827–845; Gerhard Höpp and Gerdien Jonker, In fremder Erde. Zur Geschichte 
und Gegenwart der islamischen Bestattung in Deutschland (Berlin: Verlag Das Arabische 
Buch, 1996).
Figure 1.1 European Muslim Congress, 1935. Family Archive, Mohammed Ali van Beetem; 
Naaldwijk – The Netherlands. With gratitude to his grandson for giving access  
to the papers
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of this volume in cooperation with the Leiden University Centre for the Study 
of Islam and Society (lucis) and the research group “Europe from the Outside” 
at the University of Bonn sponsored by the German Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research (bmbf).4 A number of scholars from various disci-
plines were invited to discuss how individuals and groups labeled as “Muslims” 
interacted with their respective European societies during the interbellum 
period.5 Some of the guiding questions were: What were their circumstances 
in their countries of residence? How did they interact as a minority group with 
the majority society? What impact did their connections to their counterparts 
in the Muslim world have on their presence and reflections in Europe? How 
did the attitude of their respective European societies influence their under-
standings of Islam and Europe? What kind of new challenges did their pres-
ence represent for the European societies? In dealing with questions of this 
kind the participants attempted to scrutinize some gray areas of European his-
tory and connect geographically restricted findings; this has the potential to 
give us a whole new perspective on the Muslim presence in interwar Europe.
The following chapters aim to fill a gap by reflecting on different examples of 
Muslim presences and interactions in western, central, and eastern Europe and 
by offering an integrative approach to include them in European history. Muslim 
autochthonous and émigré groups and individuals in interwar Europe are 
indeed difficult to categorize. The contributors try to further our understanding 
of Muslim social, political, intellectual, and religious activities in European his-
tory, by offering the necessary historical depth to the growing body of literature 
on Islam and Muslim minorities in the West. The volume thus pieces together 
specific case studies that emphasize the interconnections between Muslim reli-
giosity, political activism, and modernity in interwar Europe by considering 
them as complex, borderless, self-organized, cross-cultural, and multi-ethnic 
groups. Here there is a focus on the idea of the entanglement of Muslim and 
European memories as “parallel histories.” The volume aims to contribute to the 
existing debates on the historiography and territorialities of the Muslim world 
4 See http://www.hum.leidenuniv.nl/godsdienstwetenschappen/nieuws/islam-in-interwar 
-europe-2012.html; http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/r%26b-vol3–iss4–muslims-in-interwar 
-europe.pdf; http://www.ioa.uni-bonn.de/abteilungen/islamwissenschaft/europe-from-the 
-outside/activities-and-events/international-symposium-leiden-university-netherlands 
-2012 (accessed 19 November 2013).
5 See the coverage of the Turkish Review (1 August 2013) to the conference: http://www 
.turkishreview.org/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=223353 (accessed 19 November 
2013).
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by situating Muslim actors in the European context during this crucial time 
of global entanglements.
 Europe as a Transcultural Space for Muslim Action
In recent years, historians have become interested in studying political, reli-
gious, and social movements beyond local cultural borders. In the editors’ 
view, the focus of the present volume is innovative, as the contributions study 
the complexity of the Muslim presence in interwar Europe from a transcul-
tural historical perspective.6 By studying the processes of culture transfer and 
border crossings of Muslim transnational actors in the interbellum period, the 
volume offers a more global understanding of the European past, one that goes 
beyond the histories of defined entities such as nations or classes. Such an 
approach widens our sense and scope of history by producing a more dynamic 
history of all those who identified themselves—or have been identified against 
their will—as “Muslims” within Europe and leads to a deeper reflection on 
their place in European and global history. Studying Muslim networks in inter-
war Europe from this perspective of “entanglement,” and “trans-culturality” 
with and within Europe will, therefore, be useful in creating a global approach 
and a bigger picture by avoiding the numerous traps of the politics of 
forgetting or selective remembering beyond the historical narrative of the 
nation-state. The volume illustrates the historical development of Muslim bor-
der-crossing and trans-culturality by focusing on “significant contact zones, 
adaptation and exchange processes and moments of crossing borders in a global 
context”7 in interwar Europe. An examination of the Muslim trans-cultural role 
in interwar Europe is useful to help us understand the transformation of 
Muslim identities and their imagined collective past in Europe before the 
nation-state.
Thus, many developments of Muslim actions in interwar Europe had global 
provenance, transcending national and assumed cultural boundaries. Studying 
these developments from a global and transcultural perspective can also be 
meaningful to the discussions about the histoire croisée approach, which has 
proved in recent years to be a challenge to the conceptual debates about how 
to understand “interwoven histories,” and how to shed new light on histories 
6 For more about this new historical approach, see Madeleine Herren, Martin Rüesch, and 
Christiane Sibille, Transcultural History: Theories, Methods, Sources (Berlin: Springer, 2012).
7 Herren, Rüesch, and Sibille, Transcultural History, 6.
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often already told in the much more restricted frames of national histories.8 As 
read against the background of this approach, the chapters in this volume 
should be seen as a prelude to a reconsideration of the interactions and inter-
crossings between European and Muslim cultural and political spheres in this 
crucial period. The study of Muslim actors in interwar Europe is a new “prom-
ising line of inquiry for the writing of a history of Europe,” one that rethinks 
their position within the transcultural context.9 By focusing on Muslims and 
their action in this time, this history of interwar Europe can be seen as deeply 
interwoven with colonial subjects living in Europe, making Europe and the 
“Muslim” world partly overlapping spheres. The volume looks at how the 
Muslim presence and movements cut across national boundaries in interwar 
Europe, and made use of transnational ties. This consideration of Muslim 
“transnationalism,” even by necessity and not primarily by design, is well-
suited to deepen our understanding of the transformations of Muslim identi-
ties and their imagined collective past in Europe before the formation of 
contemporary nation-states. The chapters that follow recount a variety of 
examples of Muslim engagement on the European continent in this crucial 
interwar time. Since such Muslim actors were active in Europe and had inten-
sive contacts with peers across colonial lines, the focus on their activities and 
networks shows their significance for the history of Europe. Europe at that 
time was an attractive destination for Arab and Muslim students, revolutionar-
ies, nationalist activists, political exiles, and intellectuals. Europe in this regard 
not only constitutes a geographical entity, but also an overarching intellectual 
space for Muslim actors. The latter, as is shown in the contributions, perceived 
interwar Europe as an “imaginary” borderless, cross-cultural, multi-ethnic and 
a pluri-national sphere for their political and intellectual action, a place where 
discussions on Islam took shape.
In that sense, Muslims in interwar Europe cannot be reduced to passive 
strangers of the internal European local politics and public debates. To be 
more specific, historians of the modern Middle East underestimate the role of 
interwar Muslim actors in writing a history of Islam and its relationship to 
modernity, whereas historians of Europe underestimate the insiderʼs role of 
Muslims in intra-European developments. Some of the contributions in this 
volume try to present a picture of how Muslims, who belonged to various 
social, geographic, linguistic, intellectual, and religious backgrounds under-
stood their shared “Islamness”; and how they impacted on the “Europeanness” 
8 M. Werner and B. Zimmermann, “Beyond Comparison: histoire croisée and the Challenge of 
Reflexivity,” History and Theory 45 (2006): 30–50.
9 Ibid., 43.
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of those who interacted with them. In the following chapters, the contributors 
take into account the multiplicity of Muslim activities, religious and political 
institutions, and (re)interpretations of European homogeneity, civilization, 
and culture in the European setting. In this, the volume will definitely contrib-
ute to shaping not only a Muslim history, but a European history “à géométrie 
variable”10 as well.
The recovery of this history of Muslims in interwar Europe, uncovered by 
following the trajectories of such networks, enables us to underpin the levels 
of interaction and fusion between local and global settings. The volume is 
therefore another new contribution to the different fields of European history, 
Islam in Europe, and Middle Eastern Studies, all coming together in the study 
of Islam in interwar Europe. It constitutes, on the one hand, part of the rapidly 
growing interest in the establishment of Islam in Europe, and on the other 
hand a recognition of the importance of transnational networks for the evolu-
tion of political, social, and religious movements. Thus, the use of the histoire 
croisée as a conceptual tool generates new concepts and shifts the scholarly 
focus from a study of Muslim religious/political ideals out there to see them 
here as part of western modernity and history. A volume like this seeks to gen-
erate “frontier knowledge” in the historical study of the Muslim pre-migration 
and pre-integration experience in Europe. By focusing on this field we are able 
to comparatively redefine the status and collective identity of Muslims in the 
interwar European context; their acceptance, syntheses, or rejection of influ-
ential European ideas. By studying the socio-cultural developments of Muslim 
activities in Europe in this formative era, we can look at the contemporary 
scene anew, without resorting to a neatly tailored or exaggerated hypothesis; 
by getting to know these first Islamic activists, we can indeed better under-
stand the later developments of the so-called “European Islam.”11
 Muslim Activist “Frontiers” in Interwar Europe
The interwar period was the very era in which, to a large degree, the destinies 
of the contemporary European and Muslim-majority societies were shaped. 
Contemporary Europe is indeed the result of the outcomes of this very inter-
bellum episode, in which not only aggressive reactionary European national-
isms emerged, but also where the height of the colonial enterprise and the 
10 Ibid.
11 See Ian Johnson, A Mosque in Munich: Nazis, the cia, and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in the West (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2010).
7Introduction
<UN>
dichotomy between East and West was reached and culminated. In that time, 
Europe was not confined to its geographic borders: politics and intellectual 
debates in the Middle East, North Africa, and South and Southeast Asia closely 
followed the political modes of thinking and conflicts of the colonial centers 
that shaped their political and territorial realities.
Having in mind Muslim activities in the pre-World War i period, the volume 
traces different trajectories of Muslim activism in their new European context, 
in which they faced the challenges of a non-Muslim environment on them, 
their ideas and networks. As we shall see, being located in the metropolitan 
centers, Muslims in interwar Europe were in some cases able to involve them-
selves in both urban and overseas connections by establishing various fronts 
together across the European space.12 In that respect, the volume offers fasci-
nating examples of the intersecting histories of Muslims in the international 
context and politics after the end of World War i. Our approach is to situate 
their history among other actors in Europe and reconstruct the consequences 
of their interaction with non-Muslims and non-Muslim institutions in terms of 
Muslims’ experiences and self-understanding. By concentrating on Muslims 
living in and interacting with European societies, the central thrust of the book 
seeks to analyze the extent of the likely coincidence and potential interrela-
tions of Muslim self-images and local conditions.
In their attempt to overturn France and Britainʼs domination of the post-
World War i international order, a number of Muslims allied themselves to 
anti-imperialist, leftist, Fascist, and Nazi coalitions in their anti-imperial strug-
gles.13 However, their “counterparts” in central and eastern Europe seem to 
12 See David Motadel, “The Making of Muslim Communities in Western Europe, 
1914–1939,” in Nordbruch and Ryad, Transnational Islam, 13–44.
13 See Peter Wien, “Coming to Terms with the Past,” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 42 (2010): 311–321; Peter Wien, “The Culpability of Exile: Arabs in Nazi Germany,” 
Geschichte und Gesellschaft 37 (2011): 332–358; Götz Nordbruch, “‘Cultural Fusion’ of 
Thought and Ambitions? Memory, Politics and the History of Arab–Nazi German 
Encounters,” Middle Eastern Studies 47, no. 1 (2011): 183–194; Israel Gershoni, “Egyptian 
Liberalism in an Age of ‘Crisis of Orientation’: Al Risala’s Reaction to Fascism and Nazism, 
1933–39,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 31 (1999): 551–576; Israel Gershoni, 
“‘Der verfolgte Jude.’ Al-Hilals Reaktionen auf den Antisemitismus in Europa und Hitlers 
Machtergreifung,” in Blind für die Geschichte? Arabische Begegnungen mit dem 
Nationalsozialismus, ed. Gerhard Höpp et al. (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2004), 39–72; 
Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski, Confronting Fascism in Egypt: Dictatorship versus 
Democracy in the 1930s (Stanford, ca: Stanford University Press, 2009); Ethan Katz, ʽDid 
the Paris Mosque Save Jews?: A Mystery and its Memory,ʼ Jewish Quarterly Review 102, 
no. 2 (2012), 256–287; Raffael Scheck, ʽNazi Propaganda toward French Muslim Prisoners 
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have had not only different self-representations, but also different religious 
and political motivations.14 As outside observers from within, Muslims in inter-
war Europe pushed the discussions beyond the question of anti-colonial 
nationalism to include the Muslim imaginations of the races, civilization, and 
religion in the West. While they based their claims to authenticity on Islam and 
its nostalgic past, they indirectly created multifaceted representations, percep-
tions, and narratives about Europe. By utilizing the writings and images of 
Europe made by Muslim exiles, we can trace the alternative views and diagno-
sis of the international structure of ideas and powers that Muslims offered in 
their attempts to find their place in the international domain.
In their new setting, Muslims in interwar Europe attempted to assert them-
selves as components of the emerging colonial nation-states they now 
belonged to on the one hand, but they had to recognize the reality and agony 
of colonialism in the Muslim world as such on the other. Interestingly, their 
presence in interwar Europe intensified their daily and constant encounters 
with Europe as the colonizer, which they now experienced from within. 
Nationalism as interpreted by Muslims adapted itself to its interwar variety of 
guises, causes, and transitions. These Muslim political actions took place 
across the boundaries of Europe and their places of origin as responses to vari-
ous international political upheavals.
We should also emphasize that the relation of Muslim actors to Europe 
has been a longstanding crucial point of reference in contemporary debates 
of War,ʼ Holocaust and Genocide Studies 26, no. 3 (2012), 447–477. Among other works that 
selectively look for affinity between Islam and Nazism or Fascism, J. Herf, The Jewish 
Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War ii and the Holocaust (Cambridge, ma: Harvard 
University Press, 2006); J. Herf, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World (New Haven, ct: Yale 
University Press, 2009); J. Herf, “Nazi Germany’s Propaganda Aimed at Arabs and Muslims 
During World War ii and the Holocaust: Old Themes, New Archival Findings,” Central 
European History 42 (2009): 709–736; Matthias Kuentzel, Jihad and Jew-hatred: Islamism, 
Nazism and the Roots of 9/11 (New York: Telos Press Publishing, 2007); David G. Dalin et al., 
Icon of Evil: Hitler’s Mufti and the Rise of Radical Islam (Transaction Publishers, 2009); 
K.M. Mallmann and M. Cüppers, Halbmond und Hakenkreuz: Das Dritte Reich, die Araber 
und Pal a stina (Darmstadt: WissenschaftlicheBuchgesellschaft, 2006).
14 See, for example, Katarzyna Górak-Sosnowska (ed.), Muslims in Poland and Eastern 
Europe: Widening the European Discourse on Islam (Warsaw: University of Warsaw, Faculty 
of Oriental Studies, 2011); Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: 
Occupation and Collaboration (Stanford, ca: Stanford University Press, 2001), 466–510; 
Marko Attila Hoare, The Bosnian Muslims in the Second World War: A History (London: 
Hurst, 2013); Emily Greble, Sarajevo, 1941–1945: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Hitler’s 
Europe (Ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press, 2011); David Motadel, Islam and Nazi 
Germanyʼs War (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 2014).
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among Muslim intellectuals and activists. The European experience and refer-
ence is crucial for a proper “Islamic argument” in the political and intellectual 
debate and until today bears the legacy of this encounter. In the colonial era 
Muslim migrants in Europe generally developed specific insider/outsider 
views characterized by fascination or rejection. For Muslims in interwar 
Europe, local European controversies and prevailing socio-political concerns 
influenced their intellectual and political perceptions as well.
 Muslim Self-Assertion in the “Lands of the Colonizers”
The following chapters should be read against the historical background of the 
legacy of Muslim reform in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. It 
should be emphasized that important pan-Islamist activities took place out-
side the vanquished Ottoman Empire. Many Muslim actors in Europe after the 
end of the Great War (politicians, intellectuals, and propagandists) considered 
pan-Islam as the only practical way to continue their political activity.15 A 
number of Muslim activists in interwar Europe therefore inherited the legacy 
of modernist Islamic reform and pan-Islam that strove for Muslim unity across 
different groups and schools of thought. Their cosmopolitan experiences gave 
them access to ideas, and enabled them to communicate with people in order 
to foster their aspirations for religious reform and liberation from colonialism 
in the lands of the colonizers, i.e. Europe. Affected by a contemporary wave of 
15 J.M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organization (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), 228–230. See also C. Snouck Hurgronje, ‘Heilige oorlog 
made in Germany,’ De Gids 79 (1915), 1–33. For the English translation, see Joseph E. Gillet 
as The Holy War “Made in Germany (New York and London: G.P. Putnamʼs Sons, 1915). 
Gottfried Hagen, “German Heralds of Holy War: Orientalists and Applied Oriental 
Studies,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 24, no. 2 (2004): 
145–162. See also T. Luedke, Jihad Made in Germany: Ottoman and German Propaganda 
and Intelligence Operations in the First World War (Munster: Münster, Lit, 2005); K. Karpat, 
The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the Late 
Ottoman State (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); D. McKale, War By 
Revolution: Germany and Great Britain in the Middle East in the Era of World War i (Kent 
and London: Kent State University Press, 1998); cf. S. McMeekin, The Berlin-Baghdad 
Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid For World Power, 1898–1918 (London and 
New York: Belknap Press, 2010); Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, “Euro-Islam by Jihad ‘Made in 
Germany,’” in Nathalie Clayer, Eric Germain (eds.), Islam in Inter-War Europe (London: 
Hurst & Co. 2008), 271–301; Mustafa Aksakal, “‘Holy War Made in Germany’? Ottoman 
Origins of the 1914 Jihad,” War in History 18 (April 2011): 2184–2199.
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globalization, they managed to connect themselves by cross-regional networks 
by which they sought to enhance their political, religious, and cultural intel-
lectual aims. As we shall see, their political, religious, intellectual, and even 
military contributions were not isolated from the wider context of Europe.
In the interwar period, Muslim émigrés to Europe and indigenous European 
converts to Islam formed societies, congresses, and organizations in order to 
promote “a cosmopolitan sense of Muslim solidarity.”16 The European Muslim 
Congress in Switzerland (1935) was the first attempt to gather Muslim activists 
in Europe. Its organizer, the well-known Lebanese émigré Shakīb Arslān 
(1869–1946) in Geneva, was a strong defender of pan-Islam, besides his pan-
Arab, anti-colonial, Islamic revivalist objectives in that time. In this congress, 
Arslān tried to make Geneva a center of Muslim activism, something unimagi-
nable just one or two decades earlier; this shows the great degree to which 
Muslims in Europe were connected to those outside it.17 Muslim political self-
assertion in interwar Europe was connected to their different ways of religious 
self-understanding. Because they belonged  to different non-European ethnic 
backgrounds, their political and religious networks overlapped and even in 
many forms were intertwined. Besides the followers of so-called “mainstream” 
Islam, there were other variations of Islam, outside the mainstream, that were 
very active in the European public domain. The most prominent of these was 
the Ahmadiyya movement that operated from religious centers in London and 
Berlin. Their mission in Europe can in many ways be considered, in the words 
of Gerdien Jonker, as a Muslim “laboratory of modernity” in the European con-
text.18 Their missionary activities in Europe were appreciated by many 
Muslims around the world, even if their unorthodox beliefs were highly 
debated. Their greatest field of success was their ability to convert indigenous 
Europeans to Islam; these Europeans then joined Muslim networks, published 
translations of Muslim texts, and explained Islam from their modern European 
perspective. Many of these and other converts played a significant role in the 
interwar period as brokers between the Muslim minorities and the majority 
society in Europe. Their translations of Muslim texts, their philosophical com-
mentaries of the Islamic faith, and their self-confidence and strong sense of 
16 Martin Kramer, Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986), 142.
17 Ibid., 142ff. For a new study on Arslān’s influence on Islamic circles in Egypt from his Swiss 
exile, see Mehdi Sajid, Muslime in der Zwischenkriegszeit und die Dekonstruktion der 
Faszination vom Westen (Berlin: eb-Verlag, forthcoming).
18 Gerdien Jonker, “A Laboratory of Modernity—The Ahmadiyya Mission in Inter-war 
Europe,” Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014): 1–25.
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belonging to the European civilization made them strong allies to a variety of 
Muslims. Many of them left behind fascinating “conversion narratives,” includ-
ing statements about their choices that seemed to reflect their efforts to prove 
their new faith to the outside world. However, many isolated conversion sto-
ries have not been told thus far and these individual biographies must still be 
integrated into the larger framework of the Islamic presence in Europe.19 In 
general, reading their accounts of conversion reveals the complex ways in 
which they refashioned their spiritual orientations and melded their European 
lives with their Islamic identities. Their conversions to Islam included many 
cross-border activities that highlight significant historical aspects of connec-
tions across European and Muslim religious and cultural boundaries. In that 
sense, their history should not represent just the western discovery of Islam, 
but could also reflect the interests, perspectives, and habits of a group of peo-
ple in a new religious and cultural context beyond the particular part of the 
world to which they belonged. Their discovery of Islam conveyed a sense of 
“passing” and “surpassing” that resulted from their access to western power 
and knowledge.20
By consulting important primary sources, the chapters in this volume repre-
sent a significant prelude to the religious and political cultures of Islam in 
Europe. This can indeed shed a new light on the complexity of interactions of 
Muslim actors in their European contexts. By pursuing the historical anteced-
ents and following up its culminations, this volume therefore lays a solid foun-
dation for understanding the transitional developments and structure of 
various Muslim groups in the West.
19 Ali Köse, Conversion to Islam: A Study of Native British Converts (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2010), 19. See John T.F. Keane, Six Months in Meccah: An Account of the Mohammedan 
Pilgrimage to Meccah. Recently Accomplished by an Englishman Professing 
Mohammedanism (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1881); Richard Burton, Personal Narrative of 
a Pilgrimage to el Medinah and Meccah, 2 vols. (London: G. Bell, 1913); Owen Rutter; 
Triumphant Pilgrimage: An English Muslimʼs Journey from Sarawak to Mecca, (London 
[etc.]: Harrap, 1937); Eric Rosenthal, From Drury Lane to Mecca: Being an Account of the 
Strange Life and Adventures of Hedley Churchward (also known as Mahmoud Mobarek 
Churchward), An English Convert to Islam (Cape Town: Howard Timmins, 1982 [repr. of 
1931 edition]); H. St. John B. Philby, A Pilgrim in Arabia (London: Golden Cockerel Press, 
1943); Lady Evelyn Cobbold, Pilgrimage to Mecca (London: John Murray, 1934). See also 
Augustus Ralli, Christians at Mecca (London: William Heinemann, 1909); A.J.B. Wavelle, 
A Modern Pilgrim in Mecca (London: Constable & Company Ltd., 1913).
20 M. Herman Erman, “Roads to Mecca: Conversion Narratives of European and Euro-
American Muslims,” Muslim World 89 (1999): 82–83.
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 Contributions
The interaction between Muslim missionaries and indigenous European con-
verts provides a vivid example of trans-cultural entanglement. In this volume, 
Gerdien Jonker triggers the discussion by tracing Muslim Ahmadiyya mission-
ary activities in interwar Berlin by focusing on German converts governed by a 
common quest towards new political utopias and an appetite for intellectual 
experiment. In the aftermath of World War i, many Germans turned their back 
on Christianity and went in search of spiritual alternatives. Foreign missionar-
ies with a fresh message were welcomed, and the Weimar Republic became a 
stage for Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, and alternative Christian missions. From a 
starting point of 1922, Jonker compares the activities of the Islamische 
Gemeinde Berlin and those of the Ahmadiyya Anjuman from Lahore in their 
German context. Jonker argues that the Muslim mission in interwar Berlin 
allowed for a rich transfer of knowledge, with which for one short moment the 
bias between East and West, periphery and center, was bridged. In order to 
fulfill their desire to modernize Islam, Ahmadi missionaries studied European 
intellectual traditions and invited Germans to attend their gatherings, which 
became the core of the mosque community. For their part, the Germans groped 
for ways to create the “future man” who would be able to solve the problems 
created by modernity. Jonkerʼs contribution argues that visions of and experi-
ments with man’s progress in the name of modernity were at the heart of the 
missionary exchange, and he asks why converting to Islam was considered a 
legitimate and accepted means towards that aim. While introducing the reader 
to a range of convert biographies, the contribution looks for interfaces between 
the modernity of the missionaries and that of their recipients. The study makes 
clear that liberal intellectuals recognized in Islam a potential to interface with 
modernity, a potential that ten years later was adopted and twisted by Nazi 
ideologues.
Within this context of “spreading the message” in Europe, various intra-
Muslim disputes emerged and took sectarian shapes in their new European 
environments. Aspects of these sectarian conflicts were also molded by the 
new context and the quest of Muslims searching for a space in Europe. Some 
Muslims in interwar Europe, especially European converts, perceived of a uni-
versal Muslim community that should take priority above religious differences. 
In this respect, Umar Ryad in his contribution argues that European converts 
played a prominent trans-cultural role in the development of modern Islamic 
thought in the interwar period; they tried to bridge historically and geographi-
cally established and accepted divisions within the Muslim community, divi-
sions which they, as newcomers, did not inherit. Whereas many of them 
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maintained good relations with the Ahmadiyya missions in interwar Europe, 
they were also present in the debates in Salafi reformist pan-Islamic circles in 
Egypt. By dwelling on the materials embodied in two Muslim Salafī magazines 
in Egypt, al-Manār, published by Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (1865–1935) and 
al-Fatḥ, published by Riḍā’s contemporary Syrian writer and activist Muḥibb 
al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb (1886–1969), Ryad emphasizes that although Salafī writers 
held strongly negative attitudes against the Ahmadiyya, their responses were 
not always homogenous. On the one hand, Muslim reformists harshly attacked 
Ahmadiyya doctrines, but on the other hand, in many cases they also praised 
their missionary work in Europe. After a short term appraisal of the Ahmadiyya 
success in Europe, many disputes began to emerge and finally deteriorated 
their relations; reaching a peak in the mid-1930s. Many converts left the 
Ahmadiyya missions and started to establish their own organizations and soci-
eties in protest of the Ahmadiyya’s refusal to recant Ghulam Ahmad’s beliefs 
altogether. This chapter shows that although there were multiple and deeply-
rooted conflicts between the Salafiyya and Ahmadiyya based on principles 
that could not be compromised, the presence of European converts as new 
engaging figures unconsciously created a certain commonality between these 
disagreeing Muslim branches, whose role in Europe became entwined. They 
all had one goal in common, namely the relevance of Islam on European soil.
Converts played a crucial role in the Islamic community in interwar Europe; 
and conversion took different forms. Reflecting on the role of European con-
verts to Islam in intercultural communication and Islamic scholarship, Pieter 
Sjoerd van Koningsveld distinguishes between three main types of conversion: 
(1) permanent conversion, where the convert acts out of free will and personal 
conviction and therefore believes it to be a permanent step, (2) forced or fraud-
ulent conversion, and (3) conversion of convenience, which is an insincere 
form of conversion performed to obtain certain interests, like marriage, access 
for one’s children to a confessional school, access to a club or place open 
to adherents of a particular religion. Van Koningsveld sheds light on the 
controversial conversion of the Dutch orientalist Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje 
(1857–1936) as a “semi-permanent” conversion. He argues that Snouck 
Hurgronje’s conversion started as a temporary one, but developed into a more 
permanent form. After converting for a pragmatic reason, to join the pilgrim-
age and observe Muslim networks there, the knowledge that he remained a 
Muslim was restricted to a segment of Snouck Hurgronje’s Muslim network, 
which he maintained after his journey to Mecca in the years 1884 and 1885. 
Towards his European network, Snouck was crystal-clear in “defending” his 
conversion as merely a means to obtain access to Mecca and be accepted in a 
Muslim society. Van Koningsveld considers Snouck Hurgronje’s conversion of 
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convenience as perhaps the most successful case in colonial history of the 
instrumentalization of Islam for the benefit of the Islamic policies of the rulers 
and for the development of ethnological field studies. The key people in his 
Muslim network not only consolidated his social position within Muslim cir-
cles, but also enabled him to acquire his authority among Muslims, such that 
he acquired prestige as a Muslim religious scholar himself. He was even some-
times addressed by his Muslim interlocutors as the “Mufti of Batavia,” and even 
as “Shaykh al-Islām fī al-Diyār al-Jāwiyya.” Being addressed as an authority for 
Islam in the Netherlands and in Jawa clearly shows the supranational space in 
which the “Muslim world” and “Europe” could no longer be thought of as 
clearly distinguished units.
In his contribution, Klaas Stutje studies Indonesian students in the 
Netherlands during the interwar period; particularly Snouck Hurgronjeʼs con-
temporaries. Although there were relatively few Muslim residents living in the 
Netherlands before World War ii, those present succeeded in building organi-
zations and infrastructures of their own, and are examples of early forms of 
Muslim self-organization in Europe. Stutje writes a Dutch chapter on the trans-
cultural history of Islam in interwar Europe. He focuses on the Muslim associa-
tion of Perkoempoelan Islam, which included the mostly Indonesian migrant 
communities in the Netherlands, and subsequently, the ‘colonial’ Muslim com-
munities of Europe as well, as it became an inner-European actor. He also 
describes the attitudes of Dutch authorities towards Muslim organizations in 
the Netherlands at that time. By illustrating its local activities and its organiz-
ers’ attempts to connect with other pan-Islamic organizations, Stutje finally 
concludes that the Perkoempoelan Islam was not only concerned with politics 
in their “home countries,” but had strong roots in the Dutch environment. It 
was more concerned with the accommodation and representation of 
Indonesian workers vis-à-vis the Dutch authorities than with networking 
abroad. Moreover, the story of the relatively small Muslim community within 
the Perkoempoelan Islam is illustrative of the attitude the Dutch authorities 
and Dutch society at large adopted towards migrant communities in general, 
and of the strategies these communities adopted to cope with their inherently 
vulnerable position. As such this aspect of the colonial past is part of general 
Dutch history and shows that state interactions with Muslim organizations are 
not new in the Netherlands.
Other European colonial states were concerned with the situation of 
Muslims within their borders as well. Naomi Davidson examines the interwar 
origins of Muslim histories in metropolitan France as a case study. She argues 
that the seeds for the racialization of people identified as Muslims in France 
were laid during this period with the state-sponsored creation of a mosque and 
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other “Muslim” sites in Paris. By examining the creation and management of 
these new Muslim spaces by French officials and North African religious lead-
ers, Davidson tries to write a transnational history of Islam in Europe, one that 
acknowledges Islam’s long presence as a fact in European social and political 
life. By acknowledging not only the role of French colonialism, but also that of 
Muslim leaders, Davidson stresses how this collaborative construction of a 
particular vision of Islam ultimately contributed to the process of essentializa-
tion of those people identified as “Muslim.” By focusing on the Paris Mosque 
(Mosquée de Paris) and the Franco-Muslim Hospital (Hôpital Franco-
Musulman), the author argues that this particular vision of French Islam was a 
blend between “Muslim” and “French” civilizations. “French Islam” inscribed 
Islam firmly within a French republican model, yet it simultaneously main-
tained Islam outside the boundaries set by French secularism. The architec-
tural and aesthetic plans for the mosque, as well as the events that marked the 
milestones in its development, were essential to the creation and diffusion of a 
version and concept of “French Islam.” In that sense, it was the panoply of 
interwar social and political programs that depended on the establishment of 
the Paris Mosque that helped establish Muslims as only and eternally Muslims 
in metropolitan France.
While these chapters deal with Muslim history in their religious and politi-
cal realms, we should not neglect the military participation of Muslims in 
European wars, as this also played an important role as a pretext for the estab-
lishment of the Mosquée de Paris. This definitely contributes to our under-
standing of European subaltern history, a “history told from below.” Ali Al 
Tuma offers the example of the Spanish Civil War, during which Spanish soci-
ety was confronted by the presence of large numbers of Muslim Moroccan 
soldiers on Spanish territory. Given the history of the Reconquest campaigns 
against the Moors in medieval times, it was rather ironic for the Spanish 
Nationalists to use Muslims in a so-called Cruzada against the Spanish 
Republic. In addition, the use of Muslim soldiers in Spain presented the prob-
lem of how to deal with the religious differences between the Moroccan sol-
diers and the surrounding Spanish society. Al Tuma explains that the Spanish 
Nationalists dealt with this by ensuring that the Moroccan soldiers stayed 
within the boundaries of their religious space, even when that meant enforc-
ing an Islamic identity. This the Nationalists did to protect the religious sensi-
tivities of the Moroccans but also because, in Spanish eyes, the Moroccans 
could not be considered anything but conservative religious Muslims. The 
Spanish Nationalist military employed religion to justify the use of Moroccan 
soldiers from a Christian perspective, to attract the Moroccans to their cause 
with Islamic rhetoric, and to separate the Moroccans from the surrounding 
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Spanish culture and society on a religious basis. This chapter sheds light on an 
aspect of Christian-Muslim religious relations in Europe during the interwar 
period and the contradictory attitudes of embracing while keeping at bay the 
Muslim “Other.”
Besides migrant groups in western Europe, Muslims in eastern and central 
European territories are also part of the European past. Permanent Muslim 
communities, mainly prisoners of war and refugees, had already settled in the 
Grand Dutchy of Lithuania (then a shared monarchy with Poland) in the thir-
teenth and fourteenth centuries. By the end of sixteenth century, these Tatar 
groups had lost their language, but maintained their religion.21 In his chapter, 
Egdūnas Račius discusses the predicament of Muslims of interwar Lithuania 
as a conflicted autochthonous ethno-confessional community. He attempts to 
uncover the process and consequences of identity change in the Tatar Muslim 
community in the territory of the interwar Lithuanian nation-state, as it was 
captured in the formal communication between the Tatar Muslim communi-
ties and state authorities. Račius shows that the once unified Muslim commu-
nity of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, due to new geopolitical realities, 
mutated into several separate, even antagonistic, national Muslim communi-
ties, which, even when given a chance after several decades, resisted reunifica-
tion. The birth of new national identities among Tatars of the former Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania is well worth a deeper analytical look as it contributes to a 
wider picture of identity changes and identity building among Muslims in 
interwar Europe. In this regard, the Lithuanian (and arguably Polish as well as 
Byelorussian) Tatar case differs from the otherwise stereotypically perceived 
process of integration and indigenization of Muslims in Europe, then and now.
Zaur Gasimov and Wiebke Bachmann look to another aspect of the discus-
sion; they point to Azerbaijani and Tatar discourses in interwar Europe as part 
of the transnational lives of those who identified themselves as Muslims in a 
multicultural space. After the Caucasus and Crimea were occupied by the Red 
Army in 1920, a number of Muslim intellectuals (both Shīʿī and Sunnī) from 
Russia left for France, Poland, and Turkey. With the financial help of the Polish 
authorities these émigrés founded several newspapers and journals in Paris 
and Warsaw with the aim of continuing anti-communist activity abroad, in yet 
another example of non-Muslims using Muslims for their political cause and 
Muslims accommodating non-Muslim actors. Islam was an important theme 
21 Konrad Pędziwiatr, “‘The Established and Newcomersʼ in Islam in Poland or the Intergroup 
Relations within the Polish Muslim Community,” in Górak-Sosnowska, Muslims in Poland 
and Eastern Europe: Widening the European Discourse on Islam (Warsaw: University of 
Warsaw, 2011), 171.
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in the Azerbaijani, Tatar, and Dagestani discourses in the interwar period, as it 
was percieved as a cultural legacy endangered by the communist regime. Many 
of the contributors to the émigré journals stressed the importance of Islam 
even though they were adherents of secularist and nationalist ideologies. Thus 
a certain ambivalence with regard to Islam can be found in these discourses. 
The contributors argue that while those Muslims were eager to make European 
readers aware of the culture and the political problems in the Soviet Caucasus 
and the Crimea of that time, Islam played a significant role in their argumenta-
tion when they addressed their non-Muslim public, though they tempered 
their discussions of it, perhaps in an attempt to avoid being perceived of as 
“religious Muslims.”
<UN>
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chapter 2
In Search of Religious Modernity: Conversion  
to Islam in Interwar Berlin
Gerdien Jonker
 Introduction
Throughout the interwar period, Berlin experienced the devastating effects of 
increasing globalization; in the aftermath of a war it had not started, it found 
that, nonetheless, it had to pay the costs. Towards the end of the war, which 
involved the loss of lives on a hitherto unknown scale, the Prussian, Ottoman, 
Habsburg, and Russian Empires were abolished. Russia went through a revolu-
tion that changed the political topography of Eastern Europe and inspired 
dreams of revolution elsewhere; Hungary was occupied and forced into 
Communism. Poland drew new borders, with deadly implications for the bor-
der populations, the former Habsburg Empire was cut down into minute par-
cels, and France, the country in which a large part of the war had been fought, 
emerged drastically mutilated.1
After the armistice was declared, Germany lived through a period of serious 
political destabilization. Most Germans failed to comprehend why they had 
been defeated, and it did not help that the political classes refused to acknowl-
edge this.2 National pride was at stake. Returning divisions formed paramili-
tary organizations and terrorized Germany for at least four years. Between 
1918 and 1922 the ultra-right created havoc in the Rhine area, the Baltic coun-
tries, and Schlesien. In Munich, a Communist regime took power. In Kiel, 
Hamburg, and Berlin socialist uprisings and uncontrolled street fighting 
created great political tension.3 From the far right to the far left, the country 
groped for a return to its “original” state; it invented as it went along a 
1 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, “War and Revolution in a World of Empires: 1914–1945,” 
in Empires in World History, ed. Jane Burbank et al. (Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press, 
2010), 369–413.
2 John Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities: A History of Denial (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 2001), 327–400; Eric Hobsbawn, The Age of Extremes: A History of the 
World 1914–1991 (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).
3 Vanessa Conze, Das Europa der Deutschen: Ideen vonEuropain Deutschland zwischen 
Reichstradit-ion und Westorientierung (1920–1970) (Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 
2005), 25–100.
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Deutschheit (German-ness) that resulted in visions of “anti-modern modernity”4 
and vehemently opposed the democratic but feeble Weimar government.
A spiritual vacuum across Europe accompanied the political crisis. Official 
religion, both in its Lutheran and Catholic form, quickly lost authority. The 
Kaiser had been a symbol of Protestantism and when he left the country the 
Lutheran church was widely felt to be devoid of meaning. Likewise, the occu-
pation of the Rhineland and the refusal of the victorious powers to unite 
Germany with Austria contradicted the traditional German Catholic self-
understanding of the Christliches Abendland (Christian Occident).5 As a result, 
many people turned their backs on the German churches and went in search 
of spiritual alternatives;6 it helped that the trend toward globalization had 
already enhanced the level of knowledge and respect for other belief systems. 
In the age of modernity, the awareness of other religions not only meant the 
enhancement of knowledge, it also implied the freedom to choose between 
them. Along with the study of religious texts, theosophy in particular encour-
aged the study of religions through encounter, experience, and conversion.7 In 
the aftermath of the war, all these elements joined to create a fertile breeding 
ground for religious experiment. Foreign missionaries with a fresh message 
were welcomed, and the Weimar Republic became a stage for Hindu, Buddhist, 
Muslim, and alternative Christian missions.
After 1923, when a fragile equilibrium began to take hold, Berlin quickly 
became the cultural capital of continental Europe. A magnet for artists, writers, 
cinematographs, and actors, it became the avant-garde center of European 
modernity. Journalists representing the main European and American dailies 
joined ranks in order to report about revolutionary progress and its backlashes.8 
As many as 500,000 refugees from Russia flooded Berlin on their way to the 
Americas, among them the Russian-Jewish intelligentsia and revolutionary art-
4 Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, “Suchbewegungeninder Moderne. Religion im politischen 
Feldder Weimarer Republik,” in Religion und Gesellschaft. Europa im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. 
Friedrich Graf and Klaus Große Kracht (Köln/Weimar/Wien: Böhlau, 2007), 177.
5 Doering-Manteuffel, “Suchbewegungen,” 179.
6 Michael Klöckner and Udo Tworuschka, Religionen in Deutschland. Kirchen, Glaubens-
Gemeinschaften, Sekten (Munich: Olzog  Verlag, 1994).
7 Ulrich Linse, “Lebensreform und Reformreligionen,” in Die Lebensreform. Entwürfe der 
Neugestaltung von Leben und Kunst um1900, ed. Kai Buchholz et al. (Darmstadt: Haeusser-
media, 2001), 193–199; Helmut Zander, Anthroposophie in Deutschland. Theosophische 
Weltanschauung und gesellschaftliche Praxis 1884–1945 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and 
Ruprecht,2007), 33–51.
8 Sigrid Bauschinger, “The Berlin Moderns: Else Lasker-Schülerand‚ ‘Café Culture,’” in Berlin 
Metropolis, ed. Emily D. Bilsky (New York: Jewish Museum, 2000), 58–102.
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ists whom the revolution had betrayed.9 This amalgam of people created an 
extraordinary creative potential. For some time, Berlin’s large apartment houses 
were inhabited by a floating bohemia that was critical of European civilization, 
sympathized with revolution, and wrote the books, produced the films, and cre-
ated the art that today are among the classics of modern European art. The 
proponents of anti-modern modernity, the conservative elites, the National 
Socialists, and the right-wing paramilitary despised and hated them.10
This constellation served as the local setting in which students, writers, mis-
sionaries, and revolutionaries from Muslim countries, those who constituted 
the Muslim community in interwar Berlin, interacted with their host society. 
From yet another angle, they can be seen as part of the same globalization 
disaster, in which the Muslim world had perceived Germany as a friend. During 
the Great War the Ottoman Empire had been Germany’s comrade-in-arms; 
Indian, Tatar, and Arab revolutionaries had been trained by German and 
Ottoman officers to inspire insurgencies against British colonial administra-
tions; pow camps outside Berlin had gathered some 20,000 French, British, 
and Russian Muslim prisoners of war. A mosque had been erected to serve 
their religious needs, and a group of Tatars, reluctant to join the revolution, 
built the first organizational structures. For some time, the financial crash kept 
rents and the cost of living low, and this made university study in Berlin attrac-
tive. Thus, Berlin became the stage for a nascent Muslim community because 
it offered a local setting that favored the development of global, pan-Islamic 
ideas.11 These were voiced in a large range of Arabic, Persian, Tatar, French, and 
German periodicals, papers, and books that were all written, printed and pub-
lished in Berlin.12
For ten years, from 1923 to January 1933, these people turned Berlin into a 
melting pot in which extremes prevailed: extreme bourse crashes, extreme 
political instability, extreme outpourings of creativity, and extreme missionary 
9 Karl Schlögel, Das russische Berlin. Ostbahnhof Europas (Munich: Panthon, 2007); Verena 
Dohrn and Gertrud Pickhan, Transit und Transformation. Osteuropäisch-jüdische Migranten 
in Berlin 1918–1939 (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012).
10 Werner Maser, Adolf Hitler. Mein Kampf. Geschichte. Auszüge. Kommentare (Rastatt: 
Moewig, 1981); Ernst von Salomon, Der Fragebogen (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1961).
11 Gerhard Höpp, “Zwischen Moschee und Demonstration. Muslime in Berlin, 1922–1930,” 
Moslemische Revue (1990): 135–146, (1990): 230–223, (1991): 12–19; Gerhard Höpp. ‘Die 
Sache ist von immenser Wichtigkeit.’ Arabische Studenten in Berlin (ms, Höpp Archive), 
1990; Iskander Giljazov, Muslime in Deutschland: Von den zwanziger Jahren zum ‘Islamische 
Faktor’ während des 2. Weltkrieges (ms, Höpp Archive), 1989.
12 Gerhard Höpp. Arabische und islamische Periodika in Berlin und Brandenburg 1915–1945. 
Geschichtlicher Abriß und Bibliographie (Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1994).
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activities. On 30 January 1933 when the fascist National Socialists came to 
power, the pluralistic society engendered by the Weimar Republic was devas-
tated. The new regime forged political stability through the persecution of 
anyone who did not conform to its idea of German-ness, and it targeted com-
munists and socialists, artists and homosexuals, political opponents, gypsies, 
and Jews. The remaining opponents left the country. The rest of the popula-
tion conformed politically, taking membership in the Nazi party or becoming 
active in one of the many Nazi sub-organizations.13 The influx of migrants was 
stopped. Foreigners were scrutinized and refused residency permits unless 
they conformed to Nazi politics. Alternative religious groups were closed down 
or brought under government control. Muslim organizations in Berlin faced 
the same choices as their German neighbors: Muslim Communists fled 
the country, the rest, again, conformed to, or cooperated with the prevailing 
regime.
In this study I address Muslim missionaries together with those they tar-
geted: Germans who during these turbulent years chose to become Muslims. 
Starting in 1922, when the first Muslim mission commenced, this study ends at 
the moment Germany entered the next war and the last missionary left the 
country. Within these limits, I trace Muslim missionary activities and map the 
different responses to them.
For two Muslim organizations especially, the establishment of a mission 
among the Europeans was central to their endeavor to ameliorate the situation 
in their home country of British India. The Islamische Gemeinde zu Berlin e.V. 
(igb), invited Europeans to embrace Islam and join their revolutionary strug-
gle. For the Ahmadiyya Anjumani-Isha’ati-Islam (aaii), missionary work 
among the Europeans implied the creation of a trans-cultural religious space 
in which Indians and Germans met as equals and sought individual progress.14 
Those were very different aims. In their quest for freedom, the igb did not 
exclude the use of weapons, whereas the Ahmadiyya followed Gandhi and 
developed methods of non-violence. For the aaii, mission among the 
Europeans was the primary aim and its missionaries went about it in ways that 
13 In 1933, when the nsdap came to power, this party already counted 2.5 million members. 
To avoid the influx of nominal members, the regime put a stop on new memberships until 
1937. Once this was removed, membership mounted to 11.5 million of a total population of 66 
million inhabitants. Available online: http://www.bundesarchiv.de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/ 
bilder_dokumente/00757/index-11.html.de.
14 The competing Ahmadiyya Qadiani branch tried to do the same but failed for a variety of 
reasons. See Gerdien Jonker “A Laboratory of Modernity—The Ahmadiyya Mission in 
Interwar Europe,” Journal of Muslims in Europe 3 (2014): 1–25; Missionizing Europe: The 
Ahmadiyya Quest for Religious Progress 1900–1965 (Leiden: Brill, 2015).
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were highly professional, whereas the igb first of all ministered to Muslim 
émigrés because what it needed was political solidarity, not converts in search 
of personal redemption. As a result, the two organizations were in constant 
competition.15
While introducing the reader to a range of convert biographies, in this 
contribution I look for interfaces between different ideas of, and searches for, 
modernity. During the interwar period, visions of and experiments with 
man’s progress in the name of modernity were at the heart of the transna-
tional exchange, and for very different reasons: converting to Islam was con-
sidered a legitimate and widely accepted means towards that aim. Germans 
who converted to Islam covered a wide societal and political range, from 
revolutionaries and avant-garde artists, to conservative university professors 
and orientalists, to sympathizers and members of the Nazi Party, and 
included both Christians and Jews. Their imaginative conceptions of Islam 
differed accordingly and ranged from rational religion to mysticism, from a 
religion fit for world revolution to one with a penchant towards the military. 
Apart from Lev Nussimbaum and Leopold Weiss, this group has not yet been 
the subject of academic research. This study therefore makes a novel 
contribution.
Missionary activities could be traced in registry files, mission journals, the 
archives of the Foreign Office, as well as in the scant remains of the Ahmadiyya 
Mosque Archive. Tracing the convert biographies is more difficult. Some con-
verts left only a name in the registry files, others added a photograph, still oth-
ers a conversion narrative. Some wrote under a pseudonym, others changed 
their Christian or Jewish names for a Muslim surname. All this makes access to 
their lives extremely difficult. In some cases, where it was possible to establish 
an original name, we found traces in the national library, sometimes also in the 
nsdap membership files.
In the framework of this volume on European (trans)cultural history we ask 
what the missionary endeavor and its German responses added to the global 
exchange. Did the interaction engender fresh ideas and a transfer of knowl-
edge? Did it manage to break down cultural borders? To find answers we scru-
tinize the meeting between missionaries and converts while introducing the 
term religious modernity to describe the character of that meeting point. Our 
assumption is that there were various interfaces between the missionaries and 
modernity and that experimentation with religion played a major role in the 
ensuing communication.
15 Jonker, “A Laboratory of Modernity”; Jonker, Missionizing Europe.
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 Leadership in the Missionary Field
Let us first focus on the nascent Muslim community in Berlin. In 1922, there 
were already sixteen organizations in existence.16 By 1932 we count twenty 
political organizations with the aim of liberating Muslim home countries from 
colonial rule, six student organizations, and six different religious organiza-
tions that represented as many as 46 different Muslim ‘nations’ in their ranks.17 
Situated in a non-Muslim country, leadership of this international community 
could only be symbolic and needed religious legitimacy in order to function. 
Once created, it was also subject to intense competition, in which political, 
dogmatic, and generational differences all played a part. In order to foster pan-
Islamic aspirations among Muslims in Berlin, it was necessary to unite the 
local community under one leadership. The reality of their diversity, however, 
forged a different course, and created several competing Muslim leaders who 
incidentally also employed different missionary styles. Because these men rep-
resented the ‘face’ of Islam in Germany, and official interaction with German 
society focused on them, I introduce each briefly here.
Any attempt to create a ‘Who’s Who’ of Muslim leadership and missionaries 
in interwar Berlin inevitably calls to mind Gilbert Achcar’s ordering of the dif-
ferent political positions in the Arab world between 1933 and 1947.18 Already 
anticipating the Arab political scene of the 1930s, Weimar Berlin collected 
western-oriented liberals, Marxists, nationalists, reactionaries, and/or funda-
mentalist pan-Islamists. In contrast to Achcar’s findings, however, in the 1930s 
most Muslim organizations in Berlin gravitated towards fascism, a trend that 
must be considered against the background of the oppressive German politics. 
Whereas the liberal administration of the Weimar Republic set the scene for 
political and cultural diversity, the Nazi regime only tolerated its own world-
view, though they created a framework in which Muslim fascist responses 
could become articulate.
In the order of their appearance on the Berlin stage, we first meet Abdul 
Jabbar Kheiri (1880–1958), who, during World War i acted as an agitator against 
the British in the service of the Germans, and in 1922 united Berlin’s Muslim 
population in the igb. An Indian revolutionary working towards the liberation 
of the Muslim world, if need be by violent means, Kheiri combined Marxism 
with pan-Islamism. Global change, or so his philosophy seems to hold, had to 
16 Giljazov, Muslime in Deutschland; Höpp, Zwischen Moschee und Demonstration.
17 Jonker, Missionising Europe.
18 Gilbert Achcar. Les Arabes et la Shoah (Paris: Actes sud, 2009).
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come about through world revolution.19 When founding the igb, his political 
involvement and his mission among the Europeans seem to have closely inter-
acted. The documents in the archive of the Foreign Office that deal with him 
consistently label him a Bolshevik.20 In the eyes of his community, it made him 
a hero: a photograph in the file, dated 1925, reveals an authoritative man in 
turban and loose robes, carried in triumph on the shoulders of young men 
from his community.
In 1922, Kheiri also launched a mission journal, Der Islam: Ein Wegweiser zur 
Rettung und zum Wiederaufbau (Islam: A guide for rescue and restoring). Here, 
for the first time in German history, Germans were invited to embrace Islam as 
a way to join the world revolution. Christianity cannot play that role, the text 
warns, because clearly it is a concoction of fantasy and lies, full of disdain for 
women. Only Islam holds the key to the main concerns of the day: “world 
peace,” “global freedom,” “justice,” “happiness,” “development,” and “progress.”21 
In this text, key concepts of modernity (progress, development) are closely 
joined to global concerns: seen from this angle, liberation of the Muslim world 
from colonial oppression would bring world peace, justice, and happiness. If 
peace and justice was what the Germans were looking for, or so the text seems 
to suggest, they should join the struggle and become part of the worldwide 
Muslim community.
The second leader who dominated these early years was Khwaja Sadr-ud-
Din (1881–1981), a missionary trained by the Ahmadiyya of Lahore. He arrived 
in 1923 and built a mosque in Wilmersdorf for which he was much envied and 
which for a long time was the only mosque in Berlin. Thus responding to press-
ing needs, Sadr-ud-Din refrained from founding his own religious organiza-
tion. Instead he used his energies to set up a mission post and in 1924 also 
launched the mission journal Moslemische Revue, in which he introduced him-
self as a western-oriented Muslim intellectual interested in starting a dialog 
with European intellectuals on the topic of peace and personal progress. His 
mission goal was simple and straightforward. From 1925 onwards, every issue 
featured ‘modern’ aspects of the religion and explained how to join:
To become a Muslim, a ceremony is not required. Islam is not only a 
rational, widely spread and practical religion, it is also in full harmony 
19 AA/2 (Oct. 1928); Abdul Jabbar Kheiri, Sowjet-Rußland und die Völker der Welt (Petrograd: 
Verlag Kommunistische Internationale, 1924).
20 AA/1, AA/2.
21 Der Islam. Ein Wegweiser zur Rettung und zur Wiederaufbau, ed. Jabbar Kheiri and Sattar 
Kheiri, 1 (1922), 17.
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with the natural human disposition. Every child is born with it. This is 
why becoming a Muslim does not require a transformation. One can be a 
Muslim without telling anyone…22
This indeed was a totally different message than that which the igb advocated. 
Progress, or so the Ahmadiyya philosophy ran, was inherent in personal prog-
ress and a key concept of Islam. Except for their contribution to world pacifism 
(see below), the Ahmadiyya did not target global politics. Rather, they tried to 
create a transnational space for the meeting of different cultures.23 To Germans 
trying to sort out their present spiritual turmoil the Ahmadiyya mission goals 
indeed offered an intellectual and emotional meeting ground, one in which 
different approaches to European modernity, especially the concept of 
Lebensreform (Life reform) could be brought forward, questioned, and linked 
to Islam and Muslim modernization.
In 1927, a third leader entered the Berlin stage, one who, in only a few years 
time, superseded Kheiri, opening up the Arab community towards a more 
practical, western-oriented liberalism. Arriving as a student in 1923, Mohammed 
Nafi Tschelebi (1901–1933), founder of the Islam Institute and the Islam Archive, 
actively worked towards what he called “a fruitful, healthy synthesis of Islamic 
and European cultures.”24 His concept included a critical approach to the con-
vert influx. Tschelebi was the first to draft a set of rules for Europeans who 
wished to become Muslim. In all his considerations, the safeguarding of tradi-
tional religion played a leading part. As the Foreign Office observed: “Oriental 
attempts at modernizing…are also located in circles that want to safeguard the 
old religious bond, that is to say the religiously minded Arabs, Egyptians, 
Indians etc., even reaching into the Wahhabi camp.”25 Tschelebi was not a 
Wahhabi. Rather, he combined a rare mix of western-oriented liberalism, reli-
gious nationalism, and pan-Islamism.
To complete the picture, we must also mention the Sufi Bewegung e.V. 
(Sufi movement), founded in 1925 by the missionary Hazrat Pir Inayat Khan 
(1882–1927). Seeking individual religious experience, this organization did not 
position itself politically, nor did it attract the attention of the Foreign Office or 
any of the media. It did, however, cater to the Ahmadiyya mosque. Eight years 
later, when German politics turned away from liberalism and the persecution 
22 Moslemische Revue (1925): 20.
23 Jonker, “Laboratory.”
24 AA/2: “An Islamic Press Agency in Berlin” (undated).
25 AA/2: “Islamische Verständigungsarbeit in Berlin” (Oct. 1928).
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of minorities began, it immediately dissolved itself,26 while at about the same 
time the Deutsch-Moslemische Gesellschaft e.V. (the German Muslim Society, 
or dmg) expanded in the direction of spirituality and inclusion. As a result, 
some of its members, notably Hosseyn Kazemzadeh “Iranschär” (1884–1962), 
who had been, earlier, a revolutionary congenial to the German government and 
a creative publisher trying to promote the regeneration of Iran,27 re-surfaced in 
the Ahmadiyya mosque with an experimental mixture of theosophy and Sufi 
wisdom.28
Once established, the Nazi regime set the scene for a very different kind of 
Muslim leadership, although some years passed before the face of Islam in 
Berlin started to change. Between 1928 and 1936, the Ahmadiyya missionary 
S.M. Abdullah (1889–1956) dominated the mission activity; Kheiri left the city 
in 1929 and Tschelebi drowned in the summer of 1933 while swimming in a 
nearby lake. In 1930, while the country quickly moved towards National 
Socialism and intellectuals of the right and left signaled a new atmosphere of 
“no-nonsense,”29 meaning that the chaotic market of ideas was abandoned in 
favor of a single solution, with the help of the Kantian philosopher Hugo 
Marcus (1880–1966), Abdullah founded the dmg. The initiative attracted a 
peculiar segment of Berlin society; in its early stages liberals, pacifists, and 
Nazi sympathizers mingled in a common search for a religious modernity that 
befitted the present age. From their contributions to the Moslemische Revue, 
the search seemed to have been truly open-minded, including orientalism, the 
meeting of “East” and “West,” pacifism, gestalt psychology, life reform, rational 
conduct, different outlines of “future man,” and an open sympathy with the 
newest Nazi reforms—notably hygiene and body culture (see below). Until 
1933, the dmg was also widely acknowledged publicly. An inter-religious entre-
preneur, Abdullah was repeatedly invited to speak before Catholic, theoso-
phist, and Jewish audiences.30 As an active pacifist, he visited international 
peace conferences and drew up questionnaires to bring out the peace poten-
tial of the different world religions.31
26 vr Sufi (April 1933).
27 Jamshid Behnam, “‘Iranshär’ and ‘Iranshär, Hosayn Kazemzada,’” in Encyclopedia Iranica 
(2006), 13:535–536, 537–539.
28 Moslemische Revue, issue 3 (1933); issue 3–4 (1935); issue 2 (1936); cf. Jonker, Missionising 
Europe.
29 Salomon, Der Fragebogen, 242.
30 AMA/Interwar, 4.
31 AMA/Interwar, 5; 12–13.
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In 1933, Muhammed Ali, president of the aaii, assessed the political land-
slide in Germany, and came up with a positive result:
We welcome the new regime in Germany as it favors the simpler princi-
ples of life which Islam inculcates. Islam’s great contribution to the civili-
zation of the world is its solution of the wealth problem and the sex 
problem.…. So far [as] we can see, Germany under the new regime is 
tackling both the wealth and the sex problem in an Islamic spirit, and 
there is every hope that in the future the whole of Europe would follow in 
its wake….32
Thus fortified, the dmg continued to study and to single out aspects of 
European modernity. On the surface, nothing changed.
However, in 1935 the dmg shed the last of its liberal and pacifist members, 
among them the philosopher Marcus, a former Jew who had played a major 
role in shaping the religious search. After repeatedly receiving accusations 
from igb members that the dmg “shelter[ed] communists and Jews,” Abdullah 
wrote to the Foreign Office to introduce a new dmg board. His enumeration 
of the party membership reads like a directory of main Nazi organizations: 
“Our president Mr Boosfeld is [a] member in the Opfer-Kreis für die 
Nationalsozialistische Partei; our second secretary Dr Klopp von Hofe is [a] 
member of the nsdap and the ss; the treasurer Mr Schubert is [a] member of 
the Arbeitsfront, and the first assessor, Mr Beier is member of the nsdap.”33
About the same time a man called Habibur Rahman (1901–?) appeared on 
the scene, incorporating the novel kind of leadership that Nazi politics allowed. 
Rahman was an Indian Muslim and comrade-in-arms of the future founder of 
independent India, Subha Chandras Bose.34 He was already studying in Berlin 
when Abdul Jabbar Kheiri set up the igb,35 but for a long time he remained 
invisible on the organizational level. In 1936, Rahman revived the igb, which 
32 Moslemische Revue 2–3 (1934): 45–46; ama/Interwar, 5.
33 AA/3 (31 August 1936). nsdap = Opfer-Kreis für die National-Sozialistische Deutsche Partei 
(“Circle of Victims of the National Socialist German Party”). The nsdap was founded in 
1920; it engaged in anti-Semitism and street terror, and soon attempted a coup under the 
leadership of Adolf Hitler. Members who were imprisoned on account of this coup later 
acquired the status of victim; ss = Schutzstaffel der nsdap (“Protective Arm of the 
nsdap”); Arbeitsfront (“German Work Front”). The latter was founded in 1933, a few days 
after the annihilation of the trade unions.
34 AA/3 (20 March 1936); Jan Kuhlmann, Subhas Chandra Bose und die Indienpolitik der 
Achsenmächte Zeitgeschichte (Berlin: Verlag Hans Schiler, 2003), 343.
35 vr igb: 7–8.
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had been inactive after Kheiri’s departure, and acted as its secretary general 
until, in 1938, he was elected president.36 Two years later he was also elected 
president of the Islam Institute, thus uniting the two organizations under one 
umbrella.37
Profiting from a political atmosphere that encouraged denunciation, 
Rahman made ample use of it to reach his goals. Between 1935 and 1939, he 
wrote many letters to the Foreign Office and major Arab and Indian dailies in 
which he denounced the Ahmadiyya for performing an “unscrupulous mis-
sion” and fostering “criminal, communist, and Jewish elements.”38 Rahman 
also tried to incriminate the Ahmadiyya missionary Abdullah whenever he 
could, claiming that the latter played tennis with his wife when “normal” 
Muslims were praying, that Abdullah sold pork, and had illicit contacts with 
German women.39 Rahman’s missionary activity was limited to damaging the 
Ahmadiyya successes. Continuing Tschelebi’s approach to converts, he also 
further restricted conditions on those who wanted to embrace Islam (see 
below).
Habibur Rahman strove for acknowledgment as the main Muslim represen-
tative vis-à-vis the Nazi regime. Although he closely cooperated the Mufti of 
Jerusalem Amin al-Husseini, who was favored by the Nazis, his own role in the 
war remained minor.40 Politically, Rahman seems to have embraced a mix of 
nationalist and pan-Islamist positions, and, like so many others around him, 
exchanged communism for fascism in response to the Nazi pressure.
 Converts to Different Muslim Modernities
The mission advances of Abdul Jabbar Kheiri, head of the igb, and those of 
Sadr-ud-Din, head of the Ahmadiyya mission, drew very different crowds; 
these differences continued to deepen as their places were taken by Habibur 
Rahman and S.M. Abdullah. Only three of Kheiri’s converts, Albert Seiler, 
Khalid Banning, and Maria Hesselbach switched to the Ahmadiyya, while only 
36 vr igb: 184–199.
37 vr iib: 1939.
38 AA/4 (22 March 1937).
39 AA/4 (Aug.-Sept. 1936).
40 In 1936, Hafiz Abdul Rahman Peshawari, leader of the Afghan pan-Islamist movement, 
warned the Foreign Office against him, stating that Rahman was “a Luna park dancer and 
a communist” (AA/4: 20 March 1936). Spotting him as a troublemaker and denunciator, 
the Foreign Office kept its distance (AA/4: 1936, et passim). Rahman ended up working in 
the war propaganda department.
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one new Muslim from the ranks of the Ahmadiyya (Georg Konieczny) joined 
the igb. The majority of the two convert circles kept their distance from each 
other. As we saw, the main distinction between the two mission approaches 
was in their position on British India, where the progress of Islam and the bet-
terment of the political situation were interlinked. The very different solutions 
each put forward—world revolution versus individual progress—had differ-
ent implications for the modernization of the world and the place of the 
German Muslims therein. To this, converts added their own distinctions. 
Whereas the igb attracted the student generation born after 1900, the 
Ahmadiyya appealed to members of the upper middle class, many of whom 
were born in the last decades of the nineteenth century. In the aftermath of the 
war, the former age group was branded “Generation 1902” because it was too 
young to have experienced the front line and consequently could not claim 
heroic deeds; while the latter had fought in the trenches of northern France 
and Galicia, an experience that had utterly destabilized their lives. In this sec-
tion, we encounter the two age groups at several intersections of their time 
line, and seek to understand how they experimented with religion in order to 
remedy their needs in ways that modernity allowed for.
 igb—Islamia—Islam Institute
Among the young who felt attracted to Kheiri’s revolutionary message were 
students and artists trying to escape the German isolation that was developing; 
they were critical of western civilization, dared to articulate anti-war views, 
and to all appearances felt thrilled to join a non-European international move-
ment. From the scant biographies that remain, one gains the impression that 
for them, joining Islam first of all implied joining the anti-colonial struggle in 
support of the liberation movements in North Africa and British India. Some 
fifty German and Eastern European students, flanked by a few of the older gen-
eration, first joined the igb, then regrouped in the student organization 
Islamia, then finally broke away from Kheiri in 1927 by setting up the Islam 
Institute. Who were they?
At the height of Abdul Jabbar Kheiri’s quarrel with the Islamia,41 he released 
a list of active igb members,42 and acccused German Muslims especially of 
41 The list features a mix of Muslim émigrés and new Muslims and numbers 163 members, a 
quarter of whom had European names. In the ensuing correspondence ten additional 
new Muslims were included. Some of the known members however, notably the women 
of converted couples, are never mentioned.
42 vr igb: 159–64.
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communism and “frequent contacts with Moscow.”43 In these correspon-
dences, the reader encounters a string of German Muslims: Dr H. ‘Khalid’ 
Banning, Ewald Brendel, Helene Bosner, Anton Dybe, Adelheid Cappelle, 
Albert Fischer, Dr Käthe Göritz, Friedrich ‘Hassan’ Heinze, Erna ‘Hedije’ 
Hoeftmann, Walther ‘Hassan’ Hoffmann, Bruno Kramer, Hans ‘Ali’ Knofke, 
Erwin ‘Hossein’ Neumann, Bruno Richter, Elsa Schiemann, Hermann Schulz, 
Albert ‘Chalid’ Seiler, Werner Voigt, Ulla Westermann, and others.44 Across the 
sources, we count at least two artists and painters (Bruno Richter, Elsa 
Schiemann), two publishers and art printers (Anton Dybe, Albert Seiler), and a 
string of dissertation students. Käthe Göritz, Werner Voigt, and Erwin Neumann 
deposited their dissertations in the Berlin National Library. Erna Hoeftmann, 
Albert Seiler, and Bruno Richter were affiliated with the university Institute of 
Oriental Studies.45 Some can be traced throughout the records of interwar 
Islam, notably Walther Hoffmann, Bruno Richter, and Albert Seiler, who never 
tired of novel attempts to re-shape the Berlin Muslim community. Of this cir-
cle, only Anton Dybeand Georg Konieczny re-emerged after the war to help 
restore Muslim life in Germany.46
The list features only two well known names, that of Leopold Weiss/
Muhammed Asad (1900–1982) and Lev Nussimbaum/Esad Bey (1905–1942).47 
Raised in different Jewish milieus—Weiss in Lemberg, Nussimbaum in Kiev or 
Baku48—both arrived in Berlin with the first waves of Russian refugees. They 
arrived with nothing, took up oriental studies, and eventually became journal-
ists with an oriental assignment. Both embraced Islam, but it seems that they 
43 AA/2 (17 Dec. 1928).
44 After Kheiri quarreled with the Islamia, he wrote adopted Muslim names in parentheses 
only.
45 vr sos: 53, 57.
46 Mohammed A. Hobohm, Neuanfänge muslimischen Gemeindelebens nachdem Krieg, 
2000.
47 Günther Windhager, Leopold Weiss alias Muhammad Assad (Wien: Böhlau, 2003); Tom 
Reiss, Der Orientalist. Auf den Spuren von Esad Bey (Berlin: Osburg Verlag, 2008); Gerhard 
Höpp, Moh. Esad Bey: Nur Orient für Europäer? (unpublished ms), 1995; Gerhard Höpp. 
“Noussimbaum wird Essad Bey. Annäherung an eine Biographie zwischen den Kulturen,” 
Moslemische Revue (1996): 18–26.
48 In his first book Oil and Blood in the Orient (1928), Nussimbaum poses as the heir to an old 
Azerbaijani Muslim oil dynasty in Baku. But in 2009, Fuhrmann, himself an economist 
with Azerbaijani specialization, claimed to be in possession of Nussimbaums’ birth cer-
tificate from a Kiev synagogue. For reasons of his own, he did not publish this document. 
Fuhrmann did publish an internal report of the German Secret Service (Gestapo), which 
in 1935 had arrived at the same conclusion (www.essadbey.de).
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had very different reasons. Thirty years later, Weiss describes in his autobiogra-
phy his conversion experience, an intense moment in which he rejected west-
ern civilization, in which he suddenly “saw” the lack of fulfillment and the 
unhappiness of the wealthy Berliners sitting next to him in the U-Bahn.49 In 
very different fashion, Nussimbaum experimented with an exotic sounding 
name, weaving a fable of his oriental origin as he went along. Originally, he 
seems to have made a living in the Romanische Café, where he recited oriental 
stories in appropriate garb to the assembled bohemia.50 Later on, he outright 
denied his conversion, and claimed to be the offspring of a Azerbaijani Muslim 
oil millionaire in Baku, and a Russian bolshevist mother who happened to be 
imprisoned in that city at the time of marriage.51
Weiss/Asad and Nussimbaum/Esad Bey were migrants from Eastern Europe. 
Scrutinizing Kheiri’s list, it seems that other Eastern Europeans accompanied 
them. The reader meets with Helene Adas, Ewald Brendel, Albert Ceasar 
Czernikow, Viktor Glikin, Leon Jekelzewitz, Arpad Jerenzz, Diodor Kopinski, 
Leowar Mirimanian, Melly Podleschewsky, Paul Warkoicz, and Eugenie 
Woranoff, none of whose lives could be reconstructed. Many of these family 
names can be traced to the passenger lists of steamers that left weekly for 
America. A survey through the North and South American Jewish communi-
ties suggests that many of them had Jewish roots as well.
Kheiri’s ambitious plans ultimately came to nothing. Isolated after a nasty 
dispute over the abolishment of the khalifate, he discontinued not only the 
mission journal but also the yearly igb gatherings.52 In the end, Nafi Tschelebi, 
the student leader of the Islam Institute, dethroned him. Tschelebi’s idea of 
Muslim modernization was not world revolution, but the laying of foundations 
for future Muslim nation states. Although accused of receiving money from 
Moscow,53 he nonetheless acquired the trust and cooperation of important 
German institutions, and in only a short period of time created the Islam 
Institute, the Islam Archive, two periodicals, and a closely-knit local network. 
Tschelebi managed to give a different focus to the development of Muslim 
modernity in Berlin. In their estimate of the political situation, the Foreign 
Office judged his circle “to have completely distanced itself from the ‘world 
49 Muhammad Asad, The Road to Mecca (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 174–177.
50 Reiss, Der Orientalist, 256.
51 Esad Bey. Öl und Blut im Orient. Meine Kindheit in Baku und meine haarsträubende Flucht 
durch den Kaukasus (Munich: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1930), 17; Wilfried Fuhrmann. 
Plagiat, Lüge oder Vertrauen? Wo ist Essad-Bey? Available online: www.essadbey.de.
52 Jonker, Missionising Europe.
53 AA/2 (17 Oct. 1928), 3.
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revolutionaries’ and their political-military illusions, which dominated the war 
and the post war period,” and decided that the time had come “to begin a fruit-
ful cooperation.”54
The Islam Institute indeed became an attractive place for many different 
people. The director of Das Seminar für orientalische Sprachen (Institute for 
Oriental Studies) at Berlin University, Prof. Kampffmeier and member of 
Parliament Julius Bachem sat on the board; Walther Hoffmann, Bruno Richter, 
and Georg Konieczny served as authors, editors, and printers of its periodicals. 
From the Middle East, Weiss/Asad and Nussimbaum/Esad Bey contributed 
articles; Erna Hedije Hoeftmann and Albert Chalid Seiler were commissioned 
to run a convert register and to “rethink the relationship between old and new 
Muslims.”55 With a view to the convert influx, this was a novel policy, and 
pointed towards restriction: “Inscribed in the register may be those who are 
able to give proof of exit from their former religious community and proof of 
entry to Islam.”56 The phrase dips into the sensitive subject of religious belong-
ing, revealing the fact that many new Muslims did not deem it necessary to exit 
from their former religious communities. Rather, as I discuss in the next sec-
tion, German religious seekers preferred to move from one religious commu-
nity to the next, without binding themselves.
Nonetheless, whereas many of the Muslim émigrés only stayed for the dura-
tion of their university study, German Muslims guaranteed continuity and 
durability for the community. There is no doubt that this circle served to 
anchor the Muslim community in Germany. They adopted the roles of naviga-
tor, cultural translator, and interpreter in the local framework and engaged in 
the transfer local knowledge. In contrast to Muslim émigrés, local Muslims 
knew all about the legal requirements and the political and societal expecta-
tions surrounding the founding of migrant organizations.
Khalid Banning, for instance, navigated the proceedings, which led to the 
foundation of the igb.57 Hoffmann, his wife Emina, Erna Hoeftmann, and 
Seiler supported Nafi Tschelebi in breaking away from the igb.58 Hoffmann 
even took it upon himself to file a complaint.59
54 AA/2 (17 Oct. 1928), 1.
55 Die Islamische Gegenwart. Monatszeitschrift für die Zeitgeschichte des Islam, ed. M. Nafi 
Tschelebi and Muhammed Hassan Hoffmann (Berlin, 1929), 1.
56 Die Islamische Gegenwart, 1.
57 vr igb: 8.
58 vr igb: 20.
59 vr igb: 58, 66–70, 79, 94–95, 104.
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In the mid-1930s, Hoffmann and Konieczny also supported the revival of the 
igb by Habibur Rahman. Hoffmann, a former communist, sat on the board. 
Secretary Konieczny signed his letters with “Heil Hitler!,”60 was active in differ-
ent Nazi organizations, and also acquired nsdap membership.61 Seiler, by then 
head of the dmg but equally supportive of the Islam Institute, pleaded for 
amalgamation with the igb, a suggestion the dmg board utterly rejected.62 For 
their part, Muslim émigrés increasingly considered German Muslims as insig-
nificant. When, on 27 May 1940 Rahman finally attempted to fuse the igb with 
the Islam Institute, thus creating the platform that was to be the official Muslim 
representative vis-à-vis the war ministries, none of them were invited any 
more.
 Ahmadiyya Lahore and the dmg
How can one recognize a convert? The answer to this question very much 
depends on how the act of conversion is defined. Over the last hundred years, 
sociologists of religion came up with many definitions, from “a radical change 
of consciousness in which the individual changes both his world view and his 
identity,” to “socially embedded happenings which are communicated through 
group belonging, narrations of the self and demonstrative acts.”63 For some, 
conversion is a communicative act, for others, it signals deep psychic change. 
For scholars who occupy themselves with boundary marking, converts are rad-
ical transgressors of cultural borders: they quit their traditional (religious) 
habitat in order to adopt the space of the other.64 Seen through this lens, bodily 
signs that broadcast one’s new solidarity seem to be a necessity: otherwise, 
how can the adopted community recognize that the newcomer is one of them?
Turning the pages of the Moslemische Revue, that necessity is utterly absent. 
Many Germans accepting Islam with the help of the Ahmadiyya missionaries 
published a photograph in this journal, which they labeled with their real or 
adopted names. In addition, some added a conversion narrative. Others wrote 
learned articles on aspects of Islam, in which the reader easily detects autobio-
graphical traces. In all, fifteen individual photographs were published. Some of 
60 vr igb: 1935.
61 Barch B: Nr.4831277.
62 vr dmg (Sept. 1938).
63 Detlev Pollack, “Was ist Konversion?” in Treten Sie ein! Treten Sie aus! Warum Menschen 
ihre Religion wechseln, ed. Hanno Loewy, et al. (Berlin: Parthas, 2012), 44.
64 Michele Lamont, “The Study of Boundaries Across the Social Sciences,” Annual Review of 
Sociology 28 (2002): 167–195.
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those portrayed appear alone, others with Sadr-ud-Din. Two newly wed cou-
ples pose in front of the mosque. One photograph portrays a whole family.
In line with the missionaries view that “becoming a Muslim does not require 
a transformation” (see above), those portrayed did not stress their transgres-
sions anywhere. They are neither adorned with ‘Islamic’ elements, nor do they 
dress up in any other special way. “Dr H. Khalid Banning,” for instance, looks 
very much like the public prosecutor he probably was (1924).65 Banning posed 
with “Muhammed Taufiq Killenger,” a gentleman with a military demeanor, 
described in an undated Ahmadiyya pamphlet from the 1930s as an adventurer 
who had served in different armies around the world, including the Hungarian, 
Austrian, Swiss, Dutch colonial, Venezuelan, and Ottoman armies.66 In 1938, he 
surfaces again as M.T. Killinger, enthusiastically welcoming the Nazi occupa-
tion of Sudetenland.67 During World War ii, already an old man, Killinger 
repeatedly offered his service to the ss, which eventually employed him as 
director of the ss imam training.68
In the next issue, we meet with very different characters. One calls himself 
“Konrad Giesel,” and holds a book in his hands, on which is written “With 
Islam, 1.X.1924.” We can identify him as Konrad Algermissen, a Roman-Catholic 
priest who during the 1920s published a series of sociological studies on differ-
ent religious “sects” with Giesel Verlag. His photograph evokes the German 
intellectual; in the accompanying analysis, “Thoughts on Community,” 
Algermissen enthuses about the community potential of Islam.69 In contrast, 
Hanns Lobauers’ photograph corroborates his self-description as a tormented 
Prussian officer who lost himself in the trenches.70 Only one of the ladies of 
this early period has wrapped herself in a kind of Indian cloth. The other two 
65 There is a Dr H. Banning in the 1924 Berlin address book who lived in the Wilmersdorf 
borough and practiced as a public prosecutor. Since most visitors of the Wilmersdorfer 
mosque lived within walking distance, there is fair chance he is the same one.
66 AA/5.
67 “Endlich sind wir im Reich!” (Finally we are in the Reich!), Moslemische Revue (1938), 94. 
For 1934, we find Fischer’s name on the dmg board, proof that for some time at least he 
was an active member.
68 Pieter Sjoerd van Koningsveld, “The Training of Imams by the Third Reich,” in The Study 
of Religion and the Training of Muslim Clergy in Europe: Academic and Religious Freedom 
in the 21th Century, ed. Willem B. Drees and Pieter Sjoerd van Koningsveld (Leiden: Leiden 
University Press, 2008), 348–368.
69 Moslemische Revue (1925): 25–28.
70 Moslemische Revue (1926): 34–38.
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present the image of well-dressed upper middle-class women with short hair, 
and wearing pearls.71
The pattern repeats itself in the portrayals of the early 1930s. “Saffiah Irma 
Gohl, stud. Phil.” commissioned an art photograph in which she poses as a 
modern German woman with a flowery band in her short hair (1931). In her 
conversion narrative Saffiah describes her religious quest as “a journey” past 
Buddha, Zoroaster, and Confucius, through the cliffs of Egyptology, Oriental 
Studies and Arab literature, until she finally encountered an Egyptian who 
became her spiritual mentor, and eventually her husband.72 In 1944, the two of 
them directed an inflammatory protest to the League of Nations, describing in 
detail the “havoc and ruin” caused by the Italian armies in Tripoli.73 Of all the 
German converts, she was the only one who engaged in resistance against the 
Nazi regime.
Also in 1931, the Moslemische Revue finally featured an oil painting of the 
founder of the dmg: “Dr Hamid Marcus, President of the Deutsch-Moslemische 
Gesellschafte.V.” We behold him in the typical posture of Germany’s poets and 
thinkers, outstretched fingers against his temple, books in the background, and 
a furrow between his brows.
In the scant remains of the interwar mosque archive his handwritten con-
version narrative, dated 1931, survived, and corroborates his self-conception as 
‘thinker.’74 Studies on conversion often stress that the blueprint of any conver-
sion narrative is a transformation from crisis to salvation, followed by the urge 
to give witness.75 Differently, but much in line with Ahmadiyya philosophy, 
Marcus stated that his journey to Islam was neither governed by crisis (like 
Lohbauer and other soldiers who served at the front), nor by a spiritual journey 
(like Gohl and others who used theosophy as a vehicle) but by continuation. As 
a philosophy student, he had embraced Kant, Nietzsche, and Spinoza and 
developed the philosophy of “mono-pluralism,” and thus created the founda-
tion of a severe kind of monotheism as he progressed. In this self-portrait he 
could therefore rightly stress that, while encountering Islam in the person of 
Sadr-ud-Din, he only re-discovered his philosophical roots.
Marcus also had Jewish roots, a fact that on the surface does not seem to 
have played a role in his writings. His biography still remains to be written, but 
71 Moslemische Revue, photographs preceding the 1924 and 1925 issues.
72 Moslemische Revue (1931): 56–59.
73 ama/Post-war: 2.
74 ama/Interwar: 7.
75 Andreas B. Kilcher, “Konversion als Erzählung,” in Treten Sie in! Treten Sie aus! Warum 
Menschen ihre Religion wechseln, ed. Hanno Loewy et al. (Berlin: Parthas, 2012), 50–64.
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from his many contributions to the Moslemische Revue it is already clear that 
this philosopher searched for a modern religious foundation, which had out-
grown the old religions, and from which could grow up as a “novel man.” 
“Where and who are the people for whom it is worth to (re-) shape the world 
into a paradise? Where are these people to whom belongs the future as we 
want it?” he asks in “Religion and Future Man,” to which he answers himself: 
“We will not find them, we will have to create them first.”76
In the last years of the Weimar Republic, Hugo Hamid Marcus truly was not 
the only one who raised this question. ‘Novel man,’ ‘novel leadership,’ and 
‘people of the future’ were the catchwords that governed the politics of the day, 
which appeared in a multitude of book titles and stood for visions of the future 
that ranged from modern to anti-modern, from liberal to conservative, from 
the far right to the far left.77
The difference between Marcus’ vision, as laid down in his writings for the 
Moslemische Revue, and the solution that in 1933 forced its way to political 
power, must be sought in the open-minded curiosity with which this philoso-
pher tried to bridge not only East and West, Christianity and Islam, but also 
left- and right-wing ideologies. Marcus, himself born in 1880 and a veteran of 
the Great War, believed in the creative powers of a young generation that had 
been molded by a religion that embraced rationality as well as modernity, 
practical humanitarianism as well as spirituality. From his writings it becomes 
clear that this could only be Islam.
But creating the “future man” was still very much a work in progress, its 
result open-ended. For the moment it led to very different profiles. Returning 
to the photo gallery displayed on the pages of the Moslemische Revue, two men 
of that young and coming generation still need to be highlighted. At the time, 
they seemed to incorporate the ideal Marcus envisioned.
One year after Marcus’ publication, Rolf von Ehrenfels, born in 1901 in 
Prague, son of the gestalt therapist Christian Baron von Ehrenfels, at home in 
the literary and bohemian circles of Vienna, Prague, and Budapest, answered 
with “Islam and the Young Generation in Europe.”78 Positioning himself as a 
man of the future, von Ehrenfels drew a parallel between Islam and certain 
aspects of the European Lebensreform (life reform). Among others, he 
addressed erotic communication, respect for the earth, the ways in which peo-
76 Moslemische Revue (1930): 66.
77 Friedbert Aspetsberger, ‘Arnolt Bronnen.’ Biografie (Wien/Köln/Wiemar: Böhlau Verlag, 
1995), 412; Maser, Adolf Hitler, 315–316; Kurt Hiller, Leben gegen die Zeit. Erinnerungen 
(Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1969), 218 f.
78 Moslemische Revue (1931): 81–91.
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Figure 2.1 Hugo Hamid Marcus (1929). 
Moslemische Revue 1 (1931), p. 1
Courtesy Nasir Ahmad
Figure 2.3 
Faruq H. Fischer (1934). Moslemische Revue 2 (1934), p. 1
Courtesy Nasir Ahmad
Figure 2.2 Rolf Umar Ehrenfels (1926). 
In: photo album “Mosque & 
Friends”, Oettinger Archive 
Courtesy Suhail Ahmad
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ple greet each other, dress themselves, and shape their house interiors, and 
thereby create a framework in which they live and communicate. Islam, he 
concluded, is modern because it possesses the potential to shape life in ways 
that are recognized as progressive in Europe. In 1931 von Ehrenfels was not yet 
an anthropologist, but the theory behind the article points to the future; it was 
already his conjecture that material frameworks shape and direct human com-
munication and experience. In a typical fashion, von Ehrenfels’ own encoun-
ter, which made him decide to embrace Islam in the first place, was an intensive 
experience of mosque architecture that resulted in a thick description that 
betrays the influence of gestalt therapy.79
Although von Ehrenfels was appointed co-editor of the Moslemische Revue 
and wrote several articles for the journal, he never published his photograph. 
We only know his contemporary face from his journey to Lahore in 1933, when 
he met with figures from the Ahmadiyya mother organization, and from some 
earlier photographs published in the Nussimbaum biography.80
Some years later, the editors of the Moslemische Revue thought to recognize 
another “future man” in the popular author “Faruq H. Fischer.” Invited to pres-
ent a piece on the occasion of the ten-year celebration, they announced him as 
“the well-known author, one of the youngest Europeans who have gladly 
embraced Islam”81 The accompanying photograph bears the traits of a sleek 
and calculating Nazi youth; his name can be traced to Hans Fischer who, in 
1932 and 1933, was one of the up-and-coming young men of popular Nazi ideol-
ogy. His many theater plays, advertised with titles like Jung Deutschland voran 
(“Young Germany to the fore”), Deutschland’s Morgenrot entflammt! (“Germany’s 
dawn ignites!”), or Heb’ deine Flügel, deutscher Adler…(“Raise your wings, 
German eagle…”) are full of blood and earth symbols and ugly examples of 
anti-Semitism, which he employed for comic effect.
What did this “future man” write for the Moslemische Revue? His contribu-
tion was titled “Does Islam ‘lack modernity’?—A parallel between the old reli-
gion and Europe of the present.”82 In its pages, Fischer, like von Ehrenfels, sets 
off to find parallels between Islam and examples of modern European-ness but 
unlike von Ehrenfels, in Fischer’s world ‘modern’ is everything that Nazi ideol-
ogy stands for: Islam forbids alcohol? No problem! “The Führer of the German 
79 Moslemische Revue (1930): 98–105.
80 Reiss, Der Orientalist, 363.
81 Moslemische Revue (1934): 62. For 1934, we find Fischer’s name on the dmg board, proof 
that for some time at least he was an active member.
82 Moslemisch Revue (1934): 62–73.
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people does not take one single drop!”83 or, “Does Islam lack progress? Certainly 
not! Europe adopts more and more Islamic thought.”84 Instead of intellect and 
liberalism, Fischer writes, Nazism propagates hygiene, sports, and attachment 
to the earth; instead of individualism, it cultivates group experience.85 To 
Fischer, this is what Islam is all about: “Not modern? Never! Not civilized? 
Never! Otherwise, our statesmen would not act in an Islamic way. Are you not 
modern? Am I perhaps not modern?”86
 Shaping Religious Modernity
From our visit to the photo gallery of the Ahmadiyya mission journal, it 
becomes clear that ‘their’ new Muslims did not adopt any visible Islamic attri-
butes because, first, it was the Ahmadiyya view that “becoming a Muslim does 
not require a transformation,” and second, because the Germans thought that 
their entry necessitated a range of changes for Islam as a matter of course. For 
the circle of Muslim émigrés who gathered in the igb, the German enthusiasm 
to join Islam thus acquired an uncomfortable edge. In their view, the way con-
verts in the Ahmadiyya mosque communicated about Islam and the courses to 
progress they suggested, were not only unrecognizable to ‘real’ Muslims, but 
they should be downright rejected.
Early in 1937, Habibur Rahman sent a 10-page paper to the Foreign Office in 
which he once again summarized his grievances against the Ahmadiyya.87 
The Ahmadiyya, he states, present a serious disturbance in Berlin, not only 
because they possess the only mosque but also because the ways in which 
they shape Islamic communication angers igb Muslims to the extent that 
they refuse to pray there. “Disturbing” is the “shameless, indiscriminate mis-
sion activity,” which attracts “criminal elements such as Jewish and commu-
nist agitators.”88 By way of solution, Rahman suggests that the influx of 
converts should be strictly controlled, and that this control should be based 
on the rules already laid down in the renewed founding protocol of the igb.89 
This document stipulates that converts should not only give written proof of 
83 Moslemisch Revue (1934): 67.
84 Moslemisch Revue (1934): 71.
85 Ibid.
86 Moslemisch Revue (1934): 73.
87 AA/4 (22 March 1937): 1.
88 Ibid., 7–8.
89 AA/4 (10 July 1936), protocol in attachment.
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their exit from their former communities and their entries into the Muslim 
community, as Tschelebi already decreed, but they must also prove “flawless 
conduct for a period of two years,” give “written consent to adopt a Muslim 
name,” and establish “serious attempts to acquire one of the oriental 
languages.”90
Why did Rahman bear down on converts in a manner that seems designed 
to prevent them from becoming Muslim at all? Despite the tirade of hate with 
which the author attacked his opponent, despite his obvious desire to obtain 
the mosque, there is an element in this text that touches upon the very nature 
of religious renewal itself.
In an article headed “We Require a Mosque in Berlin,” appearing some 
weeks later in The Star of India, he or one of his circle explained the rationale 
behind his statement. For example, the author deplores the sense of foreign-
ness one may feel when visiting the discussion circle in the Ahmadiyya mosque, 
and when participating in prayer he even detects something decidedly 
un-Islamic:
If (…) a Muslim pays a visit to one of the conferences which are held on 
Friday evening in the mosque or in the house of the Imam, he will prob-
ably find there a Christian lady or gentleman delivering a speech about 
beautiful landscapes in foreign countries, about the political situation in 
India, about Persian Poets and all sorts and kinds of subjects of more or 
less general interest. Real Islamic instructions and information are hardly 
ever given and if so, the subject will mostly serve to cover up the differ-
ence between Islam and Christianity.91
Partaking in the Friday prayer presents another shock: “To take part at the con-
gregational Friday Prayer is impossible for an orthodox Muslim…. The few 
Muslims see themselves, during the prayer, surrounded by a crowd of non-
Muslims, sitting on benches and watching ‘the performance.’”92
This, the author concludes, cannot be true Islam. These performances defi-
nitely give a false impression of what real Islam was about: “Under those circum-
stances, the Berlin mosque…can never be the center of the Muslim community.”93
Whoever wrote this article certainly had been an intimate observer of the 
comings and goings in the Ahmadiyya mosque and mission house. However, in 
90 Ibid.
91 AA/4 (21 April 1937). Newspaper clipping in attachment.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
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contrast to the move toward modernization, which both Europe and the 
Muslim world overwhelmingly desired, Habibur Rahman and those around 
him seem to have held up a frozen, timeless image of Islam, which they ‘knew’ 
by right of birth. Acting along the lines of purity and danger (Mary Douglas), 
this circle set out to re-draw its borders without even discussing their views 
openly. At least we do not find any evidence of such discussions among the 
many comments on lectures held in the mosque. Rahman’s main instrument 
of communication exhausted itself in a rhetoric of hate, of which many 
instances survive.
Unfortunately the times were propitious for him. Muslim émigrés in Berlin 
who suspected converts of eroding ‘their’ religion expected Nazis to support 
them. But their extensive cooperation during the war falls outside the scope of 
this contribution; this is treated elsewhere.94
There exists a group photograph in the Moslemische Revue, dating 1936, in 
which we see the dmg community listening to a sermon in the mosque.95 The 
viewer beholds European men and women sitting on wooden chairs in close 
proximity to one another. Although it seems to be cold and the congregation 
huddles in winter coats, many of the women are bare headed, as are the men. 
In front of the pulpit one catches a glimpse of two men in Arab headgear sit-
ting on the floor. Is this what our author is talking about? On close inspection, 
the congregation gives a vaguely Lutheran impression but there is also no 
doubt that these are Muslims celebrating the annual Eid festival. What can be 
seen then is an instance of modern Muslim ritual communication. It is but one 
instance of the bridge the Ahmadiyya tried to build between East and West, 
Christianity and Islam, between the need for modernization in the Muslim 
world and European visions of progress and of the “future man.”
 Conclusion
Religion is not a primordial entity thrown into the world from outer space. In 
the eyes of its adherents it may be inspired, even ruled by divine power. But the 
ways in which this inspiration takes form is entirely a matter of human creativ-
ity. Every religion has appeared in a specific societal setting, creating a tradi-
tion that shaped social communication, and in its turn was shaped by society. 
As societies change, reform and renewal of that tradition constitute a neces-
sary and never-finished task.
94 Jonker, Missionising Europe.
95 Moslemische Revue (1936): 1.
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In this contribution I have shown that in Berlin Muslim missionaries from 
British India fostered different ideas of how to modernize their home country; 
they envisioned a struggle that involved the modernization of Islam as a cen-
tral feature and they invited the Germans to join in this effort. In the early 
1920s, when revolutionary movements still held Germany in their grip, Kheiri’s 
invitation to ‘world revolution’ attracted a circle of German and eastern 
European students, intellectuals, and artists. In a very different fashion, Sadr-
ud-Din approached modernization from the viewpoint of personal progress: 
all the German seekers had to do was find the ‘right’ roots in themselves.
But missionaries were not alone in searching for change. Between the Great 
War and the chaos that engulfed the world in 1939, many Germans also desper-
ately groped for ideas that would allow them to help shape the future in ways 
they deemed appropriate, in ways that utilized pacifism, that would bring prog-
ress, bridge the East and West, and represent a meeting of minds, foster per-
sonal well-being, and provide for peoplesʼ spiritual needs. Borrowing from, even 
transgressing on other religions was only one means to this end. Such Germans 
considered “being modern” a method of achieving personal progress and a 
shield against all those who wanted to turn back the clock and re-establish the 
traditions and power structures of a bygone age.
In the tumultuous years at the end of the Weimar era, when an aggressive 
authoritarian form of modernity took hold of the masses, this “religious mar-
ket” was put to the test. It was not only the Indian Muslims in Berlin; the Arab, 
Afghan, and Tatar Muslims were also focused on reforming their homelands 
and making them politically independent. Islam was assigned very different 
roles in that process. The Muslim émigrés who gathered in the igb perceived 
their religion as something that bonded them together, but which did not nec-
essarily call for outward change. By siding with the Nazi regime in an attempt 
to gain power, the igb even tried to ward off renewal and withdrew to a pri-
mordial vision of ‘pure Islam.’
In contrast, Ahmadiyya Muslims tried to build a bridge between different 
cultural traditions with the aim of fertilizing and reforming both Christianity 
and Islam. In the interwar years this was their hallmark of religious modernity. 
Acting in a political constellation in which missionaries and converts 
embraced personal progress as the essence of modernity, conversion itself 
became a two-way process. And herein lies the meaning of Ahmadiyya activity 
for European (trans)cultural history: In their attempt to cross the gulf between 
East and West, missionaries smoothed the way, borrowing from, and adapting 
to western thought wherever it was of use. By paralleling religious with intel-
lectual exchange, missionaries allowed their converts to adapt Islamʼs foreign 
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knowledge, ritual, and moral traditions to more familiar patterns. What they 
shared, their common ground so to speak, was a taste for experiment. In a 
joint effort, missionaries and converts created a totally different image of 
Islam, one in which Germans marveled and in which they were able to find 
consolation.
In retrospect, Muhammed Ali’s welcome of the new regime in 1933 because 
of its “tackling the wealth and sex problem” may sound naïve in the face of the 
violence that followed. But how was he to know? Did the dmg realize it was 
playing with fire? Individual members continued to believe that European 
civilization would be changed by re-modeling the self and shaping a Muslim 
“future man”; this was a vision strong enough to keep liberals, fascists, and 
Jews assembled under one roof. The bond lasted until the Nazi element took 
over in 1935. Taking this into account, the interaction between Muslim mis-
sionaries and their host society engendered fresh ideas and knowledge trans-
fers in many different directions. Modernization and progress were the key 
words around which communication circulated; converts who had sur-
mounted cultural borders simply continued to pursue these central notions in 
their search for salvation. Muslims like Habibur Rahman, who clung to a pri-
mordial image of religion, probably never noticed the momentum and urgency 
of their quest.
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chapter 3
Salafiyya, Ahmadiyya, and European Converts  
to Islam in the Interwar Period
Umar Ryad
Introduction
The religious conflict between the Ahmadiyya Muslims and so-called “main-
stream” Islam is as old as the establishment of this movement in India by Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908) in the late nineteenth century. The heated debates 
that took place between the Ahmadis and other Muslims included both theo-
logical and political issues, such as the seal of the prophecy of the Prophet 
Muḥammed, the claim that Ghulam Ahmad was the Promised Messiah, and 
the “collaboration” of the Ahmadiyya with British colonial authorities.1 In the 
interwar period the Ahmadiyya occupied a pioneering place as a Muslim mis-
sionary movement in Europe; they established mosques, printed missionary 
publications in a variety of European languages, and attracted many European 
converts to Islam. These converts played prominent trans-local, as well as 
transnational and transcultural roles in the development of modern Islamic 
thought in that era. Their new link with Islam should be seen as ingrained in 
the zeitgeist that inspired a few rich, mostly well-educated Europeans to adopt 
Islam as a new faith as a result of their search for spiritual pathways beyond 
their original culture and beliefs. In England, France, and Germany, many 
European converts became zealous in spreading Islam in Europe.2
The success of Ahmadiyya missionary work in interwar Europe reached the 
Muslim world and caused huge controversies among Muslim scholars, espe-
cially within the so-called Salafī reformist movement led by the well-known 
Muslim reformist scholar Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (1865–1935) and popular-
ized in his journal al-Manār [The lighthouse, 1898–1935]. We place these writ-
ers under the rubric “Salafiyya” because they approached Islam in the modern 
age by means of a reformist call to return to the early salaf (forefathers). 
1 See, for example, H. Hanson, “Jihad and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community: Nonviolent 
Efforts to Promote Islam in the Contemporary World,” Nova Religio 11, no. 2 (2007): 77–93; 
Spencer Lavan, “Polemics and Conflict in Ahmadiyya History: The ʿUlema, the Missionaries, 
and the British (1898),” Muslim World 62, no. 3 (1972): 283–303.
2 Nathalie Clayer and Eric Germain (eds.), Islam in Interwar Europe (London: Hurst, 2008), 8–9.
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Although these Salafī groups had sectarian differences with the Ahmadiyya, 
there were also commonalities in terms of their discourse on Islamic reform 
and modernity. Amid these Salafī-Ahmadi doctrinal and sectarian divisions, 
news about the Ahmadiyya success in propagating Islam reached these circles 
(especially in Egypt) and put these Salafī writers in a quandary between their 
uncompromising sectarian differences with the Ahmadiyya and their desire to 
welcome the Ahmadiyyaʼs success in converting Europeans to Islam.
Most of these Salafī writers were aware of the split within the Ahmadiyya 
movement, and that most of the work in Europe was achieved by the 
Ahmadiyya Anjuman-i Isha’at-i Islam (Ahmadiyya Society for the Propagation 
of Islam) under the leadership of Mawlana Muḥammad ʿAlī (1874–1951). 
Muḥammad ʿAlī was a sincere follower of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and affirmed 
his position as a mujaddid (reformer), but not as a “Promised Mahdi or 
Messiah.” Others also took this position: the Lahore mission in London, for 
example, was keen on distinguishing themselves from the Qadiyani branch of 
the Ahmadiyya led by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s son in Qadiyan, who insisted 
that his father was the “Promised Messiah.”
The historical role of the Ahmadiyya in the interwar period has been stud-
ied from the perspective of their local activities in Muslim communities in 
Europe. For example, the Woking Mission and mosque in South West London 
(established in 1914) became a “symbolic and organizational centrality in the 
inter-war period for British Islam,”3 when its first leader, the well-known 
Muslim lawyer Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din (1870–1932) set up a literary trust to pub-
lish their magazine and other missionary tracts.4 Through this mission, Islam 
appealed to many British figures, such as Baron Lord Headley (1855–1955) who 
founded the British Muslim Society in 1914, and Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1872–1953), 
a well-known translator of the Qurʾān, to name just a few.5 In April 1925, a 
“Lahori” mosque (i.e., aligned with the main Ahmadiyya) which was closely 
connected to the Woking mosque was established in Berlin.6 In 1924, the foun-
dation stone for a Qadiyani mosque was laid in the Southfields suburb of 
London; the mosque was officially inaugurated in 1926. The Woking and 
Southfields mosques approached their propaganda in similar ways. In 
3 See, K. Humayun Ansari, “The Woking Mosque: A Case Study of Muslim Engagement with 
British Society since 1889,” Immigrants & Minorities 21, no. 3 (2002), 7.
4 Eric Germain, “The First Muslim Mission on a European Scale: Ahmadi-Lahori Networks in 
the Interwar Period,” in Islam in Inter-War Europe, ed. Nathalie Clayer and Eric Germain 
(London: C. Hurst & Co., 2008), 89–91.
5 Ansari, “The Woking Mosque,” 8.
6 See Gerdien Jonker’s chapter in this volume.
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Germain’s view, at the grassroots level the boundary between the two branches 
of the Ahmadiyya was somehow blurrred. Despite their competition, the 
Qadiyani mosque advertised the activities of the Lahori, and their newspapers 
had subscribers in common. In London, some people attended religious cele-
brations in Woking as well as in Southfields. This confusion was probably more 
convenient for the Qadiyani branch, since their work was still beginning in 
Europe.7
To a certain extent, the faith of the Lahore group in Ghulam Ahmad as a 
reformer made them less controversial than the Qadiyanis in some Salafī 
groups. It should be also emphasized that the Lahori Ahmadiyya missionaries 
in interwar Europe tried to down play these sectarian conflicts by adapting 
their message to their audiences in Europe on the one hand, and by seeking 
ways to present a positive image of themselves and their work in Europe 
to the Muslim public outside Europe. In 1929 James Thayer Addison described 
the Lahore group as more clever than sincere with regard to their origin, since 
they were
reluctant to admit any connection with the Ahmadiyya movement. Its 
leaders, especially in England, are eager to adapt their message to the 
convictions or the fashions of the present hour and to exploit the igno-
rance of their audience by making any assertions that will favor their 
cause. Intellectually more acceptable than the Qadiani, they inspire less 
respect, for one usually prefers the naive and narrow-minded to the 
sophisticated and slippery.8
In his well-documented work on British converts in the period from 1850 to 
1950, Jamie Gilham gives a few local examples how British converts to Islam, 
who were engaged in the Ahmadiyya circles, reacted to sectarianism during 
that period. After World War I, early British converts repeatedly confirmed in 
their writings that the Ahmadiyya mission was part of the wider umma; but 
tensions about the Ahmadiyya differences and leadership began to appear 
again throughout 1930s.9 Around the same time, these conflicts reached the 
Muslim world. In addition to their involvement in the Ahmadiyya mission, dur-
ing the interwar period European converts were active in a wider pan-Islamic 
7 Germain, “The First,” 102–103.
8 James Thayer Addison, “The Ahmadiya Movement and Its Western Propaganda,” Harvard 
Theological Review 22, no. 1 (January 1929), 1.
9 Jamie Gilham, Loyal Enemies: British Converts to Islam 1850–1950 (London: Hurst, 2014), 
200–205.
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Salafī network of associates, both inside and outside Europe. In particular, they 
took part in missionary work, in the translation movement of the Qurʾān in 
Europe, and in the Muslim intellectual and religious debates of that time. By 
such “transnational” connections, European converts were intermediaries, 
playing an “in-between” role between the European and Muslim cultures on 
the one hand, and between the Salafī reformist and the Ahmadiyya groups on 
the other. A deeper historical reading of these connections shows that despite 
their religious dissonance, the Ahmadiyya achievements in Europe and in rela-
tion to European converts created specific contact zones.
The position of European converts to Islam in the Salafī-Ahmadiyya dis-
putes in the interwar period is remarkable. At the beginning of the 1930s, 
Muslim communities in India began an anti-Ahmadiyya campaign that 
included Ahmadiyya activities in Europe;10 the debates that were generated 
had wide repercussions in various regions in the Muslim world and Europe. It 
is not surprising, given their reformist and puritan understanding of Islam, 
that the Salafiyya movement, in Cairo in particular, led one of the most outspo-
ken anti-Ahmadiyya trends at the time. But, as we shall see, such negative atti-
tudes were not always homogenous. On the one hand, we find that these 
Muslim reformists harshly attacked the Ahmadiyya doctrines, particularly 
their pacifistic view of jihad in Islam, but often praised their daʿwa (mission-
ary) activities in Europe on the other. We can also argue that the context of 
Muslims in Europe and the roles played by European converts to Islam some-
times obliged pan-Islamic reformist groups in interwar Europe to recognize 
and sometimes cooperate with the Ahmadiyya in serving common Islamic 
objectives.
In order to form a detailed picture of these conflicts, we highlight the atti-
tudes of the Muslim reformist writers who contributed to Rashīd Riḍā’s journal 
al-Manār and to the magazine al-Fatḥ [The opening] founded by Riḍā’s con-
temporary Syrian writer and activist Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb (1886–1969). 
Al-Fatḥ, a weekly Islamic-oriented magazine, focused on the position of Islam 
and Muslim institutions in interwar Europe, especially on the work of European 
converts. Its editor can be considered among the Salafiyya because he sup-
ported the idea that Islam is not only restricted to ritual performance, but is a 
religion of “doctrine, worship, and rule.” The magazine worked towards the 
removal of any “heretical elements” in the body of Islam.11 After Riḍā’s death in 
10 Germain, “The First Muslim,” 103.
11 Amal N. Ghazar, “Power, Arabism and Islam in the Writings of Muhib ad-Din al-Khatib in 
al-Fatḥ,” Past Imperfect 6 (1997): 133–150 · Also see Nimrod Hurvitz, “Muhibb ad-Din 
al-Khatibʼs Semitic Wave Theory and Pan-Arabism,” Middle Eastern Studies 29, no. 1 (Jan. 
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1935, al-Fatḥ carried on Riḍā’s legacy of the Salafiyya and flourished as a mouth-
piece for many leading Salafī organizations and writers. However, as compared 
to Riḍā’s “intellectual” Salafīsm, al-Fatḥ carried this religious trend toward a 
more “populist” discourse. The activities of those European converts in their 
homelands were highlighted in a positive light by these journals in Egypt. 
Despite their adamant rejection of Ghulam Ahmad’s “heterodox” theology, 
Salafī writers appreciated the religious work of the Ahmadiyya in interwar 
Europe and the conversion of many Europeans to Islam.
 Al-Manār and European Converts
The conversion of European Christians to Islam was enthusiastically received 
by the early Salafiyya movement from the late nineteenth century on. They 
believed that Islam, unlike Christianity, could expand across the Muslim bor-
ders without any organized and collective missionary work. For example, 
Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849–1905), the mufti of Egypt and Riḍā’s mentor, had 
direct contact with the prominent British convert Hajj Abdullah Browne 
(d. 1907). ʿAbduh was impressed by Browne’s “sincere worship and prayers,” in 
English, which he found better than that of many who were born Muslim.12
Like ʿAbduh, Riḍā boasted about the conversion of Europeans to Islam. He 
saw their conversion as evidence of the failure of Christian missionary work in 
the Muslim world.13 He believed that most Muslims who abandoned Islam 
would never become real Christians, but rather turn into “atheists” or become 
antagonistic toward religion. Muslims mostly converted to Christianity out of 
poverty and need for financial support from missionaries, while in most cases 
western converts to Islam belonged to the elite classes in Europe.14
Riḍā was aware of the role of the Ahmadiyyaʼs Woking mosque in convert-
ing Britons. Despite his positive tone regarding their work in Britain, al-Manār’s 
strong anti-Ahmadiyya campaign never diminished. As early as 1901, Riḍā 
attacked Ghulam Ahmad for his claim to be a “shade for the Prophetic 
1993): 118–134; Catherine Mayeur-Jaouen, “Les débuts dʼune revue néo-salafiste: Muhibb 
al-Dîn al-Khatîb et Al-Fatḥ de 1926 à 1928,” Revue des mondes musulmans et de la 
Méditerranée, 95–98 (April 2002), available online: http://remmm.revues.org/234.
12 Umar Ryad, “Islamic Reformism and Great Britain: Rashid Riḍā’s Images as Reflected in 
the Journal al-Manār in Cairo,” Islam and Christian Muslim Relations 21, no. 3 (2010), 273.
13 Umar Ryad, Islamic Reformism and Christianity: A Critical Reading of the Works of 
Muhammad Rashid Riḍā and his Associates (1898–1935) (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 166–169; 
Ryad, “Islamic Reformism and Great Britain,” 271.
14 Ryad, Islamic Reformism and Christianity, 160, 168–170.
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miracle.”15 In response, Ghulam Ahmad depicted Riḍā as a “jealous” and “arro-
gant” scholar who, like many others, not only rejected the message, but fueled 
the dislike of Indian Muslims against him and his followers.16
15 See, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Iʿjāz al-masiḥ (Tilford, Surrey, uk: al-Shirkat al-Islamiyya 
Limited, 2011), 34; available online: http://www.islamahmadiyya.net/pdf/ijaz_maseeh 
_full.pdf (accessed 20 March 2014); Riḍā wrote this in a fatwā to a question sent to 
al-Manār by a certain Aḥmad Muḥammad al-Alfī, a local Shafiʿī scholar in the town of 
Tukh in northern Egypt. Al-Manār, 4, no. 12 (31 Aug. 1901), 460–468.
16 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, al-Hudā wa-l-tabṣira liman yarā (Tilford, Surrey, uk: al-Shirkat 
al-Islamiyya Limited, 2011); available online: http://www.islamahmadiyya.net/books2.
asp?book_key=67&magazine=0 (accessed 20 March 2014). also, al-Manār 5, no. 8 (22 July 
1902), 317–320; al-Manār 5 no. 10 (20 Aug. 1902), 398–399. Cf. al-Manār 23, no. 1 (Jan. 1922), 
33–35; al-Manār 31, no. 5 (Dec. 1930), 391–396; al-Manār 5, no. 19 (15 Jan. 1903), 789–791; 
also see al-Manār 24, no. 8 (Aug. 1923), 578–583; al-Manār 27, no. 1 (April 1926), 55–67. Also 
see the reactions of Mawlana Abu Wafa Sanaullah of Amritsar (1868–1948), one of the 
fiercest Indian opponents to Ghulam Ahmad, in al-Manār 27, no. 3 (June 1926), 238–239. 
Figure 3.1  Sheikh Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (1865–1935) in his Al-Manār Office in Cairo (Family 
archive in Cairo)
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 Cautious Appreciation: Lord Headley
Despite harsh critiques of Ahmadiyya doctrines, al-Manār, in some instances, 
hailed the conversions of Europeans to Islam in the Woking mosque. The 
above-mentioned Baron Lord Headley and his conversion occupied a promi-
nent place in al-Manār, despite Headley’s known close connection with the 
Ahmadis in London.
Yet Headley’s conversion was disputed in British society and Christian mis-
sionary circles, where it was seen as a form of “political Islam” because of his 
representation of Muslims in the House of Lords. Others claimed that he had 
not given up his former Christian beliefs completely, that in fact he maintained 
his faith in Jesus and his divine mission.17 Moreover, we know of two letters 
that Headley received from devout Christian friends who were shocked by his 
conversion to a religion “of sensuality and [in which] the Prophet had a great 
many wives.”18
Many journals in the Muslim world became interested in these disputes 
regarding Headley’s conversion to Islam. His response, “Why I became a 
Mohammedan,” was fully translated into Arabic and published by al-Manār. In 
this response, Headley argued that “Islam and Christianity as taught by Christ 
himself are sister religions, only held apart by dogmas and technicalities which 
might be very well be dispensed with.”19 In his comment on Headleyʼs article, 
Riḍā agreed with his “brother” Lord Headley that Islam is the Christianity 
which Jesus had called for. For Riḍā, Headley’s views resembled the response of 
Riḍā’s pan-Islamic predecessor Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī to the “failure” of 
Christian missions in India in the nineteenth-century when he said: “Islam is 
Christinaity with some additions.” Islam confirms the same monotheistic faith 
and ethics that Jesus had called for, but invalidates what the Christians had 
Ahmadiyya followers contended that the issue was unilateral and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad 
was not involved in this issue at all. See, for example, http://aaiil.org/text/acus/mga/
sanaullah.shtml (accessed 24 March 2014). See Riḍā’s debate with them during his stay in 
Lucknow (1912), al-Manār 31, no. 5 (Dec. 1930), 391–397; al-Manār 31, no. 6 (Jan. 1931), 
479–480; al-Manār 31 no. 7 (Feb. 1931), 559–560; al-Manār 31, no. 10 (July 1931), 751–752.
17 As quoted in al-Manār 17, no. 1 (Dec. 1913), 34–40. Cf. al-Manār 28, no. 7 (Sept. 1927), 
543–550. About Headley’s conversion in the western press, see, for example, “Irish Peer 
turns Moslem,” New York Times (16 Nov. 1913), 1; “Mohammedan Peer,” Observer (16 Nov. 
1913), 13; “Irish Peer converted to Mohametanism,” Manchester Guardian (17 Nov. 1913), 9.
18 Al-Manār 17, no. 1 (Dec. 1913), 34–40. Cf. Lord Rowland George Allanson Headley, “Why I 
became a Mohammedan,” Observer (23 Nov. 1913), 4.
19 Headley, “Why I became.”
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later “corrupted.” Riḍā believed that Europeans of his age would find Islam 
suitable, as it is the religion of “reason,” “science,” “civilization,” and “peace.” 
There were a number of impediments to their conversions to Islam, including 
Muslim sectarian strife, political animosities, the deteriorating state of 
Muslims, and their own unfamiliarity with the truth of their religion. In addi-
tion to these obstacles among Muslims, the Europeans lacked knowledge 
regarding Islam, the Arabic language, and were influenced by materialist sci-
ences and practices, and by Christian myths and the cruelity of Papacy’s 
authority in the past. These all led to the prevalent European aversion to reli-
gion in general. Riḍā’s words also addressed “westernized” Muslims, who mis-
takenly thought that Europeans were atheists.20
In addition to his joy in Headley’s conversion, an unknown reader of 
al-Manār in London, wrote under the name muslim ghayr mutafarnij (a non-
westernized Muslim) that he appreciated the religious work of the Woking 
mosque and their periodicals, The Islamic Review and Muslim India, that served 
the Islamic message. In a short time, the Woking mosque was able to convert a 
good number of Europeans, including Elinor Annie Saxby, Ernst W. Oaten, and 
Amina Bamford. This so-called non-westernized Muslim translated Amina 
Bamford’s conversion account that had been published in The Islamic Review, 
and submitted the translation for publication in Riḍā’s journal. This was 
another message to Europeanized Muslims who had decided to abandon their 
religious beliefs and practices after mixing with Europeans.21 This London 
reader of al-Manār wished that a Muslim prince or a rich man would finance 
Riḍā’s Islamic missionary school, Dār al-Daʿwa wa-l-Irshād (founded in 1912), 
so that it could serve as a training college for young Muslim preachers commit-
ted to propagate Islam in Europe.22 In response to the doubts expressed by 
some Muslims about the sincerity of European converts and their adherence 
to religious duties such as prayer and fasting, he replied that the Europeansʼ 
knowledge was based on their own research and reading, and their negligence 
of Islamic duties was no less controversial than that of some who were born 
Muslims and also neglected their religious duties. In his view, the Europeansʼ 
conversions was a boon to Islam in the west.23 In his response, Riḍā expected 
more from Indian Muslims than Egyptians, at least with regard to the task of 
Islamic propaganda in Europe. The majority of rich Muslims were, however, in 
20 al-Manār 17, no. 1 (Dec. 1913), 34–40.
21 Ryad, “Islamic Reformism and Great Britain,” 278–279.
22 Ibid.
23 Al-Manār 18, no. 1 (Feb. 1913), 73–75.
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his view, too “stupid” and “villainous” to fund public projects, except when 
such projects would raise their status in the eyes of rulers and princes.24
In general, Riḍā agreed with Khwaja Kamal-ud-Dinʼs “friends” and followers 
in Egypt and considered him a “moderate” follower of the Ahmadiyya. In 1923, 
Lord Headley, Kamal-ud-Din, and Abdul Mohye, the Arab mufti of the Woking 
Mosque (the Arab press gave him the title of the Mufti of the English Lands), 
passed through Egypt on their way to hajj. The trip was covered in a favorable 
light in the Islamic press in Egypt, including al-Manār. In Egyptian newspa-
pers, Kamal-ud-Din found a suitable opportunity to defend the Lahore branch 
of the Ahmadiyya and their faith as being a trend close to “mainstream” Islam. 
Riḍā was not able to meet them in order to discuss his doubts regarding the 
Ahmadiyya with Kamal-ud-Din in person. At this point, Riḍā found that 
Kamal-ud-Din’s consideration of Ghulam Ahmad as merely a “reformer” was a 
good step by the Lahore branch towards the “true” Islam.25
Headley and his fellow pilgrims were highly regarded during this visit. 
Reception committees were organized in Port Said, Cairo, and Alexandria in 
order to honor Lord Headley in particular. From Port Said to Cairo and 
Alexandria, large gatherings appeared in train stations:
everywhere people would shake hands with Lord Headley and reveren-
tially kiss the Khwaja’s hands. Young and old joined together in lusty 
cheers of “Long live Lord Headley!” and “Long live Khwaja Kamal-ud-
Din!” At such of the stations where stoppage was not less than three or 
four minutes the guests would speak a few words…26
In the Cairo railway station, a huge crowd gathered to welcome the guests. 
Headley and his friends were guests at the Heliopolis residence of the Egyptian 
notable and Sufi Sayyid Iḥsān al-Bakrī, who was well known to most English 
Muslims because of his stay in England and interest in the Woking mission 
activities. After the Friday prayer at al-Ḥusayn Mosque, prayers and speeches 
were made in honor of the British Muslims by religious scholars and other 
notables, including Shaykh al-Sāwī, the president of the Cairo reception com-
mittee and the Naqīb al-Ashrāf (head of the descendants of the Prophet). A 
dinner banquette was organized for five hundred people that evening. Similar 
meetings were also organized in Alexandria, where Headley and his fellows 
24 Ryad, “Islamic Reformism and Great Britain,” 278–279.
25 Al-Manār 24, no. 8 (Aug. 1923), 583.
26 “Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din and Lord Headley in Egypt,” Islamic Review (Sept. 1923), 301–307.
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were welcomed by religious scholars, merchants, politicians, and notables 
including the Egyptian prince ʿUmar Ṭusun (1872–1944).27
The Egyptian press took great interest in this visit. The Egyptian daily 
al-Siyāsa, for example, portrayed a picture of the zeal of Egyptians in receiving 
these special guests from London. Egypt had not welcomed anyone with this 
much fanfare since the return of the well-known Egyptian politician Saʿd 
Zaghlūl (1858–1927) from exile. In al-Bakrī’s residence, the journalist met 
Headley and made the following description: “His Lordship received me with 
his great polite and nice manners. On his head he wore the Egyptian tarbush 
(fez) put on his grey hair that reflected the redness [of the tarbush] in a beauti-
ful rosy colour because of his white face and moving blue eyes.”28
In that interview, Headley revealed the reasons he had converted to Islam. 
He said that as a child he had doubted many doctrines taught by the church. As 
he was not an entirely convinced Christian, he considered himself a unitarian, 
as did many others in Britain and the United States. Thus, even during the 
years before his official conversion, he considered himself a Muslim. While he 
was working as an engineer in India in 1883 he read a copy of the Qurʾān in 
English translation that had been given to him by a friend and he became 
impressed by the simplicity of the tenets of Islam. After reading the Qurʾān, he 
discovered that he was a Muslim—and in fact he had not been exposed to any 
kind of missionary work. He stated that he delayed his public conversion 
because he did not want to hurt the feelings of the elderly members of his 
family.29
Riḍā did not agree with those Muslims who questioned the Englishman’s 
sincere belief in Islam; he stated that “anybody reading this report with a heart 
should feel that it was said out of truth and sincerity.”30 Furthermore, Riḍā said 
that it was no surprise that the majority of British people would disbelieve in 
the traditions of the church, since the British upbringing often takes into 
account the human fiṭra (pure disposition), and encourages independent 
thought.31 As a result of Headley’s conversion, Riḍā wished that “if Muslim 
missionaries went to Britain and the United States and revealed the swindle of 
politicians and…[Christian] missionaries, who caused enmity and animosity 
between Islam and Europe, the people of the two countries would actually 
27 Ibid.
28 As quoted in al-Manār 24, no. 7 (July 1923), 555–559.
29 al-Manār 24, no. 7 (July 1923), 555–559.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
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embrace Islam in droves.”32 In addition, al-Manār translated and quoted some 
of Headley’s works at length, including his A Western Awakening to Islam, in 
order to counter the arguments of “westernized” Muslims who criticized and 
distanced themselves from Islam.33
Meanwhile, despite Riḍā’s appreciation of the Lahore Ahmadiyya mission-
ary work in Europe, he was critical of their translation of the Qurʾān into 
English. The Lahore Ahmadiyya tried to circulate Mawlana Muḥammad ʿAlīʼs 
English translation of the Qurʾān in Egypt and Syria, but their attempt was 
resisted by the religious institution of al-Azhar, Riḍā himself, and his friend 
Shaykh Muṣṭafā Najā (1852–1932), the mufti of Beirut. In his fatwā, Riḍā saw it 
as a “deviant” translation that contradicts the principles of Islam. He stated 
that the translation attempts to destroy Islam from within by disseminating 
the Ahmadiyya’s “false” doctrines on revelation and by abrogating Qurʾānic rul-
ings, such as jihad.34 In his view, Riḍā emphasized that Muḥammad ʿAlī inten-
tionally distorted some verses related to the Messiah (al-masīḥ) in order to 
argue, based on these verses, that Ghulam Ahmad is the promised Messiah. 
Riḍā urged Muslims not to rely on this translation, or on any other, to under-
stand the Qurʾān, but rather to act according to its rulings in a direct manner. 
However, Riḍā did believe that this translation and other Qurʾān translations 
could be used to invite non-Muslims to Islam, particularly those without 
knowledge of Arabic.35
Riḍā’s tone was inconsistent. With regard to the differences between the 
Lahore and Qadiyani branches in matters of creed (ʿaqīda) and their religious 
work in Europe, Riḍā argued that the Lahore movement agrees with other 
Muslims in general, except in specific issues related to the death of Jesus and 
the abrogation of certain verses of the Qurʾān. Despite their “great” sacrifices 
32 As quoted in Ryad, Islamic Reformism and Christianity, 169.
33 al-Manār 26, no. 1 (April 1925), 60–64 and also see al-Manār 29, no. 5 (Sept. 1928), 344–351. 
See also Riḍā’s recommendation of Headley’s works and his cooperation with Indian 
Muslims during the celebrations of the Prophet’s birthday in the early 1930s, al-Manār 32, 
no. 3 (Feb. 1932), 190–192; al-Manār 32, no. 4 (April 1932), 280–283; al-Manār 34, no. 2 (June 
1934), 129–139.
34 al-Manār 25, no. 10 (March 1925), 794–796.
35 al-Manār 29, no. 4 (July 1928), 268–271. See Mohamed Ali Mohamed Abou Sheishaa, “A 
Study of the Fatwā by Rashid Riḍā on the Translation of the Qur’an,” Journal of the Society 
for Qurʾānic Studies 1, no. 1 (Oct. 2001), available online: (http://www.islamicwritings.org/
quran/language/a-study-of-the-fatwa-by-rashid-rida-on-the-translation-of-the-quran/).
Cf. Moch Nur Ichwan, “Differing Responses to an Ahmadi Translation and Exegesis: The 
Holy Qurʾān in Egypt and Indonesia,” Archipel 62 (2001): 143–161.
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for Islam in India and Europe, Riḍā finally concluded that the Ahmadis of both 
branches were followers of falsehood (bāṭil).36
Nevertheless, it is strange that Riḍā utterly dismissed Kamal-ud-Din from the 
Ahmadiyya movement. After Khawaja Kamal-ud-Din’s death, Riḍā eulogized 
him for his service for Islam in Europe. A brief biography of Kamal-ud-Din was 
soon published in al-Manār by Khwaja Abdul Ghani, secretary of the managing 
committee of the Woking Muslim Mission and Literary Trust in Lahore, as a 
token of appreciation. Riḍā considered Kamal-ud-Din “the greatest missionary 
to Islam” in their age. Through his mission, he provided a great service to Islam 
by converting many high-class British, the most refined of them being Lord 
Headley. Although Kamal-ud-Din was known as a “moderate” follower of the 
Ahmadiyya, Riḍā was told by many friends who were familiar with his work in 
Europe, that his activities and writings did not actually reflect any inclinations 
to the Ahmadiyya convictions as such.37
 Cutting All Connections with the Mirza: A Populist Salafī Voice
Riḍā’s journal does not reflect any further details about other contemporary 
European converts. As noted, by the late 1920s, al-Fatḥ magazine had become 
36 al-Manār 28, no. 7 (Sept. 1927), 543–550.
37 al-Manār 33, no. 2 (April 1933), 138.
Figure 3.2 Id-ul-Fitr day at Woking, 10 July 1918 (The Islamic Review, August 1918) ( from the 
website of the Ahmadiyya Anjuman Ishʿat Islam Lahore (U.K.), Wembley, London)
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the mouthpiece of a more populist strand of Salafism. With regard to the 
Ahmadiyya and European converts in particular, its attitudes, like those of 
Riḍā, were not always consistent, but its tone was much harsher than al-Manār. 
Initially, some of the contributors to al-Fatḥ were confused about the 
Ahmadiyya missionary work and doctrines and their success in Europe. 
Although Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb, the editor of al-Fatḥ, did not express a posi-
tive view of the Ahmadiyya and its two branches, and remained very suspi-
cious about their beliefs and missionary work; surprisingly, he allowed other 
writers to voice positive remarks about their work in Europe. However, 
throughout late 1930s, as we see, this appreciation was gradually replaced by a 
harsh campaign against the Ahmadiyya and their missionary work in Europe.
In 1932, the Irish-French convert Khalid Sheldrake (1888–1947), president of 
the Western Islamic Association in Britian (and also active in the Woking mis-
sion in London),38 sent a letter to al-Azhar in Cairo asking for a fatwā on the 
permissibility of building and designing a new mosque in London that would 
be built by Christian builders in a modern European architectural style; this 
triggered a heated debate about the Ahmadiyya in al-Fatḥ. The scholars, while 
aware of the sectarian disputes among Muslims in Britain at that time, replied 
in the affirmative. However, they advised the questioner to open this mosque 
to all Muslims, and not favor one sect over another. For the validity of their 
prayers in the West, the determination of the qibla (prayer direction) should be 
accurately measured. Al-Fatḥ’s editor was impressed by Sheldrake’s work and 
urged Muslims to support him financially. Al-Khaṭīb was probably not aware of 
Sheldrake’s role in the Woking mosque at this time, since he emphatically 
requested him not to follow the example of the Woking mosque, whose doors 
were only open to the followers of the Ahmadiyya, at least in the eyes of the 
editor (this was not entirely correct).39
Interestingly, al-Fatḥ was read in London. In response, a certain Ali Muhib, 
a Muslim living in London and a subscriber of the Ahmadiyya magazine The 
Islamic Review, immediately noted that this mosque played a great role in 
spreading Islam in the West and to him, all the preachers in the mosque, 
including Headley and Sheldrake himself, were Sunnīs. Others who did not 
follow the Ahmadiyya, such as Sultan Shah Jahan, Begum of Bhopal,40 offered 
38 About his activities, “Moslem Funeral Service,” Irish Times (1 Sept. 1928), 11; “40,000 For 
London Mosque,” Manchester Guardian (27 Feb. 1928).
39 Al-Fatḥ 6, no. 299 (1 July 1932), 15.
40 About him, see Saeedullah, The Life and Works of Muhammad Siddiq Hasan Khan, Nawab 
of Bhopal: 1248–1307/1832–1890, with a foreword by H.M. ʿAbd al-Quddus Qasmi (Lahore: 
Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1973).
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generous donations to the mosque. Ali Muhib reminded al-Fatḥ readers of 
Kamal-ud-Din’s denial of any connection with the Qadiyani branch during his 
above-mentioned stay in Egypt. Nevertheless, unlike Riḍā, al-Fatḥ did not trust 
Kamal-ud-Din’s words, because he had not completely renounced the figure of 
Ghulam Ahmad, his claim of prophecy, and the presumed alliance between 
the Ahmadiyya and the British.41
Soon Prince ʿĀdil Arslān (1887–1954), the brother of the well-known exiled 
Druze prince Shakīb Arslān (1869–1946), became involved in the debate by 
supporting Ali Muhib’s arguments.42 During the Eid al-Fitr of 1930, ʿĀdil Arslān 
saw that the majority of Muslims in London, even those of different nationali-
ties, preferred to pray in the Woking mosque (despite its remote location from 
the city center) because of their hatred for the Qadiyani mosque. At the Woking 
mosque Arslān met with Lord Headley, other British Muslims, the deputy of 
the Egyptian consul and other Egyptian civil servants in the Egyptian consul-
ate, Shaykh Ḥāfiẓ Wahba (1889–1967) (envoy extraordinary and minister pleni-
potentiary of the King of Hijaz in London), in addition to many Egyptians, 
Yemenis, Somalis, Syrians, Afghanis, and Indians. In a speech after the prayer, 
Lord Headley urged Muslims to unite and build a bigger mosque in the English 
capital; one like the Paris Mosque. This mosque should include rooms to house 
Muslim students and Muslim dignitaries visiting the city. ʿĀdil Arslān strongly 
believed in Lord Headley’s “undoubted and great sincerity” for Islam. Therefore, 
he stated, the Muslim press, including al-Fatḥ, should support Headleyʼs initia-
tive to build this mosque as a meeting place to foster Muslim mutual support 
in Europe. Arslān was pleased to see Muslims wearing their oriental attire 
(such as turbans) on that day. Because the British loved such exotic scenes, he 
believed that the appearance of Muslims like this during the feast days might 
elevate the position of Muslims in their eyes. Friday prayers were also meant to 
teach people and answer their queries. “If you visited or resided in these lands,” 
he wrote, “you would be assured that fairness belongs to the nature [of 
Europeans], particularly when they became persuaded of something.”43
41 Al-Fatḥ 7, no. 304 (5 Aug. 1932), 14.
42 ʿĀdil Arslān, “al-Daʿwā ilā l-Islām fī l-gharb” [Calling for Islam in the west], al-Fatḥ 7, no. 
308 (2 Sept. 1932), 4–5. About him, see, for example, J. Honvault, “Speaking about Oneself 
when External Life is Ethically Primordial: The Diary of the Sryo-Lebanese Arab 
Nationalist ʿĀdil Arslān (1887–1954),” in Many Ways of Speaking About the Self: Middle 
Eastern Ego-Documents in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish (14th–20th Century), ed. Yavuz Köse 
and Ralf Herausgegeben von Elger (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2010), 47–58.
43 Arslān, “al-Daʿwa,” 4–5.
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ʿĀdil Arslān compared the missionary zeal of the Ahmadiyya in the West 
with Protestant and Catholic missions. In the United States, they converted a 
huge number of people. The only obstruction to spreading Islam among mil-
lions of Americans was race: the Ahmadiyya missionaries were not white. 
Because mainstream Muslims had failed to propagate the “true” essence of 
Islam, Arslān found no harm in such heterodox Muslim denominations 
preaching Islam in the West.44 Yet al-Fatḥ’s editor was still doubtful about the 
Ahmadiyya missionary work with its two branches in Europe and believed that 
even the work of Lahore members in London was “futile” as long as they did 
not recant their conviction in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. Therefore, he strongly 
urged Sunnī Muslim dignitaries to support the building of a new mosque in 
London.45
In response to al-Fatḥ’s uncompromising stance, Mawlana Abdul-Majid 
(b. 1896), the acting imam of Woking Mosque (1932–1935), tried to clear the 
mosque’s name of any misunderstanding by stressing that the Woking mosque 
was a center for the Islamic mission in England and was not limited to a spe-
cific sect of Islam. To prove his point, he enclosed a copy of The Islamic Review 
in which a photo of the Eid prayer was published, showing Muslims from vari-
ous ethnic groups in the mosque. The prayer was led by the British convert 
William Burchell Bashyr Pickard. Other leading Sunnī Muslims, such as the 
mufti of Jerusalem Amīn al-Ḥusaynī and Shaykh Ḥāfiẓ Wahba, used to lead 
the prayers in the mosque as well. Abdul-Majid denied any connection with 
the other Qadiyani group: “I confirm to you that God had bestowed us unprec-
edented success in these lands only due to our vigorous efforts in propagating 
pure monotheism; and that the honorable Prophet Muḥammad was the seal of 
prophecy. Our books are enough proofs that we really take distance from any 
[other] sects.”46
Again al-Khaṭīb noted that his magazine had avoided becoming involved in 
polemics with the Ahmadiyya who had been active in Europe for many years, 
but he was obliged to answer Ali Muhib’s remarks. Although the nature of the 
Woking mosque and its differences with the Qadiyani branch was no secret, he 
44 Ibid. Arslān mentioned that Muslims in New York, for instance, used to have their Eid 
collective prayer in an old theater. As they had neither competent religious guides nor 
good preachers to help them in their faith, Arslān wrote a letter to the Egyptian ministry 
of education, requesting that they to dispatch an Egyptian imam to lead the community, 
but he did not receive an answer.
45 Arslān, “al-Daʿwa,” 4–5.
46 “Masjid Woking fī London” [Woking mosque in London], al-Fatḥ 7, no. 313 (7 Oct. 1932), 
10–11.
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insisted that Ghulam Ahmad was “the most corrupting person that had 
appeared in Islam in the last [nineteenth] century.”47 He urged his followers to 
sharpen their recantation of this “charlatan and his absurdity.”48 In al-Khaṭīb’s 
view, Abdul-Majid’s claim that some prominent Muslim figures used to attend 
their mosque in London is not a valid argument. If al-Khaṭīb himself one day 
visited London, he would have no problem praying in the Woking mosque 
because, from an Islamic point of view, Muslims are allowed to pray anywhere 
on the earth, as it is all considered pure.49
 Ahmadiyya in Europe: Useful and Harmful
At this stage, in Salafī circles a dichotomy was made between the positive 
impact of the Ahmadiyya in Europe and their doctrines, which were considered 
47 Ibid., 11.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
Figure 3.3 Muslim group at the Woking Mosque, with the convert Omar (later Sir Omar) Hubert 
Rankin, showing also Abdul Mohiy (The Islamic Review, January 1928) ( from the 
website of the Ahmadiyya Anjuman Ishʿat Islam Lahore (u.k.), Wembley, London)
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false. As the debate became heated, the Moroccan Salafī writer Taqī l-Dīn al-Hilālī 
(d. 1987), a close associate of Riḍā and Shakīb Arslān, became enthusiastic about 
the Ahmadiyya work in Europe; he defended European converts’ “sincere zeal” 
for Islam. As a prolific writer in al-Fatḥ, al-Hilālī was at this time in Lucknow 
where he was working as a lecturer of Arabic literature in Nadwatul-Ulama; and 
was learning English under the tutelage of a British Christian missionary in India. 
He also became an avid reader of the Ahmadiyya literature in English, especially 
the Lahori periodical The Light and the Qadiyani Review of Religion.
Some Muslims in India were doubtful about the sincerity of European con-
verts because of their negligence of their religious duties, an issue that was 
earlier discussed in al-Manār. Al-Hilālī stated that while hundreds of millions 
of Muslims might pray and fast, they remained fragile and weak in the world 
and God’s victory on earth will not be given to fasting and praying people only. 
For example, al-Hilālī deemed the works of the famous translator of the Qurʾān, 
Muḥammad Marmaduke Pickthall (1875–1936), who was an active convert in 
the Woking mission, as equal to a “Muslim battalion” in the face of the enemies 
of Islam. His service for Islam in Europe was far better than the prayers of mil-
lions Muslims. He believed that a distinction should be made between the 
pious work of an individual Muslim and communal work that benefits the 
Muslim public interest. For al-Hilālī, prayers only benefit the one praying, 
while such communal acts as translating the Qurʾān are useful for all Muslims 
all over the world.50
On the basis of his various readings in the Ahmadiyya literature in India, 
however, al-Hilālī reached a conclusion that the Ahmadiyya mission in Europe 
was useful and harmful at the same time. Their major and “amazing” religious 
work in Europe was even more successful than Christian missions in the 
Muslim world. In his view, because of their work, European converts now had 
access to some “true” Islamic tenets, even under the disguise of the “invented 
doctrines” of the Ahmadiyya. The Ahmadiyya, a tiny Muslim group, was capa-
ble of achieving what hundreds of millions of Muslims had failed to do for 
many years. He was sympathetic with their writings and even considered their 
defense of Islam in the West as a “real jihad” that should please every Muslim.51 
His main critique of the Lahore Ahmadiyya magazine The Light was that it 
focused on their “odd” exegesis of the Qurʾān and their “unfounded” fatwās 
regarding specific theological issues such as the virgin birth of Jesus. But he 
distinguished their work from the Qadiyani branch, which remained, in his 
50 Muḥammad Taqī l-Dīn al-Hilālī, “Fī tarjamat al-Qurʾān aydan” [Regarding the translation 
of the Qurʾān, too], al-Fatḥ 6, no. 293 (6 April 1932), 4–7.
51 Ibid.
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view, more harmful, because of their unyielding conviction that Ghulam 
Ahmad was the “Promised Messiah.”52
Al-Hilālī ascribed the “usefulness” of the Ahmadiyyaʼs missionary work to 
their potential “enlightening” of Europeans regarding Islam; they removed the 
“remnants of myths and fallacies” which “fanatic” Christian clergymen had 
been disseminating in Europe since the time of the Crusades. On the other 
hand, the Ahmadiyya work also influenced the image of European soldiers 
based in the Muslim East by revealing to them the reality of Islam and its 
Prophet. As a result, they might not take part in what al-Hilālī called the 
“destruction of Muslims” because of an inherited animosity against Islam. To 
remain a Christian or to convert to Islam through Ahmadiyya beliefs was for 
al-Hilālī equal. However, their efforts in removing misconceptions in European 
minds should be simply recognized as one of their advantages.53
In response, Masʿūd ʿĀlim al-Nadwī (1910–1956), co-founder of al-Ḍiyāʾ mag-
azine and one of al-Hilālī’s associates in India, argued that this movement was 
neither useful to Islam, nor was their “charlatan” Ghulam Ahmad a reformer.54 
Al-Khaṭīb agreed and added that the Ahmadiyya was a separate “religion” com-
pletely opposed to Islam. Their work to convert non-Muslims was therefore 
useless because they were “corrupting” God’s words and the Prophet’s sayings 
with their own interpretations. In this case, one should combat their “damage” 
to Islam instead of praising them.55
At the same time, the debate on the religious works of the Ahmadiyya 
reached other Muslim regions. For instance, the weekly newspaper Hadramaut 
launched an anti-Ahmadiyya campaign among the Arabic-speaking commu-
nity in Indonesia.56 They fervently requested that Rashīd Riḍā and Shakīb 
Arslān stop praising the Ahmadiyya work in Europe; and stand against the 
Woking mosque and other centers in Europe instead of supporting them. It 
should be emphasized that Arslān defended the Ahmadiyya, and attended the 
52 Taqī l-Dīn al-Hilālī, “al-Qadiyāniyyūn—Baʿḍu ma lahum wa-ma ʿalayhim” [The Qadiyanis, 
the pros and cons], al-Fatḥ 7, no. 315 (21 Oct. 1932), 9–10.
53 Ibid., 9–10.
54 Al-Fatḥ 7, no. 319 (17 Nov. 1932), 2.
55 Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb, “al-Qadiyāniyya dīn yukhālif dīn al-Islām kamā anna 
al-Naṣraniyya dīn yukhālif dīn al-Yahūd” [Qadiyaniyya: A religion that contradicts Islam 
just as Christianity contradicts the religion of the Jews], al-Fatḥ 7, no. 320 (24 Nov. 1932), 
1–3; Cf. idem, “Islāmunā wa-Islām al-Qadiyāniyyīn” [Our Islam and the Islam of the 
Qadiyanis], al-Fatḥ 7, no. 322 (8 Dec. 1932), 1–3.
56 In 1932 a series of articles was published in Hadramaut under the title “al-Barāhīn 
al-qatʿiyya ʿala butlan al-niḥla al-Qadiyāniyya” [Decisive proofs about the invalidity of the 
Qadiyani sect] by the Palestinian Azhari shaykh Rabbāḥ Ḥassūna al-Khalīlī.
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inauguration of their mosque in Berlin. The Hadramaut warned that the 
Ahmadiyya often quoted Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad ʿAbduh, 
as well as al-Manār and Riḍā’s Qurʾānic exegesis only in order to deceive 
Muslims about the real nature of their faith.57 In response, Zeki Kiram Hishmat 
(1886–1946), a Muslim living in Berlin and a friend of both Arslān and Riḍā,58 
tried to refute the claims that Arslān was affiliated with the Ahmadiyya mis-
sion in Berlin as it was portrayed in the Indian press. It was true that Arslān 
used to visit their mosque, but this was only due to Arslān’s aspiration to foster 
Muslim unity in Europe and eliminate any sectarian conflicts. Therefore, in 
1932 the Berlin missionary imam of their mosque, S.M. Abdullah, invited Arslān 
to tea through Kiram, and they accepted. Strangely enough, Kiram implied that 
neither he nor Arslān had much previous knowledge about the Ahmadiyya’s 
doctrines before this visit. In their publications, which they saw in the mosque, 
Ghulam Ahmad’s adherence to the sharia was confirmed, as were his claims of 
prophecy and high esteem of the British Crown.59 Interestingly, most of the 
anti-Ahmadiyya campaign brochures were published by the Egyptian Mansur 
Rifaat in the 1920s at Kiram’s publishing house in Berlin, the Morgen- und 
Abendland Verlag.60
 Come Back to “Mainstream” Islam
Such indistinct views continued to circulate in Muslim Salafī circles in the 
early 1930s. Although most of them were aware of the doctrinal differences 
between the Lahore and Qadiyani branches, they insisted on alluding to both 
groups as “qadiyani.” In reaction to Kiram’s above-mentioned article, the 
57 Weekblad Hadramaut, Soerabaja (Java), 318 (Feb. 1932).
58 About him, see, Umar Ryad, “From an Officer in the Ottoman Army to a Muslim Publicist 
and Armament Agent in Berlin: Zekî Hishmat Kirâm (1886–1946),” Bibliotheca Orientalis 
63, nos. 3–4 (2006), 235–268.
59 Weekblad Hadramaut, 328 (14 May 1932).
60 For instance, the following by Mansur Rifaat, Die Ahmadia-Sekte: Ein Vorkämpfer für den 
englischen Imperialismus (Berlin, 1923); Der Verrat der Ahmadis an Heimat und Religion 
(Berlin, 1923); The Ahmadi Sect: Vanguard of the British Imperialism and the Greatest 
Danger to Islam, Convincing Evidence of their Duplicity (Berlin, 1923); Ahmadi Betrayal of 
Country and Religion (Berlin, 1923); Die Ahmadia Agenten: ein Rätsel. Werden sie tatsächlich 
von den deutschen Behörden unterstützt und beschützet? (Berlin, 1924); Vollständiger 
Zusammenbruch der Ahmadia-Sekte: Weitere Beweise für Ihre Tätigkeit als englische 
Agenten (Berlin, 1924); Total Demoralisation of the Ahmadia Sect: Further Evidence in 
regard to their Activities as British Agents and Menace to Islam (Berlin, 1924).
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Tunisian-Egyptian scholar and later Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar, Muḥammad 
al-Khiḍr Ḥusayn (1876–1958), branded the Lahore branch as “misguided.” He 
stated that if they had confined the spread of their message to non-Muslims, its 
“danger” would have been less; their proselytizing work among non-Muslims 
was tolerated, but their mission among Muslims should be totally rejected. 
Al-Khiḍr Ḥusayn bitterly asserted that their “greedy” ambitions exceeded the 
limits of converting non-Muslims and extended to influencing Muslim nations 
and peoples who were already “guided” by the “light” of the Qurʾān and Sunna.61 
In order to combat their missionary work among Muslims, ceremonies were 
organized in Cairo to celebrate former Ahmadiyya members who wanted to 
denounce their affiliation to the movement publicly.62
At this stage, many of these scholars stopped expressing any appreciation of 
their work, including their missions in Europe. A certain Abū l-Makārim 
Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Salām al-Salīm, a lecturer of Arabic in Kurnool, India, 
requested that Muslim scholars in the East and North Africa, especially in 
al-Ḥaramayn (the Two Sacred Shrines), Shaykh al-Azhar, Shakīb Arslān, and 
al-Hilālī, issue a general clear-cut fatwā against the Ahmadiyya.63 The dispute 
then took another radical shift when many contributors to al-Fatḥ penned 
heated articles against the Ahmadiyya and their doctrines and work.64
Shortly thereafter, in response, Shakīb Arslān agreed that specific doctrinal 
quotations in the Ahmadiyya books could eventually lead to unbelief and 
apostasy from Islam. Ghulam Ahmad’s claimed prophecy would also harm the 
61 Muḥammad al-Khiḍr Ḥusayn, “Ṭāʾifa al-Qadyāniyya” [A Qadiyani sect], al-Fatḥ 7, no. 317 
(3 Nov. 1932), 1–7 and al-Fatḥ 7, no. 319 (17 Nov. 1932), 12–13.
62 In 1932, as founder and president of Jamʿiyyat al-Hidāya al-Islāmiyya (Society of Islamic 
Guidance), al-Khiḍr Ḥusayn welcomed a former head of the Ahmadiyya branch in Cairo 
and his secretary, who recanted their Ahmadiyya beliefs. This public celebration was 
attended by the Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar, the founder of the Muslim Brothers Ḥasan 
al-Bannā, and other prominent Muslims who congratulated the two men for their  “bravery.” 
See, al-Fatḥ 8, no. 375 (14 Dec. 1932), 6–9 and al-Fatḥ 8, no. 376 (21 Dec. 1933), 14–15. The 
Ahmadiyya center in Cairo was located in al-Khurfush district. It was mainly established 
to combat Christian missionary work in Cairo, but it was closed down by the police after 
conflicts with the Muslim inhabitants. Accused of public disorder, three Ahmadiyya 
members had to pay a fine of one pound each. See al-Fatḥ 8, no. 376 (21 Dec. 1933), 3 and 
al-Fatḥ 8, no. 377 (28 Dec. 1933), 3. See also, al-Fatḥ, 9, no. 411 (7 Sept. 1934), 20–22; al-Fatḥ 
9, no. 415 (4 Oct. 1934), 2–3, 21–22; al-Fatḥ 9, no. 416 (11 Oct. 1934), 18–19; al-Fatḥ 9, no. 417 
(18 Oct. 1934), 4.
63 As the highest religious position in Egypt, the shaykh al-Azhar was also required to draw 
the government’s attention to the Ahmadiyya missionary center in Cairo which had to be 
closed down. Al-Fatḥ 7, no. 324 (22 Dec. 1932), 1–4.
64 Al-Fatḥ 7, no. 325 (29 Dec. 1932), 5–6.
67Salafiyya, Ahmadiyya and European Converts to Islam
<UN>
Lahore branch if they did not recant it. Arslān, who visited their mosque in 
Berlin two times, had several discussions with the Ahmadi religious leader in 
Germany Mawlana Sadr-ud-Din (d. 1981), who repeatedly insisted to him that 
they merely considered Ghulam Ahmad a reformer. As Arslān had not studied 
any of their works in any depth, his judgment was mainly based on these meet-
ings in Berlin and various oral reports about their doctrines. However, besides 
his deep respect for Mawlana Muḥammed ʿAlī and his writings on Islam, he 
still admired their zeal and their successful dissemination of Islam, which sur-
passed all other Muslim organizations in Europe. In Germany, they were suc-
cessful in converting fifty elite Germans. In his correspondence with the 
Ahmadiyya Anjuman-i Isha’at-i Islam in Lahore, Arslān frequently advised 
them to believe in Ahmad as a reformer, and avoid any doctrines outside the 
boundaries of Islam. He never replied to the Qadiyani branch, who sought his 
support various times; he avoided any contact with them because of their 
belief in Ahmad as the Promised Messiah.65
Following Arslān, al-Hilālī quickly responded to the fatwā. His previous 
enthusiasm completely changed after he read some of Ghulam Ahmad’s works. 
He bluntly considered him a “big charlatan…aiming at establishing supremacy, 
which is a kaʿba of all evil.”66 Claiming to have a firsthand knowledge of their 
publications and work in India, al-Hilālī became one of the most prominent 
anti-Ahmadiyya writers in al-Fatḥ.67 As for their activities in Europe, he com-
pletely changed his mind and wrote sarcastically: “Primary school children of 
65 Shakīb Arslān, “al-Jawāb bi Shaʾn al-Qadiyāniyya” [A response regarding the Qadiyaniyya], 
al-Fatḥ 7, no. 328 (19 Jan. 1933), 6–7.
66 Ibid., 7.
67 See, for example, his reaction to their views on Islam and prophecy in “Voice of God,” The 
Light (17 July 1933), 3–4: Taqī l-Dīn al-Hilālī, “Sabb al-Qadiyāniyyīn li-l-Islām i & ii” [The 
offense of Qadiyanis to Islam i & ii], al-Fatḥ 8, no. 362 (15 Sept. 1933), 1–5 and al-Fatḥ 8, no. 
363 (22 Sept. 1933), 13–16. Soon the anti-Ahmadiyya campaign was fueled in wider circles 
in Egypt and elsewhere in the Muslim world. See the articles by Shaykh Muṣṭafā Abū 
Yūsuf al-Ḥamāmī (d.c. 1949), an Azhari scholar and former imam of the well-known 
Zaynab Mosque in Cairo, al-Fatḥ 7, no. 329 (26 Jan. 1933), 5–6, 13–14. About his works, see 
Muṣṭafā Abū Sayf al-Ḥamāmī, al-Nahḍa al-islāḥiyya (Cairo, 1935); Ghawth al-ʿibād bi-
bayna al-rashād (Cairo, 1950). See also the responses of Ṭaha Fayyāḍ al-ʿĀnī, an Iraqi law-
yer and journalist, al-Fatḥ 7, no. 332 (16 Feb. 1933), 10. Cf. Taqī l-Dīn al-Hilālī, “Bal hiya 
rābiṭa Qadiyāniyya” [It is a Qadiyani association], al-Fatḥ 7, no. 340 (14 April 1933), 4–5; 
“al-Barāʾa min al-Qadiyāniyya” [Clearing one’s name from the Qadiyaniyya], al-Fatḥ 8, no. 
372 (23 Nov. 1933), 3; al-Fatḥ 8, no. 385 (1 March 1934), 12. See also the reaction by Taqī 
l-Dīn al-Nabhanī (1909–1977), later founder of Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr, Taqī l-Dīn al-Nabhanī, 
“al-Qadiyāniyya wa-l-falsafa al-hindiyya” [The Qadiyaniyya and Indian philosophy], 8, 
no. 372 (23 Nov. 1933), 14–15.
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the Christians in Europe would ridicule and laugh [at their doctrines].”68 
Strangely enough, during these heated polemics, al-Hilālī used to quote some 
Ahmadiyya writings that supported his arguments in questions related to 
Islamic theology and prophecy in Islam.69
Amidst these fierce debates, al-Fatḥ demanded the Ahmadiyya to issue a 
vehement denial on behalf of the Lahore branch, if they were serious in their 
claims of being close to Sunnī Islam. Muslims now became convinced that 
participating in their activities equaled “unbelief.”70 In response to this anti-
Ahmadiyya campaign in Egypt, the leaders of the general Ahmadiyya head-
quarters in Lahore set up a propaganda branch in Cairo in order to clarify their 
beliefs and the ways that they differed from the Qadiyani movement. But al-Fatḥ 
remained unshaken in its conclusions: “The consequence of following the 
Qadiyani Ghulam will be the Hell-fire whether this was based on [the belief] in 
him as a ‘prophet of the devil’ or a ‘modernizer’ of the daʿwa of the devil.”71
European converts to Islam found themselves in the middle of these sectarian 
debates in national and transnational contexts. Some of them were active in both 
the Salafī and Ahmadiyya circles. For a while, their simultaneous activism in vari-
ous Muslim circles downplayed the tone of bitter hostility on both sides. But 
eventually Salafī writers demanded that European converts deny any connection 
with the Ahmadiyya, if they were genuine believers in Islam and Sunnī Muslims. As 
we shall see, two prominent European figures became the central focus of the 
Salafī-Ahmadiyya polemic, the above-mentioned British convert Khalid Sheldrake 
(b. 1888) and the Austrian Baron Omar Rolf von Ehrenfels (1901–1980).
 Khalid Sheldrake: A European Sunnī Muslim
If Headley had occupied a prominent place in al-Manār, Khalid Sheldrake was 
identified in al-Fatḥ as a zealous new Muslim serving Islam in Europe. In the 
68 al-Hilālī, “Sabb ii,” 13–16.
69 For example, he translated for the readers of al-Fatḥ an article from The Muslim Revival, 
which was official magazine of the Ahmadiyya Anjuman-i Isha’at-i Islam Lahore (1932–
1936), into Arabic about the “prophecies of world scriptures about the advent of the 
Prophet Muhammad.” Al-Fatḥ 8, no. 373 (30 Nov. 1933), 9–11. Cf. Muslim Revival (June 
1933), 22–29.
70 Al-Fatḥ 9, no. 418 (28 Oct. 1934), 8.
71 “Lahūrī Ablah” [A Lahori idiot], al-Fatḥ 9, no. 429 (19 Jan. 1935), 4. They even approached 
ʿAbd al- Ḥamīd Saʿīd (d. 1940), the president of the Young Muslim Menʼs Association, to 
ask him to organize public events in order to address fellow Muslims about their beliefs in 
Mirza as a reformer, but not as a prophet.
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early years of his conversion, he became active in the Liverpool Muslim 
Institute (established in 1889 by the British convert Abdullah Quilliam (1856–
1932)). He defended the Woking mission and regarded the Ahmadis as “part of 
the rich tapestry of the umma.”72 By 1914 he claimed to be “Sheikh of the 
British Muslims,” which annoyed the Woking Muslims and British converts, 
who asked him to leave; he was later readmitted. His congenial ties with the 
Qadiyanis after their khalifa’s visit to London in 1924 irritated other Muslims. 
In response, Sheldrake clarified his preference for unity above division: “I 
accepted Islam, and schools of thought mean but little to me.”73 In 1926, 
Sheldrake was again ejected from the Woking mission; but this time he con-
vinced other converts, namely Omar Richardson, Osman Watkins, and 
Abdullah Day, to leave the Woking mission in order to establish the Western 
Islamic Association, a separate and non-sectarian Muslim organization. In 
Sheldrake’s family home in South London (sometimes known as Peckham 
Mosque), they established a prayer room with an information center and dis-
tress and welfare fund. In addition, Sheldrake funded other activities, includ-
ing a short-lived journal, the Minaret, and was able to make a few new 
converts.74
As noted, it was Sheldrake’s question regarding the building of a mosque by 
non-Muslims in London in 1932 that triggered the controversy among Salafī 
writers about the Ahmadiyya missionary work in Europe. His role and activi-
ties in Europe were often portrayed in Salafī circles as those of a European 
Muslim who had no Ahmadiyya inclination.75 However, as late as 1931, 
Sheldrake wrote to the Lahoris in India that, despite being “unable to associate 
72 Gilham, Loyal Enemies, 200. See, for example, Khalid Sheldrake, “The Religion of Peace,” 
Islamic Review and Muslim India 3 (1915), 25; “The Message to Mankind,” Islamic Review 9, 
no. 1 (Jan. 1921), 21; “Our Duty To-day,” Islamic Review 9, no. 2 (Feb. 1921), 71; “Islam and the 
Unity of Mankind,” Islamic Review 9, no. 10 (Oct. 1921), 373; “Practical Experience of Islam,” 
Islamic Review 9, no. 11 (Nov. 1921), 420; “More ‘Massacres,’” Islamic Review 10, nos. 6–7 
(June/July 1922), 267; “Muhammad and World Unity,” Islamic Review 14, nos. 3–4 (March/
April 1926), 148.
73 As quoted in Gilham, Loyal Enemies, 201.
74 Ibid.
75 Taqī l-Dīn al-Hilālī, “Abdullah Daye: Akh Muslim yasqut min ṣufūf al-jihād [Abdullah 
Daye?: A Muslim brother fell down the rows of jihad]”, al-Fatḥ 7, no. 325 (29 Dec. 1932), 11. 
He translated an article by Sheldrake about the death of another British convert to Islam, 
Abdullah Daye, which the latter published in the Madras magazine Peace-Maker. 
Sheldrake eulogized him as his “right hand” in their common activities in the Association 
for British Muslims in England since his conversion in 1929.
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myself any longer with the Woking mission… I remain on the best of terms 
with the Ahmadiyya Anjyman Ishaat-i-Islam of Lahore.”76
In November 1932, Sheldrake visited India in order to advance the role of 
European Muslims in Islamic unity by calling for a European Muslim congress 
devoted to the study of Muslim problems in Europe, to promote the Islamic 
daʿwa, and to refute any allegations against Islam in Europe. Sheldrake related 
his conversion story to Arabic readers in order to prove his closeness to main-
stream Islam. As he always hoped for Sunnī-Shīʿī unity, Sheldrake observed the 
Friday prayer in the Great Mosque in Bombay, a Sunnī mosque; and later went 
to a Shīʿī mosque for the next prayers.77
Sheldrake took pride in European converts to Islam, including Napoleon 
Bonaparte’s alleged conversion (it was said that he kept a copy of the Qurʾān in 
French with him during his battles and during his exile). Among other names 
were her Highness Khair-un-Nissa, the Dayang Muda of Sarwak, and her first 
cousin Conrad (Khalid) Simpson.78 Sheldrake received the Dayang Muda of 
Sarwak into Islam in February 1932. Her conversion created a sensation in 
Europe, and she later settled in Paris and had a “salon where many grande 
dames and Muslims meet.”79 Interestingly, she embraced Islam while she was 
in an airplane, crossing the English Channel. As president of the British Muslim 
Society, Lord Headley regretted her “unfortunate” choice of an airplane for 
such a serious ceremony, and worried that she had hurt the feelings of many 
Muslims all over the world. He described her action “as a somewhat freakish 
departure from the good taste.”80 As for Simpson, he embraced Islam with the 
idea of helping Sheldrake in his mission, not because of any religious convic-
tion, though he said that he rather liked the concept of brotherhood in Islam.81
At this time, Sheldrake became a self-proclaimed suburban king of Tartary 
and king of Islamistan in western China. He visited the Far East with Conrad 
Simpson in 1933 and together they received considerable press attention. For 
example, the English-language daily Singaporean newspaper The Straits Times 
76 Gilham, Loyal Enemies, 201.
77 Taqī l-Dīn al-Hilālī, “Khalid Sheldrake fī l-Hind: ḥadīth lahu muhim ʿan al-shuʾūn 
al-Islāmiyya” [Khalid Sheldrake in India: an important talk for him about Islamic issues], 
al-Fatḥ 7, no. 326 (5 Jan. 1933), 6–7.
78 Al-Fatḥ 7, no. 327 (12 Jan. 1933). About Bonaparte’s conversion, see, for example, Christian 
Cherfils, Bonaparte et lʼIslam dʼaprès les documents français et arabes, with a foreword by 
Abd El-Hakim (Paris, 1914).
79 “Head of seven million Muslims visits Singapore,” Straits Times (26 June 1933).
80 “English Moslem Peer Deplores Plane Conversion of Princess,” New York Times (20 Feb. 
1932), 17.
81 “Head of seven million…,” Straits Times.
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(26 June 1933) was impressed by Sheldrake as the “head of millions of Muslims,” 
whose intention was to connect Muslims in Asia with their “brethren” in Europe.82
In India, other Muslim publications doubted Sheldrake’s sincerity as a 
Muslim. The Muslim Review, a monthly review of the shīʿī educational center 
Madrasatul Waizeen (College of Preachers) in Lucknow, accused Sheldrake of 
“trading” with religion merely in order to gain wealth through missionary activi-
ties in the West, unlike the Woking mosque’s people, who were sincere in their 
dissemination of Islam in Europe.83 In a fierce response, the above-mentioned 
Taqī l-Dīn Hilālī defended Sheldrake’s sincerity and efforts to convert many 
prominent and high-class Europeans and Americans to “true” Islam. Al-Hilālī 
retaliated, and accused the Ahmadiyya movement of explicitly deceiving 
Muslims by collecting money from India and elsewhere in the name of Islam in 
order to propagate their doctrines and to fulfill their own interests.84 In al-Hilālī’s 
view, this press campaign against Sheldrake’s visit to India was backed by the 
Ahmadiyya, who did not dare to criticize him in public. In response, al-Hilālī 
accused Kamal-ud-Din of accumulating a treasure after his arrival in London, 
and said that he used it only for his own comfort and for his heirs after him. 
Al-Hilālī, who had earlier highly praised the work of the Ahmadiyya in Europe, 
now changed his mind completely and said that the Ahmadis had exaggerated 
their work by enlisting the names of famous European converts, such as 
Sheldrake, who had in fact converted to Islam much earlier, even before the 
start of the Ahmadiyyaʼs work in London. As for Lord Headley, al-Hilālī con-
tested his financial integrity as well. In 1928, Headley succeeded in persuading 
the Nizam of Hyderabad to donate money for the establishment of a mosque in 
West Kensington, London; the site cost 28,000 pounds at the time, but the proj-
ect was delayed for many years. He also distrusted the choice of the location of 
the mosque—beside night clubs and cinemas. He blamed Indian Muslims for 
being “foolish” in donating money to the Woking mosque in order to “propagate 
the fallacies made by the Prophet of Punjab [Ghulam Ahmad].”85
Sheldrake was accused by the Ahmadis of “flattering” other Muslims by 
essentially telling them what they wanted to hear. Al-Hilālī saw it as a false 
accusation because the Ahmadis envied his success among Indian Muslims 
82 Ibid.
83 Taqī l-Dīn al-Hilālī, “al-Itijār bi-l-dīn” [Trading in religion], al-Fatḥ 8, no. 371 (16 Nov. 1932), 
9–12. See also other debates in the Ahmadiyya press during this visit. “Princess Sarawak 
on Islam,” The Light (24 Jan. 1933), 2; “The European Muslims,” The Light (8 Feb. 1933), 3; 
The Light (24 Jan. 1933), 9–10; The Light (24 Feb. 1933), 4.
84 Taqī l-Dīn al-Hilālī, “al-Itijār,” 9–12.
85 Ibid., 10.
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after his speech in Calcutta. They intentionally organized the anniversary of 
Kamal-ud-Din’s death on the same day as Sheldrake’s lecture, just to compete 
with him. At this gathering, they distributed free pamphlets with photos of 
their “prophet” among Sheldrake’s audience. Al-Hilālī was surprised that 
whereas The Light welcomed his trip to India, the Woking mosque in London 
was “fighting against him by all means.” However, in al-Hilālī’s view, the Muslim 
world highly appreciated Sheldrake’s work for the sake of Islam and poor fel-
low Muslims in Britain.86
Al-Hilālī accused the Ahmadis of “paradox and cunning” for “playing” with 
Sheldrakeʼs name and that of other European converts; but Sheldrake had 
already uncovered this Ahmadiyya scheme by denying his conversion in their 
circles. Ahmadi attacks against Sheldrake were deemed as “testimony for him 
before all Muslims in the world that he seeks God’s face only….”87 Al-Hilālī 
argued that the Ahmadi falsely accused him of making the trip to India to col-
lect money in the name of the Muda of Sarawak.88 However, it should be noted 
that Muda of Sarawak received many letters from India regarding the tour of 
Sheldrake and Simpson in India; and for this reason she distanced herself from 
their statements on her behalf.89
At this point, in order to unify all mainstream Muslims, Sheldrake was 
strongly urged to deny all connections with Ghulam Ahamd and his “absurd” 
mission as a reformer of Islam.90 In the Arab Muslim press in Egypt, Sheldrake 
distanced himself from the Ahmadi factions and defended his sincerity for 
Islam in Europe to such an extent that he lost his wealth and family for the 
sake of his new religion.91 Al-Fatḥ boasted about Sheldrake’s Muslim mission-
ary activities in the Far East and southeast Asia and declared that he was “the 
greatest Muslim guide of the age.”92 At this time, an Egyptian dignitary 
86 Ibid.
87 Al-Fatḥ 8, no. 371 (16 Nov. 1933), 12.
88 Ibid., 12.
89 The Light (June 1933), 11.
90 An example of that was his support to the Egyptian nationalist Muṣṭafā Kamīl (1874–1908) 
during the well-known Dinshwai campaign led by the latter in England in 1906. Al-Fatḥ 7, 
no. 327 (12 Jan. 1933), 1–2.
91 Khalid Sheldrake, “al-Duktūr Khalid Sheldrake yataḥaddath ʿan tārīkh ʿalāqatih bi-l-Islām 
wa yuʿlin barāʾatahu min al-Aḥmadiyya wa-l-Qadyāniyya awalan wa-ākhiran” [Dr. Khalid 
Sheldrake speaks about the history of his relationship to Islam and clears his name from 
any connection with the Ahmadiyya and Qadiyaniyya], al-Fatḥ 8, no. 383 (15 Feb. 1934), 
6–7.
92 “Al-Duktūr Khalid Sheldrake wa-riḥalātuh fī l-sharq” [Dr. Khalid Sheldrake and his trips in 
the East], al-Fatḥ 8, no. 385 (1 March 1934), 7.
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appealed to Shaykh al-Azhar to donate money to the Ahmadiyya movement 
to support their efforts to spread Islam in England. But the editor of al-Fatḥ 
was disappointed, and campaigned instead for financial support for 
Sheldrake’s activities; the editor claimed that he served the “genuine” Islam in 
Europe.93 To his Arab readers, Sheldrake did not deny that he maintained 
good ties with Mawlana Muḥammed ʿAlī, but this did not mean that he had 
any direct association with the Ahmadiyya. He said that although the 
Ahmadis intended to destroy his reputation by linking his name to their mis-
sion in Europe, his efforts were still appreciated by many Muslim leaders in 
Europe, such the Agha Khan, the above-mentioned Ḥāfiẓ Wahba, and the 
Egyptian consul to the United States. He also claimed to be a defender of the 
Palestinian cause, and sent money for Palestine, and supported the cause of 
needy Muslim seamen and their families in Britain.94 After his trip to the 
Orient, Sheldrake was keen on presenting himself as a defender of pan-
Islamic endeavors.95
 Omar Rolf Baron von Ehrenfels: A Controversial Convert
While Sheldrake was closely engaged with Salafī groups in Egypt, the above-
mentioned Baron von Ehrenfels became a controversial convert in these circles 
because of his evident connection with the Ahmadiyya in Berlin.96 Initially, 
von Ehrenfels was praised by the Ahmadiyya for his founding role in the estab-
lishment of the Islamische Kulturbund (Association of Muslim Culture) in 
93 Ibid.
94 Khalid Sheldrake, “Li-mādha yaḥmilu ʿalayya al-Aḥmadiyyūn?” [Why are the Ahmadis 
against me?], al-Fatḥ 9, no. 421 (15 Nov. 1934), 22–23.
95 Khalid Sheldrake, “Mustaqbal al-Islām” [The future of Islam], al-Fatḥ 9, no. 434 (21 Feb. 
1935), 12–13. Khalid Sheldrake, “al-Yapān wa-l-Islām al-ḥaqq” [Japan and genuine Islam], 
al-Fatḥ 9, no. 439 (5 April 1935), 18–19.
96 See some of Baron Omar Rolf von Ehrenfels’ works: “Islam and the Present Generation in 
Europe,” Islamic Review 20, no. 11 (Nov. 1932), 383; “Muslim Women in Present-Day Europe,” 
Islamic Culture 24, no. 10 (July 1936), 471; “The Pre-Aryan Cultures of India and the 
Ethnological Background of Islam,” Islamic Culture 13, no. 2 (April 1939), 176; “Ethnology 
and Islamic Sciences,” Islamic Culture 14, no. 4 (Oct. 1940), 434; Mother-Right in India 
(Hyderabad: Government Central Press, 1941); “A Scheme for Equitable Distribution of 
Zakat,” Islamic Review 34 (1946), 407; “The ‘How?’ and ‘Why?’ of Conversion to Islam,” 
Islamic Review 49, no. 6 (June 1961), 23; “Islam und Wissenschaft,” Kairos: Zeitschrift für 
Religionswissenschaft und Theologie 5 (1963), 114; Das Kulturproblem der Entwicklungshilfe 
im Südasiatischen Raum (Heidelberg: Universität Heidelberg. Südasien-Institut, 1966).
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Vienna.97 However, the Ahmadis were criticized by Khalid Simpson for having 
given little credit to the Egyptian medical doctor Zākī ʿAlī, an associate of 
Arslān, and for his co-founding role with von Ehrenfels in the Islamische 
Kulturbund in Austria. Moreover, it was Zākī ʿAlī who also tried in collabora-
tion with Sheldrake to organize the Muslims of central Europe.98 In response, 
the Ahmadis apologized for this unintentional mistake and stressed that other 
Muslims working in Europe, including Sheldrake, should be given due credit. 
They warned other European Muslims against “imbibing the virus which has 
sapped all validity out of Eastern Muslims. Mr. Simpson’s letter plainly shows 
that some so-called ‘friends’ of his have been trying to inject the same poison 
into him.”99 Therefore, sectarianism should be denounced by European 
Muslims in order to proceed with the “Islamization” of Europe.100
In 1932–1933, von Ehrenfels traveled to India accompanied by Muḥammad 
S. Abdullah, the imam of the Ahmadiyya Berlin mosque. As in the press cover-
age about Headley’s visit to Cairo almost ten years before, von Ehrenfels’ arrival 
in Lahore was described by the Ahmadi magazine The Light: “as the Frontier 
Mail slided in, the platform resounded with shouts of Allah-o-Akbar. On alight-
ing from the train, the Baron and the Imam were profusely garlanded and it 
was stilt great difficulty that a way could be forced out of the huge crowd to the 
car, bedecked with flowers.”101 Taqī l-Dīn al-Hilālī translated The Light’s report 
about von Ehrenfels’ visit, the welcoming of the Ahmadiyya to his project to 
translate the Qurʾān into German, and the plans to start a Muslim mission and 
build a mosque in Vienna. Al-Hilālī saw the Baron’s choice of India to increase 
his knowledge of the Islamic sciences as an unfortunate one. He chose India 
because Qadiyani (he did not use the Lahori) Muslims were not welcomed 
anymore in Egypt, the Hijaz, Yemen or Syria. The Ahmadis allegedly kept von 
Ehrenfels away from the centers of “Muḥammadan Islam” for fear that their 
“fallacies” would be unearthed.102
97 “Iḥtifāl al-Muslimīn fī l-Nimsā bi-taʾsīs rābiṭat al-thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya” [Celebration of 
Muslims in Austria to the inauguration of the Association of Muslim Culture], al-Fatḥ 7, 
no. 324 (22 Dec. 1932), 15. It enthusiastically announced its inaugural festivity and postal 
address in Austria without giving any reference to its Ahmadiyya character.
98 “The European Muslims,” The Light (8 Feb. 1933), 3.
99 Ibid., 4.
100 Ibid.
101 “The Anjuman’s Anniversary,” The Light (Jan. 1933), 1.
102 Taqī l-Dīn al-Hilālī, “al-Baron Omar Rolf al-Nimsāwī aslama islāman qadiyāniyyan” [The 
Austrian Baron Omar holds a Qadiyani Islam], al-Fatḥ 7, no. 337 (24 March 1933), 14. To 
combat the Ahmadiyya Light magazine, he suggested that the English supplement of 
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Baron von Ehrenfels publicly announced that he never denied Zākī ʿAlī’s 
support as a secretary of Kulturbund in Vienna; and said that he had he always 
had good “brotherly” relations with him.103 Meanwhile, on behalf of the 
Kulturbund, a certain Muḥammad Saljaq al-Busnawī, a member of the 
Kulturbund’s board, strongly rejected the “rumors” ascribed to the Baron that 
he had converted to Islam according to the Ahmadiyya doctrines; and that 
their society was connected in any way to the Ahmadiyya movement in Europe. 
Zākī ʿAlī’s main objective was to establish an Islamic center in the heart of 
Europe. His choice of the Baron as its president was because of the latter’s 
sincerity and fame as a European writer. It was a condition of the board that 
the Baron should not attach himself to any Muslim organization that was at 
odds with the mainstream consensus in the Muslim world. The Kulturbund 
had several connections with Muslim organizations, including the Ahmadis. 
This was, therefore, the reason he was invited to deliver lectures in India in 
many Muslim circles, including the Ahmadiyya in Lahore. The Kulturbund’s 
board warned von Ehrenfels against expressing any direct affiliation with the 
Ahmadiyya, or, they said they would be compelled to replace him in that posi-
tion. They also sent a declaration to the Indian press regarding this issue.104 
Al-Khaṭīb was relieved by this news and appreciated the Kulturbund’s public-
ity in India. “If my father were connected to the Qadiyanis,” he wrote, “I would 
launch a ‘war’ against him and would warn all Muslims against him.”105
 Sense of Competition and Climax
In this context, and because they perceived a sense of competition with the 
Ahmadiyya missionary work in Europe, al-Fatḥ became keen on countering 
their missions by reporting the “success” of non-Ahmadiyya Muslim missions 
in Europe.106 They strongly urged Muslims to form a front of European and 
American converts who could stand up to the spread of Catholic and Protestant 
allegations against Islam. The historical changes in Europe of that time 
al-Azhar mouthpiece, Nūr al-Islām, should include a chapter entitled: “The Light of Islam” 
in which anti-Islamic ideas could be refuted.
103 The Light (24 Feb. 1933), 4.
104 “Barʾa min al-Qadiyāniyya” [Innocent of being a Qadiyani], al-Fatḥ 7, no. 340 (24 April 
1933), 14.
105 Ibid.
106 Ḥasan Anwar, “al-Daʿwa ilā l-islām fī Ūrubā” [Islamic mission in Europe], al-Fatḥ 8, no. 381 
(1 Feb. 1934), 6–7.
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indicated that it was a suitable time to launch such solid Islamic missions in 
Europe. After World War i, the European and American public had changed; 
and it was high time for Muslim missionaries to clarify the “values of Islam” in 
Europe. In the past, western political parties and leaders had nourished the 
western Christian public opinion against Islam in order to get rid of Muslims 
on the European continent. This spirit thoroughly dominated in Europe before 
the war, and negatively effected Muslim minorities in these states, especially in 
Hungary and Poland. Therefore, al-Khaṭīb saw it as a pressing issue for Muslims 
to strengthen their presence in Europe by establishing religious, economic, 
and social relations with Europeans. He especially lamented the “weakness” 
and “ignorance” of Muslims in eastern Europe, and hoped that the European 
Muslim Congress (1935) in Geneva would sustain them in their religious 
affairs.107
Previous conversions in the Woking mosque were again brought into ques-
tion. These accounts were confused. A certain Aḥmad al-Sharīf, an Egyptian 
living in Berlin, cast doubt on the authenticity of Lord Headleyʼs conversion to 
the “true” Islam.108 Despite this clear anti-Ahmadiyya line of thought, the con-
versions of new European Muslims were confused and inconsistently recalled 
in these Salafī circles. For example, Lord Headley’s role in the conversion of 
other elite British people to Islam was eulogized. An Arabic summary of the 
introduction of Lady Evelyn Cobbold’s book, Pilgrimage to Mecca,109 which 
was about her conversion, was discussed in al-Fatḥ at length without referring 
to her active role in the Woking mosque in London.110
The disputes about the Ahmadiyya’s position in Europe resonated among 
Egyptian readers. Some Egyptians were already in contact with the Woking 
mosque. A certain Maḥmūd Ḥamdī ʿAlī, president of the association of al-Muslim 
al-Āmil (the Active Muslim, which was affiliated with the Muslim Brothers) in 
Cairo, was a reader of Ahmadiyya (such as The Islamic Review) and Salafī journals. 
Being confused about their religious work in Europe, he contacted the Woking 
mosque in London (August 1934) with an inquiry about the prevailing “rumor” in 
107 Al-Fatḥ 8, no. 399 (4 June 1934), 1–3.
108 Aḥmad al-Sharīf, “al-Lāhūriyyūn wa-Britānia” [The Lahoris in Britain], al-Fatḥ 9, no. 423 
(29 Nov. 1934), 20–22. See also al-Fatḥ 9, no. 426 (20 Dec. 1934), 11.
109 Al-Fatḥ 9, no. 429 (18 Jan. 1935), 11. See also, William Facey, “Mayfair to Makkah,” Saudi 
Aramco World 59, no. 5 (2008): 18–23; available online: http://www.saudiaramcoworld 
.com/issue/200805/mayfair.to.makkah.htm (accessed 20 March 2014).
110 Cobbold’s name was also enlisted in the Ahmadiyya volume of conversion stories of 
Europeans. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad Cobbold, Charms of Islam: A Collection of Writings of 
Some of the Eminent Scholars (Woking: Woking Muslim Mission & Literary Trust, 1935), 
45–47.
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Egypt that concerned their propagation of the prophecy of Ghulam Ahmad in 
Europe.111 The Islamic Review published ʿAlīʼs letter after a few months and 
stressed that their mosque was neither a Qadiyani nor an Ahmadi movement. 
They believed in the Prophet Muḥammad as the seal of prophecy, and belonged 
to the Ḥanafī school of thought. Any claimant of prophecy after him was consid-
ered beyond the pale of Islam.112 In al-Fatḥ, ʿAlī noted that his message was effec-
tive because the magazine changed its Arabic caption from “naḥmaduh wa nuṣallī 
ʿala rasūlih al-karīm” (we thank Him [God] and our prayers are upon his generous 
prophet) to “naḥmaduh wa nuṣallī wa nuṣallim ʿala rasūlih Muḥammad khaṭam 
al-nabiyyīn” (we thank Him and our prayers and greetings are upon his messen-
ger Muḥammad, the seal of prophecy).113 Al-Fatḥ tried to convince its reader that 
the Lahore branch was rather a “chameleon,” that changed its “colors.”114
Those in the Salafī circles were not clear about the nature of the Ahmadiyya 
work in Europe. The same Maḥmūd Ḥamdī ʿAlī published an Arabic transla-
tion of the 1934 Eid al-Adha sermon delivered in the Woking mosque by the 
above-mentioned envoy extraordinary of the King of Hijaz in London Shaykh 
Ḥāfiẓ Wahba. This article was placed in al-Fatḥ a few pages after a thorny anti-
Ahmadiyya article written as part of a series by the former president and sec-
retary of the Ahmadiyya branch in Cairo.115 The editor of al-Fatḥ, a great 
sympathizer of the King of Hijaz, probably forgot that Ḥāfiẓ Wahba was a 
regular visitor to the Woking mosque. It should be noted that Wahba was 
close to the imam of the mosque and delivered the sermons there several 
times.116
Nevertheless, in the mid 1930s these inconsistent attitudes coincided with 
the peak of the anti-Ahmadiyya campaign in the Muslim press worldwide. 
Still, it was sometimes presumed that the Woking mosque was not directly 
affiliated with the Ahmadiyya because of their defense of Sunnī Islam and the 
reception of Muslim dignitaries visiting Britain. On 30 June 1935, Prince Saʿūd, 
eldest brother of King ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Āl Saʿūd, was cordially received at the 
Woking mosque during his visit to London.117
111 See Islamic Review (March 1935), 108.
112 Ibid., 81.
113 Islamic Review (Sept. 1934), 1.
114 al-Fatḥ 9, no. 445 (16 May 1935), 17–18.
115 See al-Fatḥ 10, no. 456 (2 Aug. 1935), 13–15; cf. 18–19.
116 See, for example, Islamic Review (July 1934), 221–223. See Wahba’s photo with his signature 
in Islamic Review (March-April 1931).
117 Islamic Review (Aug. 1935).
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Meanwhile, al-Fatḥ announced, as surprising news, that the Woking mosque 
had been finally and conclusively “unmasked” as an Ahmadi religious institu-
tion after years of vacillating. Although many Muslims, both in the Muslim 
world and in Europe, were still confused about its nature, the affiliation of the 
Woking mosque with the Ahmadiyya became evident after the Ahmadiyya 
representative in Cairo distributed Mawlana Muḥammad ʿAlīʼs book, al-Bayān 
fī l-rujūʿ ilā l-Qurʾān, in which the author openly stated that the Woking mosque 
in London and the Muslim Mission in Berlin were associated to the Lahore 
Ahmadiyya.118
By this time, Shaykh Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Salām Salīm al-Hazarwī (Hazarvi) 
(1898–1947),119 a well-known teacher of Islamic sciences in Mysore (India), was 
keen on informing his Arab “brethren” through al-Fatḥ about the real nature of 
the Woking mosque and their “hypocrisy.” As one of the fiercest opponents of 
the Ahmadiyya in the region, al-Hazarwī urged people to boycott the 
Ahmadiyya altogether. In May 1935, Abdul-Majid, the imam of Woking, and 
Khwaja Abdul-Ghani, secretary of the mosque, visited al-Hazarwī in order to 
convince him that their mosques and activities in Europe were neither associ-
ated to the Qadiyanis, nor to the Lahore line of belief, rather, they stated, they 
were followers of Ahl al-Sunna wa-l-Jamaʿa. During this meeting, al-Hazarwī 
requested that they sign a paper on which they clearly state that Ghulam 
Ahmad was an unbeliever (kāfir) because of his claim of prophecy, but they 
refused. This was, for al-Hazarwī and al-Fatḥ, definitive proof of their separa-
tion from Islam.120
The above-mentioned Egyptian Maḥmūd Ḥamdī ʿAlī gently blamed 
al-Khaṭīb for persisting in this stance regarding the Muslims of the Woking 
mosque, who did not explicitly consider Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet. 
But al-Khaṭīb remained adamant in his position. For him, the Ahmadiyya 
Lahore missionaries, including Mawlana Muḥammad ʿAlī and Kamal-ud-Din, 
were clandestinely concealing their real nature behind their claim that the 
Mirza was a reformer, in order to achieve their goals, which ultimately served 
British colonial interests.121 In the view of al-Fatḥ, another proof of their hatred 
of Islam was the joy expressed by a Qadiyani paper in India at the death of 
118 al-Fatḥ, 10, no. 475 (12 Dec. 1935), 6.
119 About him, see online at: http://www.almoajam.org/poet_details.php?id=3920 (accessed 
20 March 2014).
120 al-Fatḥ 10, no. 454 (18 July 1935), 8–10.
121 al-Fatḥ 10, no. 456 (2 Aug. 1935), 8–10; see also, al-Fatḥ 10, no. 461 (5 Sept. 1935), 14–15; 
al-Fatḥ 10, no. 464 (26 Sept. 1935), 16–17.
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Rashīd Riḍā; it stated that his demise was the “perishing of the first and the 
strongest adversary of the Promised Messiah…in the Muslim world.”122
European converts started to demand that the Woking leadership disassoci-
ate themselves from the Ahmadiyya. Led by Sheldrake, a group of British con-
verts, including Sir Omar Hubert C. Rhys Stewart-Rankin (1899–1988) and Sir 
Charles Edward Abdullah Watkin Hamilton (1876–1939), disclaimed any rela-
tionship with Lord Headley, and regretted their earlier friendship with the 
Ahmadiyya altogether. To Sheldrake, the Ahmadis were “tricky people” who 
caused him “pain.”123 At this point, some British converts severed their ties to 
the Woking mosque. After Headley’s death in 1935, Omar Stewart-Rankin suc-
ceeded him as president of the British Muslim Society. A month later, he 
resigned after a meeting with the Woking members during which he put for-
ward a resolution that the mosque should not have any connection with the 
Ahmadis in India. When his resolution was defeated, Stewart-Rankin and 
other members walked away. He decided therefore to form a new “orthodox 
and non-sectarian” Muslim society.124 Stewart-Rankinʼs move was seen by 
some other converts as a “non-sensical split…through his impulsiveness.”125 
Mubarak Fuelling, a Qadiyani British convert, even criticized this split by argu-
ing that most British Muslims were “led like sheep in all matters that affected 
Islam by any man from the East who had a beard or spoke Arabic.”126
A few days later, al-Khaṭīb received the news of Stewart-Rankinʼs split from 
the Ahmadiyya in London with great joy. For him, it was now the right time to 
“purify” the Islamic daʿwa in Britain from the “filth” of the Ahmadiyya. He 
boasted that it was his magazine that raised its “gentle voice” against their work 
in Britain from the start. But his “good intentions” regarding the Woking 
mosque and The Islamic Review in the beginning were spoiled by mosque’s 
refusal to clearly distance itself from Ghulam Ahmad. He saw Stewart-Rankinʼs 
resignation as a result of anti-Ahmadiyya voices in the Muslim world.127
Similarly, at the invitation of the Islamische Gemeinde in Berlin, a group of 
more than fifty Muslims living in Berlin gathered and issued a declaration to 
the Muslim world to condemn and boycott the Ahmadiyya activities in Europe. 
They denounced their work as “charlatanry” in the name of Islam. The list 
included Arab, Indian, and European names, such as the converts Walter 
122 al-Fatḥ 10, no. 470 (7 Nov. 1935), 13.
123 Sheldrake, “Li-mādha,” 14–15. See al-Fatḥ 9, no. 417 (18 Oct. 1934), 4.
124 “British Muslims’ Leader Resigns,” Times (12 Dec. 1935).
125 See Gilham, Loyal Enemies, 204.
126 Ibid.
127 al-Fatḥ 10, no. 476 (19 Dec. 1935), 6–7.
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Mohammed Ḥasan Hoffmann, Chalid-Albert Seiler-Chan, Faruq Fischer, and 
S. Umar W.A. Schubert,128 who later supported the establishment of another 
Muslim congregation in Berlin.
 Conclusion
As we have seen, the individuals analyzed in this chapter followed specific paths 
that elucidate, in different ways, the many worlds in which they lived. In particu-
lar, the history of European converts to Islam highlights aspects of the shifting 
patterns of interaction not only between Muslims and European society, but also 
with the global Muslim community in the interwar period. It is clear that they, as 
European actors, crossed boundaries in the transcultural history of the period; 
this was a result of their active role as new Muslims connecting the East and 
West. Their role was also a function of the intra-Muslim religious debates between 
the Salafiyya and Ahmadiyya as conflicting branches of Islam of that time.
As a matter of fact, the multifold and deeply-rooted conflicts between the 
Salafiyya and Ahmadiyya were uncompromising. However, we have observed 
that the presence of European converts as new and engaging figures uncon-
sciously created a certain commonality between these disagreeing Muslim 
branches through their entwining role in Europe. They all had one goal in com-
mon, namely the relevance of Islam on European soil. The chapter has also 
tried to demonstrate the interconnected history of the Salafiyya, Ahmadiyya, 
128 al-Fatḥ 10, no. 478 (2 Jan. 1936), 17. My gratitude to Gerdien Jonker for her help in identify-
ing these figures.
Figure 3.4  (continued)
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and European converts in a common past that was not only characterized by 
enduring conflict, but also by the exchange of ideas. In other words, these con-
flicts were not always primarily translated into complete boycott, but knew 
many blurry zones. This can be seen quite clearly in the unprecedented 
Egyptian welcome of Lord Headley despite his Ahmadiyya affiliation. As for 
the case of the Salafī-leaning journal al-Fatḥ, despite its editor’s vehement dis-
like of the Ahmadiyya, he allowed many writers to express positive remarks 
about the Ahmadiyyaʼs role in Europe.
Salafī responses to the Ahmadiyya in Europe were ambivalent. Initially, 
some Salafī writers recognized the significance of the symbolic and organiza-
tional centrality of the Woking mosque in the interwar period and its impor-
tance for the presence of Islam in Europe in general. Nevertheless, Addison’s 
remarks in 1929 on the reluctance of the Lahore group to admit any connection 
with the Ahmadiyya movement, especially their eagerness to modify their 
message according to the fashion of the hour, correctly corresponds with the 
hesitant appreciation of the reformist figures discussed in the chapter. It may 
be no surprise therefore that Riḍā did not consider Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din after 
the latter’s death as a true follower of the Ahmadiyya.
The change of the Salafiyya movement to a more “populist” turn radically 
affected the image of the Ahmadiyya in the Muslim world. Al-Fatḥ, which was, 
initially, somewhat positive about the Ahmadiyya’s missionary work in Europe, 
boldly demanded that the Lahore group disavow their connection with Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad altogether. In 1940, Ḥasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim 
Brothers, continued the anti-Ahmadiyya campaign when he became the editor 
of al-Manār at the request of Riḍā’s family.129
Among European converts, Lord Headley and Khalid Sheldrake occupied 
prominent places in Salafī circles. Headley remained closely connected to the 
Woking mosque until his death in 1935, while Sheldrake maintained close con-
tacts with Salafī circles in the East. Despite his several writings in Ahmadi pub-
lications, he ultimately created a swift anti-Ahmadiyya backlash in the Muslim 
Salafī press. In the late 1930s, Sheldrake disappeared from the scene and became 
a business representative in Turkey and a part-time employee of the British 
Council in Ankara. He died in London in 1947, three years after his return to 
Britain. Despite his role in the formative making of British Islam, his death was 
ignored in the British and mainstream Muslim press.130 David/Dawud Cowan 
(1915–2003), a British convert and assistant imam in the Woking mosque, 
recalled to Gilham many decades later that “Sheldrake was considered a bit of 
129 al-Manār 35, no. 7 (April 1940), 443.
130 Gilham, Loyal Enemies, 237.
83Salafiyya, Ahmadiyya and European Converts to Islam
<UN>
a charlatan…Various people said Sheldrake talked about Islam for the profit of 
British secret service.”131 Although one must take such later testimonies with a 
grain of salt, they reflect at least the images made among these converts amid 
such disputes.
Interwar European converts still occupy a special place in the writings of 
some prominent contemporary Muslim scholars in the generation after World 
War ii. For example, the well-known Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar (1910–1978), 
ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Maḥmūd, was an al-Azhar student completing post-graduate 
degrees in Europe in the 1930s. In Paris, he met with Khalid Sheldrake in the 
literary salon of Dayang Muda of Sarwak, where he was impressed by this 
intellectual sphere that gathered European converts to Islam in the French 
capital.132 This experience led this traditional Azhari scholar to write his 
famous book on the relationship between Europe and Islam. Maḥmūd cited 
Lord Headley, along with the French convert to Islam Étienne Dinet (1861–
1929), as an exemplary European Muslim who rendered a great service to Islam 
in Europe; Maḥmūd avoided any reference to Headleyʼs Ahmadiyya back-
ground in the interwar period.133
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chapter 4
Conversion of European Intellectuals to Islam:  
The Case of Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje  
alias ʿAbd al-Ghaffār
Pieter Sjoerd van Koningsveld
In reflecting on the role learned European converts to Islam may play in inter-
cultural communication and Islamic scholarship, it seems useful to distinguish 
between three main types of conversion. First, there is the permanent conver-
sion, in which the convert acts out of free will and personal conviction and 
believes that he has converted for the rest of his life. In their new status, these 
intellectuals also may acquire completely new audiences and with them new 
chances for a successful intellectual career, especially if they use their talents 
in the service of combatting their old faith. In fact, numerous polemical and 
apologetic writings flew from the pens of these erudite converts who attacked 
their old faith or philosophy of life and defended their choice of Islam. A 
famous case is Fray (“Brother”) Anselm of Turmeda (ʿAbdallāh al-Tarjumān 
al-Mayurqī), who authored his famous anti-Christian pamphlet Gift for the 
Intelligent to Confute the People of the Cross in Tunis, after his conversion to 
Islam in the latter half of the fourteenth century.1 In fact, this phenomenon of 
learned European converts producing polemical and apologetic writings con-
tinues to the present day, as is amply illustrated by the study of Salah Abdel 
Razaq on neo-Muslim intellectuals in the West; he writes long chapters on 
their contributions to Islamic polemical, anti-Western, and anti-Christian lit-
erature.2 Some of the works of these converted polemicists even enjoy distri-
bution on a worldwide scale, in translations into the major languages of the 
Muslim world. There are, however, some rare exceptions to the majority of 
these polemical erudites. An example is Leopold Weiss, of Austrian Jewish 
extraction, who converted to Islam and adopted the name Muhammad Asad, 
then delved deeply into Arabic and Islamic sources, and ultimately developed 
1 ʿAbdallāh al-Tarjumān al-Mayurqī, Tuḥfat al-arīb fī l-radd ʿalā ahl al-ṣalīb, ed./trans. Mikel 
Epalza (Madrid: Hiperión, 1994), 26–42.
2 Salah Abdel Razaq, Neo-Muslim Intellectuals in the West and Their Contributions to Islamic 
Thought and the Formation of Western Islam (Leuven: Peeters, 2008), Ch. 5, 229–262, and 
Ch. 6, 263–212.
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into an Islamic scholar with a wide recognition, and even translated and com-
mented upon the Qurʾān.3
A second type of conversion frequently observed is forced conversion. Here, 
the intention of the “convert” usually is to return in due time to his/her original 
faith or conviction or even to continue his/her original faith or conviction with-
out any interruption but in secret. This results in the phenomenon of a simu-
lated or fraudulent conversion. During the period of slavery, for instance, many 
enslaved European Christians outwardly converted to Islam under duress. 
Those who were fortunate enough to escape or be ransomed usually reverted to 
their original faith immediately upon returning to their home countries.4
A third type of conversion to be distinguished is the conversion of conve-
nience. This is an insincere form of conversion performed only to obtain cer-
tain interests, like a marriage, access for one’s children to a confessional school, 
access to a certain club or place open to adherents of a particular religion. The 
fraudulent convert who converts out of convenience may have in mind activi-
ties such as espionage, research in the field, love relations, etc. The history of 
European “conversions of convenience” to Islam is promising and deserves a 
profound historical study. The earliest example known to the present author 
dates back to the year 1162, when, according to Arabic sources, two Andalusian 
Christians (probably Arabic speaking “Mozarabs” from Christian Spain), dis-
guised as Muslims, attempted to dig an underground tunnel in Medina, in 
order to steal the bones of the Prophet Muḥammad and bring these with them 
back to Spain. They were unmasked and executed.5 Another early example is 
the early sixteenth-century Italian traveler Ludovico di Varthema who as a 
“temporary convert” was able to provide an eyewitness report of the Prophet’s 
Mosque in Medina with historical explanations in a language that his readers 
could understand; he described, for instance, Abū Bakr, Muḥammad’s succes-
sor buried next to him, as a “cardinal, who had the ambition to become pope.”6
Each of us can think of some famous examples of a more recent time, like 
Edward William Lane (1801–1876), who undertook research in the first half of 
3 Martin Kramer, “The Road from Mecca: Muhammad Asad (born Leopold Weiss),” in The 
Jewish Discovery of Islam, ed. Martin Kramer (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1999), 225–247.
4 Bartolomé Bennassar et Lucile Bennassar, Les chrétiens d’Allah. L’histoire extraordinaire des 
rénégats. xvie-xviie siècles (Paris: Perrin, 1989).
5 For a detailed report see, among others: al-Samhūdī, Wafā l-wafāʾ bi-akhbār dār al-Muṣṭafā, 
ed. Qāsim al-Sāmarrāʾī (Mecca/Medina: Muʾassasat al-Furqān 1422/2001), 2:431–439.
6 Ludovico di Varthema, The Itinerary of Ludovico di Varthema of Bologna from 1502 to 1508 as 
Translated from the Original Italian Edition of 1510, by John Winter Jones, F.S.A. in 1863 for the 
Hakluyt Society (London: Argonaut Press, 1928), xxxiv.
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the nineteenth century into the manners and customs of the Egyptians. Well-
known travelogues of an earlier date, like those of Johann Ludwig Burckhardt 
(1784–1817) and Richard Francis Burton (1821–1890) could hardly have been 
written had they not enjoyed the advantages of temporary conversions. Less 
known is the example of Léon Roches (1809–1900), who would hardly have 
been successful in gathering fatwās in favor of the French colonial administra-
tion, had he not presented himself as a Muslim. He was called “Omar ould 
Roches” by the leader of the Algerian resistance against the French invasion of 
Algeria, Prince ʿAbd al-Qādir, in 1837 after the latter had married him to a 
woman from his entourage and had made him his personal secretary. His mis-
sion to collect fatwās in Kairouan, Cairo, and Mecca, that authorized Muslims 
of Algeria to live under French domination, dates back to the early 1840s. After 
having completed this mission, Roches decided to enter the clergy as a priest 
and involve himself in the mission. After King Louis Philippe convinced Pope 
Gregory xvi that he urgently needed the prolonged services of Roches, he left 
the clergy and was reintegrated into the French army as its chief interpreter.7
The Dutch orientalist Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936) is a special 
case; he accumulated the social and political advantages of a conversion of con-
venience to its fullest extent, during a long period of his active life. His conver-
sion started as a temporary one but happened to develop into a more 
permanent form, though it remained restricted to a segment of his network, 
only. Snouck’s half year stay in Mecca (1884–1885) was, probably, initially con-
ceived by him in the framework of a temporary conversion needed only for 
that stay. It so happened, however, that the further vicissitudes of his life 
incited him to revitalize his “temporary” conversion after the original date of 
its expiration, when, in 1889 he went to the Dutch East Indies and stayed there 
for sixteen years as an official advisor to the Dutch government. There he 
resumed his Meccan Muslim network and expanded it considerably, also 
founding a Muslim family with Muslim wives and Muslim children. Here we 
observe the origins of a double life that continued until his death in 1936. His 
first and by far the most extensive network were his European contacts, includ-
ing many orientalists and other academics, in addition to a long list of officials 
of the Dutch colonial administration. The second network consisted of his 
Muslim contacts, including prominent religious scholars and members of the 
ruling class, mainly from Arabia and the Dutch East Indies.8
7 Jacques Caillé, Une mission de Léon Roches à Rabat en 1845. Documents inédits avec introduc-
tion et commentaires (Casablanca: Kaganski, 1947), 13–14.
8 The previous two paragraphs are a brief summary of my book Snouck Hurgronje en de Islam. 
Acht artikelen over leven en werk van een oriëntalist uit het koloniale tijdperk (Leiden, 1987), 
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Seventy-five years after his death, it seems quite clear that Snouck’s major 
historical influence lies in his contributions to the formation of a colonial 
Islam policy in the Dutch East Indies. The Republic of Indonesia became the 
direct heir of the Dutch East Indies as they had been created and forged into 
one national state from innumerable smaller political entities during the colo-
nial era. Similarly, the Dutch East Indian Islam policies, as well as the institu-
tions developed for them during the colonial period, became the basis of the 
Islam policies of the Republic of Indonesia after its independence. Jakarta’s 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, for instance, is a direct continuation of the “Office 
of Religion” or Kantor Agama of the colonial era.9 From this perspective, 
Snouck’s Muslim network can be expected to shed light on the colonial pre-
history of modern Indonesia, and especially on the origin of its Islamic poli-
cies and their related institutions. As Snouck’s personal archives are now 
becoming accessible at Leiden University Library, also in digitalized form, this 
is the right time for a first exploration of at least the key people in his extensive 
Muslim network.
Here, one should separate the numerous incidental contacts on the one 
hand from the much less numerous long lasting contacts, on the other hand. In 
the many official capacities he occupied: Advisor of Islamic and Native Affairs, 
first in the Dutch East Indies and later in the Netherlands; Professor of Arabic 
and Islamic Studies at Leiden University; editor of the Encyclopaedia of Islam 
published at Brill; Supervisor of the Oriental Manuscripts Collection of the 
Leiden University Library with the title “Interpres Legati Warneriani”; presi-
dent of the Dutch Oriental Society—in all these official capacities Snouck was 
likely to be approached from many sides by people with some specific interest. 
In the present context we focus exclusively on those long lasting Muslim con-
tacts that occupied a structural place in his biography.
The historical basis of Snouck’s Muslim network was certainly his journey 
to Mecca in the years 1884 and 1885 and his “temporary conversion” to Islam. 
Towards his European network, Snouck was crystal-clear in “defending” his 
conversion as a mere instrument to obtain access to Mecca and be accepted in 
a Muslim society. For instance, in a contemporary letter, dated Mecca, 1 August 
292 pp. with bibliography. This book contains a (slightly) revised version of eight articles 
published in various periodicals between 1980 and 1987. See also the Indonesian edition of 
this book, Snouck Hurgronje dan Islam. Delapan karangan tentang hidup dan karya seorang 
orientalis zaman kolonial (Jakarta: Girimukti Pasaka Publishers, 1989), 312 pp.
9 Compare the work of Moch. Nur Ichwan, “Official Reform of Islam: State Islam and the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs in Contemporary Indonesia, 1966–2004” (PhD diss., Tilburg 
University, 2006).
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1885, he assured his former teacher, the German orientalist Theodor Nöldeke, 
that he regularly visited the Kaʿba, because one could not live in a Muslim 
society without outwardly behaving as a Muslim, “because the days when 
Christians or any other scum could live here in freedom, belong to the past.”10 
And in a later letter to the same teacher, of 27 February 1915, Snouck justifies 
his Islam as follows:
No, my iẓhâr al-islâm [my outward Islamic behavior] has nothing in com-
mon with the theory that in war all means are permitted. The former is an 
intransitive measure [i.e., a measure without an object] that in the worst 
case could harm him who applied it. A measure, in my eyes far more inno-
cent than when one, in a modern society, would partake of the sacraments 
of a church or desire them for one’s children, without attaching to them 
any value. It is that, which I consider personally as blasphemy, but not the 
accommodation to the externals of an intellectually inferior society which 
are necessary in order to be considered there as a human being…. I would 
regard a similar accommodation to Christian ritual as self-evident in the 
society of South-African Boers, who also mistrust someone standing out-
side their religious community and regard him as a wretch.11
On another occasion, Snouck referred to his “temporary conversion” in a more 
indirect way, as follows: “By having studied the theory of Mohammedan law 
and doctrine and prepared myself for entire accommodation to the practice of 
Mohammedan manners and customs I was able to ‘hide in the full light’ as a 
proverbial saying of Java has it, to constantly observe without being regarded 
as observer.”12 Snouck’s own explanations of his Islam towards his European 
network and his European audience are consistent and fit into the social and 
political realities of his time. I see no reason to doubt their sincerity. However, 
a different view was proposed by Jan Just Witkam, who argued that the sincer-
ity of Snouck’s Islamic faith cannot be judged scientifically, but must remain a 
matter between him and his Creator.13 But this view is contradicted by Snouck’s 
10 C. Snouck Hurgronje, Orientalism and Islam: The Letters of C. Snouck Hurgronje to Th. 
Noldeke from the Tübingen University Library (Published by P.S. van Koningsveld, Leiden, 
Faculty of Theology, 1985), 8.
11 Snouck Hurgronje, Orientalism and Islam, 222.
12 Snouck Hurgronje, C. “Some of my Experiences with the Muftis of Mecca,” in Jaarverslagen 
1934–1940 van het Oostersch Instituut Leiden (Leiden, 1941), 4.
13 C. Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka, vertaald en ingeleid door Jan Just Witkam (Amsterdam: Atlas, 
2007), especially 75 ff.
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own numerous and crystal-clear explanations towards his European network, 
as well as by his consistent agnostic convictions that are transparent on many 
pages of his publications throughout his life.
From the Muslim side, Snouck’s conversion to Islam was accepted as genu-
ine and sincere, right from the beginning, by some circles at least. When 
Snouck, after his expulsion from Mecca, feared that mistrust of his conversion 
might have been a cause, an Algerian acquaintance, ʿAzīz b. Ḥaddād, assured 
him that this was not the case, as “you have publicly announced your conver-
sion to Islam and even the religious scholars of Mecca testified to that” 
(“li-annaka ashharta islāmaka wa-ʿulamāʾu Makka yashhadūna bi-dhālika”).14 
In certain circles, however, Snouck’s conversion became controversial. The 
famous Egyptian reformist, Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, for instance, once spoke 
of Snouck as “an enemy of Islam and a hypocrite who [falsely] pretended to 
have converted to Islam and had called himself ʿAbd al-Ghaffār; he stayed for a 
while in al-Azhar and went to Mecca where he resided to spy on the Muslims.”15 
(The episode in al-Azhar is historically incorrect. Riḍā may have confused 
Snouck with Ignaz Goldziher, who studied for some time in al-Azhar, but with-
out a prior conversion.) Yet, according to the following Muslim personalities 
and groups who occupy places of pride in his Islamic network, Snouck’s con-
version was accepted as genuine and sincere.
1 al-Sayyid ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad b. Ṣāliḥ al-Zawāwī (d. 1924)
One highly influential scholar who consistently confirmed and defended the 
authenticity of Snouck’s Islam until his death in 1924, was the Meccan scholar 
Sayyid ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad b. Ṣāliḥ al-Zawāwī whom Snouck met in 1884 
in Jeddah for the first time, even before entering the city of Mecca. Snouck fol-
lowed his courses in the Holy City and stayed in contact with him after that. 
Many years later, after the Turkish revolution and in the period of the rule of 
Sharīf Ḥusayn in Mecca, he was appointed to the highest positions a religious 
scholar could occupy in Mecca, viz. of Shafiʿī mufti and Shaykh al-ʿulamāʾ. It 
was the already-quoted Rashīd Riḍā, who in an article in his Majallat al-manār 
acknowledged that “my friend ʿAbdallāh al-Zawāwī, the mufti of Mecca, who 
14 Letter dated 20 Dhū l-Qaʿda 1302 (31 August 1885) in the Leiden University Library in port-
folio S 32 of Cod. Or. 18097, among the Snouck Hurgronje documents transferred from the 
former Oosters Instituut.
15 M. Rashīd Riḍā, “Ḥālat al-muslimīn fī Jāwa wa-l-iṣlāḥ,” al-Manār 14 (1911), 761–767.
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was one of his [=Snouck’s] teachers, believed in the genuineness of his conver-
sion to Islam.”16
According to some contemporary printed Arabic sources, al-Zawāwī had 
been expelled from Mecca in the year 1307/1889–1890 by Sharīf ʿAwn because 
of a conflict that had arisen between them concerning the authenticity of 
Snouck’s conversion to Islam, which Sharīf ʿAwn doubted, but al-Zawāwī 
defended. According to these sources, this forced al-Zawāwī to travel to Java 
(the Dutch East Indies), Malaysia, China, Japan, and India.17 For his part, 
Snouck Hurgronje informs us that al-Zawāwīʼs
intimate connections with Turkish governors and with members of the 
Sherif family who disliked the Grand Sherif Aun, became ever more evi-
dent, so that the latter watched a favourable opportunity to get rid of his 
opponent. Well knowing that such an opportunity could not fail to come, 
Sayyid Abdallah secretly put his private affairs in order, and escaped from 
his birthplace in woman’s garb. For about fourteen years his life was that 
of a wandering scholar; he visited his numerous friends and pupils in 
British India, in the Straits Settlements, in the Dutch Indies, where we 
often met. Wherever he came he was gladly received and entertained by 
his admirers, who in the meantime asked him for fatwâ’s on questions of 
law, and for a couple of years he acted as the official Mufti of the Sultan 
of Pontianak in Borneo, a prince of Arabic descent.18
The extensive collection of al-Zawāwī’s Arabic letters to Snouck preserved in 
Leiden is an eloquent witness of their continuous contacts. These letters were 
written from different places where al-Zawāwī was staying, among others dur-
ing his journeys in Southeast Asia: Singapore, Pontianak, Sukabumi, Yokohama, 
Calcutta, etc. In all of his letters (written in Arabic) which span the period 
1894–1917, Snouck is addressed as “Ḥājjī ʿAbd al-Ghaffār [Effendi], may God 
preserve him” (al-Ḥājj ʿAbd al-Ghaffār [Effendi] ḥafiẓahu Allāh), preceded by 
various expressions of politeness and appreciation.19 In 1908, after the Turkish 
revolution, he returned to Mecca. In addition to the offices of Shafiʿī mufti and 
16 Rashīd Riḍā, M. “Fatāwī al-Manār (Masāʾil al-libās wa-l-zayy),” al-Manār 26 (1926), 
416–424.
17 Aḥmad Shiryāf, “al-Sayyid ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Zawāwī Muftī l-Shāfiʿiyya bi-
Makka,” Majallat al-Sāda al-Ashrāf, vol. 11 (without pagination), and the sources men-
tioned there: http://www.alashraf.ws/vb/showthread.php?t=46218.
18 Snouck Hurgronje, “Some of my Experiences,” 15 f.
19 Leiden University Library, Cod. Or. 8952 A: 1117–1127.
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Shaykh al-ʿulamāʾ, he occupied the posts of Raʾīs Majlis al-Shūra, and that of 
Raʾīs Majlis al-Shuyūkh, thus playing a major political role in the period pre-
ceding the Saudi era. He was shot in Taʼif in 1924.
2 Raden Aboe Bakar Djajadiningrat (ca. 1854–1914)
A key person of an entirely different nature was Raden Aboe Bakar, scion of the 
noble Javanese family of Djajadiningrat, who became Snouck’s personal assis-
tant in Arabia and afterwards. Raden Aboe Bakar had studied for five years 
under the guidance of ʿAbdallāh al-Zawāwī, before he became Snouck’s per-
sonal “research-assistant.” He collected most of the vital information about the 
Jawi community in Mecca and about Meccan manners and customs which 
were to form the backbone of Snouck’s book on Meccan life in the late nine-
teenth century. His field work notes are preserved in Leiden.20
At Snouck’s personal recommendation, Raden Aboe Bakar was officially 
connected to the Dutch consulate in Jeddah as translator and information offi-
cer who, among others, was to provide the Dutch consul with information 
needed about the Jawi (i.e., Dutch Indian) community in Mecca.
What had made him so employable was his family connections with the 
Dutch administration in West Java, his connections with the large Jawi 
community in Mecca, and his fluency in several languages required for 
dealing with them, namely Arabic, Malay, Sundanese, and Javanese. From 
then on he served as the leading “native” hand at the consulate, liaising 
between the Dutch consul and the local authorities, both Ottoman and 
Sharifan; translating for visiting pilgrims from the Dutch Indies when 
they called in to register their arrival; and monitoring the activities of the 
Jawi community in nearby Mecca.21
Aboe Bakar was personally involved in preparing Snouck for his conversion 
to Islam in 1884, and his letters dating back to the period 1885 to 191222  
20 See my Snouck Hurgronje en de Islam, index s.v. Djajadiningrat, Raden Hadji Aboe Bakar.
21 Michael F. Laffan, Raden Aboe Bakar, “An Introductory Note Concerning Snouck 
Hurgronje’s Informant in Jeddah (1884–1912),” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 
155 (1999): 517–542; idem, “Writing from the Colonial Margin. The Letters of Aboe Bakar 
Djajadiningrat to Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje,” Indonesia and the Malay World 31 (2003), 
356–380, especially 358.
22 Leiden University Library, Cod. Or. 8952 A: 9–13.
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witness his conviction of the authenticity of Snouck’s Muslim identity; he 
addressed him, among other titles, as “our brother in God Shaykh ʿAbd 
al-Ghaffār Effendi, may God favor him in both worlds” (“al-Salāmu ʿalaykum 
wa-raḥmat Allāh wa-barakātuhu bi-l-dawām ʿalā mamarr al-layāli wa-l-
ayyām—yukhaṣṣu bi-hadhā ilā ḥaḍrat saʿādat al-ʿazīz dhī l-majd al-rahīb 
al-adīb akhīnā fī Allāh al-shaykh ʿAbd al-Ghaffār Effendi ballagha Allāhu 
manānahu fī l-dārayn”) (1885). At times, the letters seem to express the subor-
dinate affection of a disciple or of a servant towards his master: “His Highness, 
the unique person of his age, my fountain-head the great scholar ʿAbd 
al-Ghaffār” (“Haḍrat farīd ʿaṣrihi manbatī l-ʿallāma ʿAbd al-Ghaffār”) (1891), 
and, in 1897: “His Highness, the most exemplary model, my highest support 
Dr ʿAbd al-Ghaffār, may his rank be increased” (“Haḍrat qudwat al-amāthil 
ʿumdatī l-aʿlā Dr ʿAbd al-Ghaffār zīda qadruhu”), in 1905: “The most exemplary 
model, his Excellency ʿAbd al-Ghaffār, may his wishes continue to be fulfilled” 
(“Qudwat al-amāthil saʿādatlu ʿAbd al-Ghaffār dāma kamā rāma”; and, finally, 
in 1909, “Ḥaḍrat ʿazīzī l-mufakhkham al-ʿallāma Dr C. Sn. ʿAbd al-Ghaffār 
Effendī dāma kamā rāma”).
In the eyes of a close friend like Raden Aboe Bakar, Snouck’s Islam was an 
indisputable and, of course, also a public fact. By his close connections to 
Snouck in Arabia and his family connections in circles close to Snouck’s women 
in Java, Raden Aboe Bakar was also informed in detail about Snouck’s intimate 
life in Arabia and Java, including his women and children.
3 Ḥājjī Ḥasan Muṣṭafā (1845–1930)
A young West Javanese religious scholar Snouck met in Mecca also played a 
major role during the remaining period of Snouck’s life. First of all, during his 
seventeen-year stay in the Dutch East Indies, he assisted him, among others, 
during his field research in the pesantrens or religious schools in Java during 
the early years of his stay, as well as during his following field research in 
Acheh. Both research projects resulted in reports with a major influence on 
Dutch colonial policies. I am referring to the West Javanese scholar Ḥājjī Ḥasan 
Muṣṭafā, who was in his early forties when he met Snouck (then twenty-eight 
years old) in Mecca. Ḥājjī Ḥasan had already returned to his country of origin 
when Snouck joined him in the Dutch East Indies, in 1889.
At my proposal, H. Hasan Moestapha accompanied me in the years 
1889–1891 during some of my journeys through Java, and for an important 
part I owed it to his inappreciable support that I soon was surrounded by 
97European Intellectuals Converting to Islam: Snouck Hurgronje
<UN>
a wide circle of Natives from the contacts with whom I soon was able to 
draw the necessary information.23
These are Snouck’s own words, in appreciation of his friend.
Ḥājjī Ḥasan Muṣṭafā was appointed chief penghulu [judge] of Kotaradja in 
Acheh (North Sumatra) in 1892, at Snouck’s recommendation, and regularly 
reported to Snouck about relevant political and military developments in 
Acheh, as is witnessed by a bundle of his letters, usually written from Acheh in 
Arabic to Snouck.24 At his request, Ḥasan Muṣṭafā was transferred to the chief 
penguluship in Bandung some years later, again at the proposal of Snouck. 
Ḥasan Muṣṭafā was a gifted writer on Sundanese manners and customs, as well 
as a composer of Sundanese poetry.
Ḥasan Muṣṭafā’s close contacts with Snouck became the object of polemical 
articles in the Arab press. A long article in the Cairo weekly Misbāḥ al-Sharq 
(29 November 1902, No. 232), written by “one of the prominent Muslims in the 
lands of Jāwah,” asserted, among other issues, that the Dutch government was 
using the services of Ḥājjī Ḥasan Muṣṭafā in order to persuade the local popu-
lation to leave Islam and embrace Christianity. According to this article, Ḥasan 
Muṣṭafā was spreading various heresies among the people of the villages of 
West Java, acting under the direct influence of Snouck Hurgronje by whom he 
was protected personally.
As we shall see later on, Ḥasan Muṣṭafā was personally involved in arranging 
both Snouck’s Islamic marriages to daughters of the West Javanese nobility. 
After Snouck left the Dutch East Indies, Ḥasan Muṣṭafā regularly informed him 
about his five children whom he had left behind in Java, together with his sec-
ond wife. An extensive collection of his letters from this period is preserved in 
Leiden as well. In these letters, Ḥasan Muṣṭafā usually avoided mentioning 
Snouck’s name in a direct manner, in accordance with Sundanese etiquette. 
They nevertheless reflect their intimate, affectionate relationship in which the 
shared Islamic faith is presupposed. This is witnessed by the addresses of his 
letters: “Peace be upon you and God’s blessings” (“al-Salāmu ʿalaykum 
wa-raḥmat Allāh wa-barakātuhu”) or “Peace be upon us and upon the pious 
servants of God” (“al-Salāmu ʿalaynā wa-ʿalā ʿibād Allāh al-ṣāliḥīn”); and 
elsewhere:
23 C. Snouck Hurgronje, Ambtelijke Adviezen van C. Snouck Hurgronje 1889–1936. Uitgegeven 
door E. Gobée en C. Adriaanse (‘s Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1957–1965), 1:180. See also P.S. van 
Ronkel, “Aanteekeningen over Islam en folklore uit het reisjournaal van Dr C. Snouck 
Hurgronje,” Bijdragen Koninklijk Instituut (1942), 311–339.
24 Leiden University Library, Cod. Or. 18097, Portfolio 16.
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Peace be upon you and God’s mercy and blessings. To the point now: We 
already sent you a picture, as a token of friendship and to wish you a happy 
feast and a feast of those who (by their growing age) repeatedly celebrate 
it. Therefore, may you and I belong to those accruing and gaining benefits, 
one year after another, years after years belonging to those who are 
respected (by men) and accepted (by God). Amen. (“al-Salāmu ʿalaykum 
wa-raḥmat Allāh wa-barakātuhu. Ammā baʿdu: fa-qad ṣadarat li-janābikum 
minnā al-ṣāra wa-l-ṣāra tahniʾa wa-muʾānasa bi-al-ʿīd al-saʿīd wa-ʿīd 
al-muʿīdīn fa-naḥnu wa-iyyākum min al-ʿāʾidīn al-fāʾizīn al-ghānimīn ʿ āman 
baʿda ʿām, sinīna baʿda sinīn min al-muḥtaramīn al-maqbūlīn, Amīn.”)25
4 Sayyid ʿUthmān b. ʿAqīl al-ʿAlawī (1822–1914)
At the very center of the key people of Snouck’s Muslim network stood the 
well-known Arab scholar of South Arabian (Hadhramī) origin Sayyid ʿUthmān 
b. ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAqīl b. Yaḥyā l-ʿAlawī (1822–1914) of Batavia. From 1889, the year 
of Snouck’s arrival in the Dutch Indies, he was active in the colonial administra-
tion (from 1891 in the official capacity of “Honorary Adviser for Arab Affairs”).26 
Sayyid ʿUthmān’s grandfather ʿAqīl had been the head of the Ḥusaynī sayyids in 
Mecca. He was killed around the year 1850 in the prison of the Grand Sharīf of 
Mecca. Sayyid ʿUthmān himself was born in Batavia, but spent a good part of 
his youth in Hadramawt and in Mecca. Both in his country of origin and in 
Mecca he had studied under the most famous teachers. After returning to Java, 
he gave courses in Islamic jurisprudence and theology in the city of Batavia. 
25 The letters dating from the period 1894–1911 are in Leiden University Library, Cod. Or. 
8952 A, 713, and 735–738.
26 There are many references to the life and work of Sayyid ʿUthmān in Snouck Hurgronje’s 
works. See the indices of his Verzamelde Geschriften en his Adviezen. In recent years, sev-
eral articles were published on aspects of his biography, among which I mention here Azri 
Azyumardi, “A Hadhrami Religious Scholar in Indonesia: Sayyid ῾Uthmân,” in Hadhrami 
Traders, Scholars and Statesmen in the Indian Ocean 1750s–1960s, ed. U. Freitag and 
W.G. Clarence-Smith (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 249–263. N.J.G. Kaptein, “Arabophobia and 
Tarekat: How Sayyid ῾Uthmân Became Advisor to the Netherlands Colonial 
Administration,” in The Hadhrami Diaspora in Southeast Asia: Identity Maintenance or 
Assimilation?, ed Ahmed Ibrahim Abushouk, Hassan Ahmed Ibrahim (Leiden/Boston: 
Brill, 2009), 33–44. Recently, N.J.G. Kaptein published his biography of Sayyid ʿUthmān, 
entitled Islam, Colonialism and the Modern Age in the Netherlands East Indies: A Biography 
of Sayyid ʿUthman (1822–1914) (Leiden: Brill, 2015), containing a special chapter on Sayyid 
ʿUthmān’s relations with Snouck Hurgronje (103–140).
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Sayyid ʿUthmān was a gifted and highly productive scholar who published an 
extensive series of smaller writings, especially fatwās, on his own lithographic 
press. Snouck Hurgronje regularly relied upon him in many of his advices to the 
colonial authorities. He occasionally referred to these materials in his pub-
lished studies, in which he discussed his views on various aspects of modernity 
and the use of modern techniques in a religious context, for instance on the use 
of the phonograph for registering and reproducing recitals of the Qurʾān.
Innumerable times, Sayyid ʿUthmān proved his use as an ally of the Dutch 
East Indian government, among others when he passed on to Snouck in 1894 a 
fatwā of the mufti of Johor. In it, the mufti proved from Islamic sources that the 
Achehnese should stop fighting against the Dutch, because of the great dam-
age that would be done to Islam and Muslims if they continued the war.27 
Sayyid ʿUthmān’s staunch support of Dutch rule comprised, among others, the 
text of a supplication or duʿāʾ composed by him for the Dutch Queen 
Wilhelmina at the occasion of her eighteenth birthday, when she was able to 
relieve her mother, the Queen Mother Emma, who had acted as her regent of 
the Dutch Empire.28 This prayer was to be read in all the mosques of the Dutch 
East Indies. It in fact provoked extensive polemical reactions. It is not surpris-
ing that the Egyptian reformist Rashīd Riḍā incidentally found occasion to 
criticize Sayyid ʿUthmān as an opponent of his reforms.29
Sayyid ʿUthmān’s letters to Snouck in Leiden date back to the years 1886 and 
1888, shortly after Snouck’s return to the Netherlands from Arabia. In these 
earliest letters, he addresses Snouck as “Mister Snouck Hurgronje” (“al-Khawāja 
Snouck Hurgronje”) (1886) and as “Dr Snouck Hurgronje” (“al-Duktūr Snouck 
Hurgronje”). In these earliest letters he draws Snouck’s attention to his own 
publications and to the place of authority he occupies among the native 
Muslims in Jāwa who consult him in their religious and legal difficulties. He 
refers to the assistance he occasionally lent to the Dutch authorities when they 
wanted to investigate the mystical brotherhoods, and asks Snouck to recom-
mend him for the official position of advisor or “mufti.” As we saw earlier, after 
Snouck’s arrival in the Indies, in 1889, Sayyid ʿUthmān in fact did become his 
right hand, in the position of “Honorary Advisor of Arab Affairs.”
27 Sālim b. Aḥmad b. Muḥsin b. Bū Bakr al-ʿAṭṭās, Risālat al-taslīm wa-l-qitāl wa-l-radd ʿalā 
man aftā bi-ghayri istidlāl, privately owned manuscript in the Netherlands. A photocopy 
is in the possession of the present author.
28 A full study is provided by Nico J.G. Kaptein, “The Sayyid and the Queen: Sayyid ῾Uthmân 
on Queen Wilhelmina’s Inauguration on the Throne of the Netherlands in 1898,” Journal 
of Islamic Studies 9, no. 2 (1998): 158–177.
29 Rashīd Riḍā, “Ḥālat al-muslimīn fī Jāwa.”
van Koningsveld100
<UN>
When Snouck returned to Leiden, and thus after having known him person-
ally for many years in the Dutch East Indies, Sayyid ʿUthmān addressed him as 
follows: “His Highness, the venerable, most beloved and profound friend 
Professor ʿAbd al-Ghaffār, may his fame and honor endure, his days be fruitful 
and the signs (of his prestige) be advanced. Amen” (“Ḥaḍrat al-mukarram 
al-muḥibb al-adwam wa-l-ṣāḥib al-aḥkam al-Profīsūr ʿAbd al-Ghaffār dāma 
ʿizzuhu wa-ijlāluhu wa-ṭābat ayyāmuhu wa-aʿlā aʿlāmuhu—Amīn”) (1906), and 
in 1909 as follows:
I convey many greetings and express deep appreciation (informing you 
that there is nothing like the longing to see a noble friend, for whom there 
is no substitute), to his Esteemed Highness, both in essence and in prop-
erties, our beloved companion Professor ʿAbd al-Ghaffār, may his honor 
endure and his rank be increased, and his prestige raise high in regions 
zand cities (“Ahdī al-salām al-jazīl wa-l-thanāʾ al-jamīl (maʿa al-inbāʾ bi-
anna al-shawq ilā ruʾyat al-ṣadīq al-nabīl laysa lahu mathīl ḥaythu lam 
yūjad lahu badīl) ilā ḥaḍrat al-ʿazīz dhātan wa-ṣifātan muḥibbinā 
wa-anīsinā al-Profīsūr ʿAbd al-Ghaffār; dāma ʿizzuhu wa-zīda qadruhu 
wa-ʿalā ṣītuhu fī al-aqṭār wa-al-amṣār”).
5 Women30
A selective analysis of the key persons of Snouck’s Muslim network must pay 
some special attention to the role of women in Snouck’s life in Mecca and the 
Dutch East Indies. As we presently see, these women are likely to have strength-
ened his social position considerably.
During his stay in Mecca, Snouck succeeded in buying an Ethiopian slave 
girl with whom he lived together and to whom he incidentally referred as his 
“family” (between inverted commas) and whose name has remained unknown, 
so far. Snouck praised her, among others, by stating that “fortunately she does 
not show any of the unpleasant peculiarities of which her race is sometimes 
accused. It is a fact,” Snouck continued,
30 The contents of this paragraph are a brief extract of the more extensive data provided in 
my book Snouck Hurgronje en de Islam, especially Ch. 5, 131–142, mainly based on my 
interviews of Snouck’s descendants in Bandung, in January 1983. The extract is preceded 
by the new information concerning Snouck’s Ethiopian slave girl in Mecca, which was 
provided for the first time by Jan Just Witkam, in the introduction to his Dutch translation 
of Snouck’s Mekka (2007).
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that the experts here prefer the good Abyssinian girls over the daughters 
of the people [of Mecca], to the great irritation of the latter. From my 
part, I decided to follow this example mainly because each day my knowl-
edge about the excessive demands and the devilish tricks of the daugh-
ters of the Holy City is increased, and also because I am able to inform 
myself about their life and customs without involving myself into more 
intimate ties with them.
In the Dutch East Indies, many Dutchmen lived with indigenous concubines. 
Their mixed descendants constituted the specific social group of the so-called 
“Indos.” Often, a Dutchman would leave his concubine with their children 
behind in the Dutch Indies, when, at the completion of his service, he repatri-
ated to the Netherlands. The case of Snouck’s Islamic marriages with daughters 
of the Javanese aristocracy was different in some important aspects, but simi-
lar in other aspects. Shortly after his arrival in Java, he married the daughter, 
Sangkana, of the local chief panghulu (or chief qāḍī) of Ciamis, Raden Ḥājjī 
Muḥammad Ṭāʾib. She gave him four children, Salmah Emah, Oemar, Aminah, 
and Ibrahim. She died in 1896, when she had a miscarriage of a fifth child. Press 
articles that soon appeared in Dutch Indian newspapers of early 1890 accused 
Snouck of cheating the local population and demanded appropriate measures 
from the government. These articles stated that the marriage had been con-
cluded in the Friday Mosque of the town. Snouck denied the reports in writing, 
as did the governor general of the Dutch East Indies.
A second Islamic marriage was concluded by Snouck in 1898, with Siti 
Sadijah, then thirteen years old, the only daughter of Raden Ḥajjī Muḥammad 
Soeʾèb, vice-panghulu at Bandung, who was known, among others things, as a 
gifted reciter of the Qurʾān on ʿId al-Fiṭr in its Friday Mosque. From this mar-
riage was born one son, Joesoef, in 1905, whom I visited in Bandung in the 
1980s. He confided to me the story of Snouck’s Muslim families, which, until 
then, had been kept strictly secret in the Netherlands. When Snouck left for the 
Netherlands in 1906 he had made financial arrangements for the maintenance 
of his children and second wife, while Ḥājjī Ḥasan Muṣṭafā, who had been the 
marriage-maker in both cases, kept an eye on them and informed Snouck 
about their vicissitudes.
 Conclusion
Snouck’s conversion of convenience was perhaps the most successful case in 
colonial history of the instrumentalization of Islam for the benefit of the 
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Islamic policies of the rulers and for the development of ethnological field 
studies. The second volume of Snouck’s book on Mecca, dealing with the 
daily life of Mecca, could not have been completed without it, even though 
much of the data were gathered after his departure from the Holy City by his 
assistant Raden Aboe Bakar. Snouckʼs major books on the Achehnese as well 
as the Gayonese, could not have been written without the advantages of his 
conversion, neither could he have given the great majority of his advice to the 
colonial government. The key people of his Muslim network, each in their 
own sphere of influence, contributed considerably, not only in establishing 
and consolidating his social position within Muslim circles, but they also con-
tributed to his authority among Muslims of the Indonesian archipelago at 
large. He soon acquired the prestige of a Muslim religious scholar himself. 
Whoever understands the social impact of a network like that of Snouck can-
not be surprised at all to find petitions in his archive addressed to him in 
Batavia as “the Mufti of Batavia,” “Muftī Jāwa” (= the mufti of the Dutch 
Indies), and even as “Shaykh al-Islām fī l-Diyār al-Jāwiyya.”31 All of these 
addresses are reflections of the widespread recognition of Snouck as a Muslim 
and indeed as a Muslim scholar, as sanctioned by a wide range of Muslim 
scholars of the highest rank.
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chapter 5
Muslim Bodies in the Metropole: Social Assistance 
and “Religious” Practice in Interwar Paris
Naomi Davidson
 Introduction
This paper examines the interwar origins of Muslim histories in metropolitan 
France. It argues that the seeds for the racialization of people identified as 
Muslim in France were laid during this period with the creation of a mosque 
and other “Muslim” sites in Paris. By examining the creation and management 
of these Muslim spaces by French officials and North African religious leaders 
we are able to write a transnational history of Islam in Europe, one that 
acknowledges Islam’s long presence in European social and political life. In 
acknowledging not only the role of French colonialism, but also that of Muslim 
leaders and by elaborating on what I call “French Islam,” we discover how this 
collaborative construction of a particular vision of Islam ultimately contrib-
uted to the process of essentializing those people identified as “Muslim.”
I examine the Paris Mosque (Mosquée de Paris) and the Franco-Muslim 
Hospital (Hôpital Franco-Musulman), built between 1922 and 1935, in order to 
understand the elaboration of this particular vision of French Islam that 
blended “Muslim” and “French” civilizations. French Islam inscribed Islam 
firmly within a French republican model, yet it simultaneously maintained 
Islam outside the boundaries set by French secularism. The architectural and 
aesthetic plans for the Mosque, as well as the events that marked the mile-
stones in its development, were essential to the creation and diffusion of 
French Islam. In this paper I argue that the social service and policing pro-
grams that emerged as satellites of French Islam’s most important site, the 
Paris Mosque, used Islam as the basis for their differential treatment of North 
Africans. In doing so, they set in motion a pattern in which the segregation of 
immigrants from the Maghrib was portrayed as protective and as preferential 
treatment based on religious difference. In other words, it was the panoply of 
interwar social programs that depended on the establishment of the Paris 
Mosque that helped establish Muslims as only and eternally Muslims in met-
ropolitan France.
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 Building the Paris Mosque, Building French Islam
In the aftermath of World War i, French social scientists, orientalists, and poli-
ticians began to articulate a vision of Islam, and Muslim practices, that they 
hoped would communicate Paris’ respect for and commitment to its empire’s 
Muslim subjects. This vision, which I call French Islam, blended French repub-
lican principles with French understandings of Sunnī Islam as practiced in 
Morocco, and emphasized the embodied practices they argued were integral 
to the proper performance of Muslim religious ritual. The French emphasis on 
these embodied religious practices transformed an ostensibly religious iden-
tity into a racialized one over the course of the twentieth century. At the center 
of the story of this process of racialization is the Paris Mosque, a “cathedral” 
mosque built in the immediate aftermath of World War i by metropolitan and 
colonial leaders in cooperation with a transnational Muslim elite. The Islam 
embodied by the Paris Mosque served as the exclusive medium for the French 
state’s management of its interactions with Muslim subjects residing in the 
metropole during the 1920s and 1930s.
The Paris Mosque and its Muslim Institute were first conceived as a war 
memorial to be built in the shadow of Les Invalides, where the French army 
honored its greatest military heroes. Locating the complex near France’s shrine 
to its military victories was intended to reflect the sacrifices made by North 
and West African colonial soldiers during World War i, as well as to render the 
complex easily accessible to elite Muslims visiting Paris. The architecture of 
this “durable monument” was expected to conform to the “artistic demands” of 
a grand capital.1 When the ground for the construction site was broken six 
years later, in the 5th arrondissement across from the city’s natural history 
museum, the site had been reimagined as a reproduction of a mosque in Fez 
that would be built alongside French civilization’s most hallowed institutions 
of learning rather than the shrine to its military successes. The Paris Mosque 
was not merely a religious site, it was a monument to France’s power in the 
Muslim world, built to reflect its vision of Islam and Muslims. As such it was a 
“repositor[y] of meaning” where a wide range of events inscribed France’s rela-
tionship with its Muslim subjects on a daily basis.2 The placement of 
the Mosquée’s complex in the cradle of French civilization, and its “Muslim 
1 “Une Mosquée à Paris,” Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Direction des Affaires Politiques et 
commerciales, 22 September 1916, shat 7 N 2104, Divers 1916–1917. This text, particularly the 
above citation, is drawn from Paul Bourdarie’s “L’Institut Musulman et la Mosquée de Paris,” 
La Revue Indigène (Oct.–Nov. 1919).
2 Daniel Sherman, The Construction of Memory in Interwar France (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999), 216.
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architectural character” visually signaled the tension between its role as a sec-
ular cultural and religious institution that defined the paradox of French Islam.
The two sites were the fruits of contentious collaboration involving the 
Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of War, 
the city of Paris, and the colonial and protectoral administrations of Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia, and French West Africa. Importantly, in addition to the met-
ropolitan and colonial administrations, a group of elite Muslims from the 
Maghrib and West Africa participated in the elaboration of this project. This 
group, known as the Society of Habous and Sacred Places of Islam (Société des 
Habous et des lieux saints de l’Islam), was headed by the Algerian-born 
Abdelkader ben Ghabrit, more commonly known as Si Kaddour. Si Kaddour 
was awarded the leadership of the group, and thus, of the Mosque and 
Institute, not because of his theological erudition or history of religious lead-
ership. Rather, his presidency depended on the political connections he had 
made in Resident General Lyautey’s Moroccan protectorate through his ten-
ure as the sultan’s master of protocol. It is thus important to note that Si 
Kaddour and the other Muslim leaders who participated in the creation of 
French Islam were not necessarily well-regarded by their fellow Muslims, on 
either side of the Mediterranean.
This collaborative vision of French Islam, a system of belief and ritual that 
was at once particular to Muslim civilization but compatible with French 
republican ideals and secularism, was to be instantiated in the site of the Paris 
Mosque. For French connoisseurs of Islam, it was in Morocco that this “rejuve-
nated Islam” originated from an Islam magnificent in “its isolation, its archa-
ism, which…brings it closer to the purest [Muslim] belief.” This purest form of 
Islam existed in a country that, through its encounter with “modern life,” was 
“adapting to progress” with France’s help.3 Moroccan Resident General Lyautey 
argued that this encounter was possible because Morocco and France were 
both civilizations that respected their ancient traditions while being open to 
progress. Like the French, he explained, the Moroccans had “an enlightened 
bourgeoisie…very concerned with progress, most especially economic pro-
gress.”4 But in addition to these similarities between elites on both sides of the 
3 René Weiss, Récéption à l’Hôtel de Ville de Sa Majesté Moulay Youssuf, Sultan du Maroc, 
Inauguration de l’Institut Musulman et de la Mosquée de Paris (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 
1927), 2, xxv.
4 Ibid., 36. President Doumergue also celebrated the friendship between “the Muslim elite and 
the French elite” in his speech. At no point in the creation of the Mosquée were non-elite 
Muslims on either side of the Mediterranean taken into account, other than that they were 
solicited for donations. As we will see, this was one of the reasons the Mosquée was critiqued 
by nationalist leaders.
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Mediterranean, proponents of the Mosque argued that Islam and French 
republicanism shared many traits. Si Kaddour asserted that “respect for moral-
ity” and the “glorification of charity” were principles dear to both Islam and a 
French civilization whose greatest concern was equality.5 French President 
Doumergue made the link between the philosophical underpinnings of French 
and Muslim culture more explicit:
[Equality] …of human consciences and of their sincere impulses, is the 
mark of our democracy; the Muslim savants, as we know, have exalted 
the respect of individual dignity and human liberty. They have called 
for…the reign of a large fraternity and of equal justice. Democracy has no 
fundaments other than these.6
There was a clear attempt to identify Islam as compatible with democracy, tol-
erance, equality, and individual liberty.
It was the Mosque, rather than the Institute, that did the work of remaining 
bound to “Muslim” tradition as filtered through French perceptions of Moroc-
can Muslim aesthetics and practices. When its proponents discussed the 
Mosque’s creation, they did not situate it in the heart of Paris’s university dis-
trict: that was the space occupied by the Muslim Institute, whose Islam was 
intellectual, modern, and compatible with French republicanism but whose 
physical design was never described. The Mosque, on the other hand, was not 
discursively located in a particular part of Paris, other than in its center. 
Although it was necessary that the site be visible to visitors in Paris’ landscape, 
its geographical location was far less emphasized than its design. Its aesthetic 
character was of primary importance because the Mosque represented an 
Islam that its French proponents believed had a “hold on its faithful” and con-
trolled all aspects of their lives. It required of its believers that they perform 
certain practices in particular settings because of the inextricable link between 
religious practices and daily life.7 Its architects hoped to ensure the Mosque’s 
appeal to Muslims by designing it in a “Moroccan” style that would respond to 
their aesthetic ideals, although contemporary observers were quick to point 
5 Si Kaddour’s speech at the Mosquée’s groundbreaking ceremony, cited in Weiss, Récéption à 
l’Hôtel de Ville de Sa Majesté Moulay Youssef, 49.
6 Doumergue’s speech at the groundbreaking ceremony, ibid., 70.
7 Letter from Saint Aulaire to Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, 7 January 1916, an Fonds Lyautey 
475AP/95/Lettres au département 1916. See also Commissariat Général à l’Information et à la 
Propagande. “Projet de loi relatif à l’édification à Paris d’un Institut Musulman” (undated), 
amae Afrique 1918–1940/Affaires musulmanes/11.
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out its appeal to Parisian and other tourists, comparing it both to tourist attrac-
tions in North Africa and metropolitan expositions and fairs.
The Mosque’s architects chose to give the building the “traditional hispano-
mauresque” style in vogue among Lyautey’s Service des Beaux Arts architects 
in the Moroccan protectorate.8 It was in Morocco, critics agreed, that “a new 
architecture [was] born… [a] collaboration between French science and intel-
ligence with indigenous craftsmanship and tradition.”9 In October 1920 Si 
Kaddour met with architects in Rabat who specialized in buildings with 
“Muslim character,” in order to prepare the preliminary plans for the Mosque 
and its annexes.10 A few months later, he reported back to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs that the Moroccan members of the Society of Habous had 
unanimously decided that the Mosque should have “an African architectural 
character” and, more specifically, that it should be modeled on Fez’s four-
teenth-century mosque-madrasa Bou Inania. Sultan Abou Inan hoped to reori-
ent the city’s religious geography by building the complex near the boundary 
between the old and new cities and thus drawing people away from some of 
the older mosques. Yet although the Inspector of Beaux Arts wrote that the site 
was “undoubtedly the biggest and most sumptuous [mosque] of all Morocco,” 
its decoration was not as refined and artistic as that of Fez’s older mosques.11 
The sources that refer to the decision to use Bou Inania as the model for the 
Mosque complex mention the physical beauty and renown of the Fassi site but 
do not refer to its founder’s attempt to remake his city’s religious landscape or 
to the site’s relative aesthetic weakness compared to older mosques. It would 
be intriguing to know whether they were conscious of the ramifications of 
their choice of this particular institution as a model for Paris’s mosque.
Once this model had been chosen, the French architects were given blue-
prints of this famous institution to inspire their first attempts at plans for 
the  Parisian mosque, whose layout is clearly based on that of Bou Inania.12 
8 The Mosquée’s original plans were drawn by the former director of the Service, Maurice 
Tranchant de Lunel, and another member, Maurice Mantout, was part of the team whose 
design was ultimately used.
9 Henri Descamps, L’Architecture moderne au Maroc (Paris: Librairie de la Construction 
moderne, 1931), 1.
10 Letter from Si Kaddour to Leygues, 6 October 1920, amae Afrique 1918–1940/Affaires 
musulmanes/11.
11 Didier Madras and Boris Maslow, Fès, Capitale artistique de l’Islam (Casablanca, Morocco: 
Editions Paul Bory, 1948), 134–135.
12 Letter from Si Kaddour to Leygues, 27 December 1920, amae Afrique 1918–1940/Affaires 
musulmanes/11. One of the Mosquée’s architects, Mantout, also wrote to Leygues to tell 
him that the Mosquée was inspired by “one of the most beautiful specimens of Moroccan 
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This  resonated with metropolitan architectural critics, one of whom noted 
approvingly that “Muslim constructions, unlike ours, have not evolved and 
must, on the contrary, remain traditional.”13 Lyautey’s Morocco was a virtual 
laboratory for modernist architecture and urbanism in a colonial setting, as 
Gwendolyn Wright has argued. Under his residency, the Service des Beaux Arts 
instituted an energetic campaign to preserve entire districts, virtually freezing 
Moroccan medinas in time, and to “restore” and “reproduce” monuments and 
other sites that had fallen into disrepair. Wright also argues that the Service, 
especially under the leadership of Tranchant de Lunel, “oriented itself towards 
charming streetscapes that would appeal to French residents and tourists.”14 
The architectural style of the Mosque and the fact of it being built to recreate, 
as closely as possible, a specific Moroccan religious site at once identified Islam 
as immutable and unchanging and turned the building into a spectacle to be 
enjoyed by non-Muslim Parisians.15
The popular press quickly touted the tourist potential of the Mosque. One 
observer wrote in the Catholic journal En Terre d’Islam of the “veritable 
enchantment” of the Paris Mosque: “in penetrating these courtyards and 
richly decorated rooms, one has more of an impression of visiting a museum 
than of entering a place of prayer.”16 The reference to visiting a museum is 
important, for despite the intentions of the Mosquée’s founders that the site 
serves a purely pedagogical function, many Parisians viewed it as a site for 
the display and consumption of Islam. In fact, the Mosque also bore some 
architecture.” See, in the same box, Maurice Mantout, “Note descriptive de la Mosquéeet 
de ses dépendences,” 12 August 1922.
13 Antony Goissaud, “L’Institut musulman et la Mosquée de Paris,” La Construction moderne 
3 (2 November 1924), 52.
14 Gwendolyn Wright, The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1991), 134.
15 As Justinard put it in his thesis on the Mosquée, “Isn’t it…paradoxical that it’s easier for a 
Christian who wants to see a Muslim religious building to penetrate a mosque in Paris 
than in North Africa, where most mosques are closed to non-Muslims?” Here an analogy 
is made between the situation in Morocco (where under Lyautey’s protectorate mosques 
were “protected” from visits by non-Muslims) and that of the rest of the territory. The 
refusal to allow non-Muslims to enter mosques is not a feature of Islam and was not even 
applied uniformly in the French empire. However, it is instructive that Justinard made 
this remark, for many of the tourists who visited the Mosquée may well have been disap-
pointed by their inability to do so in Morocco and hoped to see “the same thing” back 
home. Pierre Justinard, “La Mosquée de Paris” (ma thesis, Ecole nationale de la France 
dʼoutre-mer, 1944), 57.
16 Georges Buchet, “La Mosquée de Paris,” En Terre d’Islam 34 (January 1930), 30.
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resemblance to the colonial expositions, although unlike the exhibits con-
structed there, the Mosque was set in Paris’s landscape permanently and 
could be visited again and again. The very mosaics used to adorn the site had 
appeared at the Moroccan pavilion at the 1922 Colonial Exposition in 
Marseille, as a gift from Lyautey.17 One newspaper promised its readers, in its 
review of the Mosque, “it will provide a change for Parisians from the card-
board boxes with which one pretends to convey, in expositions, the splendor, 
the mysterious charm of the intimacy of African houses.”18 L’Illustration 
urged those who had traveled in the Muslim world to visit the Mosque in 
order to experience anew their memories of the food and decor they had so 
enjoyed.19 From the beginning, the Mosque’s founders planned to charge 
non-Muslim visitors admission to the site; this contributed even more to the 
idea that it was an exhibit to be consumed publicly. Fresh from their success, 
the Mosque’s architects went on to design both the North African pavilions 
of the 1931 Colonial Exposition and the Franco-Muslim Hospital in Bobigny 
that opened in 1935; its façade greatly resembled the Mosque’s aesthetics. 
Clearly, in many peoples’ minds, the Mosque was the highlight of a set of 
sites around the capital that provided visitors with an exoticized image of 
Islam and Muslims.
The events organized by the French state in collaboration with Si Kaddour 
and the colonial administrations contributed to the creation of a “secular” 
Islam in the sense that “religious” events were folklorized, rendered public, and 
emptied of their original significance, all the while ostensibly occupying the 
central space of the Mosque’s activities. The ceremonies surrounding the 
Mosque’s landmark moments (the groundbreaking, orientation, and inaugura-
tion) served as a way to mark both the place of the complex in Paris’s geogra-
phy of significant monuments and the relationships among metropolitan, 
colonial, and Muslim dignitaries. In addition to these landmark events associ-
ated with milestones in the Mosque’s construction, other occasions also served 
as opportunities to shore up metropolitan and colonial relations, particularly 
with Morocco. A note from the police dated 26 June 1930 reports that a “Fête de 
charité ‘Nord-Africaine’” (“North African” Charity Event) would take place in 
the Mosque’s confines the following day, under the patronage of the wife of 
17 Additional mosaics were required, and Si Kaddour organized for them to be transported 
from Morocco. In addition, he successfully argued that it was necessary to bring Moroccan 
artisans to Paris to complete the decoration of the site. See letter from Si Kaddour Ben 
Ghabrit to Poincaré, 13 March 1923, amae Afrique/Affaires musulmanes/12.
18 Le Petit Journal, 25 February 1922.
19 “Un décor d’Orient sous le Ciel de Paris,” L’Illustration (26 November 1926), 582.
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Morocco’s resident-general. The soirée was designed to raise funds for the Red 
Cross’s work with the indigènes, or Muslim “natives.”20 The Mosque was also a 
privileged site for drawing the Moroccan elite, especially the young generation, 
closer to France. Even before the site was completed, it was an important stop 
during tours of Paris taken by Moroccan students. During a 1923 visit, students 
followed an “interesting” visit to the museum at the Botanical Garden with a 
tour of the construction site led by one of the Mosque’s three architects. The 
group’s leader noted that “we recognized many of Fez and Meknes’ master 
mosaicists, who offered us mint tea.” By 1925, the students were apparently 
“thrilled” with “this corner of Morocco, completely charming with its patios, 
gardens, water jets, beautiful galleries” and proud that “European visitors do 
not hide their admiration.”21
The events designed to showcase the Mosque also highlight that it was built 
in the French capital during a period in which metropolitan-colonial ques-
tions were particularly fraught. Nowhere is the local battle to place Paris at the 
heart of the French empire more evident than in Paris City Council Member 
Pierre Godin’s campaign in support of the city celebrating the centenary of the 
conquest of Algeria. Although his omission of the Mosque itself as a site con-
tributing to Paris’s importance in the colonial Muslim world is shocking, his 
comments about the relationship between the city and the North African colo-
nies are important to understand the space the Mosque occupied in the city as 
a synecdoche of France. For, as Godin argued, “Algeria is not only…a province 
of French thought, but an enthusiastic department of Parisian thought. And 
Paris is enchanted by its animating influence.”22 Although he was primarily 
interested in bringing groups of students to Algeria to witness French progress 
in action, Godin also hoped to create Parisian venues for the exhibit of Algerian 
art, crafts and architecture, and literature. The celebration of the Mosque as a 
credit to Paris’s cachet as the heart of the Muslim world certainly supports 
Gary Wilder’s suggestion that we see Paris as “a fundamentally imperial city” in 
20 Note from 26 June 1930, app Eb125/Aït el Kébir.
21 Paul Marty, “Mission d’étudiants marocains, août 1923” and “Voyage en France des 
Etudiants Marocains 1925,” an Fonds Lyautey 475 ap 171/13: Voyages des Marocains civils 
en France, juillet 1922.
22 “Note sur la participation de Paris aux manifestations du Centenaire de l’Algérie et sur les 
dispositions prises par la Commission du centenaire pour assurer cette participation con-
formément aux déliberations du Conseil Municipal des 11 juillet et 31 décembre 1929, 
présentée par Pierre Godin, Conseiller Municipal, Président de la Commission Municipale 
du Centenaire de l’Algérie.” Rapports et documents du Conseil Municipal de Paris, 
20 March 1930.
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a metropole that was itself “the very center of an empire of which it and its 
colonies were integral parts.”23
The Paris Mosque, then, was the product of collaboration among the French 
state, colonial administrations, and a hand-picked group of North and West 
African Muslim elite men led by the Algerian-born Si Kaddour.24 It was very 
much a product of its time: fears of being eclipsed by England and Germany as 
a power in the Muslim world propelled France’s metropolitan and colonial 
administrators into providing tangible evidence of their Muslim politics. The 
Muslim elites who acted as intermediaries between Muslims and the colonial 
administrations saw their participation as a way to prove their loyalty to France 
and increase their own prestige. Yet what began as a fairly straightforward 
political move in response to external threats quickly became something much 
more complex. The Mosque de Paris became the physical embodiment of a 
“new” Islam, one compatible with the principles of secularism and rational 
modernity while rooted in “traditional” Moroccan Islam. Although it was origi-
nally justified as a gesture of recognition for the sacrifices made by colonial 
soldiers, chance dictated that the Mosque would come to be built in the heart 
of the Latin Quarter. This allowed the Mosque’s proponents to use the site as a 
theater for the display of French Islam: the Muslim Institute, whose intellec-
tual character perfectly suited the neighborhood, celebrated the similarities 
between French and Muslim civilizations, while the Mosque’s Moroccan-style 
architecture guaranteed the authenticity of the practices that would be per-
formed in the building. The deeply rooted French belief that Islam was a reli-
gion in which materiality mattered much more than in any other faith made 
the choice of embodying this vision of Islam in a mosque a logical one.
Yet the idea that Muslim practice was intrinsically physical and invaded all 
aspects of everyday life, confounding the public and private spheres, also 
implied that the metropolitan and colonial administrators who favored the 
Mosque’s construction did not believe that it was possible for Muslims to 
become modern, French, secular subjects. The state that separated church 
and  state in the law of 1905 insisted on identifying its colonial subjects and 
protégés as inevitably and only Muslim. As we see in the following section, the 
23 Gary Wilder, The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between 
the Two World Wars (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 28.
24 Interestingly, one notable Muslim supporter of the Paris Mosque project was Cheikh 
al-ʿAlawī, renowned for his defense of Islam in the face of French colonialism. The founder 
of the Ṭarīqa ʿAlawiyya movement was not an official member of Si Kaddour’s committee, 
yet his support for the Paris mosque led him to attend its inauguration. He believed the 
institution could serve the interest of Muslims living in the metropole.
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ambiguity at the heart of French Islam informed the policy and social assis-
tance programs designed contemporaneously with the Mosque to cope with 
the North African immigrant population of Paris.
 Muslim Bodies in French Spaces
The construction of the Paris Mosque and the Muslim Institute gave body to 
the vision of French Islam as imagined by its proponents, but in the late 1920s, 
the question of how government support for French Islam would affect the 
lives of the primarily male, working-class North African residents of the capital 
was unclear. Metropolitan and colonial proponents of French Islam did not 
recognize the Islam practiced by many of these men as “true” Islam; their reli-
gious observances were characterized as akin to paganism. The disregard of 
metropolitan and colonial officials, social scientists, and the Muslim leaders 
chosen by French authorities, for the Muslim practices of certain North African 
immigrants in the Paris region was essential to their defense of French Islam. 
Immigrants to France during this period sometimes linked their Muslim prac-
tices to nationalist activity; or to social solidarity and mutual aid societies; yet 
others focused on cultural activities. But from the very beginning of the articu-
lation of French Islam by French politicians and the elite Muslim members of 
the Society of Habous the possibility of Islam’s multiplicity, of different ways of 
being Muslim, was foreclosed.
Upon their arrival in Paris North African immigrants quickly learned that 
they would be counted, professionally oriented, and healed as Muslims rather 
than simply as immigrant workers. With the Mosque as the central site of 
Muslim authority, the national and local administrations created a city- and 
suburban-wide network of Muslim sites designed to structure the lives of 
North African immigrant workers. Sites like the Bureau de la rue Lecomte, at 
once a social assistance office and a surveillance center, or the Franco-Muslim 
Hospital in the northeastern suburb of Bobigny were part of a network of sepa-
rate social assistance services centered on Muslim religious identity and cre-
ated for North African immigrants. The foundations for the French policy of 
administering North African immigrants exclusively as Muslims were thus laid 
at the same time as the creation of the Mosque itself. The tension between the 
promise of openness embedded in the logic of French Islam and the restric-
tiveness of Parisian Muslim institutions symbolizes the paradox at its heart. 
Although all immigrant workers during this period were subject to different 
legal regimes than were French citizens, the programs designed for North 
African Muslims set them apart from other immigrants, even other colonial 
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immigrant workers. The rationale for this segregation was corporeal: the 
French belief in the centrality of embodied practices in the lives of Muslims 
meant that the kinds of services that were designed to assist North African 
immigrants took for granted that Muslim bodies had different demands than 
non-Muslim ones. The Franco-Muslim Hospital is the example par excellence 
of the state’s contradictory impulses: while the construction of this hospital 
effectively “protected” Parisian public hospitals from what were seen as dis-
ease-ridden North African male bodies, some of its proponents also sincerely 
believed that they were providing Muslims with the space to engage in Muslim 
practices safely and securely. This corporeal logic of the 1920s and 1930s, 
couched in the language of religious protection, continued to influence French 
Muslim policy throughout the twentieth century.
North African immigrants were thus administered separately from other 
foreigners (even though Algerians were in fact French nationals, if not French 
citizens), and more importantly, they were administered as religious subjects. 
On the one hand, the state could be commended for providing them with reli-
gious services that may otherwise have been unavailable to them since there 
simply was not a longstanding Muslim community capable of providing reli-
gious sites for new immigrants. Yet on the other hand, by requiring them to 
make use of separate Muslim services, the French state made it impossible for 
Muslim immigrants to be anything but Muslim. The Ministry of the Interior 
simultaneously helped finance the salary of an imam to serve Paris’s North 
African population and created a complex network of techniques for policing 
those same people. In the years immediately following World War i, war-era 
“Muslim” organizations resurfaced in new forms, of which the more important 
was Service des Affaires Indigènes Nord-Africaines (The North African Native 
Affairs Service, or saina), created in 1928. The saina, controlled by the 
Préfecture of the Seine and the Préfecture of Paris, was directed exclusively at 
the capital’s North African population. The cornerstone of this service was 
known as the Service de la rue Lecomte, or, as it was officially called, the North 
African Brigade (Brigade nord-africaine).
Rue Lecomte was, to a large extent, the result of one man’s obsessive cam-
paign to bring the lessons he had learned as a colonial official in Algeria to bear 
on the administration of North African immigrants in Paris. Pierre Godin, 
whom we met earlier, began his career in Algeria as a clerk and went on to 
become a police officer and eventually a sous-prefect. Godin believed that an 
understanding of the “native mentality” was essential to the proper manage-
ment of the capital’s North African populations, and indeed rue Lecomte was 
directed by a former official from the French administration in Algeria: 
Adolphe Gérolami, who had been chosen for his knowledge of the “Algerian 
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Muslim.”25 Although the Bureau de la rue Lecomte was described as a resource 
center for North African Muslim workers, it was primarily a site designed to 
monitor the movements and activities of the Maghrébin population in the city 
and suburbs. Godin, who was of course one of the Mosque’s main proponents, 
explained in his report to the Paris City Council:
A recent and sensational crime—the murder of two poor women…by an 
Algerian Kabyle…has focused the anxious attention of public opinion on 
the invasion of France by foreign or colonial elements, especially North 
African emigrants. [Public opinion] is beginning to wonder if some pru-
dent measures wouldn’t be in order, to discipline, maybe even limit, this 
invasion. … We do not know exactly how many Algerian or African natives 
[indigènes] there are in Paris. … Algerian indigènes travel freely and thus 
it is very difficult to follow this errant work-force in its peregrinations.26
The Service de la rue Lecomte was designed to respond to this free-floating 
anxiety about the presence of these “timid men from the mountains” trans-
formed into “urban workers” and living among the French. Godin minced no 
words about the service’s dual purpose: to “monitor and aid” the city’s North 
Africans. He presented it as a moral imperative, for “these ‘primitives’ are 
among us. These ‘mountain dwellers,’ these ‘barbarians’ heard civilization’s 
call and are tasting the charms of the City. With them, old Africa opens itself 
up and comes to us. It is Islam, approaching.”27 The equation of “old Africa” 
with “Islam” in this formulation is instructive. What is most important to note 
about rue Lecomte is the way its programs were structured around a con-
ception of these workers as simultaneously Muslim and North African. For 
Godin and the other authorities involved in the management of North African 
immigrant populations, “Africa” arriving on France’s doorstep was really the 
approach of Islam.
The rue Lecomte site was located in a former school building in the eastern 
part of the 17th arrondissement. Initially, it consisted only of a labor placement 
25 Clifford Rosenberg, Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control between the 
Wars (Ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press, 2006), 155–157.
26 “Proposition tendant à créer à la Préfecture de Police une section d’affaires indigènes 
nord-africaines qui s’occupera de la situation matérielle et morale et de la police des 
indigènes nord-africains, resident ou de passage à Paris. Déposée par mm. Pierre Godin, 
Besombes, et Emile Massard, Conseillers Municipaux,” Proposition no. 178, 20 December 
1923. Conseil Municipal de Paris, Rapports et Documents 1923, Nos. 151–191.
27 Ibid.
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and information office for North African workers’ use. North African immi-
grants to Paris were required to register their presence at the office and occa-
sionally to renew their identity papers. Rue Lecomte employees also promised 
aid with locating jobs, translation, legal paperwork, the shipment of one’s 
earnings to family in North Africa, and other services. The complex also fea-
tured a cafe, which, along with the other resources, was largely ignored by the 
city’s Muslims, as Gérolami sadly reported to a colonial official visiting from 
Morocco.28 The following year, in 1926, the City Council inaugurated the dis-
pensary, which provided basic care and minor surgery. Medical professionals 
concerned with public health noted with relief that the clinic also featured 
special services for those afflicted with tuberculosis and venereal diseases, 
which were thought to be endemic to North Africans.29 In 1927, an eighty-bed 
hostel, or foyer, also opened as part of the rue Lecomte site. Gérolami hoped to 
extend his and his institution’s authority beyond the walls of the rue Lecomte 
complex and do a better job of winning the loyalty of the city’s Muslim work-
ers. Another foyer was built in the suburb of Gennevilliers, which featured a 
prayer room, “hammam and café,” and dormitories, and the rue Lecomte’s 
director hoped to see similar foyers develop all over the city and suburbs. 
Gérolami believed that his agency and other Parisian Muslim institutions 
needed to create deeper connections with the city’s Muslim communities and 
that the best way to do this was through the creation of mutual aid societies, 
which would work through the idiom of Islam. He tried to launch a “fraternal 
association of… Muslims in Paris, a sort of mutual assistance society, whose 
first project would be the construction of the wall of the Muslim cemetery of 
Paris.”30 Gérolami’s Muslim mutual aid society, however, met with as little suc-
cess as his café, for Muslims continued to rely on their own associations rather 
than pay a monthly membership fee to join rue Lecomte’s association.
Managing North African immigrants thus revolved around two poles: social 
assistance and policing. The trio that oversaw Paris’s “Muslim” institutions, Si 
Kaddour, Gérolami, and Godin, was implicated in providing the conditions for 
the “proper” observance of Muslim life cycle events, particularly illness and 
death. The Paris City Council and police were instrumental in managing end-
of-life issues for North Africans, religious or not, during this period. The links 
28 Lt.-Col. Justinard, Rapport sur sa mission en France, novembre 1930, amaee K Afrique/
Questions Générales 1918–1940/32: Emploi de la main d’oeuvre indigène dans la 
Métropole, 1926–1928.
29 See Max Hulman, “L’Hôpital Franco-Musulman de Paris et du département de la Seine,” 
La Presse Médicale 74 (14 September 1935): 1443–1445.
30 Justinard, “Rapport.”
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connecting the saina, the Mosque, and the Franco-Muslim Hospital in the 
eastern suburb of Bobigny were extremely close.31 The Interministerial 
Commission for Muslim Affaires (ciam) was one of the agencies that influ-
enced the decisions taken by this triumvirate. The ciam pronounced itself in 
favor of standardized regulations concerning the burial of Muslims in the Paris 
region; the setting aside of plots in suburban graveyards, “where they can be 
buried according to their beliefs and rituals,” in addition to the expensive 
Muslim area of the Père Lachaise public cemetery; the formation of an associa-
tion to provide indigent Muslims with religious burials; and, finally, the cre-
ation of an Office of Muslim Beneficence.32 The question of Muslim cemeteries 
was thus considered at the same time that decisions about health care and foy-
ers for North African workers were being made. The ciam dedicated a meeting 
early in 1931 to debating how and where a cemetery for Paris’s Muslims could be 
created, with testimony from Si Kaddour, Pierre Godin, and Gérolami. The issue 
was raised when Si Kaddour addressed the Préfet de la Seine directly, asking 
that he support the establishment of such a site; he in turn consulted the min-
ister of the interior about the legality of such an undertaking. Si Kaddour pre-
sented the issue as something that concerned Paris’s Muslims “because of the 
religious character attached to Muslim funerals. If, in death, they find them-
selves far from Muslim lands, they attach an even greater value to having a cem-
etery reserved for members of their faith.”33 The Préfet de la Seineʼs hesitation 
in the face of this request was based not only on his concerns about legality but 
also on fears that in giving Si Kaddour a positive response, “we would expose 
ourselves to reclamations in the same style from Protestants [and] Jews.”34 Yet 
as Si Kaddour explained in person at the meeting, “As for the objections on legal 
grounds which have been put forward, they were also true for the Muslim 
Institute and the Paris Mosque, which were nevertheless created. Thus we need 
only follow an analogous procedure” to establish a cemetery. Godin’s solution 
to this problem was to suggest that the Franco-Muslim Hospital contribute 
land for the creation of a Muslim burial ground, as hospitals serving particular 
populations could legally build cemeteries on their grounds. The ciam accepted 
this compromise, and the burial ground was eventually constructed in Bobigny.
31 See Rosenberg, Policing Paris, 141.
32 Rapport de la ciam, séance du 10 février 1927. anom 81F 834.
33 This letter, dated 9 December 1930, is cited by M. Augustin Bernard at the ciam’s meeting 
on 27 February 1931. See Procès-Verbal de la ciam, 27 February 1931, Question 2: Demande 
de création d’un cimetière pour les Musulmans de Paris et de la region parisienne. anom 
81F 834: Cimetières musulmans.
34 Ibid.
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In the debate over this issue, Si Kaddour was asked who would be buried in 
such a site. He responded that it would be primarily soldiers, “since the bodies 
of Muslim notables who die in Paris are usually repatriated to their country of 
origin by their families.” Si Kaddour’s assertion that a Muslim cemetery in Paris 
was of interest to Muslims the world over was an exaggeration, but it was cer-
tainly a point of interest to French diplomats and functionaries in the Muslim 
world who were concerned with the religious observances of the Muslim elite. 
As a French diplomat stationed in Cairo explained, although “the Orientals 
who travel to France belong to the fortunate classes who don’t go to mosques,” 
the Paris Mosque had still been used for the funerals of two Egyptians who, 
though not observant at all, still wanted a Muslim burial. He was strongly in 
favor of the creation of a Muslim cemetery, because although “a ‘believer’ can 
not pray, [and] he can be treated in a public hospital with no problem, …he 
cannot face the idea of being buried right next to non-Muslims.”35
While creating areas where Muslims could be buried according to the pre-
cepts of their religion was a priority for those making Muslim policy in the 
Paris region, their medical care was also a huge concern. As historian Clifford 
Rosenberg and others have shown, in the 1920s and 1930s the French had great 
fears of venereal disease among the population of single North African men 
who arrived in France as laborers. Policies segregating this population to 
Muslim dispensaries and hospitals were based on these fears, yet were couched 
in the language of cultural sensitivity. The dispensary of the Mosque itself was 
formally placed under the control of the Office of Social Hygiene of the 
Préfecture de la Seine in 1928.
The real centerpiece of North African healthcare in Paris, however, was the 
Franco-Muslim Hospital of Bobigny, one of whose architects was none other 
than the Mosque’s Maurice Mantout. The hospital was voted into existence by 
Paris’s City Council on 11 July 1929 and came under the authority of the 
Département de la Seine in 1930. Its location was a source of great tension 
between the various Paris-area politicians involved in its creation, and it was 
eventually decided to construct it in the communist suburb of Bobigny as an 
attack on its leadership.36 Like the policing agencies, it was supposed to pro-
tect North African and French populations by isolating Muslim workers and 
providing them with separate services. During the period in which the hospital 
was conceived, constructed, and inaugurated, Paris’s public health care system 
35 Letter from Henri Gaillard to Aristide Briand, 21 March 1927. anom 81F 834.
36 See Neil MacMaster, “Imperial Façades: Muslim Institutions and Propaganda in Interwar 
Paris,” in Promoting the Colonial Idea: Propaganda and Visions of Empire in France, ed. 
Tony Chafer and Amanda Sackur (New York: Palgrave, 2002).
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was in a disastrous state. The public hospitals served only Parisians whose 
incomes fell below a certain level, and its health care services were entirely 
free. Outdated and overpopulated, the city’s hospitals were increasingly unable 
to cope with the demands of the city’s population. In the face of these poor 
conditions, many local politicians objected to spending money on health care 
for immigrants, even though, statistically speaking, foreigners made up only a 
small percentage of the patients of the city hospitals overall.
The Franco-Muslim Hospital was designed to give North Africans access to 
a health care center big enough to cope with an increasingly large population 
(the Rue Lecomte and Mosque clinics had become too crowded). The argu-
ments made in favor of this health care regime, which were echoed in the 
medical press, concerned not only anxieties about “African pathology which 
demands doctors and nurses with specialized education” but also social wel-
fare concerns about a population that felt “unmoored, isolated” in French hos-
pitals. North Africans treated in Paris’s public hospitals “found none of the 
traditions and customs which are so important to them and to which they are 
so faithful. Everything, the staff, the other patients, was strange to them.”37 The 
Franco-Muslim Hospital would allow them to feel at home again “during a 
time when, touched by illness, they are particularly sensitive.”38 Although the 
hospital contained all of the most modern medical technologies, its façade was 
designed to signal its special North African character. The medical press was 
not insensitive to the display:
This monumental door, in pure mauresque style, produces a beautiful 
effect. … It’s very “local color,” one finds oneself in a very evocative atmo-
sphere. … If one had to formulate a critique, it would be that it is too well 
done…a bit too luxurious for a clientele who, doubtless, will not appreci-
ate it, nor understand it, nor take pleasure in it.39
Aside from its “Muslim” aesthetic, the daily administration of the hospital was 
structured around Muslim religious requirements. The statutes of the hospital 
decreed that a number of Arabic-speaking doctors, preferably those “familiar…
with Muslim natives and their customs,” would be recruited and that Arabic-
speaking staff would receive bonuses. Freedom of religion would be respected 
within the hospital’s walls, but “the Paris Mosque’s imam or a Muslim clergy-
man designated by the Muslim Institute [would] have access to patients who 
37 Hulman, “L’Hôpital Franco-Musulman de Paris.”
38 “L’Hôpital Franco-Musulman,” Revue Médico-Sociale (April 1935): 134–135.
39 Hulman, “L’Hôpital Franco-Musulman de Paris,” 1444.
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seek their assistance.” Furthermore, the site would feature not only “a prayer 
room for the patients and Muslim personnel” but also a space for the “slaugh-
ter of animals according to Muslim ritual.”40 The hospital’s Muslim personnel 
were given the day off on Muslim holidays, and during the month of Ramadan, 
patients’ meals were served at sunset.
Although much care was taken to describe the hospital as a place designed 
to cater to Muslim religious needs, it was also a place to quarantine foreign 
bodies suspected of harboring dangerous diseases that might easily spread to 
French citizens. Or, as the president of the departmental council of the Seine 
explained at the hospital’s inauguration, “We needed to protect, but also police, 
because undesirable individuals had been mixing with healthy elements.”41 
The full ambiguity of the French state’s position lies in its attitude toward 
Muslim bodies: they were considered a danger to public health but were also 
taken seriously as having particular embodied religious practices that needed 
to be provided for in a hospital setting if patients were to have any hope of 
recovery. While those who celebrated the hospital’s creation claimed that “the 
population truly appreciated” the special treatment the hospital afforded 
them, even if they could not fully understand the attention that went into its 
aesthetic planning,42 many North Africans did everything in their power to 
avoid receiving treatment at the Franco-Muslim Hospital. In 1937, for example, 
one third of admitted patients refused to be treated there.43 The special 
committee of the High Committee on the Mediterranean (Haut-Comité Méditer-
ranéen, or hcm), a group of French experts on the Muslim world established 
under Léon Blum’s Popular Front government, was disturbed to report that 
Muslims had to be forced to go to the Franco-Muslim Hospital against their 
will. The hcm’s observers were surprised to find that “in spite of the excellence 
of the medical care, which incidentally demands a very significant budgetary 
contribution from the state, some North Africans prefer to be treated in other 
hospitals.”44 A member of the Seine General Council went further in his obser-
vations of the missteps of the state’s attempt to provide Muslims with appro-
priate health care. “I must say,” Léon Mauvais explained, “that Arabs have come 
40 Statuts de l’hôpital franco-musulman. Conseil général de la Seine, 9 July 1930.
41 Inaugural Speech, Augustin Beaud, Président du Conseil général de la Seine.
42 “L’Action charitable de la Ville de Paris et du département de la Seine,” Le Plus Grand Paris 
1 (February 1938).
43 See Rosenberg, Policing Paris.
44 Commission dʼÉtudes du hcm, “rapport conforme aux propositons de la sous-commission 
des lois sociales et assistance,” 17 June 1937, amae K Afrique/1918–1940/Questions 
Générales.
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to complain that they have been forced to go to this Franco-Muslim hospital 
and that the Parisian hospitals did not want to admit them.” Mauvais also 
noted that “some North Africans did not want to follow the special alimentary 
regime” used at the hospital “because they are now used to French customs, 
even [when it comes to food].”45 Immigrants’ refusal to be segregated on the 
basis of religion suggests that they were fully aware that they were being denied 
access to the services available to everyone else, even as they were being offered 
special privileges. Their desire to be treated at French public hospitals may 
have stemmed in part from fears about the quality of care at the Franco-Muslim 
Hospital, but certain Muslims were also rejecting their involuntary assignation 
to the categories “Muslim,” “Arab,” and “North African.” In other words, they 
were rejecting a regime that kept them outside of the boundaries of the French 
public sphere, supposedly for their own comfort, on the basis of their pre-
sumed religious identity.
 Conclusion
It could be argued that in providing immigrant workers from majority Muslim 
countries with health care designed to respond to Muslim sensibilities or the 
means to celebrate major holidays at a mosque located in the center of the city, 
the French state was being more generous to its colonial subjects than it was to 
its metropolitan citizens (a charge often leveled against the founders of the 
Franco-Muslim Hospital, for example). Certain politicians working at the 
municipal and national levels truly believed that they were responding to a 
desperate need on the part of Muslim immigrant workers. Yet it is essential to 
remember that the discourse of providing Muslims with “special” medical or 
employment services masked the fact that they were kept in a parallel social 
universe, separated not only from the French but also from other immigrants. 
Having defined their vision of French Islam in the form of the Mosque, the 
next step for those involved in its administration was to use that “Islam” as the 
medium for all interactions with North African immigrants, thus reducing 
their multifaceted socio-cultural lives to a single element. The religious senti-
ments of working-class immigrants from the Maghrib were dismissed as 
unorthodox at best and illegitimate at worst.
The decision to structure social assistance programs for North African immi-
grants along Muslim lines set the pattern for the state’s interaction with these 
45 Conseil Général de la Seine, jo 1938.
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communities. Rosenberg argues that by “treating North Africans so differently 
from other immigrants, by segregating them and subjecting them to an often 
brutal surveillance regime, republican authorities helped entrench what had 
been an unexceptional anti-‘Arab’ sentiment and reinforced a critical distinc-
tion between nationality and citizenship.”46 While not disagreeing with this 
conclusion, I would suggest instead that the separate regime designed for 
North African immigrants, particularly in the case of Algerians who were in 
fact French nationals, was more significant in that it legitimized segregation 
on religious grounds in the name of cultural sensitivity. The local, national, 
and colonial politicians involved in the creation of the mosque, surveillance 
and medical apparatus that policed the capital’s North Africans acted out of 
complex motives; some of them sincerely believed that they were providing 
their colonial workers with services they wanted. Judging their motives, how-
ever, is less important than recognizing the fact that French politicians 
believed Islam’s embodied demands to be such that Muslims required sepa-
rate hostels and hospitals and could not be assimilated into the larger immi-
grant population, let alone the French population. Thus in writing the long 
history of Islam’s presence in metropolitan modern France, it is crucial to rec-
ognize the importance of the collaboration between the French state and Si 
Kaddour. While their strategic use of French Islam and its incarnation in these 
three institutions was contested by many North African immigrants, it never-
theless indelibly shaped the state’s relationship with Muslims in France for 
the rest of the century.
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chapter 6
Indonesian Islam in Interwar Europe:  
Muslim Organizations in the Netherlands  
and Beyond
Klaas Stutje
 Introduction
Depending on the oneʼs interpretation, Muslim life during the interwar period 
in the Netherlands can either be characterized as “Indonesian,” “Dutch” or 
“European.” Although Muslims in the Netherlands looked to the heartland of 
Islam for religious guidance, it was primarily their immigrant Indonesian sta-
tus and their socioeconomic position in the Netherlands that determined the 
character of Muslim life there. The number of Muslim residents in the 
Netherlands before World War ii was relatively low compared to the large 
Muslim populations in other western European colonial centers. And although 
they succeeded in building organizations and infrastructures of their own, the 
absence of large-scale postcolonial Muslim migration to the Dutch metropole, 
and the fact that the first official mosque was only established in 1955, has 
meant that research on Muslim life in the Netherlands has predominantly 
focused on postwar migrant workers from Morocco and Turkey who arrived 
during the 1960s and after. Indonesians in the Netherlands in the pre World 
War ii period have rarely been taken into account.1
In the coming pages, I aim to write the Dutch chapter of the history of Islam 
in interwar Europe by focusing on Indonesian Muslim groups in the Netherlands 
before World War ii. This field of research has remained understudied in two 
ways. First, the Netherlands has remained largely beyond the scope of recent 
publications on the presence of Islam in interwar Europe, despite the fact that 
1 Harry A. Poeze, In het Land van de Overheerser, i: Indonesiërs in Nederland 1600–1950 
(Dordrecht: Foris Publications Holland, 1986). Cf. Nico Landman, Van Mat tot Minaret: de 
Institutionalisering van de Islam in Nederland (Amsterdam: vu Uitgeverij, 1992): 20–21; 
W.A.R. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld, Islam in Nederland en België: Religieuze 
Institutionalisering in Twee Landen met een Gemeenschappelijke Voorgeschiedenis (Leuven/
Paris/Dudley, ma: Peeters, 2008), 22.
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it had a considerable Muslim population under its imperial rule.2 Second, in 
the context of studies on the Dutch colonial past, research on Indonesian 
migration to the Netherlands has remained limited to political activities, for 
example, of the well-known Indonesian students association Perhimpoenan 
Indonesia.3 The Muslim identity of most of the Indonesian students, and of 
the Indonesian migrant community as a whole was not addressed. In 1967, the 
American anthropologist Joan Schutzman Wider was the first to devote a few 
pages on Perkoempoelan Islam—the only Islamic organization in the 
Netherlands before World War ii—in an unpublished dissertation on postwar 
Indonesian domestic workers in the Netherlands; this work was followed in 
1986 by a brief account by the Dutch historian Harry Poeze.4 It was only in 2012 
that the Leiden historian Umar Ryad published a comprehensive article on 
Muslim life in the Netherlands; in it he focuses on the chief Muslim organizer 
and convert Mohammad Ali van Beetem and his role in the Indonesian com-
munity in the Netherlands.5 Ryad’s article touches upon most of the organiza-
tional aspects of Muslim life in the decades before the war, but usually from 
the perspective of its central figure Van Beetem.
This chapter seeks to position Perkoempoelan Islam and its members more 
clearly within the landscape of the various Indonesian and other migrant com-
munities in the Netherlands, and subsequently among the ‘colonial’ Muslim 
communities of Europe as well. This leads to a better understanding of the 
functions of Perkoempoelan Islam, and of its loyalist stance vis-à-vis the Dutch 
2 Cf. Nathalie Clayer and Eric Germain, eds. Islam in Inter-War Europe (London: Hurst & 
Company, 2008).
3 John Ingleson, Perhimpunan Indonesia and the Indonesian Nationalist Movement, 1923–1928 
(Melbourne: Monash University, 1975); Harsja W. Bachtiar, “The Development of a Common 
National Consciousness among Students from the Indonesian Archipelago in the 
Netherlands,” Majalah Ilmu-Ilmu Sastra Indonesia 6 (1976): 31–44; Poeze, In het Land van de 
Overheerser.
4 Joan Schutzman Wider, “Indonesian Women in The Hague: Colonial Immigrants in the 
Metropolis” (PhD diss., New York University, 1967), 82–86; Poeze, In het Land van de 
Overheerser, 288–290, 316–318. Cf. Annemarie Cottaar, Ik had een Neef in Den Haag: 
Nieuwkomers in de Twintigste Eeuw (Zwolle: Waanders, 1998), 81–82; René Karels, Mijn Aardse 
Leven Vol Moeite en Strijd: Raden Mas Noto Soeroto, Javaan, Dichter, Politicus 1888–1951 (Leiden: 
kitlv Uitgeverij, 2010), 93, 96–97, 174–175.
5 Umar Ryad, “Among the Believers in the Land of the Colonizer: Mohammed Ali van Beetem’s 
Role Among the Indonesian Community in the Netherlands in the Interwar Period,” Journal 
of Religion in Europe 5 (2012): 273–310; Umar Ryad, “Te Gast in Den Haag: Discussies 
Moskeebouw in Nederland vóór de Tweede Wereldoorlog,” Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en 
Beleid 4 (2013): 59–78.
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government. It also helps to accurately assess its religious engagements with 
Muslim organizers abroad.
Three issues in particular are addressed in this chapter. First, I describe the 
various Indonesian communities in the Netherlands and their infrastructures, 
with special attention to the workers in Perkoempoelan Islam. Second, I exam-
ine the attitude of Dutch authorities towards Muslim organizations. This also 
determined the ability of an organization such as Perkoempoelan Islam to 
negotiate on behalf of Indonesian Muslims. In a third section, I evaluate the 
various international contacts of Indonesian Muslims with networks in Europe. 
Here, I not only assess primarily Islamic engagements, but also include con-
tacts with anticolonial networks and with Cairo. These events were part of the 
Islamic landscape of Dutch Indonesian Muslims as well.
In writing the history of Islam in the Netherlands it is useful to distinguish 
between the practicing of faith by individuals, and the organization of Muslims 
as a group. With regards to the former, it is remarkable that the various autobi-
ographies and personal accounts by Indonesians in the Netherlands, who 
often became dignitaries in the period of independence, are strictly confined 
to the political sphere and offer scant information on their practices and beliefs 
during their Dutch years. Nevertheless, I assume that throughout the period of 
Indonesian migration to Europe, Muslims to some extent continued to observe 
the religious duties of Islam on their own initiative and in the private sphere.6 
It is implausible to suggest that the Indonesians only became more ‘religious’ 
or devout once Perkoempoelan Islam was established in May 1932. At the orga-
nizational level, however, Muslim life did find its first embodiment with the 
establishment of Perkoempoelan Islam.7
 Indonesian Communities in the Netherlands
The Dutch Indonesian community can be subdivided into three groups. 
The  first group consisted of Indonesian students who arrived from the last 
decades of the nineteenth century onwards, and with greater numbers after 
World War i. The cohorts of students before the war were predominantly of 
Javanese aristocratic descent; this was a class that was dependent on the Dutch 
colonial administration for its wealth and social position. Unable to maintain 
6 Cf. Schutzman Wider, “Indonesian Women in The Hague,” 80–86.
7 Harry A. Poeze, Politiek-Politioneele Overzichten van Nederlandsch-Indië: Deel iv (Dordrecht: 
Foris Publications Holland, 1994), lxxviii.
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the traditional way of life, many lower aristocratic families chose to adapt to 
the new power system and sent their sons to Europe for some years of higher 
education.8 After World War i, with the native rubber industry booming, the 
social make-up of the student community in the Netherlands changed some-
what and wealthy merchant families started to send their children overseas as 
well. These Indonesian students lived predominantly in the university cities of 
Leiden and Delft, although all university towns in the Netherlands attracted 
students from the Dutch East Indies. Their number can be estimated from a 
few dozen in the first two decades, to up to two hundred people in the peak 
years before the Great Depression.9
A much larger group of Indonesian shopkeepers, restaurant-owners, and 
their personnel began to arrive in Dutch urban centers from 1900 onwards. 
Together with Indonesian domestic workers (baboes or iboes) that traveled 
along with their Dutch employers on leave, they formed the largest group of 
Indonesians in the Netherlands. A considerable Indonesian community 
emerged in The Hague, alongside Dutch families with a colonial background 
(verlofgangers) temporarily residing in the Dutch metropole.10 In general, the 
Indonesian workers and retailers in The Hague were from a less wealthy back-
ground than the students residing in Leiden and Delft. This class of people has 
received less attention from scholars, probably because they left fewer written 
sources than their student compatriots, and also because their political 
behavior was less outspoken. Nonetheless, their shops and restaurants today 
are the most visible reminders of the Dutch-Indonesian communities from 
before the war.
A third considerable group of Indonesians in the Netherlands consisted of 
dockers, sailors, and stewards on cargo and passenger ships that commuted to 
and from the colony. Of this last group little is known. Most of them were in the 
Netherlands only temporarily, and while on leave they usually stayed on their 
ships or in boarding houses in the harbor districts of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. 
There was a lively black market of colonial and European wares and clandes-
tine literature, but despite the targeted attempts of communists to bring 
the transient sailors into contact with Dutch and Indonesian-Dutch political 
8 H.A. Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite: the Colonial Transformation of the 
Javanese Priyayi (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books, 1979), 144.
9 Poeze, In het Land van de Overheerser.
10 Cottaar, Ik had een Neef in Den Haag, 72–75; Karels, Mijn Aardse Leven Vol Moeite en 
Strijd, 170.
129Indonesian Islam in Interwar Europe
<UN>
organizations, there was only incidental political or organizational coopera-
tion with other Indonesian communities.11
 Indonesian Organizations in the Netherlands
As stated above, most studies on Dutch Indonesian organizational infrastruc-
ture have focused on the organizational history of the first group. They describe 
how, in 1908, students established an ‘Indies’ association (the Indische Vereenig-
ing) to provide an environment where they could socialize, where newcomers 
could find welcoming support, and where contact with the motherland could 
be maintained. This organization was closely connected to the general aca-
demic life in Leiden and other university towns. Many of the members of the 
Indische Vereeniging were also members of elite Dutch student societies; the 
so-called corpora or fraternities. With regard to colonial policy, most students 
initially adhered to the associationist liberal school of the ‘ethici,’ which also 
found strong support among prominent Leiden professors.12 These students 
advocated moderate political reforms in the colony, with an emphasis on mod-
ernization and development. Nonetheless, they believed these reforms should 
take place under Dutch guidance, and hence the ‘ethici’ remained loyal to 
Dutch rule over the colony.
In 1923, a nationalistic student organization broke away from the loyalist 
majority and started to agitate against the Dutch colonial administration. This 
organization, Perhimpoenan Indonesia (‘Indonesian Association’), caused 
much upheaval in the Dutch media and governmental circles. Its leaders, such 
as Hatta, Sjahrir, and Sastroamidjojo, who later became prominent political 
figures in Indonesia, were constantly in the spotlights of security forces and 
the media, and consequently of scholars as well.13
11 Schutzman Wider, “Indonesian Women in The Hague,” 191–197; Cottaar, Ik had een Neef in 
Den Haag, 79.
12 Among Dutch imperial historians the ‘ethical’ tradition refers to a set of reformist social 
liberal ideas on colonial development that was current in the first decades of the twenti-
eth century among colonial ideologues and politicians. As such, it does not bear a norma-
tive connotation. For a study on the manifold character of the ethical political tradition, 
see Elsbeth Locher-Scholten, Ethiek in fragmenten. Vijf studies over koloniaal denken en 
doen van Nederlanders in de Indonesische Archipel 1877–1942 (Utrecht: Hes Publishers, 
1981), 176–208.
13 Ingleson, Perhimpunan Indonesia and the Indonesian Nationalist Movement, 34.
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Social formations among the other permanent Indonesian community in 
the Netherlands—the retailers, the cooks, and the domestic workers in the 
urban centers of Holland—attracted much less attention. They were less 
inclined to pursue radical political aims, they were oriented on self-help and 
mutual aid, and were not integrated into the higher social, political or aca-
demic strata of Dutch society. As such they had a truly subaltern character, 
both with regard to their highly vulnerable and somewhat invisible social 
position, and in terms of their subsequently poor historiographical represen-
tation by historians and social scientists. It is precisely among these classes 
that Perkoempoelan Islam found its origins. The organization was mainly 
active in The Hague; it began in 1932 with sixty members but gradually grew to 
roughly 300 members around 1940. According to the articles of the associa-
tion, Perkoempoelan aimed to facilitate the observance of the command-
ments of Islam, to promote a feeling of mutual brotherhood among its 
members, and to maintain relations with members of other religions in the 
Netherlands. Its most immediate ambition was to establish a Muslim ceme-
tery and a community building annex mosque in The Hague, where most 
Muslims lived.14
 Characterizing the Perkoempoelan Islam in the Netherlands
In characterizing Perkoempoelan Islam and its role in the Indonesian com-
munity three aspects should be mentioned: the socio-political views of its 
most prominent members, the crucial role of ordinary members in organizing 
The Hague’s Muslims, and the social and representative functions of this reli-
gious association.
With regard to the first issue, one of the initiators of Perkoempoelan Islam 
and its most conspicuous member, Mohammed Ali van Beetem, is rather atyp-
ical. Umar Ryad has already devoted considerable attention to this Dutch con-
vert, born Jean Louis Charles van Beetem, he converted to Islam in a public 
ceremony in 1931.15 His political character was much more pronounced than 
the views of ordinary Indonesian workers. Before this retired marine officer 
began to lobby for the establishment of a mosque and a Muslim organization 
14 “Indië in Nederland,” De Indische courant (29 February 1932); Ryad, “Among the Believers,” 
290–291.
15 Ryad, “Among the Believers”; Poeze, In het Land van de Overheerser, 196, 288–290. On Van 
Beetem, Oedaya, and Noto Soeroto: Karels, Mijn Aardse Leven Vol Moeite en Strijd, 93, 
96–97.
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in the Netherlands at the end of the 1920s, he engaged in various national relief 
campaigns for the Dutch East Indies, and contributed to the conservative colo-
nial journal Oedaya.
In 1929 he stood in the Dutch parliamentary elections for a short-lived ultra-
nationalist party, the Bond van Nationalisten. In public meetings Van Beetem 
advocated a tough Dutch nationalist policy, fulminating against socialism and 
social-democracy, and loudly opposing the often heard Indonesian secession-
ist slogan “Indië los van Holland, nu!” (“The Indies apart from Holland, now!”).16 
This brought Van Beetem into conflict with the nationalistic students in 
Perhimpoenan Indonesia, who called him a fascist and refused further coop-
eration. Concurrently, however, Van Beetem started to campaign for the estab-
lishment of a mosque in The Hague.17
For Van Beetem, this combination of ideas was less contradictory than it 
might seem. The promotion of Muslim interests by Van Beetem was not part of 
an anticolonial agenda, as was the case with Permi (Persatoean Muslimin 
Indonesia) and other contemporary Islamist organizations in the Dutch East 
Indies. Rather, the idea that the Dutch Muslim community was in need of its 
own societal institutions must be interpreted as part of a conservative agenda 
of ‘sphere sovereignty.ʼ In the Dutch context, this concept found strong sup-
port among Reformed Christian and Catholic leaders from the end of the nine-
teenth century onwards; they were defending their socio-religious sphere of 
influence against other denominations and against the state. This belief in 
political and socio-religious sovereignty, often referred to as ‘pillarization,ʼ was 
dominant throughout the first half of the twentieth century, and was also 
applied to the accommodation of foreign refugees and migrants, such as 
Catholic miners from Slovenia and Poland. Non-Christian migrant groups, 
such as Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe and Russia, Chinese workers in 
the Dutch harbors, and Indonesian workers in The Hague, had to build their 
own supportive social structures, and it was to this end that Mohammed Ali 
van Beetem worked.18
16 “Verbond van Nationalisten,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden (10 March 1928); “Verbond van 
Nationalisten,” Het Vaderland (26 March 1929); “Verkiezingen Tweede Kamer, de candi-
daatstelling,” Het Vaderland (21 May 1929); Mohammad Hatta, ‟De lezing van Stokvis voor 
de ‘Perhimpoenan Indonesia,’” De Socialist (8 June 1929); “Perhimpoenan Indonesia; de 
ervaringen van Stokvis,” De Sumatra Post (8 July 1929).
17 J.L.Ch. van Beetem, “Een Moskee in Den Haag,” Het Vaderland (15 June 1929).
18 Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen, Winnaars en Verliezers: Een Nuchtere Balans van 
Vijfhonderd Jaar Immigratie (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bert Bakker, 2012), 174–185.
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 Rank and File
Less politically outspoken than Mohammed Ali van Beetem, but more repre-
sentative of the rank and file of Perkoempoelan Islam, were the other founding 
members ‘Baas’ N. Oesim and Saiman (alias Pak Bouman). The former, who 
was secretary for Perkoempoelan Islam, and its driving force after the death of 
Van Beetem in 1938, worked as a cook in a restaurant, the Soekoe Manah on 
Groot Hertoginnelaan in The Hague. The latter, Saiman, opened an Indonesian 
restaurant in 1922 together with his wife. More than once, Saiman proved cen-
tral to the Indonesian workers community. His restaurant, Senang Atie, was 
located just across from Van Beetem’s house, at Balistraat 70, and with tradi-
tional food at low prices it was a popular meeting place for Indonesian work-
ers. The preparatory meetings for the establishment of Perkoempoelan Islam 
were held in Saimanʼs restaurant; ceremonial slametan-dinners and lebaran-
festivities, to celebrate the end of Ramadan, were organized in his house at 
Obrechtstraat 117 (see Figure 6.1).19
Although Saiman and Oesim were very active in organizing the Muslim 
community in The Hague, they did not engage in overt politics. Whereas Van 
Beetem was active in various conservative organizations and campaigns, the 
names of Oesim and Saiman were nowhere to be found in other Indonesian 
political organizations or official festivities. In this respect, it is important to 
remember that most of the Indonesian workers were illiterate and did not 
speak Dutch very well.20
At least until the establishment of a community building, the religious and 
social life of Perkoempoelan Islam was centered around individuals and their 
respective homes. Van Beetem, Saiman, and Oesim were very energetic in 
attracting new members and in realizing a basic Islamic infrastructure. In 1932 
they negotiated with the local government to designate an Islamic section in 
the public cemetery of The Hague, and in 1935 they established a langgar at 
Hugo de Grootstraat 31 in that same city.21 Van Beetemʼs house was open to all 
19 “Islamieten Vereeniging,” Algemeen Handelsblad (9 October 1932); “Brieven uit het 
Moederland,” Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië (28 October 1932); Poeze, 
In het Land van de Overheerser, 238.
20 Schutzman Wider, “Indonesian Women in The Hague,” 170, 217, 222.
21 “Islamietische Begraafplaats,” Het Vaderland (24 December 1932); “Perkoempoelan Islam,” 
Het Vaderland (4 March 1935); Schutzman Wider, “Indonesian Women in The Hague,” 84. 
In the southeast Asian context a langgar is a mosque, but smaller, privately owned and 
usually attached to or part of a house, see Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1976), 181.
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Indonesian Muslims as a taman persaudaraan, ‘house of brothers,’ and meet-
ings often took place in Saimanʼs restaurant.
Other members supported the association as well. The apartments of 
Kassanna and Mar Kasim at Obrechtsstraat 431 in The Hague, the boarding 
house Persinggahan at Van Boetzelaerlaan 2, and café De Groothertogin at 
Groot Hertoginnelaan in the same city were also prominent locations.22 A spe-
cial communal function was performed by Indonesian iboes—the female 
domestic workers and nannies that worked with Dutch colonial families on 
leave. Though they remained completely absent from official accounts, they 
played an important role in preparing the ceremonial and religious slametan-
meals. On special occasions, such as funerals, weddings or with the lebaran 
feast that marks the end of Ramadan, they came together to prepare meals, 
thereby facilitating the religious ceremonies and enhancing social cohesion 
among the Indonesian workers community as a whole.23
Socially, Perkoempoelan Islam, the only Muslim association in the Nether-
lands, functioned primarily as a communal organization in which workers 
found a welcoming environment. Politically, its character was mainly deter-
mined by Van Beetem’s conservative views, but these were perhaps more 
visible from the outside than within the workers community itself. It may have 
prevented, however, cooperation between the organization and the politically 
outspoken anticolonial students in Perhimpoenan Indonesia. Although the 
latter organization was in favor of inter-communal, inter-religious, and inter-
regional unity and solidarity, they also required, as a fundamental precondi-
tion for cooperation, an anticolonial and non-cooperative stance towards the 
Dutch state.
Conversely, Perhimpoenan Indonesia was not a serious partner for the 
Indonesian workers in Perkoempoelan Islam. Not only was the student asso-
ciation inter-religious, and therefore non-Islamic because of its multi-religious 
membership, but more importantly, Perhimpoenan Indonesia was deemed too 
elitist, and insensitive to the immediate problems of their poorer compatriots. 
As Schutzman Wider indicates in her examination of Dutch Indonesian work-
ers after World War ii, differences in social background often prevented struc-
tural cooperation between the two groups.24
22 “Viering van het Indisch Nieuwjaar,” Het Vaderland (28 January 1933); Landman, Van Mat 
tot Minaret, 21.
23 Schutzman Wider, “Indonesian Women in The Hague,” 86–91, 199–200.
24 Ibid., 214.
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 Social and Representative Functions and the Negotiation of Space
In fact, in the Indonesian organizational landscape, Perkoempoelan Islam was 
the only body that could represent Indonesian workers in socio-economic 
matters vis-à-vis the local or national government. Other organizations in the 
Netherlands, such as Perhimpoenan Indonesia and Roekoen Peladjar Indonesia 
(established in 1936) were predominantly focused on students. Moreover, 
other organizations either explicitly refrained from political action and nar-
rowed their activities to the cultural sphere, as was the case with Roekoen 
Peladjar Indonesia and the Indo-Chinese association Chung Hwa Hui, or they 
consciously exercised ‘big-politics’ with regard to the situation in the Dutch 
East Indies, as was the case with Perhimpoenan Indonesia. Mutual aid or prac-
tical representation were not among the latter’s fields of interests.
This aid was, however, urgently required as the Great Depression devastated 
the world in the 1930s. The Indonesian workers were particularly vulnerable in 
the disastrous economic situation. The Dutch East Indies were hard hit by the 
depression, and one-sixth of the large European and Eurasian population were 
unemployed during this period.25 A considerable number chose to migrate to 
the motherland, but were unable to find employment there either.26 Indonesian 
domestic workers and cooks that had followed their employers, the Indies 
families, to The Hague were dismissed. Indonesian workers had an additional 
problem: they were not eligible for unemployment benefits, as they had been 
employed unofficially, nor were they eligible for local welfare, which required 
that one be registered in a municipality for more than a year. These unem-
ployed workers faced the additional misfortune of being too poverty-stricken 
to afford return tickets to Indonesia. Perkoempoelan Islam stepped into this 
void of socio-economic despair, both in terms of direct aid and by protecting 
their interests at the official level.27
In Joan Schutzman Widerʼs interviews with domestic workers in The Hague, 
she describes how Mohammed Ali van Beetem took direct relief seriously: 
‘“When I was sick, he took me to the hospital”; “If a family was not good, he 
spoke to them or found us another family”; “Once he brought me some coal, 
when I was not well enough to work.”28 Van Beetem was also instrumental in 
25 John Ingleson, “Fear of the Kampung, Fear of Unrest: Urban Unemployment and Colonial 
Policy in 1930s Java,” Modern Asian Studies 46 (2012), 1639–1643.
26 “Werklooze Suikergeëmployeerden in Nederland; twee duizend Indische werkloozen?” 
De Indische courant (4 December 1934).
27 Poeze, Politiek-Politioneele Overzichten, Deel iii, 423; Ibid., Deel iv, lxxviii.
28 Schutzman Wider, “Indonesian Women in The Hague,” 71.
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working for the Indonesian workers at the official level. In June 1933 the asso-
ciation, according to its loyalist views, sent a letter to the Dutch Queen to 
inform her of the dire situation of Indonesian domestic workers. In this letter, 
Van Beetem argued that Indies families should be obligated to maintain their 
servants, and that with a subsidy, Perkoempoelan could ease the most urgent 
problems. Furthermore, Van Beetem started negotiations with the municipal 
social service of The Hague, the ‘Dienst Maatschappelijk Hulpbetoon’ which 
provided unemployment benefits; he urged them to make an exception to the 
one-year residency rule for unemployed Indonesians.29 Finally, when the lang-
gar opened its doors, a job mediation office for Indonesian servants was estab-
lished as well.30
 Loyal but Vulnerable
Compared to the other Indonesian organizations, the Muslim association had 
to maintain a balance between loyalty to the state and criticism of its policies. 
For the nationalists in Perhimpoenan Indonesia it was clear that there was no 
space for negotiation with the Dutch authorities. And even if there was, they 
adhered to the position of non-cooperation. At the other end, the moderate 
‘ethici’ were deeply involved in the upper strata of academic life and society, 
and their journals and associations generally adopted an apolitical stance. The 
authorities initially approached Perkoempoelan Islam sympathetically, espe-
cially with regard to the cemetery and the one-year residency rule.31 After all, 
Perkoempoelan was not a political organization and was outspoken in express-
ing its loyalty to the queen. The Dutch central intelligence agency even praised 
the work of Van Beetem because he kept his followers from taking ‟revolution-
ary paths.”32
Nonetheless, despite the loyalist views of Van Beetem, the local and national 
authorities ultimately adopted an uncooperative attitude towards Perko-
empoelan Islam once it started to pursue social aims. For reasons that are 
29 “De behandeling van Nederlandsch-Indiers,” Algemeen Handelsblad (22 June 1933); 
“Perkoempoelan Islam,” Het Vaderland (29 October 1933); “De Islam, lezing R.A.A. Wiranata-
koesoema,” De Indische courant (14 November 1933).
30 “Perkoempoelan Islam,” Het Vaderland (4 March 1935).
31 “Perkoempoelan Islam, afscheid Van Beetem,” Het Vaderland (28 December 1933).
32 “Brieven uit het Moederland,” Het Nieuws van den Dag voor Nederlandsch-Indië 
(28 October 1932); “Deelneming der Perkoempoelan Islam,” Het Vaderland (29 March 
1934); De Nederlandse Bank archive.
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unclear, the social service suspended payments to Indonesian workers in 1935, 
and other requests of Perkoempoelan fell on deaf ears. The authorities seemed 
to be more interested in solving the problem by repatriating the ‘foreign’ work-
ers, than in mitigating their needs.33
In this respect, there are clear similarities with the governmental approach 
towards other migrant communities in the 1930s, such as the Chinese workers 
communities of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. The local and national Dutch 
authorities tried to bring an end to the problem of “the Chinese and other 
Asian vermin”—as an official at the Ministry of Justice addressed the severely 
hit community—with a combination of administrative restrictions on immi-
gration, and aid deprivation for the destitute Chinese sailors.34 Over ten years’ 
time, the once bustling Chinatowns in Rotterdam and Amsterdam, once home 
to around three thousand souls, were reduced to around two hundred persons 
(in 1939).35 Although the Netherlands never knew fascist or national-socialist 
movements of the size of those in Germany and other European countries, 
authoritarian nationalist governance, xenophobic ideas, and thinking in terms 
of final solutions were certainly on the rise. Officially, the Indonesians were 
subjects of the Crown, but that fact did not protect the workersʼ communities 
of The Hague; indeed they were still faced with these sentiments and policies. 
In April 1935, Mohammed Ali van Beetem resigned from his post as secretary of 
Perkoempoelan Islam as he felt that his many attempts to address the various 
authorities met no results.36
 Indonesian, Dutch or European Muslims?
As indicated above, Perkoempoelan Islam was the only official Muslim associ-
ation in the Netherlands; its objective was to facilitate the observance of the 
commandments of Islam. Nonetheless, more significant than its religious 
character were its social functions as a communal self-help organization for its 
33 “De Islam, lezing R.A.A. Wiranatakoesoema,” De Indische courant (14 November 1933); 
“Stopzetting van steun aan Inlanders,” Algemeen Handelsblad (10 March 1935); “Indische 
en Inheemsche werkloozen,” De Indische courant (22 June 1935).
34 Henk J.J. Wubben, Chineezen en Ander Aziatisch Ongedierte: Lotgevallen van Chinese 
Immigranten in Nederland 1911–1941 (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 1986); Lucassen and Lucassen, 
Winnaars en Verliezers, 179–180.
35 Wubben, Chineezen en Ander Aziatisch Ongedierte, 168–174.
36 “Perkoempoelan Islam,” Het Vaderland (15 April 1935); “Indiërs in Nederland: De invloed 
van extreme elementen, Perkoempoelan Islam,” De Indische Courant (10 May 1935).
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members, and as a body for official representation vis-à-vis authorities and 
employers. In essence Perkoempoelan Islam—of which no non-Muslim 
Dutchman was member—was a “Dutch” organization in that it was firmly 
rooted in Dutch society. The Dutch environment, rather than the Islamic world, 
determined to a large extent its shape and functions. Not surprisingly, 
Mohammed Ali Van Beetem, who stood with one foot in the Muslim commu-
nity and with the other in Dutch society, played an important role in represent-
ing the Indonesian workers in The Hague, despite being very different from the 
rank and file of the community.
The “Dutch” and communal character of Perkoempoelan Islam raises the 
question: to what extent was the organization was connected to the larger 
Muslim world at all? Were there any attempts to reach out to other Muslim 
communities, for example, in other countries of western Europe? In France 
more than 300,000 Muslim workers from the colonized world supplemented 
the crippled French workforce after World War i. In Britain there were sev-
eral hundred British converts, and between 10,000 and 20,000 Muslims from 
British India, Malaysia, and the Arab Peninsula. In Germany, Italy, and Spain 
thousands of Muslims filled the ranks of the armies, the universities, and the 
factories.37
In the case of Perkoempoelan Islam there is scant archival information on 
its connections with other groups in Europe. There appear to be two reasons 
for this lack of information. First and significantly, Perkoempoelan Islam was 
absent on the radar of Dutch authorities, and hence it remained largely undoc-
umented. Anticolonial Islamist, nationalist or communist organizations were 
much more distressing to the authorities than the loyalist Perkoempoelan 
Islam. Neither the documents filed in the archives of the Dutch Ministry of 
Colonies, nor the monthly reports on political and social action in the 
Netherlands and the colonies issued by the Dutch East Indies Procurator-
General mention Perkoempoelan Islam. The association is mentioned only 
twice, and these are references to its loyal and strictly legal approach.38 The 
most informative sources about religious activities are contemporary newspa-
per articles that do not give information on the organizationʼs involvements 
with Dutch Indonesian Muslims abroad.
Second, the scarcity of information on international Muslim networks in 
the Netherlands may also be due to the fact that the domestic workers, cooks, 
and shopkeepers of Perkoempoelan Islam lacked the international outlook of 
37 Clayer and Germain, Islam in Inter-War Europe, 11–15.
38 Poeze, Politiek-Politioneele Overzichten, Deel iii, 423; Ibid., Deel iv, 392.
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the Senegalese dockers of Marseille, the Yemeni sailors of Cardiff, or for that 
matter the Indonesian students of Perhimpoenan Indonesia. The nature of 
their professions did not stimulate international contacts. Moreover, the rai-
son d’être of their organization was less dependent on propaganda abroad or 
solidarity from foreign organizations. In contrast to the nationalist Indonesian 
students in Perhimpoenan Indonesia who, after 1923, consciously established 
contacts with other anticolonial nationalists in Europe, Perkoempoelan Islam 
was more concerned with the needs and challenges of its own community in 
The Hague, than with networking abroad.39
 Muslim Networks Abroad
Nonetheless, despite the fragmented source materials, we can distinguish an 
international side of Islam in the Netherlands. When we examine the transna-
tional networks of Indonesian Muslims beyond the Dutch borders we must 
discriminate between three types of engagements. First, there were a few occa-
sions in which Indonesian Muslims were in contact with organizations abroad 
for religious purposes. Second, and more importantly, throughout the 1920s and 
1930s there were political events in which prominent Muslims—Indonesians 
and non-Indonesians—were involved, though not primarily in the capacity of 
their religious identity. Finally, the Dutch Indonesian Muslims, workers and 
students, were in frequent contact with the Indonesian community in Cairo 
that was deeply embedded in religious institutions.
In the period from 1910 to 1939 I have listed forty-two occasions in which 
Indonesians in the Netherlands were active abroad, or in which foreigners 
approached the Dutch Indonesian community for political, organizational or 
religious purposes. With regard to the first type of engagement, I would label 
only three of the forty-two events as primarily religious. The most important of 
these was undoubtedly the presence of Mohammed Ali van Beetem at the 
European Muslim Congress in Geneva in 1935, which Umar Ryad describes in 
his article on Van Beetem.40 The congress was initiated by the well-known 
Lebanese pan-Islamic organizer Shakīb Arslān, who fostered an influential 
network of Muslims in Europe from his residence in Geneva, and who in turn 
was part of the circles around Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā and Amīn al-Ḥusaynī. 
39 Klaas Stutje, “Indonesian Identities Abroad: International Engagement of Colonial 
Students in the Netherlands, 1908–1931,” bmgn—Low Countries Historical Review 128 
(2013), 159.
40 Ryad, “Among the Believers,” 300–301.
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The congress was attended by sixty participants, among them European con-
verts, European Muslims from the Balkans, and immigrants such as Messali 
Hadj from Algeria. For a number of personal and political reasons the European 
Muslim Congress turned out to be a disappointment: political issues, internal 
quarrels, and colliding personalities frustrated the establishment of a perma-
nent European Muslim umbrella organization in the home city of the League 
of Nations.41 For Mohammed Ali van Beetem, however, it provided the oppor-
tunity to request—half a year after the inauguration of the langgar-commu-
nity building in The Hague—moral support for the construction of a proper 
mosque like the mosques in London, Berlin, and Paris.42
A second remarkable religious event was the arrival in the Netherlands of 
an Ahmadiyya-Lahore missionary, Mirza Ali Ahmad Baig, in 1939.43 This Indian 
propagandist founded an Ahmadiyya center on Java and worked at least twelve 
years in the Dutch East Indies before he was transferred to the Netherlands. 
There, he aimed to promote the study of Islam among Indonesian students 
and establish a mosque.44 He also sought contact with Perkoempoelan Islam, 
where he soon became a respected member.45 It seems that World War ii put 
an early end to Ahmad Baig’s activities, as the German authorities imprisoned 
him.46 Nonetheless, the presence of one of the two Ahmadiyya branches in the 
Netherlands is important: it was this outcast reformist movement of Islam that 
was at the forefront of institutionalizing Islam in other countries in Europe as 
well. Its activists devoted much effort and missionary resources to establishing 
a basic Islamic infrastructure, introducing Islam to non-Muslims, and translat-
ing the Qurʾān and other important texts into European languages. They took 
control of the Woking Mosque in London, and initiated the establishment of 
mosques in Berlin, Vienna, Madrid, and other European cities.47
Although the arrival of Ahmad Baig was most likely the first outward 
attempt to extend the Ahmadiyya network to the Netherlands, there are 
41 Martin Kramer, Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1986), 142–153, there 152.
42 Ryad, “Among the Believers,” 301.
43 On the Ahmadiyya and its Lahore and Qadiyani branch, named after the headquarters of 
both branches, see Clayer and Germain, Islam in Inter-War Europe, 89–118.
44 Poeze, Politiek-Politioneele Overzichten, Deel I, lxxx, 200; Idem, In het Land van de 
Overheerser, 289; Landman, Van Mat tot Minaret, 23–32; Ryad, “Among the Believers,” 304; 
iish, Stokvis: inv. nr. 228.
45 “De moskee in Nederland,” De Indisch Courant (13 December 1939).
46 This information is derived from an interview with the former chair of the Lahore branch 
in the Netherlands, Mr. Keeskamp: Landman, Van Mat tot Minaret, 29.
47 Clayer and Germain, Islam in Inter-War Europe, 28–29, 51, 97–100.
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indications that Indonesian students in the Netherlands were in contact with 
Indonesian Ahmadis abroad before 1939. In 1927, the Dutch police in Leiden 
raided the secretariat of the nationalist association Perhimpoenan Indonesia 
under the pretext of the latter’s anticolonial sedition. Among other documents, 
the police confiscated a list of subscriptions of its journal Indonesia Merdeka. 
Judging from this list, it would seem that the journal was sent to two addresses 
in Lahore: the first was a certain Ahmad Sarida, a student of the Ahmadiyya 
Ishaʼat Islam college, and the second address was that of the Ahmadiyya 
Anjuman-i Ishaʼat-i Islam headquarters itself.48 From a couple of years earlier, 
but confiscated during the same police raid, a small postcard to the Indonesia 
Merdeka secretariat survived, indicating that the same Ahmad Sarida wanted 
his address changed from the “Ahmadia Buildings Lahore” to the “Ahmadia 
School Qadian Gurdaspur Punjab.” Sarida also thanked Perhimpoenan 
Indonesia for sending its journal free of charge. “Your journal is instructive for 
the Indonesian community here in Lahore and Qadian, which comprises 22 
souls. May God help us, Indonesians, in our work: to destroy what is evil.”49
Although the relations between the Ahmadiyya branches and the main-
stream Muslim world have always been problematic, and the Ahmadiyya 
movement itself was also split into Qadiyani and Lahori branches, the Dutch 
historian Harry Poeze concludes from an interview with an Indonesian in The 
Hague that religious disputes did not affect the Indonesian Muslim commu-
nity in the Netherlands.50 While in Cairo an anti-Ahmadiyya association was 
established by Jawi students from Padang, in the Netherlands the authority of 
Ahmad Baig seems to have been widely recognized by the Indonesians.51
 Student Politics Abroad, Merging Networks
Connections with other Muslim communities in Europe through political net-
works occurred much more frequently than through religious networks. This 
implies, however, that the students in Perhimpoenan Indonesia, by virtue of 
their attempts to establish political contacts abroad, were much more success-
ful than the workers in Perkoempoelan Islam, who did not focus on foreign 
representation. While only three primarily religious transnational connections 
48 na, Koloniën: inv.nr. 300.
49 na, Koloniën: inv.nr. 301.
50 Poeze, In het Land van de Overheerser, 289.
51 On the anti-Ahmadiyya Majlis Asjaura al Indonesia, see na, Koloniën: inv.nr. 312 and 314.
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were established, no fewer than thirty-five events bore a political or semi- 
political character, be they loyalist, nationalist, communist, anticolonial, 
antifascist or pacifist events.52 These non-religious events in Europe served as 
locations for encounters between prominent Muslims in Europe as well. 
Political, anticolonial, and religious solidarity were often inter-related.
For example, the Kongress gegen Koloniale Unterdrückung und Imper-
ialismus in Brussels in 1927 was organized at the instigation of the Communist 
International Red Aid and the Comintern, and bore a strong Communist 
imprint.53 Among historians, this congress is usually studied because of its sig-
nificance to the anticolonial movement.54 Several prominent anticolonial 
organizers and political leaders from all around the world were present, such 
as Jawaharlal Nehru of the Indian National Congress and the Senegalese-
French Communist Lamine Senghor of the Comité de Defense de la Race 
Nègre. However, among its participants we also find the Indian Mawlana 
Barkatullah Bhopali, who pursued pan-Islamic and nationalist goals through 
revolutionary action and who spoke on behalf of the Indian revolutionary 
Ghadar Party. The prominent Muslim Algerian nationalist Messali Hadj, who 
lived in France and was involved in the network around the aforementioned 
Shakīb Arslān was also in attendance.55 Mohammed Hatta, the Indonesian 
student who represented Perhimpoenan Indonesia at the Kongress with a 
mandate of a number of Indonesian organizations and who later became 
the  first vice president of the independent Indonesian Republic, spoke with 
various groups, among them Messali Hadj and his Étoile Nord-Africaine.56 
Although the precise content of the discussions is unknown, in his memoirs 
52 These activities do not include the many artistic tours of Noto Soeroto and Jodjana, or 
holiday trips; see Karels, Mijn Aardse Leven Vol Moeite en Strijd, 91–106.
53 L. Gibarti, Edo Fimmen and Moh. Hatta, Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais Egmont: offi-
zielles Protokoll des Kongresses gegen Koloniale Unterdrückung und Imperialismus, Brüssel, 
10–15 Februar 1927 (Berlin: Neuer Deutscher Verlag, 1927); na, Justitie: inv.nr. 16609; iish, 
Henriette Roland Holst: inv. nr. 39; Fredrik Petersson, ‟We are Neither Visionaries, nor 
Utopian Dreamers, Willi Münzenberg, the League against Imperialism and the Comintern, 
1925–1933” (PhD diss., Åbo Akademi University, 2007), 49, 109.
54 Petersson, ‟We are Neither Visionaries, nor Utopian Dreamers”; Poeze, Politiek-Politioneele 
Overzichten, Deel I, xcix–ci.
55 Messali Hadj, Les Mémoires de Messali Hadj 1898–1938 (Paris: J.C. Lattès, 1982), 156–157.
56 The other Dutch Indonesian delegates were Nazir Pamoentjak, Gatot, and Soerbardjo 
(Manaf). The mandate was given by the parties Partai Nasional Indonesia, Partai Sarekat 
Islam, Boedi Oetomo, and several student societies, united under the banner of Nationale 
Concentratie. A fifth Indonesian representative was the Communist Semaoen, represent-
ing the Sarekat Rakyat.
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Messali Hadj frequently referred to other participants from Indonesia, Syria, 
British India, Egypt, Senegal, and Tunisia as his “coréligionnaires.”57
The Lebanese organizer Shakīb Arslān himself was not present at this event 
in Brussels, because the French and Belgian authorities did not grant him a 
visa.58 However, ten months later, in November 1927, the Indonesian students 
and Perhimpoenan Indonesia members Achmad Subardjo and Sulaiman, had 
the chance to meet Arslān in Moscow, Messali Hadj from Algeria, and Ahmed 
Essafi from Tunisia. They met on the occasion of the festivities for the tenth 
anniversary of the Soviet Union. Apart from communist delegations from all 
around the world, anticolonial nationalists were invited as part of the 
Cominternʼs attempt to gain influence in the colonial world. In his autobiogra-
phy, Achmad Subardjo describes that his friend Sulaiman—‘a pious Muslim’—
initially hesitated to accept the invitation because he had heard many negative 
stories about the treatment of Muslims in the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, they 
accepted the invitation and during their stay joined the aforementioned 
Muslim nationalists. When Shakīb Arslān gave a speech in the famous Bolshoi 
theater in Moscow on the Islamic concept of redistributing wealth among the 
toiling masses, Subardjo and Sulaiman were greatly inspired.59
At first sight, the encounters of Indonesian students with prominent Muslim 
organizers took place within the context of anticolonialism and the struggle 
for national liberation. At these moments, they do not seem to have provoked 
profound theological debates or discussions about the role of Islam in soci-
ety.60 However, because the political events took place on a regular basis, the 
various Muslim communities became aware of each other’s existence. It also 
may have fueled the idea among some European Muslim organizers to build an 
international platform on religious grounds as well, of which the aforemen-
tioned European Muslim Congress is a telling example.
 Cairo and Contacts with the Jawi Community
Finally, in our attempt to explore the connections between Indonesian 
Muslims in the Netherlands and Muslims beyond the confines of the Dutch 
57 Hadj, Les Mémoires de Messali Hadj, 157.
58 na, Koloniën: inv.nr. 309; “De Liga; het congres te Brussel,” De Indische Courant 
(10 December 1927).
59 Ahmad Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo, Kesadaran Nasional: Sebuan Otobiografi (Jakarta: 
Gunung Agung, 1978): 140–144; caran 13170.
60 See, for example, the conference proceedings: Gibarti, Fimmen, and Hatta, Das Flammenz-
eichen vom Palais Egmont.
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Empire we must consider the large Jawi community in Cairo. In the same 
period that Indonesian students started to arrive in the Netherlands, the first 
cohorts of Indonesians enrolled in al-Azhar university in Cairo. Contemporary 
Arabs usually referred to this group as the Jawi; in fact this category 
comprised people from more cultural backgrounds than the Javanese alone. 
In fact, all Muslim students in Cairo coming from Muslim lands east of 
present-day Thailand—including a considerable number of Arabs living in 
Southeast Asia (the Hadhramis)—came under the rule of the Shaykh al-
Jawi.61 Nonetheless, the main group within this Jawi community came from 
the Dutch East Indies, and considered themselves related to the Indonesians 
in the Netherlands.
These Jawi students, numbering fourteen in 1904, twenty-two in 1912, 150 in 
1925, and around 100 in the 1930s, established organizations and journals just as 
the Indonesians in the Netherlands had, though usually on the basis of regional 
background rather than social class or political affiliation, and they were 
inspired by Egyptian nationalism and pan-Islamism, rather than by anticolo-
nial nationalism and international communism.62 The social background of 
the average Cairene student differed from that of the Dutch students as well. 
As mentioned earlier, the Dutch students were typically of aristocratic or mer-
chant descent and from the urban centers on Java, whereas the students in 
Cairo more often came from religious families and were, in half of the cases, 
from the west coast of Sumatra.
However, despite these differences, the two communities remained in 
close contact. The main association of Jawi in Cairo, the Djamʼiat al Chairijah, 
sent its journal Seruan Azhar to Perhimpoenan Indonesia, while the latter 
organization sent its Indonesia Merdeka in return.63 When there were internal 
quarrels and disagreements in Cairo—and these occurred more often in 
Cairo than in the Netherlands—Perhimpoenan Indonesia tried to mediate.64 
On  international conferences Perhimpoenan Indonesia, through Achmad 
Subardjo, was authorized to represent the Djam’iat al Chairijah.65 And finally, 
when prominent Indonesians traveled from Indonesia to Europe, or vice-versa, 
61 Michael Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds 
(London: Routledge, 2003), 13, 233; Idem, “An Indonesian Community in Cairo: Continuity 
and Change in a Cosmopolitan Islamic Milieu,” Indonesia 77 (2004): 1–26.
62 Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia, 129, 137–138, 219, 229.
63 na, Koloniën: inv.nr. 300; William Roff, ‟Indonesian and Malay Students in Cairo in the 
1920s,” Indonesia 9 (1970), 79.
64 na, Koloniën: inv.nr. 362.
65 Mohammad Hatta, “Het Brusselsche Congres tegen Imperialisme en koloniale onder-
drukking en onze buitenlandse propaganda,” Indonesia Merdeka 5 (1927), 16.
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they often made a brief stopover in Cairo. There they visited the Jawi commu-
nity, as did the Muslim cleric Haji Agus Salim on his way to an international 
labor conference in Geneva in 1930, and Mohammed Hatta on his way back in 
1932.66 On at least one occasion, an Indonesian Cairo resident paid a visit to 
the Indonesian community in the Netherlands. The Minangkabau scholar 
Djanan Tajib was the first Indonesian to have obtained the degree of ʿĀlim 
from al-Azhar and was the chief editor of the Seruan Azhar. When he studied 
in Paris for six months in 1926 he took the opportunity to meet Hatta and other 
Indonesian students in Rotterdam.67 In Paris, it seems likely that he was in 
touch with Indonesian activists such as Mononutu and Subardjo.
Of course, the various contacts between Perhimpoenan Indonesia and 
Djamʼiat al Chairijah were not strictly religious. They probably illustrate the 
evolution of an idea of (proto-)Indonesian communality more than unity on 
the basis of Islam. However, as the last organization was well embedded in the 
religious circles in, and Islamic networks radiating from Cairo, it suggests that 
the militants within Perhimpoenan Indonesia through their contacts with the 
Djam’iat al Chairijah were at least aware of the religious, semi-religious or 
political forces in the Islamic world at the time.68
Moreover, on at least at one occasion, the pan-Indonesian relations bore 
an  explicitly religious character. As Ryad describes as well, Mohammed Ali 
van Beetem and Mohammed Rasjid of Perkoempoelan Islam traveled to Egypt 
in January 1934 to visit Islamic institutions there.69 Van Beetem wanted his 
conversion to Islam recognized by the highly esteemed rector of al-Azhar 
University, Muḥammad al-Aḥmadī l-Ẓawahīrī. With the support of Shaykh- 
al-Jawi Burhan el Din (the official representative of the Indonesian students 
at al-Azhar’s board), a special meeting was summoned with religious digni-
taries, Egyptian members of parliament, student representatives, and many 
individual Muslim students from Europe, Asia, America, and Africa.70 The trip 
was a memorable success and granted Van Beetem the prestige and recogni-
tion that he had pursued for years.
66 na, Koloniën: inv.nr. 345 and 381; Poeze, In het Land van de Overheerser, 225.
67 Mona Abaza, Changing Images of Three Generations of Azharites in Indonesia (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), 5.
68 On the religious environment of the Djam’iat, and the presence of the Jawi Dalhar at the 
pan-Islamic conference of 1932 in Jerusalem, see na, Koloniën: inv.nr. 381.
69 Ryad, “Among the Believers,” 298–300; “Perkoempoelan Islam, afscheid Van Beetem,” Het 
Vaderland (28 December 1933).
70 Ryad, “Among the Believers,” 298–300.
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 Concluding Remarks
The journey of Mohammed Ali van Beetem and Mohammed Rasjid to Egypt in 
1934 is a striking example of the organized activity of Muslims in the 
Netherlands in the prewar period, and an example of “Dutch” Muslim involve-
ment with Islamic networks abroad. It can even be argued that Van Beetem 
and his fellows in Perkoempoelan Islam were consciously part of a ‘European 
Islam,’ as they were in contact with Muslim networks around Shakīb Arslān 
and with Ahmadiyya missionaries such as Mirza Ali Ahmad Baig.71
However, this chapter also demonstrates that we need to take into account 
the other Indonesian organizations in the Netherlands as well, to get a more 
nuanced impression of the functions and activities of Perkoempoelan Islam. 
Rather than being a pan-Islamic organization with transnational connections, 
Perkoempoelan Islam was, first and foremost, a communal organization with 
strong roots in the Dutch environment. It was more concerned with the accom-
modation and representation of Indonesian workers vis-à-vis the Dutch author-
ities than with networking abroad.
Despite Van Beetemʼs trips to Geneva and Cairo, other Indonesian groups, 
such as the students in Perhimpoenan Indonesia, were much more active in 
exercising ‘big-politics’ in the Dutch Empire and beyond than the Muslim 
workers in Perkoempoelan Islam were. If we focus on the only group that man-
ifested itself as Islamic, we risk overemphasizing the significance of a few pri-
marily religious activities of Van Beetem, while missing other, although less 
‘religious’ events and encounters, that were important for the Indonesian com-
munity in the Netherlands at large.
Notwithstanding these remarks, the interwar presence of Indonesian 
Muslims and their various organizations in the Netherlands is significant in 
the context of several research areas: the history of Islam in the Netherlands, 
the history Islam in interwar Europe, and Indonesian migration to the 
Netherlands. Moreover, the story of the relatively small Muslim community in 
Perkoempoelan Islam is illustrative of the attitude the Dutch authorities and 
the society at large adopted towards migrant communities in general, and of 
the strategies these communities adopted to cope with their inherently vulner-
able position. As such, this aspect of the colonial past is also a key part of Dutch 
history.
71 Cf. Clayer and Germain, Islam in Inter-War Europe, 122–126.
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chapter 7
Moros y Cristianos: Religious Aspects of the 
Participation of Moroccan Soldiers in the Spanish 
Civil War (1936–1939)1
Ali Al Tuma
 Introduction
The Spanish Civil War, in which around 80,000 Moroccan Muslims fought, was 
not, initially, supposed to be a holy war in the religious sense. Nor were the 
majority of the Spanish Nationalist officers who rebelled against the Spanish 
Republic in July 1936 particularly religious, despite their political conservatism. 
In fact, it was in the Spanish protectorate of Morocco that the military coup 
first received its designation as a holy war, and it was the Moroccan Khalifa, the 
nominal representative of the Moroccan sultan and the highest Moroccan 
authority in the Spanish zone, who first did so.2 In this chapter I discuss the reli-
gious aspects of the Moroccan participation in the Spanish Civil War. I examine 
the idea of a religious alliance between Moroccan Muslims and Spanish 
Christians against a supposedly atheist enemy from the point of view of Spanish 
Nationalist propaganda, but also from the point of view of the Moroccan sol-
diers. I also demonstrate that the Spanish Nationalists portrayed the Moroccans 
in their Moroccan protectorate as devout Muslims. This portrayal influenced 
the propaganda the Nationalists used to win the loyalty of the people in Spanish 
Morocco. With regard to the Moroccan soldiers, many aspects of their daily life 
was deferred to the notion of the religious Moroccan. The Spanish Nationalist 
military endeavored to create a separate Muslim religious sphere for the 
Moroccan soldiers. In this chapter I show that the Nationalist authorities not 
only wanted to respect the Islamic religion of their troops but also expected the 
1 The phrase ‘Moros y Cristianos’ translates to Moors and Christians. It refers to the battles 
between the medieval Moors and the Christians in Spain during the age of the Reconquest, 
and to the festivals in Spain that commemorate and re-enact these battles.
2 Stanley G. Payne, The Franco Regime 1936–1975 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1987), 197n1. Initially, as Payne states, religious concern did not play an overt role in the rebel-
lion of July 1936, rather it was its counter-revolutionary character that made Catholics natu-
ral allies from the start.
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Moroccan soldiers to adhere to the idealized image of devout Muslims, even 
when some of these soldiers had no desire to comply with that idealized image.
Soon after the outbreak of the Civil War, strange scenes started to emerge: 
the archbishop of Toledo returned to his archiepiscopal see escorted by 
Moroccan Muslim troops, a priest accompanied Moroccans into battle, pro-
Nationalist crowds cheered and pinned crosses and scapularies on the chests 
of African soldiers, and many similar scenes.3 In Ceuta, the Nationalists autho-
rized the building of a new mosque in which stones from the battlefields of the 
Alcazar of Toledo, Oviedo, and Teruel were integrated as “official recognition” 
of the existence of Islam in Spain and as “proof” of the meaning of these “mar-
tyred cities” for Muslims.4
As a matter of fact the Spanish Republicans inadvertently helped the 
Nationalist propaganda in portraying this war to the Moroccans as a struggle in 
which the Republic targeted Islam and Moroccans in particular. Early in the 
war, Republican planes struck the native medina of Tetuan, hitting a mosque 
in the process, and later dropped bombs near a ship that was to take pilgrims 
on their trip to Mecca, while the Republican navy shelled a number of coastal 
towns in Spanish Morocco.5 In August 1936 the Nationalist newspaper Diario 
Marroquí highlighted an air raid that supposedly targeted the Mezquita of 
Cordoba, “the historical monument of Arab civilization.”6
The Nationalists portrayed the struggle against the Republic to the Muslims 
of Spanish Morocco as a conflict in which religion played a prominent role, 
because the Nationalists saw and presented the Moroccans as primarily ori-
ented and driven by religion and religious biases. The Moroccans were first 
and foremost Muslims. It was clear that they were perceived as extremely reli-
gious by those who held a negative, hostile view and by those with a benign or 
3 Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York: Modern Library, 2011), 400; Claud Cockburn, 
Cockburn in Spain: Despatches from the Spanish Civil War (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1986), 161; Ronald Frasier, Blood of Spain: An Oral History of the Spanish Civil War (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1979), 155.
4 Tomas García Figueras, Marruecos: La acción de España en el Norte de África (Madrid: 
Ediciones Fe, 1944), 292.
5 Balfour, Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War (Oxford: Oxford uni-
versity press, 2002), 273, 281; Shannon E. Fleming, “Spanish Morocco and the Alzamiento 
Nacional, 1936–1939: The Military, Economic and Political Mobilization of a Protectorate,” 
Journal of Contemporary History 18, no. 1 (January 1983), 36, 37. The target of the bombing in 
Tetuan was perhaps the building of the High Commissariat which lies not far from the 
medina.
6 “Los aviones rojos bombardean la Mezquita de Córdoba,” Diario Marroqí, 19 August 1936. The 
famous mosque-turned-cathedral was not hit.
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paternalistic view of Islam and Moroccans. One Spanish soldier who fought for 
the Nationalists remarked retrospectively on the “Moors” he met in Melilla in 
1936, that they were “in this aspect [being religious] superior to us who never 
remembered to visit a church.”7 García Figueras (1892–1981), one of the most 
prominent administrators of the Spanish protectorate in Morocco, considered 
the greatest achievements of the Nationalist administration in Morocco those 
that took into account the spiritual and religious nature of the Moroccan popu-
lace. This understanding applied not only to Moroccans but to the rest of the 
“Muslim people.” In 1939 Franco sent a letter to the association of Muslim youth 
in Cairo, answering a memorandum that the Islamic conference in Cairo sent to 
him. In his letter, Franco commended the “Muslim people” for succeeding in 
preserving their “spiritual treasures” in a materialistic age, and pointed to the 
blood bonds that were formed with the Moroccan people in defense of the 
“faith and spirituality.”8 Regardless of propaganda, Franco seemed to truly 
believe that the alternative to a deeply religious Muslim was not a palatable 
one. In a less public remark he declared that “the Arab without a turban is a 
future Marxist.”9
Of course some of the Nationalist veterans of the protectorate perceived 
that the religiousness of the Moroccans was neither blind nor absolute. Ruiz 
Albéniz, also known as El Tebib Arrumi, an important journalist and radio 
speaker for the Nationalists during the Civil War, observed in the early years of 
the protectorate that Moroccan religiousness was rather practical in nature 
and religious observance was ultimately subordinated to profit.10 Once one 
from the Rif does not perceive a threat to his faith, he would be guided by 
his innate desire for profit and would associate himself with the actions of the 
protectorate.11 But for the Moroccan, that security in faith must first be guaran-
teed by the Spanish, and a part of that involved communication. The Spanish 
considered it essential to attach the greatest importance to religious mat-
ters when communicating with the Moroccans of their protectorate or when 
buying their support. One remarkable example from the Republican side 
7 Jose Llordes Badía, Al dejar el fusil: Memorias de un soldado raso en la guerra de España 
(Barcelona: Ariel, 1969), 60.
8 The text was published in the Moroccan newspaper al-Ḥurriyya, 16 February 1939.
9 Abel Albet-Mas, “Three Gods, Two Shores, One Space: Religious Justifications for 
Tolerance and Confrontation between Spain and Colonial Morocco during the Franco 
Era,” Geopolitics 11, no. 4 (2006), 593.
10 Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, “Popularizing Africanism: The Career of Víctor Ruiz Albéniz, El 
Tebib Arrumi,” Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies 11, no. 1 (April 2005), 40.
11 Ibid., 42.
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proves the point. Early in the war the communist paper, Mundo Obrero, pub-
lished what seemed to be a note by a young Moroccan prisoner of war denounc-
ing Franco. The paper published a Spanish translation of the letter as well as a 
picture of the original. While the Spanish version denounced Franco as a “trai-
tor,” we can see that in the Arabic text the word “infidel” is added to “traitor,” 
though the paper omitted this from the translation.12 Perhaps the Republican 
paper’s lack of accuracy in translation stemmed from its unwillingness to por-
tray the conflict in religious terms. But this example shows that even when the 
Moroccan soldier wanted, or in this case, probably felt forced to attack the 
Francoists he could only do so in terms of religion: believers and infidels. It 
comes then as no surprise that early in the war Franco paid a great deal of 
attention to his famous sponsorship of the pilgrimage to Mecca.
 El Hajj Franco
In early 1937 Franco scored one of his most impressive propaganda achieve-
ments in relation to the Muslims of the Spanish protectorate and his army: 
the Franco-sponsored pilgrimage to Mecca. In December 1936 the High 
Commissariat (the seat of the Spanish administration in Morocco) requested 
that Franco assign a ship for the Spanish Moroccan pilgrims to sail to Mecca; 
Franco agreed on the same day and ordered the navy to make the necessary 
preparations.13 At the time the High Commissioner in Morocco was General 
Orgaz, but it seems that the one behind the idea was the Arabist Colonel Juan 
Luis Beigbeder, secretary general of the Commissariat at the time and later 
High Commissioner.14 The Nationalist navy prepared a ship that was to depart 
from Ceuta at the end of January 1937, and which was arranged so as to become 
a “floating mosque.” The Nationalistsʼ air force and navy protected the pilgrim-
age part of the way until the Italians took over.15 Nationalist Spain appointed a 
12 María Rosa Madariaga, Los moros que trajo Franco: La intervención de tropas coloniales en 
la guerra civil española (Barcelona: Ediciones Martínez Roca, 2002), 323–324.
13 Archivo General Militar de Ávila (agmav), A.1, L.59, Cp. 87. Cables: Generalissimo to 
Orgaz on 12 December 1936, and Generalissimo to naval general staff on 12 December 1936.
14 This according to his British mistress Rosalinda Powell Fox in her memoirs: The Grass and 
the Asphalt (Puerto Sotogrande: J.S. Harter and Associates, 1997), 130.
15 See the account by Abdel Krim Kerrisch, a Dutch protégé who accompanied the Spanish-
Moroccan pilgrims to Arabia; the account can be found in the Dutch national archives: 
Nationaal Archief, Gezantschap Marokko, 2.05.119, inv.nr. 36. Missive nr.: 821/103. According 
to this witness, the Spanish warships escorted the pilgrims to Tripoli. According to a Spanish 
document, the plan was to provide protection, which would be “indispensable until” the 
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consular agent for Jeddah and Mecca. The choice for this position fell on a 
Muslim officer of the Regulares (though of Spanish nationality).16 Franco also 
prepared an audience for the pilgrims in Seville upon their return in March. 
This gesture was not an easy matter, given the fact that much of the Spanish 
navy had fallen into the hands of the Republicans at the start of the Civil War, 
and Franco could not easily dispense with any ships. In the words of Rosalinda 
Fox, it was “like asking Whitehall [British War Ministry] in the middle of a war 
to release half of the Royal Navy.”17
The Francoist pilgrimage not only helped Francoʼs message that he was a 
friend of Islam, it shined in comparison with the transport the French pro-
vided for the Algerian pilgrims, and strengthened Francoʼs credentials even 
more.18 One of the fruits of this propaganda was evident in the words of the 
Khalifa in Tetuan, who described Franco as the “protector of Islam.”19 Next to 
its political benefits in Spanish Morocco itself, the pilgrimages must have left 
an impression on the soldiers fighting in Spain too. It is probably due to this 
pilgrimage, and others that followed during the course of the war, that Franco 
became known as El Hajj Franco (the pilgrim Franco), a title the northern 
Moroccans and his ex-soldiers used for a long time.20 For some he remains to 
this day a good man partly because “he had the character of Muslims.”21
Oran meridian, from where the Italians could take over. agamv, A.1, L.59, Cp. 87. Note by 
Generalissimo hq on 25 January 1937.
16 agamv, A.1, L.59, Cp. 87. Note by Generalissimo hq on 25 January 1937. Regulares is short 
for Regulares Indígenas, which refers to military units composed of native Moroccan sol-
diers and a corps of officers who were largely Spanish. The forces were founded in 1911 to 
help combat Moroccan rebels; they became part of the Spanish army and therefore had, 
officially, a different status, compared to the Mehal-la units that belonged to the Moroccan 
government, but were also largely commanded by Spanish officers. They were called 
“Regulares” because they were full-time soldiers who conducted regular army missions, 
and this also distinguished them from the irregular auxiliary groups of natives who 
helped the Spanish army.
17 Powell Fox, The Grass and the Asphalt, 130.
18 See the account by Abdel Krim Kerrisch in the Dutch national archives.
19 agamv, A.1, L.59, Cp.. 87. Cable by the office of the High Commissariat.
20 Mohamed Choukri mentions, in his internationally acclaimed autobiographical novel al-
Khubz al-ḥāfī (known in English as ʽ For bread aloneʼ), those who were disabled in the Civil 
War in Tetuan, some of whom “were proud of it for it allowed them to have adventure and 
to have memories of the battles they fought whether victorious or defeated. The Caudillo 
was called El Hajj Franco among them.” Mohammed Choukri, al-Khubz al-ḥāfī 
(Casablanca: Le Fennec, 2010), 28. I even heard this “Hajj Franco” reference in Tetuan in 
early 2011.
21 Interview with Abdessalam Mohammed Amrani, a veteran of the Spanish Civil War, 
Ceuta, June 2011.
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 A Religious Alliance?
In the struggle to save Catholic, spiritual, and traditionalist Spain, the Moor 
who was the old enemy of these three had become the ally of the regenerated 
traditional country. It certainly was not a self-evident development and it was 
sometimes an uncomfortable one and it required some justification for at least 
a part of the masses that the Nationalists appealed to. One Nationalist Catholic 
writer commented, perhaps uneasily: “It does not matter that next to Christians, 
the turbans of Mohamed are seen. The sword is of rich Toledan steel, even if 
the hilt had an Arab enamel, and the Moors and Christians were united in 
some of the endeavors of the medieval Christian kingdoms.”22 One Nationalist 
newspaper, abc Sevilla, while commending the Moors of whom “no one put a 
step backwards” went further by calling Morocco the “Covadonga of the cur-
rent reconquista” in a reference to the place that symbolized the birth of the 
first successful Christian resistance to the medieval Muslims and the start of 
the Reconquista.23 In one anecdote, the Spanish priest and Arabist Miguel 
Asín Palacios related that in one hospital a print of the Virgin was going to be 
removed so as not to hurt the feelings of the wounded Moroccans, and a 
Moroccan protested against the removal, stating “the Virgin is good for 
everyone.”24 The priest used this anecdote to demonstrate how much these 
Moroccans had in common with the supposedly true Spanish.
In 1940 Miguel Asín Palacios published a paper called “Why did the Muslim 
Moroccans fight on our side?” In one of the most eloquent of the Nationalistsʼ 
rationalizations of the Moroccan participation, he answers:
Below the rugged crust of these simple and brave Moroccan soldiers, 
beats a heart that is identical to the Spanish, which renders reverence to 
some other-worldly ideals, not very dissimilar to ours, and which feels the 
religious emotions which we feel, because it follows many of the Christian 
22 From an article entitled “El Cerro de los Angeles y el General Varela,” La Correspondencia 
de San Fernando, 9 November 1936. The copy of the article cited here is in Archivo 
Histórico Municipal de Cadiz (ahmc), Varela, doc. 15/22.
23 “Marruecos: Covadonga de la actual reconquista,” abc Sevilla, 17 July 1938, 24. Ironically 
the “Moors” contributed to the occupation, in October 1937, of that place.
24 Miguel Asín Palacios, “Porqué lucharon a nuestro lado los musulmanes marroquíes,” in 
Obras escogidas ii y iii de historia y filología árabe, ed. Miguel Asín Palacios (Madrid: 
Viuda de Estanislao Maestre, 1948), 136. He published this text first in 1940 in the Boletín 
de la Universidad Central in Madrid.
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dogmas which we follow and which atheist Marxism repudiates and 
persecutes.25
To illustrate that this was not a figment of his imagination, he referred to a 
Moroccan soldier who allegedly used a hand-grenade to intimidate a “Marxist” 
soldier by crying in Spanish “Tú no estar de Mahoma! Tú no estar de derechas!” 
[You are not of [the followers of] Mohammed! You are not one of the Right!].26
One wonders whether the position that Palacios took was representative of 
the Spanish Catholic clergy, even in the mere propagandistic sense. Let us con-
sider two views, those of a priest and a bishop, both captured by the Republicans. 
Their situation as prisoners of war renders their statements less than ideal and 
somewhat unreliable, but it is interesting because it shows the Republicans 
asking representatives of the Church about why it stood in the same camp as 
the Moors. In January 1938, the priest García Blasco was captured by the 
Republicans during the battle of Teruel. During his interrogation he was asked 
whether he ever thought of protesting against the use of Moroccan troops 
by the Nationalist command. The priest answered: “Not in public. But of course 
during private conversations I commented upon it, that the old history 
would feel disturbed when the greatness which we acquired by fighting Islam 
would look like a lie now that we are fighting alongside those who used to be 
our enemies.”27 As a prisoner, the priest might naturally have given his inter-
rogator the answer he wanted, although his other answers with regard to 
morale in the Nationalist rearguard—which he described as high—was not 
what a Republican would necessarily wish to hear.
But ingratiating oneself to an enemy interrogator does not seem to be the 
case with Bishop Polanco who was also captured in Teruel. When questioned 
in January 1938 about the presence of the Moroccan troops in Spain, he 
answered that he saw nothing wrong in Franco using them, for Franco saw 
them as “soldiers in the service of Spain.” When the interrogator pressed that it 
was strange that the Church, after long years of fighting the Muslims, was now 
coexisting with them, and asked whether that could be considered the 
Christian order of things, the bishop answered in the affirmative. He stated 
that, in his opinion, history has witnessed many occasions in which people 
from different religions form alliances to fight an enemy, alliances that were 
25 Asín Palacions, “Porque lucharon,” 148–149.
26 Ibid., 145. By “Right” he meant of course the Nationalist camp that was usually referred to 
as “people of the Right” as opposed to the Republican Left.
27 Interrogation of the priest García Blasco, dated 13 January 1938. Archivo General de la 
Guerra Civil (aggc), Caja 58/8.1
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based on a “perspective that had nothing to do with religion.”28 Asín Palaciosʼs 
grand depiction of Muslim-Christian brotherhood may have been a minority 
voice among the Spanish clergy after all, even if it was offered in the cause of 
propaganda. Perhaps his sympathies with the Moors derived more from his 
background as an Arabist than as a priest.
The positive image of the Moroccan soldiers as devout allies in a common 
struggle is at odds with the extremely negative view that most of the Spanish, 
including many in the military, had of the Moroccans a couple of decades ear-
lier. Centuries of embedding the image of the Moor as a traditional enemy 
were strengthened by the military engagements of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries in Morocco, especially during the colonial war (1920–1926) 
against the Rif rebels of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī, when Spain 
suffered one the most humiliating colonial defeats in the battle of Annual 
in 1921. Racist attitudes towards the Morrocans were prevalent among the 
vengeful officials, soldiers, Spanish politicians, and the press, who described 
the Moroccans as uncivilized, xenophobic, fanatical, brutal, degenerate, and 
deceitful. Some even called for their complete extermination. But at the same 
time there were some who felt an attraction to Moroccan culture and recog-
nized a shared history between Morocco and Spain and even saw the Moroccans 
as younger brothers. In fact, many Spaniards displayed contradictory responses 
towards Morocco and the Moroccans, and the course of the brutal colonial war 
in Morocco, which ultimately ended with a Spanish victory, had its effect on 
the development of the image of the Moroccans in the eyes of the Spanish.29
In any case, the Moor, the fanatic foe of the recent Rif wars, was rehabili-
tated in Nationalist Spain by the Nationalist state, by its leading military fig-
ures, and its propaganda machinery, which included press, the film industry, 
and poetry.30 This rehabilitation was perhaps not difficult to accomplish. It 
required a simple adjustment to the presentation of basically the same image 
of the Moor. As the irrational Moor became simple, childlike, and innocent, so 
the fanatic became pious, in fact spiritual. The Nationalists forbade foreign 
journalists—and we must presume Spanish ones too—from describing the 
Moroccans in any way except as devoted God-fearing soldiers.31
28 Interrogation of Bishop Polanco, dated 28 January 1938. aggc, Caja 58/8.1. During the 
collapse of the Republican army in Catalonia in early 1939 both the priest and the bishop 
were shot.
29 Balfour, Deadly Embrace, 193–200.
30 On the aspects of this rehabilitation, see Madariaga, Los moros que trajo Franco, 345–364.
31 Judith Keen, Fighting for Franco: International Volunteers in Nationalist Spain during the 
Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939 (London: Leicester University Press, 2001), 69.
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The view of the Moroccan soldiers as religiously devout and controlled by 
religious prejudices, which was in turn derived from the same view the Spanish 
had of the Moroccan society that they ruled, was behind both the explanations 
the Nationalists gave to the outside world with regard to the motivations of the 
Moroccan soldiers for fighting in Spain and the policies of the Nationalists 
with regard to the actions of the Moroccan soldiers in their Spanish environ-
ment, especially those involving direct religious aspects. The actions of the 
“Moorish” troops, their lifestyle, the incentives etc., were supposed to be shaped 
by or directed towards their Muslim-ness. In fact, this sometimes mixed with 
wishful thinking, and it is here that we try to explore the border between the 
two, starting with the supposed religious motivations of the Moroccans for 
fighting against the Republic.
 Jihad
While the Spanish Nationalists promoted this idea, the Moroccans were not far 
behind in their support of it. The native urban political elite helped the reli-
gious interpretation for the enlistment of the Moroccans to fight in Spain as 
well. The day after the official end of the Civil War, al-Ḥurriyya, the daily of the 
Spanish Morocco-based Nationalist Reforming Party, expounded on the cir-
cumstances and motives of the Moroccan soldiers who went to Spain. The 
newspaper rejected any notion that economic motives were primarily behind 
the enlistment of the locals. Instead it listed other reasons, among which was 
the fear for their “religious sentiments.” “For Communism has run rampant 
and dominated these lands [Spain], for the Muslims are, by the nature of their 
situation, staunch enemies of the idea of equality in wealth.”32 Either this 
merely and blindly followed the Spanish Nationalist line or the paper could 
not accept the stigma that comes with the notion of the mercenary, or both.33
32 al-Ḥurriyya (2 April 1939). It also claimed that the Islamic world “supported us in our posi-
tion, despite some mad campaigns directed against us from some Muslim countries. 
Those campaigns were the result of hire and bribery by France or Communism itself.”
33 I am inclined to believe the second interpretation, because al-Ḥurriyya, both during and 
after the war, was not devoid of articles criticizing aspects of the Spanish Nationalist 
administration, nor of warning Spain against the consequences, should it fail in the fulfill-
ment of its promises towards the Moroccans after the war. The newspaper of the other 
and rival Moroccan nationalist party, al-Waḥda al-Maghribiyya (Unidad Marroquí; 
Moroccan Unity), also claimed that the Moroccans did not fight for money, for “feelings 
can not be bought or sold, but because of the honest belief that the victory of Spain will 
immediately bring victory for the cause of the Moroccan people.” But it did not explicitly 
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The pro-Franco political forces, be they Spanish or Moroccan, might have 
used the religious element in their propaganda to justify the participation of 
Moroccans in the war, but it was apparently an impression that even some on 
the Republican side believed.34
The Nationalists went to great lengths to portray the enlistment of their 
Moroccan troops as ideologically motivated, but historians have found this 
interpretation difficult to defend. Maria Rosa Madariaga and Sebastian Balfour, 
convinced as they are that the volunteers who filled the ranks of the Moorish 
units in the Spanish peninsula joined for purely economic reasons, reject the 
idea that there were any higher ideological causes behind the participation of 
the Moorish troops in the Civil War. For them, and perhaps the majority of 
those studying the Spanish Civil War, the issue was quite simple.
The issue is less simple for two Moroccan historians who seem convinced 
that the religious appeal of the cause, propagated by Francoʼs agents, was an 
important factor in the decision of Moorish recruits to enlist in the Spanish 
Nationalist army. According to El Merroun, Franco’s rhetoric about Communism 
and its destruction of Christianity and Islam left an impression on the 
Moroccan troops. He cites a Moroccan soldier “In Spain ar-rojo [the red one, 
the communist] comes, burns shrines, kills saints. Moor comes to help Franco 
fix Spain.”35 Indeed religion was an important aspect in pulling the Moroccans 
towards the Nationalist Spaniards.36
Ibn Azzuz Hakim (perceived in Morocco as one of the most prominent 
 historians working on the history of the Moroccan nationalist movement and 
northern Morocco) attacks in an angry tone the historians who did not trouble 
themselves with the real reasons for the Moroccan participation in the war. 
According to him, the real reasons were that “the agents of Franco wanted 
to  give the Muslims the opportunity for Jihad alongside the People of the 
Book, the believers in one God, against the Infidels” and that the Moroccans 
“entered the war alongside the Catholics of Franco for religious solidarity.”37 
cite Islam as a factor in siding with the Nationalists. See ‟La guerra ha terminado. 
Marruecos confía en la palabra del caudillo de España,” Unidad Marroquí (30 March 1939).
34 One Canadian volunteer in the International Brigades, Jules Paivio, remembered decades 
later the “Moors” who believed “it’s an honor to die for Allah, so they keep coming at you. 
They won’t stop.” From the tv documentary series Battlefield Mysteries, episode ‟The Lost 
Graves of the International Brigades” (produced by Breakthrough Entertainment, Canada, 
2008).
35 Mustapha El Merroun, Las tropas marroquíes en la Guerra Civil española (Madrid: Almena 
ediciones, 2003), 40.
36 El Merroun, Las tropas marroquíes, 224.
37 Mohammed Ibn Azzuz Hakim, La actitud de los moros ante el alzamiento: Marruecos 1936 
(Malaga: Algazara, 1997), 45. The historian José Luis de Mesa does not explicitly endorse a 
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He continues: “some chiefs of Muslim brotherhoods, paid by the Francoists, 
were spreading in low voice the news that general Franco had converted to 
Islam” and was waging a campaign against “those without god.” In fact, Hakim 
regards as unfair the view that the “Moors” died or became handicapped for a 
cause that was not theirs, and were only attracted by money and as simple 
mercenaries.38 It appears that both historians base these opinions mainly on 
the discourse of the Spanish Nationalists and the Moroccan nationalists and 
collaborating elite. El Merroun and Ibn Azzuz Hakim are motivated by the 
morally negative presentation of the Moroccan soldiers as pure mercenaries 
attracted solely by money and the prospect of looting.
Ironically, the voice of those about whom the debate of religious motives 
revolves, is the voice least heard. The historians of the 1990s and early 2000s 
rarely if ever based their statements on the views of the soldiers whose motives 
they interpreted, or even took the trouble of citing them to support arguments 
in favor of or against this religious aspect of the conflict. Of course it is not an 
easy matter for historians now. There are only a few indications and examples 
to help us understand the views of the Moroccan soldiers with regard to the 
religious nature of their struggles in Spain, and the image that arises from 
these examples is still a mixed one.
In March 1938 a group of spokesmen for the 6th Tabor of the Regulares 
Ceuta and for the wounded soldiers in the Granada military hospital sent a 
letter to the military controller (interventor) in Seville complaining against one 
of the Muslim clerics serving in Spain. After the death of a number of soldiers 
during the “jihad,” this cleric refused to wash the bodies of the “mujāhidīn,” to 
lead the prayers for their souls or even to attend the funerals. Adding insult to 
injury, he stated that “everyone who died in the lands of Spain was an infidel 
and a half.”39 The complaint denounced this man and called him “red.” This 
document is notable for its use of the terms “jihad” and “mujāhidīn” to describe 
view on the issue of possible ideological motivations for Moroccan troops fighting for 
Franco, but the way he presents historical opinions and citations leads one to believe that 
he agreed with the views of Ibn Azzuz Hakim. Mesa quotes a Moroccan, who was appar-
ently a young friend, saying that “it was natural. Mohammed and Christ proclaimed and 
represented God who was rejected by the Reds. That is why we could stand with the 
Christians against them.” See José Luis de Mesa, Los moros de la guerra civil española 
(Madrid: Actas, 2004), 124.
38 Hakim, La actitud de los moros, 45.
39 Archivo General de la Administración (aga), Af, 81.1179, Leg. 3962, Letter from notables 
of the 6th Tabor of Ceuta to Sanchez Pol (in Arabic). There is a Spanish translation accom-
panying the letter which replaced “jihad” with “operations” and “mujāhidīn” with 
“soldiers.”
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the war in Spain and its Moroccan participants, but also for its labeling those 
who disputed the religious legitimacy of fighting in Spain as “red.”
The term “jihad” also appears in the recruitment calls that circulated in 
Spanish Morocco. One important source is the personal archive of Mustapha El 
Merroun, which includes scores of interviews with Moroccan veterans.40 One 
of these Moroccan veterans described the recruitment by stating that the qāʾids 
(tribal chiefs) shouted “O servants of God! Those who wish to perform the Jihad, 
the Jihad has now returned.”41 On the battlefield itself, the attacking waves of 
the Moroccans started with cries exalting God or the Prophet Muḥammad. 
Ruiz Albéniz, the Nationalist propagandist, cites one such cry “Jandulilah! La 
[Ilaha] Illa Allah, Sidi Mohamed Rasul Allah…” [Mobilize for Allah, there is no 
god but Allah].42 According to Sanchez Ruano,43 the Moroccans entered the 
battle crying “Allah Akbar.” A more typical charging battle cry commenced with 
praise of the prophet: “O lovers of the prophet, pray on him,” only to end with 
“heaven is for the patient, and hell is for the infidels.”44 Do such religiously 
inspired battle cries necessarily mean that the soldiers, or the majority of them, 
believed at the time that they were fighting for a religiously sanctioned cause? 
Or do they merely reflect the cultural background of the Moroccans, for whom 
it would have been inconceivable to have come up with any other sort of verbal 
encouragement? Or is this simply a confirmation of the view that everyone is 
religious in the trenches? There is no easy answer, but such examples make it 
difficult to dismiss out of hand the notion that religion played a role in how the 
Moroccan volunteers viewed or justified their part in the war.
Regardless of whether or not the Moroccan soldiers actually went to war 
motivated by the moral message that this was a holy war, it seems that many, if 
not the majority, deemed their Republican opponents on the wrong side with 
regard to godly matters. We see this in the way the veterans describe the 
40 During the 1990s El Merroun conducted interviews with Moroccan veterans of the 
Spanish Civil War. He kindly offered me special access to these transcripts. I refer to this 
personal archive as El Merroun papers.
41 Clerics also called on the people: “O servants [of God]! The bread will come from them 
[the Spanish], the munitions from them and the weapons from them.” Testimony of El 
Sebtaoui, El Merroun papers.
42 Víctor Ruiz Albéniz, Las cronicas de El Tebib Arrumi, Tomo ii, Campañas del Jarama y el 
Tajuña (Valladolid: Librería Santarén, 1938), 35. The author might have misheard the cry, 
which is perhaps why he missed the “Ilaha” which means “god.”
43 Francisco Sánchez Ruano, Islam y Guerra Civil Española, Moros con Franco y con la 
República (Madrid: La esfera de los libros, 2004), 233.
44 Interview with Abdessalam Amrani, Ceuta, June 2011. This veteran still believed, in 2011, 
that they emerged victorious because God stood on their side.
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Republican rojos or reds. According to one Moroccan, “the rojos killed the monks 
and destroyed the churches so they believed only in the hammer and sickle.”45 
A similar definition of a rojo was “the enemy of Spain or the criminal who aban-
doned his religion.”46 The first impression the “reds” left upon the memory of 
another soldier was equally typical: “When we went [to Spain] we found that 
the rojos were burning churches.”47 It followed that if a Moroccan defected to 
the reds “he would die as an infidel.”48 One veteran told Sánchez Ruano that the 
Moroccan soldiers would not desert to the Republicans, for they thought that “if 
they died, they would go to heaven for performing the Jihad.”49 So for the major-
ity of Moroccan soldiers, the Nationalist propaganda about a holy war suc-
ceeded, at least in convincing Franco’s Muslim soldiers that if they were not on 
the right side of the conflict, at least they did not stand on the wrong side.
 Letters and Graves
Since the Nationalists perceived and presented the Moroccan soldiers fighting 
in Spain and the Moroccan population of the protectorate in general, as reli-
gious beings first and foremost, it was natural that the Nationalists took great 
care not to offend the religious feelings of their Muslim soldiers. Sometimes 
this happened at the request of the Moroccan soldiers themselves, other times 
at the request of higher Moroccan authorities, and at times even when this 
care was not asked for. This attention to policies manifested itself in many 
aspects of the daily lives of the Moroccan soldiers, for example, on Muslim 
religious festivities Moorish detainees (troops incarcerated for different 
offenses) were released as a sign of respect for the religious feelings of the 
Moorish troops;50 this was a clear assertion of the pro-Islamic stance of the 
Francoist government. Other aspects such as correspondence paper, grave-
yards, diet, conversions, and especially life in hospitals display the great lengths 
the Nationalists went to create a religious space in which, the Nationalists 
believed, their Muslim soldiers wanted to remain.
45 Testimony of Abdel Kader Amezian. El Merroun papers. “The Spanish took us to the 
Churches and we found them ruined and the idols destroyed. So they told us ‘are these 
people going to be successful?’,” he continues.
46 Testimony of El Bubakra. El Merroun papers.
47 Testimony of El Ayyashi. El Merroun papers.
48 Testimony of Messoud, a corporal. El Merroun papers.
49 Sánchez Ruano, Islam y Guerra Civil, 233.
50 See, for example, agmav, C.2374, L.145, Cp. 63.
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One aspect of the military policy of respecting the religion of their Muslim 
troops or, alternatively, the policy of maintaining a safe distance between the 
religious sphere of the Moroccans and that of the Spanish was manifested in the 
issue of letters the soldiers sent home to their families. These letters were natu-
rally subjected to censorship. In February 1938 the political section of the High 
Commissariat in Tetuan wrote to the chief of staff of the Morocco forces express-
ing the concern of the political section that many Muslim soldiers were sending 
letters to their families on a kind of stationery with Christian religious symbols 
printed on it.51 To correct the mistake, considerable effort and time was invested 
in the arduous task of copying the letters on a different type of paper. There were 
already requests (going back as far as October 1937) to closely monitor the type 
of paper used by the Muslim soldiers.52 The February 1938 complaint suggested 
measures that involved the coercion of vendors accompanying the units to carry 
a different kind of paper. More importantly, and to understand what annoyed 
the author of the angry complaint (and it was one of many similar complaints), 
was the argument that the use of the aforementioned kind of paper would con-
tribute to the rumors of Christian missionary activities among the Muslim 
troops.53 This was a concern that the Nationalist military authorities reiterated 
several times in relation to other aspects of the daily life of the Muslim soldiers.
Graves formed another aspect of the religious policy that must have been of 
more emotional importance to the Moroccan soldiers than the letters were. 
We can say with certainty that no Moroccan soldier (or at least almost none) 
who died during the Spanish Civil War was returned to Morocco for burial. 
They were all buried in Spain, as were almost all those of foreign nationality 
who participated in the war in great numbers.54 In many cases and during the 
heat of battle, it was not possible to bury the dead Moroccan soldiers in proper 
cemeteries, and these fatalities were buried where they died, sometimes 
 collectively. In some cases the dead were buried with the Christians, especially 
in the beginning.55 Whether by their own initiative or in response to the 
demands of Moroccan soldiers, the Spanish started to separate the burial 
places. According to a veteran “during one of the battles, the dead were mixed, 
51 aga, Af, 81.1122, Cp. 4.
52 aga, Af, 81.1150, Missive: Exp./5429.
53 aga, Af, 81.122, Cp. 4.
54 For example, 4,175 Italian dead were buried in Spain, with scores of others buried else-
where or lost at sea. Brian R. Sullivan, “Fascist Italy’s Military Involvement in the Spanish 
Civil War,” Journal of Military History 59, no. 4 (October 1995), 713.
55 Testimonies of veterans of the Spanish Civil War: El Zeruali, Hamido el Mi’dani, 
Mohammed Emhawesh, and Krimo ben Abdel Kader. El Merroun papers.
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so they [the Spanish] looked for the Muslim corpses to bury them. So they took 
the trousers off the dead to see who was circumcised.”56
When burial in a proper cemetery proved possible, it seems that the 
Nationalist army tried to provide for separate Muslim cemeteries fairly early in 
the war. In October 1936, the chief staff of General Varela instructed the mili-
tary commander of the northern town of Vargas (near Santander) to send all 
Moorish soldiers killed in fighting or dead as a result of sickness to Talaveral de 
la Reina to be buried in the “Moorish cemetery” there.57 There were also those 
who died later in hospitals as a result of their wounds. As these Moroccan sol-
diers were usually treated in so called “Muslim” hospitals, the Nationalist mili-
tary authorities required the hospitals to take careful measures when burying 
the dead Muslim troops, so that even if they were to be buried in a Catholic 
cemetery, the deceased Muslims should have their own separate section within 
the cemetery and, if possible, a separate entrance point.58
It is not clear whether the idea for separate Muslim cemeteries first came 
from the Spanish Nationalist army or from Moroccan officials. In March 1937 a 
Moroccan minister from the Spanish zone of Morocco visited Spain and sug-
gested that Muslim hospitals dedicate a place for burying the Muslim dead;59 
this suggestion was welcomed by the Nationalist authorities and included in 
subsequent instructions for military hospitals. But as we have seen there was 
already a Moorish cemetery in Talavera in 1936. The use of some of the ceme-
teries for Muslim soldiers was re-continued, decades later, by the (migrant) 
Muslim communities of Spain (e.g. Granada. See Figure 7.1).
The efforts to provide for separate burial space for Moroccan soldiers 
 continued after the war. In 1940 the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
requested (at the request of the Moroccan authorities) that efforts be under-
taken to determine the burial places of many Moroccan soldiers with the goal 
of separating the Muslim dead from the Christians.60 It seems that no one 
managed to find the burial places of all the Muslim dead, and many are uniden-
tified to this day.61
56 Testimony of El Sebtaui. El Merroun Papers.
57 ahmc, Varela, 14/389.
58 Directorate of Moroccan Affairs in Spain, January 1938. aga, Af, 81.1122, L.2958, Cpt.3.
59 agmav, C.2396 A.2, L.190, Cp 14. Letter in Arabic.
60 aga, Af, 81/1114. Leg, 3747/2, Cementerios.
61 The request by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs resulted in some findings. Among the 
regions that answered the request were Toledo in which 614 dead Moroccans were identi-
fied plus an undetermined number in Seseña and Puente del Arzobispo; Barcelona with 
28 plus two questionable cases; and Guadalajara where 43 were buried. According to 
some of these responses, in a few cases the dead were shot by firing squads.
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 Conversions
If writing letters on paper with Christian symbols caused enormous irritation 
with the bureaus of native affairs and the Spanish military, then the conversions 
of Moroccan soldiers raised great alarm. Such proselytizing activities appar-
ently happened only in hospitals, as these were the places where priests might 
have enough time to engage in the process. The military authorities were never 
happy with Spanish religious personnel roaming around inside hospitals where 
wounded Moroccan soldiers were treated. It was probably in November 1936 
when a report by the army inspector brought to the attention of Franco for the 
first time the disturbing effects of the efforts of the “señoritas” and priests to 
convert the injured Moroccans to Catholicism.62 Immediately, Franco instructed 
military hospitals to “respect the religious creeds of the natives.”63
It appears, however, that missionary zeal still persisted in some places. In 
November 1938 the Inspector of Moroccan Affairs suggested more active obser-
vation of non-hospitalized people entering hospitals, and advised that some 
sort of tough talk should be undertaken with religious authorities.64 Copies of 
a telegram by Franco forbidding the conversions of Moroccans were suppos-
edly hung in some hospitals “in big letters.”65 The generalissimo himself per-
sonally demonstrated his will and dissipated any doubts as to the sanctity of 
the Islamic space of his Muslim soldiers. One day he arrived at a hospital for a 
quick inspection. Entering a ward where wounded Moorish soldiers were 
being taken care of, he looked around and noticed a couple of crosses hanging 
on the walls of the ward. He obviously did not like that and ordered them to be 
removed immediately.66 Nevertheless and despite all the stern warnings and 
precautions, there were individual cases of Moorish soldiers who converted to 
the Catholic faith. In 1938, for example, the Directorate of Moroccan Affairs in 
Spain reported such a case. The directorate reported on the conversion of a 
Moorish soldier named Bin Kiran. This case was especially difficult because 
the conversion happened under the auspices of General Moscardó, the famous 
protagonist of the siege of the Alcázar of Toledo. Still, the report instructed 
62 agmav, A.1, L.59, Cp. 86. Report on 19 November 1936.
63 agmav, A.1, L.59, Cp. 86. Cable by the army of the north on 27 November 1936. It reported 
that the instructions of Franco, on 24 November, were communicated to the hospitals of 
that army.
64 aga, Af, 81.1113, Cp 3.
65 aga, Af, 81.1150.
66 Antonio Corral Castanedo, Esta es la casa donde vivo y muero (Valladolid: Ateneo de 
Valladolid, 1992), 236.
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directors of military hospitals to warn charity sisters as well as nurses of the 
damage their proselytizing activities would cause to the National Movement. 
The damages would include reversing years of work done in the Protectorate, 
and besides all this, the Directorate of Moroccan Affairs believed the conver-
sions were “almost always fake.”67 It is difficult to ascertain the real motives of 
those who converted since there are no testimonies of Moroccan veterans who 
had converted. These religious transformations were still an issue even after 
the war, when a couple of conversions were recorded, like one in Cordoba. 
In March 1941 the Bureau of Moroccan Affairs commented on the case of 
Mohammed El Uariachi, who was expelled from Spain after the war; he 
returned and managed to stay by being baptized and marrying a Spanish 
woman. The bureau commented that the majority of such cases revolved 
around “opportunistic people.” It is safe to say, however, given the relatively few 
cases mentioned, that those conversions were certainly not significant enough 
to have an impact in Spanish Morocco or on the army fighting in Spain.
 Hospitals
The one place where Muslims and Christians interacted most was in military 
hospitals. There, Moroccan soldiers fell in love with Spanish women, priests 
tried to win new souls for Christianity, complaints on religious matters were 
made, and compromises were reached. A military hospital was almost the only 
place for Moroccan soldiers to get to know Spanish society, or at least its 
Nationalist version.
If the testimonies of the surviving Moroccan veterans are any indication, 
then a very large segment of the Moroccan combatants in Spain stayed for 
short or long periods in the Spanish military hospitals. There is scarcely a sol-
dier who was not wounded in battle and sent to recuperate in the military hos-
pitals of Spain. But within months of the start of the war, wounded Moroccans 
were hospitalized in separate spaces, usually separate wards in the same hos-
pitals. Gradually, the Nationalists founded separate Muslim hospitals all 
around Spain, to accommodate the presence of Moroccan units in all theaters 
of operation.68 Late in the war, the Muslim hospital in Zaragoza grew to be the 
67 aga, Af, 81.1113, Cp 3: letter, 20 May 1938.
68 In the spring of 1937 hospitals of signicant size for the Moroccans were located in 
Zaragoza, Burgos, Valladolid, Caceres, Coruña, Almendralejo, Zafra, Cordoba, Sevilla, 
Jerez de la Frontera, Cadiz, Huelva, Medina del Campo, Plasenca, Villablanca, Ronda, and 
Puerto de Santa Maria, among others. At the time beds per hospital varied between 225 
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most prominent one. In such hospitals on the peninsula, care was taken to 
provide Muslim a diet for the wounded,69 and to distribute the tables for 
prayers times.70 For the entertainment of the inmates there were Moorish 
cafés. Even storytellers were sent to the hospitals to “mitigate the torment of 
these wounds.”71
As the presence of Muslim hospitals in Spain had no precedent in recent 
times, and certainly not on such a large scale, some problems and complaints 
arose at the beginning because of the lack of an established organization to 
provide for Islamic dietary needs, of organized religious personnel, of rules of 
communication and so on. In November 1936 the army inspector Cabanellas 
complained to Franco about what he saw in some “Muslim” hospitals that he 
visited. In addition to his disapproval of proselytizing attempts in the hospital 
he remarked that some patients were deceived into believing that the meat 
they were served was slaughtered according to Muslim rites, only to discover 
later that this was not the case, leading some to refrain from eating for days.72 
Such complaints led to individual efforts to correct the situation and, in 1937, 
the Moroccan authorities and the Spanish Nationalists organized their efforts 
to adapt the hospitals to make them a more Islamic environment and ensure 
that the stay of the wounded was a pleasing one. This adaptation effectively 
meant the creation of a separate Moorish space.
In March 1937 the Moroccan vizier Ben Ali visited Spanish hospitals, where-
upon he wrote a letter suggesting the establishment of separate Muslim hospi-
tals in the rear lines. He suggested that the wounded be quartered separately 
according to their military affiliations: the Regulares separately from the 
Mehal-las. The vizier also suggested a Moorish staff consisting of, first, a faqih 
(cleric) who would be charged with the duties of the Imam, butcher, notary, 
and undertaker; second, a raqqāṣ whose duties were to carry letters and money 
to the soldiersʼ families in Morocco; and third, an interpreter. Among other 
suggestions, like the establishment of ablution and prayer halls and a burial 
place, Ben Ali suggested that each town with a Muslim hospital establish an 
“Arab café” for the Muslim wounded. In that case, he continued, the Muslim 
and 400, with the possibility of an additional 200 beds in Zaragoza and 300 in Medina del 
Campo. See agmav, A.2, L.190, Cp 12/6 and agamv, A.2, L.190, Cp 14/1.
69 aga, Af, 81.1122, Racionado para moros hospitalizados. 31 December 1937.
70 See examples in aga, Af, M.1685, L.2963.
71 aga, Af, 81.1180, Proponiendo el envío a España de narradores de cuentos para que recor-
ran los Hospitales para marroquíes allí instalados. 28 December 1937.
72 Cabanellas to Franco, 19 November 1936, agamv, A.1, L.59, Cp 86.
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wounded would be prohibited from entering “foreign cafés so that they would 
not have forbidden drinks. For that, a special vigilance must be appointed.”73
In the requests of the Moroccan minister we see an attempt to exercise 
some control on the lives of Moroccan subjects in Spain, by limiting the 
contact of Moroccan soldiers with the surrounding Spanish environment 
and preventing its perceived corrupting influence, like drinking alcohol. 
The High Commissariat had already, in February 1937, preceded the Moroccan 
minister by issuing instructions on the organization of Moroccan hospitals 
in Spain. The religious staff was larger than that suggested by the minister. It 
consisted of an Imam, chief of the religious staff, who also functioned as a 
notary, a mudarris (teacher) to answer religious questions, a kātib (writer) 
to write letters to the soldier’s families, and a munaẓif al-mawta (cleaner of 
the dead) who was responsible for the burial preparations. These were 
assisted by two cooks who were also butchers, as well as four assistant cooks, 
plus two couriers to attend to the injured and handle inheritance matters 
of the deceased, in addition to an interpreter. As for general hospitals 
with “Moroccan departments” the staff varied according to the number of 
wounded present.74
The general staff in Salamanca was in agreement with much of the minis-
ter’s request and especially with regard to the prohibition of Moroccan soldiers 
visiting European cafés. It cited as an extra reason the fear of espionage and 
the necessity of avoiding incidents which had been “unfortunately frequent” in 
towns where many natives were present.75 In February 1937 Franco had also 
already referred to “Moorish cafés” which would provide the wounded soldiers 
with a place that had a “familiar” environment.76 It seems that the prohibition 
of selling alcohol to Muslims did not meet with equal success everywhere. 
A report, in March 1938, on drunken Moroccan inmates, lamented the absence 
of such a prohibition in the southern town of Jerez de la Frontera.77 In March 
1938, Salamanca suffered from the same problem: the local authorities would 
not prevent sales of alcohol to the Moroccan inmates of the military hospital 
there and this led to the intervention of Moroccan military police to stop the 
“scandals of the Moors.”78 But hospitals were not allowed to actually forbid 
73 agmav, C.2396 A.2, L.190, Cp 14. Letter in Arabic.
74 agmav, C.2396 A.2, L.190, Cp 14. Instrucciones para la organización de los hospitales 
instalados en la península, destinados a marroquíes. 28 February 1937.
75 agmav, C.2396 A.2, L.190, Cp 14. Report by the General Staff, 19 March 1937.
76 agamv, A.1, L.35, Cp. 20.
77 aga, Af, 81/1179, Varios hospitales.
78 aga, Af, 81.1180, Intervención del norte to Sanchez Pol, 10 March 1938.
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ambulatory Moroccan inmates from taking strolls outside the hospital. In a 
report in March 1937, Moroccan soldiers in a Salamanca hospital complained 
that they were not allowed out, nor were their visitors allowed in; this led the 
commander of the army of the north to instruct this hospital not to forbid the 
inmates from taking walks outside the premises.79
Despite the care the Nationalists took to respect the religious sensitivities of 
their Moroccan soldiers, complaints in this regard still arose. Sometimes the 
reason for these grievances was the behavior of the Moroccan religious person-
nel themselves. Excessive alcohol drinking, continuously shaving their own 
beards, or failing to lead the prayers were reasons given in a number of com-
plaints about these fuqahāʾ (pl. faqih).80 Similar complaints about drinking 
were occasionally also filed against members of the native military police who 
were atttached to military hospitals.81 These complaints seemed, however, not 
as grave as failing to perform duties towards the dead, or even flatly refusing to 
handle these duties because the dead did not deserve them.
When complaints related to religion arose in hospitals the Nationalist 
authorities strived to investigate and verify. One hospital about which repeated 
complaints were made was the one in Villafranca de los Barros (Badajoz prov-
ince). The complaints against the director of the hospital revolved around the 
presence of religious (Christian) images, the lack of a separate kitchen for 
the Muslims, and the lack of a separate space within the same kitchen (i.e., the 
same utensils were used for Spanish Christians as for the Moroccan Muslims), 
the refusal of the director to provide transport for the burial of the dead, the 
existence of a “bar” inside the hospital, etc.82 Upon investigation the com-
plaints were found to have been exaggerated: the religious images were all cov-
ered, except one in a hall that the inmates were forbidden from entering; the 
Europeans cooked and used their utensils in a separate space in the kitchen 
and plans were made for an independent kitchen; the burial transport prob-
lem was a one-time incident that resulted from maintenance problems; and in 
fact not all the Muslim religious personnel agreed with the content of the com-
plaints. The investigation recognized, however, that the director of the hospital 
79 agmav, A.1, L.50, Cp. 17. Instructions on 20 March 1937; report by the hq of the 
Generalissimo on 12 March 1937.
80 aga, Af, 81.1122, letter of complaint nr. 3159, 9 January 1939.
81 For complaints about gambling and failing to observe Ramadan against one such mejasni, 
see aga, Af, 81.1187, letter to the inspector of the Moroccan mejasnia, 1 December 1937. In 
this case, however, it was fellow policemen who complained about his failure to fast.
82 aga, Af, 81.1179, Leg, 3963. Zaragoza, letters on 9 January 1939; 31 December 1938; 
15 December 1938.
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was not quite amiable.83 This shows, if anything, the extent to which the 
Nationalist military authorities were prepared to accommodate the senti-
ments of the Moroccan soldiers, and the privileged position these soldiers 
(and the Muslim clerics) had in imposing their own lifestyle and wishes in hos-
pitals in a country in which they were foreigners. It is remarkable that the 
archival material does not show complaints, on the Spanish side, about these 
Moroccans who dared act more like hosts than guests.
Regardless of the occasional complaints and the initial problems, surviving 
veterans record mostly positive memories of the hospitals; they recall them 
with nostalgia. “The food was good, the beds were changed daily. The daugh-
ters of generals and officers, and the sons of merchants and doctors did that. 
They were polite” remembers one who worked there.84 “The hospital of Seville 
was very nice. A delegation of Moroccan qāʾids and bashas [tribal leaders and 
high city officials] visited us. So we were given plenty of clothing and food.”85 
The old nurses were remembered affectionately. “The nun there [in the 
Salamanca hospital] was very nice to me and used to call me son.”86 Such are 
the majority of the memories of the stays in the military hospitals. It is possible 
that the passage of decades have filtered out any memories of discomfort or 
the occasional irritation, but such consistently positive memories coupled 
with the documentary evidence of the hospital policies of the Nationalists lead 
to the conclusion that the military succeeded to some degree in establishing a 
home-like environment, or a little Morocco for its wounded Moroccan men, 
though it did not always manage to keep them in there.
 The Sinners
For all the attention the Nationalists gave to the religious sentiments of the 
Moroccan soldiers, and for all the efforts to portray them as God-fearing pious 
soldiers, many of these young men do not seem to have been particularly 
pious Muslims. There is no way to quantify those who fulfilled the profile of 
observant Muslims as opposed to those who did not. As we have seen, some 
hospitals struggled with the issue of Moroccan convalescents who caused 
83 Ibid.
84 Testimony of Abdelsalam ben Hussein. He was a kātib (writer/notary) in one such hospi-
tal. El Merroun papers.
85 Testimony of Abdel Nabi ben Omari. El Merroun papers. He adds: “Those Bashas and 
dignitaries walked among our beds and told us to be men and [be] patient and to fight.”
86 Interview with Al Hussein ben Abdessalam. Ceuta, January 2011.
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“scandals” connected to alcohol drinking. The documentary and oral evi-
dence seem, however, to demonstrate that among the Moroccan soldiers 
who  fought in Spain, those who observed prayers, abstained from drinking 
alcohol, and fasted were in the minority. “Most of them were not religious” 
remembers one veteran.87 In the whole company of another one, only one 
member performed the prayers, though they all fasted in Ramadan.88 Alcohol 
was often consumed.89
The Moroccan soldiers also engaged in sexual relations with Spanish prosti-
tutes upon their arrival in Spain,90 and this sometimes led to brawls with 
Spanish soldiers.91 And they were not always welcomed by these prostitutes.92 
This was, perhaps, one reason the Spanish military arranged, early in the war, 
for Moroccan prostitutes, as well as dancers and singers who doubled as pros-
titutes, to be shipped to Spain and quartered near Moroccan units where they 
exclusively serviced the needs of these units.93 It also happened that, during 
hard times and because of a lack of food, Spanish women exchanged sexual 
favors with Moroccan soldiers in exchange for food.94
If many Moroccan soldiers proved not to be practicing Muslims when it 
came to performing prayers, drinking alcohol or visiting prostitutes, they were, 
at least, somewhat more enthusiatic about fasting the month of Ramadan. 
87 Interview with Abdellah Abdekader. Nador, July 2011.
88 Interview with Kendoussi Bu Midyen, Nador, July 2011.
89 Interview with Mohamed Abdallah Susi, Ceuta, January 2011. See also Balfour, Deadly 
Embrace, 283.
90 Antonio Bahamonde y Sánchez de Castro, Un año con Queipo, memorias de un naciona-
lista, (Barcelona: Ediciones españolas, 1938), 28.
91 For examples of quarrels at prostitution houses between Moroccan and Spanish soldiers 
see aga, Af, 81/1125, Leg. 3770, escándalos—reyertas. In one such incident, a Moroccan 
military policeman was beaten up by a Requeté and a Legionnaire. The madam of the 
house claimed that he had mistreated one of the prostitutes while he accused the two 
Spanish men for attacking him without reason. While being interrogated he threatened to 
take revenge on the madam for testifying against him.
92 J.R. Saiz Viadero, Conversaciones con la Mary Loly: 40 años de prostitución en España 
(Barcelona: Ediciones 29, 1976), 18.
93 aga, Af, 81.1150, Exp.5429; Letter on 12 September 1938, aga, Af, 81/1125, Leg.3370, Cp 2 
Varios; agmav, A.1, L.50, Cp. 45. See also the report by a Republican spy: Servicio de 
Información Exterior, December 1937, in International Institute for Social History, Archivo 
fai, cp, 33A/5.
94 Testimony of Ihmido El Ma’dani. El Merroun papers. The witness recalls that women in 
Barcelona, upon its fall, called on Moroccan soldiers to sleep with them “for there was 
hunger.”
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Fernando Fernández de Córdoba, a famous radio announcer for the Nationalists 
during the war, related that one evening in 1936 near Valdemoro (south of 
Madrid) the “Moors” suddenly started to fire continuously in the air, creating a 
tense situation that confused Spanish troops nearby until the head of the 
Moorish unit resolved it by explaining that Ramadan had begun. According to 
Córdoba, these “infantile and simple men,” believed that “the first one to fulfill 
the ritual of firing his rifle will gain a place next to Allah.”95 Whether the major-
ity of the soldiers fasted during actual combat operations is a question in need 
of clarification. But it seems that in times and places when and where the 
troops were recuperating or resting most of the troops either observed the fast 
or at least refrained from breaking it out of fear of the judgment of other sol-
diers.96 It seems that there was a greater tendency to reprimand those who did 
not fast than those who did not perform prayers.97
It would seem that the majority of Moroccan soldiers who fought in Spain, 
rather than being the devout Muslims the Nationalists portrayed them to be, 
were in fact men prone to “sinning,” and they only selectively observed their 
religion at other times.
 Conclusion
Religion was important in the way the Spanish Nationalists viewed, presented, 
and treated their Moroccan troops. In a Cruzada against those accused of anti-
religion, religiousness was the raison d’être for the presence of these troops in 
Spain, at least in terms of the justification of their use. The presence of Italians 
or Germans could not be justified in those same terms. Faith, i.e., belief in an 
established organized religion, was the only binding element that could be 
argued. Therefore, the Moroccans, in their participation to create a traditional 
Spain, had to be religious or at least be presented that way. But this was not just 
a temporary and practical matter. The image of the religious Moroccan fit the 
standard stereotype the Spanish had of the Moors: at times he was presented 
as a “fanatic,” at other times as “deeply religious,” two terms that referred to two 
sides to the same coin.
95 Fernando Fernández de Córdoba, Memorias de un soldado locutor (Madrid: Ediciones 
Españolas, 1939), 109–110.
96 Testimony of El Siddiq El Kumeili. El Merroun papers.
97 agmav, A.1, L.50, Cp. 17. Instructions on 20 March 1937; report by the hq of the 
Generalissimo on 12 March 1937.
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The Spanish Nationalist military sought to maintain a separate religious 
space for its Muslim soldiers. The Muslim hospitals, cemeteries, the Muslim 
diet, the prohibition of Christian proselytizing among Muslim troops, etc., 
were all part of this separate religious space. In some cases it was the Moroccans 
who sought it, whether these were soldiers or visiting native officials. This was, 
therefore, a policy that was initiated and approved by both the Spanish and the 
Moroccan sides.
The motives for such policies suggest a question: Did the Spanish Nationalist 
military conduct these policies and establish separate religious spheres out of 
a genuine respect for the faith of its Muslim soldiers? Regardless of whether 
the respect for the faith itself existed and was genuine, the concern for the 
religious feelings of the Moroccan troops is clear from the many documents 
and reports that touch on the matter and therefore must be considered genu-
ine. These documents do not show any cynicism on the part of the Spanish 
military with regard to the religious feelings of the Moroccan soldiers. Treating 
their Moroccan soldiers well, also in matters of faith, ensured that Spanish 
officers could obtain the best from them. It was also politically important to 
ensure stability and the continuing support of the Spanish protectorate. It 
seems, however, that the religious policies were not only a matter of protect-
ing the spiritual space of the Moroccans, or pleasing the Moroccan authori-
ties. The rejection of the idea that a conversion to Christianity could ever be a 
genuine one, the presentation of the Moroccans to both the Spanish people 
and to the world as deeply religious and spiritual, and the establishment of a 
traditional Spain reminiscent of the medieval one meant that the Moroccan 
soldiers in Spain had to be Muslim and had to be religious whether they liked 
it or not.
It is appropriate to finish this chapter with a curious story that illustrates 
the complexities of the religious issue of the partly Islamicized Spanish mili-
tary. In the 1950s Mohammed Amazyān, the only Muslim to attain the rank of 
general in the Spanish army, was appointed Captain General of Galicia; in his 
new position he had the duty of conducting a yearly traditional honor, in the 
name of the head of state, towards the apostle Saint James of Compostela, 
known as Santiago Matamoros (Santiago the killer of the Moors). It is said 
that, to avoid an embarrassing situation, flowers or a blanket were used to 
cover the parts of the statue which show the holy apostle crushing the Moors, 
so as not to offend the general.98 Such were the ironies of the holy war.
98 Madariaga, Los moros que trajo Franco, 276.
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chapter 8
Muslims of Interwar Lithuania: The Predicament  
of a Torn Autochthonous Ethno-Confessional 
Community
Egdūnas Račius
 Introduction
Though various aspects of the history of the Muslim presence, which stretches 
for more than six hundred years, in the territory of what once was the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania (gdl), have been studied rather extensively, mainly in 
Polish historiography but also in that of Lithuania and Belarus, one particular 
period seems to have escaped the attention of historians. It is the interwar 
period, the time of the first Lithuanian Republic between 1918 and 1940. A con-
temporary Polish historian Stanisław Kryczyński in his otherwise seminal 
study from 1938, Tatarzy litewscy. Próba monografii historyczno-etnograficznej 
(Lithuanian Tatars. An attempt at historic-ethnographic monograph), barely 
mentions the situation of Tatars in the Republic of Lithuania at the time.1 It 
took over fifty years for the first scholarly article on the interwar Lithuanian 
Tatar community to appear in Lithuanian.2 Practically all other publicly avail-
able information on that period has come in the form of memoirs of Tatars 
themselves published in their monthly Lietuvos totoriai (Lithuanian Tatars) 
over the past fifteen or so years.
The absence of interest among historians in the life of the Muslim commu-
nity in interwar Lithuania can partially be explained by its numerical and con-
sequently socio-political, let alone economic, insignificance in the general life 
of the Lithuanian nation in that period—Lithuanian Tatars, who made up the 
bulk of the Muslim community in the country, had never posed any political or 
social challenge to the state or society to be placed on the radar of either politi-
cians, media, the powerful and seemingly omnipresent Catholic Church, or 
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3 This is, in a way, attested to by the fact that the Lithuanian print media of the interwar period 
ran only a handful of articles, interviews, and reports on Lithuaniaʼs Muslim community. See 
the digital archive of the Lithuanian print media, Lithuanian Cultural Heritage in the Virtual 
Environment, at http://www.epaveldas.lt/vbspi/content/about.jsp.
local scholars and intellectuals, for that matter.3 However, the main reason for 
the present lack of interest in the study of the interwar Muslim community in 
Lithuania may actually lie in the unavailability of sources (in the form of verbal 
material) for research.
Therefore, like Bairašauskaitė’s article of more than twenty years ago, the 
current text relies heavily on the same available archival material, consisting 
of several hundred individual documents kept in the Lithuanian State 
Archive. Though this material, chiefly comprising written communication 
between, on the one side, state institutions, and on the other side, the Tatar 
congregations and individual Tatars, does not provide a comprehensive pic-
ture of the (religious) life of Lithuania’s Muslim Tatars in the interwar period, 
it nonetheless allows a glimpse into the internal structures and dynamics of 
relations in the community as well as the congregations’ positions vis-à-vis 
the state and the wider society. The available material also allows one to gain 
an insight into how the state (in the person of relevant institutions) perceived 
and treated the community. Ultimately, the interwar period is a (largely miss-
ing) connecting link between the centuries-long presence of Muslim Tatars 
in the territory of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania prior to the emer-
gence of sovereign modern nation-states in that territory and the present 
situation. These precious few documents from the period that have been pre-
served deserve to be made public both to the Lithuanians who themselves 
know very little about the Tatar history in the country and to outside readers 
who because of natural obstacles like the language of the documents and 
their relative inaccessibility (the documents have not been digitalized and 
are available only on request and in person at the State Archive) have even 
less opportunity to familiarize themselves with this aspect of, indeed, 
European history.
Though, admittedly miniscule in absolute numbers, the Muslim community 
of interwar Lithuania is nonetheless part and parcel of the broader European 
and indeed global history. Along with the Polish and Byelorussian Muslim 
communities, the Lithuanian Tatar Muslim community during that time can 
be regarded as a sort of link between, on the one hand, the more established, 
albeit rapidly declining and increasingly weaker Muslim communities in the 
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Tatar ancestral lands in Eastern Europe (in the Soviet Ukraine and Russia, and 
Crimea in particular) and, on the other hand, western Europe, where Muslim 
communities were just beginning to form. The Lithuanian Tatar community 
shared both the memories of where they came from and a feeling of loyalty to 
and belonging in Lithuania.
The main aim of the chapter is to reveal the process and consequences of 
the identity change in the Tatar Muslim community in the territory of the 
interwar Lithuanian nation-state as they are captured in the formal communi-
cation between the communities and state authorities. The chapter also shows 
how closely the Lithuanian Muslim community’s public expression of identity 
through rhetoric and behavior correlated with (or even depended on) the offi-
cial state stance and policies toward the neighboring nation states, in this case 
Poland. It further illustrates how the once single Muslim community of the 
former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, because of certain geopolitical circum-
stances (like the emergence of nation states), mutated into several separate, 
even antagonistic, national Muslim communities, which, when given a chance, 
refused to re-unite. This birth of new national identities among Tatars of the 
former Grand Duchy of Lithuania is well worth a deeper analytical look as it 
contributes to a wider picture of identity changes and identity building among 
Muslims in interwar Europe. In this regard, the Lithuanian (and arguably 
Polish as well as Byelorussian) Tatar case is an alternative to the otherwise ste-
reotypically perceived process of integration and indigenization of Muslims in 
Europe, then and now.
In most historiography, the Tatars of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania are 
referred to as ‘Lithuanian Tatars,’ as opposed to Crimean and Kazan Tatars. 
In  the interwar period, however, next to this historical title, new ones 
appeared that reflect the political reality of the new nation-states. So, Tatars 
in Poland came to be called ‘Polish Tatars,’ while those living in the Soviet 
Republic of Byelorussia were called ‘Byelorussian Tatars.’ In this article, the 
designation ‘Lithuanian Tatars’ primarily means those Tatars who were liv-
ing in the  territory of the sovereign interwar Lithuanian state. Furthermore, 
since the overwhelming majority of Lithuania’s Muslims in that period were 
ethnic Tatars, and virtually all Tatars were (at least nominal) Muslims, the 
titles ‘Tatars’ and ‘Muslims’ (and consequently ‘Lithuanian Tatars’ and 
‘Lithuanian Muslims’) in this article are treated as synonyms and used 
interchangeably.
While interwar Lithuanian Tatars called their local religious communities 
‘parish’ (parapija), in this article they are called ‘congregations;’ the term ‘com-
munity’ is used only when applied to Lithuanian Muslims in toto.
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4 Stanislovas Kričinskis, Lietuvos totoriai (Vilnius: Mokslo ir enciklopedijų leidykla, 1993), 158.
5 Ibid., 161.
1 Historical Background of Islam in Lithuania
The history of Islam in Lithuania dates back to the fourteenth century when 
the first migrants—political refugees—from the Golden Horde (and later, the 
Crimean Khanate) came to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Soon they were 
joined by new arrivals, consisting chiefly of mercenaries hired by Lithuanian 
grand dukes, more refugees, and prisoners of war who, once freed, chose to 
stay. The immigrants, the majority of whom were recently Islamized Turkic 
speakers (Tatars), eventually settled in the northwestern parts of the Duchy, 
mainly in village communities around the capital Vilnius. Arguably, the choice 
of settlement area was deliberate on the side of the Lithuanian rulers—Tatars 
were settled on the monarch’s lands close to the seat of power, so they could be 
accessible and available whenever needed.
Despite or because of the fact that Muslims have been only a tiny minority 
of the citizenry of the Duchy (though precise data are not available, it can be 
safely assumed that at no time in history did the Muslim population of the gdl 
exceed 100,000 souls), they enjoyed almost all the rights and freedoms that 
their Christian fellow citizens did. Upon settlement, the Tatar elite were 
granted ranks of nobility and given tracts of land to be used as fiefs that later 
became their personal possessions. Even more, the Muslims in the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania (and later, post-1569, in the Republic of Two Nations) were 
never forced to abandon their faith either through coerced conversion or 
because of artificially created obstacles in practicing their religion (such as 
bans, prohibitions, segregationist decrees, etc.). In the gdl/the Republic of 
Two Nations, Muslims throughout the centuries, with a few brief exceptions, 
were allowed to publicly observe practically all Islamic duties and rituals.
It is believed that mosques on the then territory of the Grand Duchy were 
being built as early as the late fourteenth or beginning of the fifteenth cen-
tury.4 In the times of the Republic of Two Nations (that is, until the final parti-
tion in 1795) there might have been up to two dozen mosques,5 usually with 
adjacent cemeteries. These mosques were apparently run by local communi-
ties with little if any outside interference. The congregation as an independent 
body would choose its own religious leaders—mullas (formally called imams). 
Though the level of erudition and education of those mullas is impossible to 
assess (and there are indications that it has never been high, as many of them 
were not even capable of reading Arabic, and the first ever translation of the 
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9 Kričinskis, Lietuvos totoriai, 168.
Qurʾān into Polish, the lingua franca of the time among at least the educated 
local Tatars, publicly appeared only in 1858), in the absence of any institution-
alized religious hierarchy and formalized religious education, they appear to 
have been (the sole) spiritual guides for Muslims of the gdl and later the 
Republic of Two Nations. In general, throughout the history of Lithuanian 
Muslims, mullas were highly respected as, next to their spiritual and ritual 
functions, they were frequently among the few literate and therefore they took 
charge of administrative affairs within the community; sometimes they even 
performed the function of safekeeping the personal treasures of members of 
their congregations.6 Throughout the times of the Grand Duchy and the 
Republic of Two Nations (i.e., between the fourteenth and eighteenth centu-
ries) Muslims retained their religious autonomy from both local secular and 
outside religious authorities, though there is sufficient evidence pointing to 
the Sublime Porte’s interest in the well-being of the Muslims of the Republic of 
Two Nations.7
After the final partition of the Republic of Two Nations in 1795, most Tatars 
of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania found themselves subjects of the 
Russian Empire and the local Tatar community was entrusted to the care of 
the Simferopol-based (Crimea) Mohammedan Spiritual Governing Board 
(“Таврическое магометанское духовное правление”), which was established 
in 1794 and led by a mufti. It appears, however, that the Muslims of the lands of 
the former gdl vehemently insisted on retaining their religious independence. 
For instance, it is reported as far back as 1803 that Muslims of the northwestern 
territories of the empire approached the Russian government with a request 
not to be subjected to the authority of Russia’s muftis.8 On another occasion, in 
a letter of 1812, they insisted on their right to choose a mulla from among them-
selves.9 Nonetheless, under the Statute on the Taurida Muslim Clergy promul-
gated in 1831 and encompassing Crimea and the northwestern territories, all 
ulama had to meet certain educational and competence criteria and be certi-
fied by the Spiritual Governing Board. Unfortunately, it is impossible to assess 
to what extent the local mullas met the set criteria. Finally, in 1851 the Russian 
government acceded to the Tatars’ requests and officially allowed them to elect 
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12 For more on the birth of the modern Lithuanian nation and the state, see Alfred Erich 
Senn, Lithuania Awakening (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990).
mullas from among themselves, though they still needed to be certified by the 
Spiritual Governing Board.10 An attempt by some local Muslims in the middle 
of the nineteenth century to convince the Russian government to establish a 
separate spiritual governing body (muftiate) for the Muslims of the western 
provinces, however, failed miserably.11
In the end, the fact that the headquarters of the formal religious authority, 
the Spiritual Governing Board, was several thousand kilometers away, made 
effective communication (and control) practically impossible and the real 
authority of the generally very reluctant Crimean muftiate over the Tatars in 
the northwestern territories of the empire remained tenuous and minimal 
until the end of Russian rule in Lithuania during World War i. Ultimately, 
Russian authorities’ designs and desires to use muftiates in the form of spiri-
tual boards established from above, as tools to control the empire’s Muslim 
subjects had little practical outcomes in regard to Tatar Muslims in the lands of 
the once Grand Duchy of Lithuania; they survived as an insular community of 
interrelated but independent congregations into the twentieth century.
2 Muslims in Interwar Lithuania: The Distribution and Visibility
In early 1918, in view of the inevitable end of World War i the national(ist) elite 
in Vilnius (then German-occupied Lithuania) proclaimed its independence, 
though the definitive formation of a sovereign state took shape several years 
later after all adversarial forces were finally repelled and the borders of the new 
state were secured. This was the first time that a Lithuanian nation-state was 
founded and a Lithuanian nation with the titular Lithuanian ethnicity came into 
being. Hitherto, ethnic Lithuanians were either a political or a statistical minor-
ity in the consecutive state formations they were living in. As was common else-
where in Europe at the time, the birth of a nation and a nation-state went hand 
in hand in Lithuania too.12 All other ethnic groups living in the territory of the 
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15 Ali Miskiewicz, Tatarzy polscy 1918–1939. Zycie spoteczno-kulturalne i religijne (Warsaw: 
pwn, 1990), 58–60.
new state had to define their relation with the state and titular ethnicity and 
thus profoundly redefine their identity. This was as true of Jews, Karaims, Poles, 
Russians, Germans, as of Tatars, especially the Muslims among them.13
As has been indicated above, the bulk of the Lithuanian Tatars had tradi-
tionally been living in the vicinity of Vilnius, the historical capital of the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania—this is where they were given land by the Lithuanian rul-
ers and where they founded their villages. In the aftermath of World War i, in 
1920, the region of Vilnius was, however, occupied14 by Poland and most of the 
‘Muslims of the gdl’ (some six to seven thousand15) became Polish citizens. 
Under Polish rule, Vilnius (Pol. Wilno) became the spiritual and cultural center 
of the Muslims of the newly established Polish Republic. It is there that an 
official Muslim organization, the Muftiate, whose purpose was to unify some 
two dozen Muslim congregations scattered around Poland under one repre-
sentative institution and thus gain bargaining power vis-à-vis state authorities 
and other faith communities, was finally founded at a convention of delegates 
of Muslim congregations in late 1925. Dr. Jakub Szynkiewicz, a graduate of 
Berlin University, who was well versed in Islamic studies and spoke both Arabic 
and Turkish, was elected the first (and, as it later turned out, until World War 
ii, the only) mufti of Muslims living in the territory of the newly independent 
Polish state. The fact that Szynkiewicz was not a classical alim but a European-
educated orientalist appears not to have prevented the congregations from 
electing him mufti and, in the absence of other promising candidates, actually 
made him the only suitable nominee. Moreover, Szynkiewicz appears to have 
been the only one of his kind not only among the Muslims of Poland but also 
among all the Tatars in the territories of the former gdl—there was no one of 
similar stature in either the Republic of Lithuania or Soviet Byelorussia. This 
naturally made Szynkiewicz the only “proper” authority among Polish Muslims 
at least until several younger Tatars were sent to study at al-Azhar in Egypt. 
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Meanwhile, in comparison, imams in independent Lithuania throughout the 
interwar period remained self-taught.
The Muftiate actively participated in drafting and lobbying for a new law 
governing the relationship between local Muslim communities and the state, 
and in the spring of 1936 the Polish state passed this law. According to the law, 
communities were awarded self-rule—they had the right to elect their mullas/
imams and muazins.16 The Muftiate was thus officially recognized by the state 
as the representative of Poland’s Muslims, in this way the Tatar community 
was recognized as an autocephalous faith community.
As the Vilnius region remained under Polish control until the beginning of 
World War ii in September of 1939, the development of the Vilnius Muftiate as 
well as the Muslim congregations in and around the city until then can rightly be 
regarded as part of the history of Islam in Poland. And only between October 
1939, when the region of Vilnius was given to the Lithuanian state by the Soviet 
Union (which was then occupying the eastern part of the former state of Poland), 
and the summer of 1940, when the Soviet Union finally swallowed all of Lithuania, 
the three Lithuanian-speaking congregations and three Polish-speaking congre-
gations, including the one in Vilnius, were (re)united in a single state.
The 1923 census revealed that 1,10717 inhabitants of the Republic of Lithuania 
(excluding those possibly, though but unlikely, residing in the newly incorpo-
rated Klaipėda Region (Memelland), and, naturally, the Polish controlled 
southeastern part with Vilnius) identified themselves as Muslims. Of those, 
1,098 were Lithuanian citizens (two Polish, seven Soviet citizens18). In terms of 
self-identification, 961 Muslims identified themselves as ethnic Tatars,19 of 146 
non-Tatars 117 identifed themselves as Lithuanians (sic!),20 12 as Polish,21 one as 
Račius186
<UN>
22
23
24
25
26
27
22 Ibid., 48.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., 36.
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a Turk,22 while the remaining considered themselves Russians, and five23 failed 
to identify their ethnic belonging altogether. There were three areas with large 
concentrations of Muslims in interwar Lithuania and two with smaller num-
bers, chiefly in the eastern and southern parts of the country. By far the largest 
number, 732 in 1923, lived in villages and other small settlements in the south-
ern Alytus district.24 The second largest, with 122, lived in the Trakai district.25 
The number of Muslims in the interim capital Kaunas and nearby villages was 
just a little over one hundred26 with one third (37 individuals) identifying as 
Lithuanians (sic!).27 There were also smaller groups of Muslims in Vilkmergė 
(44 persons) and Zarasai (56 persons) districts. The census results clearly show 
that the overwhelming majority of Lithuanian Tatars at the dawn of Lithuanian 
independence were based in rural areas with just around ten percent living in 
urban areas, chiefly the interim capital Kaunas.
Arguably, the most visible sign of Muslim presence (and belonging?) in an 
area are mosques, especially purpose-built, and cemeteries. Since the major-
ity of the region’s Tatars traditionally lived in the countryside, most of their 
mosques, around which religious life revolved, were situated in villages 
rather than cities. By the beginning of the twentieth century in the territory 
of the former gdl only a dozen mosques remained. Only two of the historic 
Tatar mosque buildings were situated in the territory of interwar Lithuania, 
one, built in 1889, in the village of Raižiai (Alytus district, some 70 kilometers 
south of the interim capital Kaunas), another, built in the 1820s, in the village 
of Vinkšnupiai (some 80 kilometers southwest of Kaunas), though this one 
had been damaged during World War i and reportedly remained in bad shape 
throughout the interwar period as there were no funds (and apparently no 
need) to repair it. In the city of Kaunas itself a new brick mosque (the only 
one of its sort in Lithuania to this day) was built on the spot of a former 
makeshift mosque and opened its doors to worshipers in 1932. Naturally, 
there were mosques in Vilnius and nearby villages (like Niemież/Nemėžis, 
Sorok Tatary/Keturiasdešimt Totorių) but these were technically in Poland of 
the time.
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3 Birth of a National Identity
Prior to the emergence of sovereign nation-states, the overwhelming majority 
of the ‘Tatars of the gdl’ throughout their history lived in one state—be it the 
Grand Duchy itself, the Republic of Two Nations, or the Russian Empire—and 
thus naturally perceived themselves and each other as belonging to the same 
single community, albeit dispersed over a relatively large territory. The found-
ing of the nationalistically orientated and even mutually antagonistic inde-
pendent states of Lithuania and Poland (and also of Soviet Byelorussia) almost 
by default obliged the Tatars to publicly redefine their identity and belonging. 
Even more so—members of the same families often found themselves citizens 
of different countries with ensuing exclusivist loyalties and allegiances, some-
thing that frequently happened also to other, more numerous, ethnic groups, 
like Poles, Lithuanians, Russians, and Belarusians. The most symbolic instance 
of this was the fate of the members of the Narutavičius/Narutowicz family, in 
which one brother became a signatory of the Lithuanian Independence Act of 
1918, while the other brother became the first Polish president in 1922.
Those Tatars who, after all the commotion and border changing in the early 
1920s, found themselves in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, had to 
come to grips with the new reality—not only had they become a tiny ethno-
confessional minority in the Lithuanian nation-state, but they had also been 
cut off from their related congregations and their centuries-old demographic 
and spiritual center, Vilnius. This newly emerged factual situation demanded 
that the Lithuanian Tatars define their identity and relations with the out-
groups (the majority society but also Tatars in the neighboring countries, fore-
most Poland) anew. This was made even more urgent by the seemingly 
permanent state of war between Lithuania and Poland over the Vilnius region; 
a state of war that lasted until 1938, when the two states finally established 
diplomatic relations. Thus, for much of the interwar period both Tatar com-
munal relations and relations with the state authorities should also be viewed 
through the prism of Lithuanian-Polish relations. So, rather than lamenting 
the fate which had dismembered the hitherto single community with numer-
ous intra-communal kin relations, the Lithuanian Tatars appear to have pub-
licly expressed joy at having become inhabitants of Lithuania rather than 
Poland, even if the latter would have meant keeping the bulk of the Tatars in a 
single state. Many of the surviving documents (in the form of letters from 
Tatars to the Lithuanian state institutions) vividly attest to this.
In any case, it was in interwar Lithuania that for the first time in history a 
distinct outward Lithuanian Tatar (different from and even opposed to the 
Polish and Belarusians) identity was born. In their correspondence to the state 
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authorities, the leadership of the Tatar congregations routinely claimed to be 
loyal citizens of the Lithuanian state and the nation: “in general, in the mass of 
the Lithuanian Mohammedans, there are no sympathies for Poland, and quite 
to the contrary, the Lithuanian spirit prevails, Mohammedans do well joint 
Lithuanian work by taking part in patriotic organizations and the union for the 
liberation of Vilnius, serving in the armed forces.”28 In a letter dated 27 October 
1939 (when the Vilnius region had already been given by the occupying Soviets 
to Lithuania), its authors (“a group of Lithuanian Mohammedans”) argued that
Lithuanian Mohammedans are not Polish and any Polish influence needs 
to be eradicated and Poles are not to be given a chance to interfere in our, 
Lithuanian Mohammedans’, faith matters. The extermination of the 
Polish influence will not at all harm Mohammedans because they are not 
Poles. In general, Lithuanian Mohammedans do not feel any sentiments 
toward Poland, and quite to the contrary: they, like all Lithuanians, do 
common Lithuanian work, participate in various organizations, serve in 
public offices and armed forces.29
Financial support from the state, as evident from many of the surviving docu-
ments, must have also played an important role in the Tatars’ public rhetoric, 
especially around the time of the construction of a new mosque in Kaunas in 
the 1930s, as shown below.
A significant aspect of this identity construction is the Tatar adherence to the 
cult of Vytautas the Great, the duke who has long been regarded in Lithuania as 
one of the most important and praiseworthy rulers of the Duchy and who is the 
single most prominent figure in the Lithuanian Tatar myth of origin, which cred-
its him with bringing the Tatars to the lands of the gdl. For instance, in a letter 
to the Minister of Education, dated 6 April 1930,30 in which the Tatars solicit 
financial assistance from the state to build a new mosque in Kaunas, arguably in 
commemoration of the 500-year anniversary of Vytautas’ death, the authors of 
the letter began by paying tribute to Vytautas, whom they called “the hero, whose 
name is dear to us, Tatars.” The authors of the letter went so far as to promise to 
name the new mosque after Vytautas, who incidentally was not only never a 
Muslim, but also appears to have remained pagan even after being christened 
twice as a Catholic. If, in the case of the mosque financing, one might regard the 
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Tatar praise of Vytautas as mere rhetoric in the cause of pleasing state authori-
ties and gaining their favor, then in a lengthy handwritten letter to the Minister 
of Education, dated 29 December 1939, sent by the Raižiai Tatars, their sincere 
admiration for Vytautas can hardly be doubted. In the letter, the authors went to 
great lengths to remind the minister of the long and glorious Tatar history in 
Lithuania by closely linking it with the person of the Grand Duke Vytautas: they 
claim to be “descendants of those courageous and honorable soldiers, who took 
part in the army of Vytautas the Great” and also that “the Lithuanian Tatars, sol-
diers of Vytautas the Great, out of their own free will pledged loyalty to Lithuania 
with their swords and to this day we stand by that pledge and honorably fulfill it. 
We, the Lithuanian Tatars, Lithuania’s sons, are ardently attached to it.”31 The 
authors further claim that Lithuanian Tatars, “out of respect for Vytautas the 
Great, mention his name in their prayers” (sic!).32 Though in the surviving archi-
val material it is not used as an argument, it is worth noting that the historical 
Vytautas is reported to have been opposed to his cousin Jogaila’s (Pol. Władysław 
ii Jagiełło) marriage to a Polish princess and becoming a Polish king and thus 
uniting the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish Kingdom through their 
personal union. For this stance, in Lithuania Vytautas is almost universally held 
up as a defender of Lithuanian independence and contrasted with Jogaila’s pur-
ported treason. In the context of animosities between Lithuania and Poland dur-
ing the interwar period, this aspect of Lithuania’s history was particularly 
stressed by Lithuanian historians of the time.33
In their correspondence to state authorities, the Tatars not only identified 
themselves with the Lithuanian state but also claimed to be identical with eth-
nic Lithuanians in all but faith: “Now we are different only in religious rituals 
and festivities.”34 After the Vilnius region became part of the Lithuanian 
Republic in late 1939, even the leadership of the Vilnius-based Muslims (espe-
cially in the person of the Mufti Jokūbas Šinkevičius, his name, which he him-
self now spelled according to the Lithuanian transliteration) identified 
themselves with the Lithuanian state and the nation. In a letter to state author-
ities written on 25 January 1940, Šinkevičius claimed to be happy that the 
Vilnius region had been reunited with mother Lithuania:
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Lithuania’s independence blossomed in all its greatness in the old, 
Lithuanian capital founded by the grand dukes in the eternal sanctuary 
Vilnius! We had been waiting for 19 years longing for our true masters to 
enter the Lithuanian Vilnius region and the old capital—Vilnius. What 
we had been waiting for for 19 years, has happened! Truth has won! Truth 
and right are alive! The thrill of joy went through all Lithuanian Tatars! 
Lithuanians entered their capital not only as its permanent master but 
also as a true mother of this Lithuanian land! While regaining the capital, 
we receive her like an eastern dawn of the new times for the new achieve-
ments of the Lithuanian nation.
We pray for the freedom and well-being of Lithuania! We have grown 
together organically with the history of the Lithuanian nation, we are 
Tatars of Lithuania. We add our voice to the voice of our beloved brother 
Lithuanians! It is worth working and living! It is worth building such life 
that the Lithuanians and the Lithuanian Tatars become even closer broth-
ers, that happiness ruled in our motherland Lithuania! How terrible it 
was when brother was separated from brother. …In this land, where the 
true masters are the Lithuanians, some violent people, some invaders 
were “lords,” however…they perished! They wanted to separate the 
Lithuanian Tatars of the Vilnius region from the Lithuanian Tatars and 
Lithuanians living in free Lithuania and sought to Polonize them. 
However, the Tatar masses sincerely rejected such “works” and in the 
passport of every Tatar it was written: Lithuanian Tatar.35
Though it is highly plausible to suspect that the mufti expressed his (and the 
Tatars’ of the Vilnius region) loyalty to the Lithuanian state and nation only 
instrumentally (further in the letter he pleads with the minister to found a 
“Muslim Muftiate” in Vilnius and provide for the salaries of the “clergy”36), his 
words are nonetheless symptomatic of the situation of the wider Tatar com-
munity, which by virtue of being a negligible and weak minority needed to 
repeatedly reconfirm its identification with the state and the nation in the ter-
ritory in which it found itself. The Tatars of the Vilnius region once again had 
to reconstruct their identity and this time it must have been even more diffi-
cult, for as I show further below, the Tatars of the Lithuanian provinces were 
far from welcoming toward their co-religionists.
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4 Attempts at Organizational Unification
Though relatively dispersed, organizationally Muslims in interwar Lithuania 
(before the Vilnius region became part of it) had three independent and physi-
cally rather distant congregations (which they called ‘parishes’), centering on 
the surviving mosques—the most numerous the Raižiai Mohammedan37 
Parish in Alytus District, Kaunas Mohammedan Parish (in 1936 registered as 
Kaunas Muslim Society), and the smallest of them Vinkšnupiai Mohammedan 
Parish (though the 1923 census hardly registers a Muslim presence in that part 
of the country). Out of inertia and tradition, congregations continued to elect 
their own spiritual leaders (internally called mullas). So, for instance, Kaunas 
Mohammedan Parish unanimously elected a new ‘parish priest (mulla)’ in 1922 
after the previous one had died,38 and he officially introduced himself as the 
‘rector of the parish.’39
Despite the fact that there had never been any significant Muslim presence 
in Kaunas, after it became the capital of Lithuania, local Muslims registered a 
religious community there in the fall of 1923 and by the second half of 1925 
came up with a plan to establish a Faith Organization of Lithuanian 
Mohammedans which would supervise and coordinate the religious activities 
of all the Muslim congregations in the Republic of Lithuania. It is worth noting 
that the Muftiate in Polish-controlled Vilnius was established in December of 
the same year. This coincidence is hardly accidental—Kaunas Muslims must 
have known of the plans of their co-religionists in Vilnius and might have emu-
lated them. The temporary rules for the supervision of the relations between 
the envisioned Faith Organization and the Lithuanian government foresaw the 
seat of its governing body, the Mohammedan Central Council, as being in 
Kaunas. This council would consist of three members elected by congregation 
representatives, two per each 150 congregation members.40 However, at that 
time the idea of a central spiritual governing body in Lithuania did not materi-
alize, mainly due to a lack of commitment and the widespread mistrust among 
the Muslims of the provinces, who made up the majority of Lithuaniaʼs 
Muslims, of the Kaunas congregation’s intentions.
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After the local organization’s reorganization in 1930 into a purely religious 
(rather than a confessional Tatar) organization named the Kaunas Muslim 
Society (officially registered in 1936 and headquartered in the interim capital 
close to the seat of power), the most active members of the Kaunas congrega-
tion apparently had hoped that the relevant state authorities would recognize 
their new/old organization as the de facto leader among the nation’s Muslim 
congregations and as the center around which provincial congregations should 
unite. The state appears to have, for a moment, subscribed to this idea and 
entrusted Kaunas Muslim Society with the supervision of a state allowance 
and its distribution among the three acting imams. Members of the Society, 
perceiving themselves as acting on behalf of and in the name of the state, in 
Figure 8.1
Sample of the requested stamp of the  
Rectorate of Kaunas Mohammedan Parish, 31 October 
192341
Figure 8.2
Kaunas Muslim Society’s stamp, on a document dated 
9 September 193742
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June 1937 paid an unannounced visit to Vinkšnupiai to inspect the mosque and 
the cemetery which they later claimed, in their report to the Ministry of 
Education, to have found in an appalling state—the mosque being in a bad 
shape and therefore permanently closed, and the cemetery neglected.43 
Because of this, the Society proposed that the ministry temporarily withhold 
the allowance from the mulla of the Vinkšnupiai congregation.
Possibly emboldened by the state’s sympathetic attitude toward it (espe-
cially during the construction of a new brick mosque in Kaunas in 1930–1932, 
see below), in 1937 Kaunas Muslim Society made a second attempt to unify the 
Muslim congregations under its leadership; it submitted a request to relevant 
state authorities for the establishment of a unified Muslim confessional center. 
In the request, the Society’s leadership argued that in the absence of adminis-
trative oversight, individual mullas sometimes failed in their duties, could not 
come to terms to coordinate their activities, and also disregarded advice by 
congregation members, however, they themselves supposedly realized a need 
for such a unifying body.44 Thus the authors “humbly ask” that the addressed 
official in charge of religious affairs “takes the initiative into his hands to unite 
the actions of the mullas by appointing for this purpose one of them as Imam 
(dean) and entrusting the rest to his leadership.”45
Internal communication in the Ministry of Education suggests an initial 
positive reaction and the ministry encouraged Kaunas Muslim Society to pre-
pare a document to serve as the basis for the centralization of the Muslim orga-
nizational structure in the country; the Society soon did this.46 In its letter 
accompanying the draft of “The Rules of the Centralization of Muslim 
Confessional Institutions,” Kaunas Muslim Society leadership urged the rele-
vant state authorities (identified as ministries of education and interior) to act 
promptly as the “founding of a highest Muslim clergy body (Muftiate) is an 
urgent and necessary matter.”47
The Society’s draft of “The Rules of the Centralization of Muslim Confessional 
Institutions” stated at the outset that the supervision of Lithuanian Muslim 
confessional institutions “belongs” (direct translation from the original 
Lithuanian) to the mufti of the Lithuanian Muslims and the muftiate’s head-
quarters should be in the capital of Lithuania, though the document does not 
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indicate whether the capital is Kaunas (officially perceived to be only a temporary 
capital) or Vilnius (officially seen as “occupied,” yet the only true capital). 
However, at the end, the rules clarify the situation—“the capital of Lithuania” 
is meant to be Vilnius. And as long as Vilnius remained in Polish hands, the 
duties of the mufti were to be conferred temporarily to someone residing in 
“the interim capital” (i.e., Kaunas).
According to the proposed rules, only citizens of Lithuania, older than 
35 years and with higher education were considered eligible for the post which 
one would occupy after winning elections arranged during the convention of 
delegates of Muslim congregations. The tenure would be for life. According to 
the proposed rules, the functions of mufti would comprise spiritual guidance 
(“interpreting questions of the Islamic faith,” “accepting individuals of other 
faiths into the Muslim faith and setting general rules”), and administrative 
tasks (controlling the activities of Muslim “clergy” (direct translation from the 
original Lithuanian), checking registration books maintained by local imams 
and submitting relevant information to the supervising ministry, “controlling 
faith instruction,” supervising the property of Muslim confessional organiza-
tions, arranging the salaries of “clergy” and employees at confessional institu-
tions). Imams (or “clergy,” as they are interchangeably called) were to be elected 
by congregations but would submit to mufti’s authority; he would be entrusted 
with the right to dismiss them.
Unfortunately for Lithuania’s Muslims, this second attempt failed also. The 
provincial congregations (centered around the Raižiai and Vinkšnupiai 
mosques) rejected the initiative outright and even openly suggested that the 
despised Vilnius-based Polish Muslim organizations, who were even accused 
of having sent the very draft of the rules, must be behind this latest attempt 
by the Kaunas congregation.48 For the sake of fairness, one has to admit that 
the submitted draft of “The Rules of the Centralization of Muslim Con-
fessional  Institutions” was conspicuously reminiscent of the statute of the 
Muslim Religious Union of Poland adopted in Poland in the summer of 1936.49 
In reaction to the insinuations by the provincial congregations and in view of 
communal squabbles (described in detail below), the Department of Culture 
at the Ministry of Education in December 1937 informed the official represen-
tative of the Vinkšnupiai congregation in Kaunas that “the question of the cen-
tralization of the Muslim faith is for the time being put off.”50
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5 Intra- and Extra-communal Relations
The feeling of independence (but also the short-sightedness caused by provin-
ciality) among the members of the two provincial congregations must have 
been so entrenched that though minuscule in numbers and surrounded by a 
majority of people of a different faith, the Lithuanian Muslim community 
throughout the period of the independent interwar Lithuanian Republic was 
cursed with permanent self-inflicted disunity. This disunity, in the form of 
open animosity, appears to have escalated and reached its peak during the 
Kaunas Muslim Society’s renewed attempts to both legally and practically take 
the reins of Muslim affairs into their hands, starting in 1937. This was the time 
when the provincial congregations started barraging the relevant state author-
ities with complaints full of insinuations and conspiracy theories.
The Vinkšnupiai congregation was especially hostile toward the Kaunas 
Muslim Society. In their August 1937 reply to the report submitted by the 
Society to the Ministry of Education on the state of affairs in the Vinkšnupiai 
congregation, the congregation leadership sent a five-page letter in which it 
accused the Kaunas Muslim Society of exceeding its powers and meddling in 
the internal affairs of the Vinkšnupiai congregation.51 The authors accused 
(and indeed rightfully) the Kaunas Muslim Society of seeking to subjugate 
and even include the Vinkšnupiai congregation in the Kaunas congrega-
tion.52 They further charged the Society with sowing discord both inside 
the  Kaunas congregation itself and among the Muslims of Lithuania and 
argued that the Society should not be seen by the state as the representative 
of  Lithuania’s Muslims.53 Finally, the Vinkšnupiai congregation requested 
(though it reads more like a demand) that the ministry cease transferring 
allowance money to the Society and rather resume the earlier practice of dis-
bursing it directly to imams.54
Almost the same accusations that were leveled at the Kaunas Muslim Society 
were reiterated in a shorter letter later (written in September 1937), this time 
signed by representatives of both provincial congregations.55 This suggests that 
the two congregations joined their efforts in their fight against the perceived 
hegemony of the Kaunas Muslim Society. In this particular letter the authors 
argued that the two provincial congregations were centuries old and had always 
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been independent in their spiritual affairs with imams elected locally, some-
thing that the Kaunas congregation, being a new formation, lacked.56 In the let-
ter, as in the previous letters, the Society was called a small private organization 
with its membership consisting of relatives and therefore the claim was made 
that it was not representative of the wider Muslim population in the country.
Finally, at the end of the same year, Aleksandras Chaleckas, the represen-
tative of the Vinkšnupiai congregation in Kaunas, wrote yet another similar 
five-page letter to the Minister of Education, reiterating most of the earlier 
accusations leveled at the Kaunas Muslim Society and at the same time 
addressing, from the perspective of the Vinkšnupiai congregation, the issues 
raised in the report of the Society’s fact-finding mission.57
Further intra-congregation hostility is displayed openly in numerous subse-
quent letters from provincial congregations to the state authorities. In one of 
them, an anonymous letter dated as late as 28 October 1938, the Kaunas con-
gregation was bluntly called “a real and unbearable misunderstanding among 
Mohammedans.”58
The animosity between the congregations based in the capital and the pro-
vincial congregations crossed the limits of a simple internal power struggle and 
was intentionally extended by the provincial congregations to include the 
question of the congregationʼs position on and relations with the citizens of the 
arch enemy—Poland. The provincial congregations went so far as to accuse 
the Kaunas based Muslim activists of treason because of their alleged coopera-
tion with the Vilnius-based Muslims. For instance, in their aforementioned 
lengthy letter to the Minister of Education written on 28 October 1938, and 
marked “Secret,” its authors claimed that the Kaunas Muslim Society was main-
taining close relations with Muslim organizations (“Związek kulturalno oswia-
towy” and “Muftiat”), based in occupied Vilnius. At the purported instigation of 
these Polish organizations, with which they supposedly “had secret relations,” 
and from which they “used to receive instructions,” activists of the Kaunas 
Muslim Society “would engage in various intrigues and misunderstandings 
among Mohammedans, fighting this way with the Lithuanian spirit of 
Mohammedans and with this very much obstructed the execution of useful 
work.”59 The Kaunas Muslim Society was deemed to have received advice from 
the Polish side to “try and take under its tutelage Mohammadan parishes and 
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create a central Mohammadan organization made purely of Polephiles (Lith. 
lenkomanai).”60
The provincial (in this case, Vinkšnupiai) congregations must have been 
convinced that Muslims based in Vilnius harbored ill will for those living in 
Lithuania. They alleged that as a Polish organization the Vilnius Muftiate 
was  more a political organization and a tool in the hands of the Polish state 
than a faith-based institution: the Muftiate and its affiliated organizations 
are charged with having “secret political goals and work” which they (the Polish 
Muslim organizations) and “their agents cover and dress in supposedly 
Mohammadan faith matters,”61 while in reality “the special purpose” of these 
organizations was “to Polonize Mohammedans in Vilnius and elsewhere 
and  to  look for a means to bind the Lithuanian Mohammedans to Polish 
organizations.”62
Though it cannot be read directly from the available archival material, one 
might conclude, hypothetically, that because of their low level of religious 
and other education and lack of erudition and because of their somewhat 
heightened concern to preserve their independence and purity from foreign 
influences, let alone control, the Muslims of interwar Lithuania, unlike those 
of Poland, did not seek closer cooperation or integration with the Muslim 
communities elsewhere in Europe or in Muslim-majority states. There is very 
little evidence to suggest that Lithuanian Muslims tried to approach their 
co-religionists abroad. One such rare occasion can be found in a letter in the 
fall of 1933 written by Chaleckas, the imam of the Kaunas mosque, to the 
Moslemische Revue, a German language Ahmadi periodical, informing the edi-
tors of the opening of a new mosque in Kaunas. In its October 1933 issue 
Moslemische Revue published a short note on the opening of the Kaunas 
mosque, indicating that the information was drawn from the received letter.63 
It remains unclear if such a letter had been sent to other Muslim organiza-
tions or publications elsewhere and whether the Lithuanian Muslims were 
aware of Moslemische Revue’s Ahmadi nature.
The lack of evidence of transnational communication, let alone coopera-
tion, between Lithuania’s Muslims and those elsewhere in (western) Europe 
during the interwar years suggests that the Lithuanian Tatars were preoccu-
pied with other issues they deemed more urgent and relevant. The identity 
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shifts the Tatars of the former gdl went through after the break-up of the 
Russian Empire initially took most of their efforts. Afterwards, attempts and 
the constant failures at institutionalization caused by the demographic distri-
bution of Tatars and intra-communal relations prevented the avant-garde of 
Lithuania’s Muslims based in Kaunas from forging long-term relations with 
Muslims in Europe, let alone in the wider world. From this perspective, one 
can only lament that though the Lithuanian Tatar community had been, by 
the beginning of the twentieth century, one of the oldest Muslim communi-
ties that had lived in Europe continuously, it failed to tap into the newly form-
ing vibrant and complex transnational networks of Muslims in interwar 
Europe, something that undoubtedly would have significantly enriched the 
local community.
6 Developments after the Regaining of the Vilnius Region
The Soviet occupation of the eastern part of the Polish Republic in the first 
month of World War ii (which began on 1 September 1939) led, on 10 October 
1939, to the Vilnius region (with its significant Muslim community, estimated 
at some 670,64 and home of the Muftiate) being given by the Soviets to 
Lithuania. After regaining the Vilnius region, the number of Muslim congrega-
tions in Lithuania doubled to six. The Kaunas Muslim Society then made a 
final attempt to unify these congregations under one umbrella organization. In 
their “Memorandum” of 29 November 1939 to the Minister of Education they 
called on the minister to either promulgate the 1937 “Rules of the Centralization 
of Muslim Confessional Institutions” or solve the problem in some other way.65 
This last attempt appears to have been welcomed by the Raižiai congregation, 
which had apparently switched sides and which in its letter of 29 December 
1939 not only urged the Minister of Education to move quickly in solving the 
lasting impasse but was also full of praise for the mufti who, it claimed, was 
“full of love to Mohammedan-Muslim faith and Lithuania, his motherland.”66
However, the Vinkšnupiai congregation remained unwavering and renewed 
its bombardment of state institutions with letters of complaint about the per-
ceived intentions and activities of the Vilnius-based Muslim leadership, chiefly 
manifest in the person of Jokūbas Šinkevičius/Jakub Szynkiewicz. In his letter 
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of 17 November 1939, the representative of the Vinkšnupiai congregation in 
Kaunas pleaded with the Ministry of Education not to allow the reopening of 
the Muftiate.67 In their later letter, coincidentally (?) dated the same day (29 
December 1939) as the supportive Raižiai letter, several members of the 
Vinkšnupiai congregation argued that “for many years we did joint Lithuanian 
work not so that now, after regaining the Vilnius region, we would import 
Polish leaders for ourselves and even foreigners (Jakub Šinkevič)…and all sorts 
of troublemakers” and suggest that these “mind their own business.”68 Just a 
day later (30 December 1939), in another and more detailed letter, several rep-
resentatives (some of them the same as in the letter a day earlier) of the same 
Vinkšnupiai Mohammadan Parish argued that “Lithuanian Mohammedans do 
not want any Polish leaders to be their go-between (Janušauskai, Vilčinskai 
from “Kaunas Muslim Society”) and we protest against the work of them all.” 
The authors were adamant: “We did not do patriotic Lithuanian work for 
20  years to put on ourselves the noose of Polish leaders now, after having 
regained Vilnius (???).” In the end, they even issued a judgment on Šinkevičius’/
Szynkiewicz’s prospects of receiving Lithuanian citizenship: “The above men-
tioned Jakub Šinkevič [Jakub Szynkiewicz] cannot be a citizen of Lithuania, 
because he was born in the town of Liachovičiai [Lachowicze], close to 
Baranovičiai [Baranowicze], and his friends want to import him to us.”69 
Finally, the authors pleaded with the minister to “definitively close the afore-
mentioned Polish organizations (“Muftiat”), not to give any money to Polish 
leaders and to prevent their interference in our affairs.”70
Despite these protests by the Vinkšnupiai congregation, in January 1940, 
local authorities in Vilnius allowed the Muftiate to operate unofficially until it 
“obtains the permit to operate legally.”71 At the end of January Šinkevičius 
approached the Minister of Education with a letter requesting that the Muftiate 
be reopened and that funding for the salaries of its employees be allocated.72 
The imminent annexation of Lithuania in the summer of 1940 by the ussr and 
subsequent occupation by Germany made all this impossible. However, 
Šinkevičius/Szynkiewicz remained in Vilnius throughout the Nazi occupation 
until 1944, when, in his capacity as the spiritual head of the Muslims in the area 
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and in the wake of the Soviet return of Lithuania, he emigrated first to Egypt 
and later (in 1957) to the United States where he died in 1966.73
7 The State’s Position
The constitutions (all of them, in 1922, 1928, and 1938) of interwar Lithuania 
affirmed general religious freedom. However, no further legal regulations 
between the Lithuanian state and its Muslims were promulgated and practi-
cal relations between them appear to have been based more on moral com-
mitment and goodwill from the state’s side than on formal obligation. It was 
primarily the Department of Faiths at the Ministry of Interior, and later, in the 
1930s, the Department of Cultural Affairs at the Ministry of Education that 
were charged with the supervision of religious affairs and represented the 
state in dealings with the Muslim congregations. Ultimately, most of the doc-
uments preserved at the Lithuanian State Archive are either letters by 
Muslims addressed to one of these departments or their replies to the queries 
from Muslims.
The communication (and the cooperation stemming from it) between the 
relevant state institutions and the Muslims in the interwar period, in which the 
state’s position vis-à-vis the country’s Muslims can be discerned, can be divided 
into three areas: (a) continuous financial support for congregations in the form 
of allowances for imams; (b) financial support for building a new mosque in 
Kaunas; and (c) expected state arbitration in the relations among the Muslim 
congregations.
With regard to the allowances, in June 1929, Kaunas Mohammedan Parish 
approached the prime minister with a request to “assign permanent salary” for 
the congregation’s imam (in the document called “dvasiškis,” or “clergyman”).74 
The petitioners based their request on the fact that though the former clergy-
man would be content with the 100 litas allowance provided by the Department 
of Faiths and would serve as the imam “out of dedication, without requiring a 
separate salary,” with his passing away, the congregation, on its own, “without 
the state’s support…in no way can sustain a clergyman.” The request was 
received favorably and dealt with promptly (on the same day as it arrived at the 
prime minister’s chancery) by Prime Minister Augustinas Voldemaras person-
ally, who in his handwritten resolution on the very same letter sympathized 
73
74
73 Adas Jakubauskas, Galimas Sitdykovas, Stanislavas Duminas (eds.), Lietuvos totoriai istori-
joje ir kultūroje (Kaunas: Lietuvos totorių bendruomenių sąjunga, 2012), 148.
74 391–4–1821–41.
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77 1622–4–75–5; 391–4–148–2, −2ap.
78 391–4–148–2, −2ap.
79 1622–4–75– l, −6.
80 391–4–148–16.
with the local Muslims.75 Ultimately, the state resolved to pay modest semian-
nual allowances to the imams of all three parishes.76
The Tatars professed loyalty to the state and were generously rewarded by the 
government—it provided the bulk of the funding for a new (to this day the sole) 
brick mosque in the interim capital Kaunas; the mosque opened its doors to 
worshipers in 1932. Though initiated by the Kaunas Tatars in 1930,77 they saw the 
financial burden of bringing the mosque from its inception to completion as the 
state’s responsibility. Local Tatars (in the letter their numbers are given as 200 in 
the Kaunas region with just 70 in city of Kaunas itself78) could not have expected 
to collect the needed amount (originally estimated at a staggering 85 thousand 
litas), thus they immediately proceeded with lobbying the minister to make the 
funds available. The Kaunas mayor and other relevant authorities approved of 
the construction.79 In the end of the same year the Tatars once again requested 
25 thousand litas from the state for the completion of the mosque, citing their 
failure to raise additional funds from within the community.80
Though the surviving archival material does not allow one to speculate as to 
what extent the Lithuanian government wanted to control and even meddle in 
the internal affairs of the local Tatar community, the fact of Lithuania’s state 
of  war with Poland over Vilnius and its region must have weighed on 
the Lithuanian government’s position both toward its Tatar community and 
especially this community’s relations (ties) with their co-religionists in Poland, 
especially the Vilnius region. As shown above, the two provincial congrega-
tions bombarded the relevant government authorities about the perceived 
treason of the Kaunas Muslim Society in favor of Poland. However, it appears 
that the government, in spite of the wishes of the provincial congregations to 
avoid dealing with the Kaunas Muslim Society, chose a path of pragmatic 
cooperation with it. One might even argue that the government’s reaction in 
the form of its dealing with and treatment of the Kaunas Muslim Society sug-
gests that the state authorities rather saw in it a partner and even a possible 
national leader of all of Lithuania’s Muslims. And it was only under pressure 
from the provincial congregations that the government tacitly withdrew its 
open support for the Society.
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After establishing control over the lands formerly held by Poland, the 
Lithuanian authorities outlawed all Polish-registered organizations, including 
the Muftiate and its premises, which were locked and sealed.81 However, after 
intense lobbying by the Kaunas Muslim Society (now supported by the Raižiai 
congregation) and Mufti Šinkevičius (who, by the way, had been denied 
Lithuanian citizenship82) personally, the authorities allowed Šinkevičius to 
resume his functions for a time, though without pay or office; in this way they 
showed some sympathy for the Tatar cause, both in the sense of fulfilling their 
spiritual needs and communal unity.
 Conclusion
The interwar period was in practice the time in which the local Tatar Muslim 
community, which consciously identified itself with the Lithuanian nation-
state (in contrast to its earlier identification with the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, 
which had covered parts of Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine), was born. This iden-
tity was closely tied to the myth of origin and settlement stories in which the 
bravery and loyalty of the Tatars in the army of Vytautas the Great and his grati-
tude to the Tatars were central. At the same time, the community appears to 
have shown little interest in the outside world or Muslims living elsewhere, 
either in Europe or further afield. The more numerous  provincial congrega-
tions took an insular stance and did not pursue transnational communication, 
let alone cooperation, with Muslim communities and organizations abroad; 
this facilitated the community’s overall provin cialism, lack of familiarity with, 
and remoteness from contemporary processes  in the religious sphere of the 
world’s Muslims, namely reformism and revivalism.
In spite of this unitary narrative of belonging to and in the land, and unlike 
their co-religionists in Poland, in the interwar period the Muslims (especially 
those based in the provinces) of the Republic of Lithuania failed to realize a 
need for or see the benefit in a greater institutionalization of Islam in its terri-
tory and instead continued with the tradition of independent congregations 
(parishes), a tradition they had inherited from the times of the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania, and resisted centralization and institutionalization very much like 
they had in Russian times. In Bairašauskaitė’s opinion,83 the part of the original 
community of the ‘Muslims of the gdl’ which found itself within the borders 
of the Republic of Lithuania was intellectually not advanced.81
82
83
81 Bairašauskaitė, “Musulmonų konfesinė bendruomenė,” 111.
82 Ibid., 112.
83 Ibid., 105.
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This certainly appears to be true in the case of the provincial congregations; 
however, the core that comprised the Kaunas Muslim Society seem to have 
been ‘progressive’—they not only sought to unite Lithuania’s Muslims under a 
single umbrella organization and thereby raise the standards of Islamic prac-
tices, but had an even broader vision and were also open to cooperation with 
the Vilnius-based Muftiate. In this regard, the Muslims of the interim capital, 
or at least the most active among them, and the provincial Tatars had rather 
divergent perspectives on the development of the Lithuanian Muslim com-
munity. As Bairašauskaitė84 correctly points out, “contradictory positions of 
Muslim parishes were caused by inner competition and different political atti-
tudes, which were obstacles for making decisions on creation of confessional 
center.” At the same time, with no pressure (or support) from above (e.g., state 
authorities), there were no interested players strong enough to organize 
Lithuania’s Muslims into a coherent faith community that would have mir-
rored the one in interwar Poland.
The stubbornness of the Vinkšnupiai congregation and its bickering with 
the rest of Lithuanian Muslims lasted to the very end, when in the summer of 
1940, the Soviet Union occupied and annexed all of Lithuania, thus terminat-
ing the state’s and also the Muslim community’s independent existence. World 
War ii dealt a final blow to the Vinkšnupiai congregation—its mosque was 
destroyed by German troops, its members uprooted and dispersed. Today, only 
the cemetery remains as a reminder of the tiny yet unwavering western-most 
congregation of Lithuanian Tatars.
The story of the interwar Lithuanian Muslim community presented above 
remains, however, incomplete. This is a result of the scarcity of archival and 
other research material. On the other hand, there are still some living witnesses 
of the time and certainly their progeny, whose testimonies could be usefully 
employed in a more comprehensive (and much needed and timely) research 
on this most neglected period in the history of the Lithuanian Tatar Muslim 
community. Such research could potentially build and expand on the work in 
this article. One can only wish this comes true, and sooner rather than later.
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chapter 9
Transnational Life in Multicultural Space: 
Azerbaijani and Tatar Discourses in  
Interwar Europe1
Zaur Gasimov and Wiebke Bachmann
Dans la période entre les deux guerres, la presse européenne dite 
d’information ne traitait que rarement des problèmes de l’Orient 
musulman.2
After a short intermezzo between 1918 and 1921, Soviet Russia was able to 
reconquer most of the territories of the former Tsardom in the Caucasus, the 
Ukraine, and in Central Asia, which became independent or at least self-ruled 
around 1917. The short-lived independent republics of Crimea, Azerbaijan, 
and Turkestan3 with their predominantly Muslim population were occupied 
by the Red Army, and then gradually sovietized.4 The Sovietization chal-
lenged the political elites of these countries dramatically. Those who survived 
the invasion of the Bolsheviks either had to accept the Communist regime or 
escape. Thousands of former politicians and intellectuals, both Shīʿa and 
Sunnīs, left for Turkey, France, Germany, and Poland. While living in exile 
many continued political, journalistic, and public activities writing against 
Communism, and protesting against the persecutions in the Soviet Union. At 
the same time, these intellectuals were eager to inform the society in their 
host countries about their countries of origin, which were left under Soviet 
occupation. Being quite well integrated into the intellectual milieus of inter-
war Paris, Warsaw, Berlin, and other European cities in the 1920s and 1930s, 
they were confronted with European realities, ideas, and views on Christianity 
and Islam.
1 All translations from Polish, Turkish, Azerbaijani, and German were done by the authors of 
the contribution.
2 Haidar Bammate, Visages de l’Islam (Lausanne: Payot, 1946), 1.
3 Here Turkestan refers to the geographic name of the region of Central Asia that was domi-
nated by Russia until 1991.
4 For more on the period of the short-lived independence, see Firuz Kazemzade, The Struggle 
for Transcaucasia: 1917–1921 (Westport, ct: Hyperion Press, 1981).
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This article explores selected publications, articles, and booklets of several 
prominent Azerbaijani,5 northern Caucasian, and Tatar émigré intellectuals 
in interwar Europe, including Mehmed Emin Rasulzade (1884–1955), Hilal 
Munschi (1899–?), Ahmet Zeki Velidi Toğan (1890–1970), Haïdar Bammate 
(1890–1965), and Cafer Seydahmet (1889–1960); these works were published in 
Europe in Russian, Polish, French, and German. The analysis here focuses on 
the representation of Islam in the writings of these Muslim intellectuals. Born 
in the 1880s, all were graduates of Russian and European schools, belonged to 
the Muslim minority in the Russian Empire, and then spent decades exiled in 
Europe. Their sojourns in France, Poland, and Germany throughout the 1920s 
and 1930s did not mean, therefore, a cultural watershed to their primary social-
ization. As Muslims they were aware of European culture while they lived in 
the Caucasus or the Crimea under Russian rule.6
Socialized under the circumstances of the imperial homogenization ‘from 
above’ and certain cultural resistance strategies of non-Russian peripheries 
and educated in imperial high schools and universities, these intellectuals 
combined the awareness of Russian, Near Eastern, and European traditions 
and cultures. It is easier to define them as entangled intellectuals who were 
rooted in several civilizations, than to try to classify them merely as Azerbaijani, 
Tatar or Muslim intellectuals in interwar Europe. They represented a multicul-
tural hybridity:7 They lived and were active in the special intellectual space of 
interwar Europe.8
5 For more detail on Azerbaijani émigrés in Europe in general and in Germany in particular, 
see Zaur Gasimov and Wiebke Bachmann, “‘Für nationale Ehre, Freiheit und Selbständigkeit!’ 
Die publizistische Aktivität der aserbaidschanischen Exilanten in Berlin in der 
Zwischenkriegszeit,” in Brücken bauen—Analysen und Betrachtungen zwischen Ost und West. 
Festschrift für Leonid Luks zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. Jürgen Zarusky, et al. (Stuttgart: Ibidem 
Verlag, 2012), 277–294.
6 We argue that at least the urban spaces of the Russian Empire, like Moscow, St. Petersburg, 
Kazan, Kiev, Odessa, Baku, Bakhchesaray, and Tbilisi can be considered European. Therefore, 
intellectuals who resettled from St. Petersburg to Paris or from Baku to Warsaw still moved 
within a European cultural space.
7 In this context the term of hybridity is borrowed from the post-colonialist debates initiated 
by Homi Bhabha.
8 It is difficult, however, to define this intellectual space as the “third space,” in Homi Bhabhaʼs 
terms. Being in Europe and therefore outside the territory of the Russian Empire and the 
ussr, Bhabhaʼs third space is hardly applicable with regard to the study of Russian Muslims 
who migrated to Europe. See Jonathan Rutherfordʼs interview with Homi Bhabha: “The Third 
Space. Interview with Homi Bhabha,” in Identity: Community, Culture, Difference, ed. Jonathan 
Rutherford (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990), 207–221.
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In this context, we investigate the role of Islam as an important element of 
the self-identification and national identity of these intellectuals. How did the 
Muslim intellectuals from the former Russian Tsardom react to the European 
visions and ideas of Islam? How did they eventually try to influence, or ‘revise’ 
these conceptions? And how important was Islam to their life in exile and in 
which regard?
Moreover the correlation of the representation of Islam and, for example, 
anti-communism, which was the main political focus of these intellectuals in 
interwar Europe, is taken into consideration. The classification of these Muslim 
intellectuals in interwar Europe as entangled intellectuals9 offers a theoretical 
approach to historical entanglements and therefore an additional key to under-
standing the specific representation of Islam under the circumstances of exile.
 Entangled Intellectuals
The entangled intellectuals Mehmed Emin Rasulzade, Hilal Munschi, Zeki 
Velidi Toğan, Haïdar Bammate, and Cafer Seydahmet were born in different 
parts of the Russian Tsardom but nevertheless were confronted with the same 
or at least similar experiences in the peripheries of the empire. As a result of 
the primary educational socialization in Russian schools they were fluent in 
Russian and had a good knowledge of Russian culture and literature. The 
period of their childhood and socialization at the secondary, and high schools 
that they attended coincided with the severe russification strategy under Tsar 
Alexander iii and Nicolas i at the end of the nineteenth century.10 In the same 
space of time the conservative pan-Slavist ideology was quite widespread in 
Moscow and St. Petersburg. The Russian pan-Slavist discourse had distinct 
anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim elements.11 Pan-Slavist ideologists, for example, 
9 For the notion of the “entangled intellectual,” see Zaur Gasimov, “Bolshevik Post-
Colonialism, Eurasian Perspective and Entangled Intellectuals. Russian Debates on 
Spengler in the Interwar Period,” in Oswald Spengler als europäisches Phänomen. Der 
Transfer der Kultur- und Geschichtsmorphologie im Europa der Zwischenkriegszeit 1919–
1939, ed. Zaur Gasimov and Carl A. Lemke Duque (Göttingen: V&R, 2013), 79.
10 For more on russification, see Theodore R. Weeks “Russification/Sovietization,” in 
European History Online (ego) (Mainz: Institute of European History (ieg), 2010). 
Accessed 2 Dec. 2013: http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/models-and-stereotypes/russification 
-sovietization.
11 For more on pan-Slavism, its agents, and variety, see the compendium: Post-Panslavismus. 
Slavizität, Slavische Idee und Antislavismus im 20. und 21. Jahrhundert, ed. Agnieszka 
Gąsior, Lars Karl, and Stefan Troebst (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2014).
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promoted the idea of a Russian conquest of Constantinople and Russian domi-
nation in the Balkans.12 This set of ideas deepened the existing antagonism 
between the Russian majority and the Muslim minority in the central cities of 
the empire as well as between the Russian authorities and the Muslim and 
non-Russian majority throughout the empire.
Rasulzade, Seydahmet, Munschi, Zeki Velidi Toğan, and Bammate, like 
many other Muslim intellectuals from the Russian Caucasus and Turkestan 
were, because of its proximity, fluent in Ottoman Turkish and regularly 
observed the political and cultural processes in Istanbul at the beginning of 
the twentieth century. They became involved in revolutionary and political 
activities in the regions they lived in. Most Azerbaijani intellectuals were also 
fluent in Persian and engaged in political processes in Iran as well. Linguistic 
competences played a certain role in making possible the transnational activi-
ties of these intellectuals by simplifying, to some extent, the crossing of bor-
ders. Additionally, at the turn of the century and particularly after the first 
Russian revolution of 1905, the languages of the Russian Muslim intellectuals 
became spaces of transboundary communication with the inhabitants of 
neighboring countries and empires as well as of the articulation of (shifting) 
personal identities. The Azerbaijani-Turkish entangled intellectual Ahmet 
Ağaoğlu, who studied in the 1890s at the Sorbonne, presented himself first as a 
Persian intellectual. He did this in Paris among French orientalists such as 
Ernest Renan and James Darmestaetter, who considered Persian culture to be 
a high culture of the Near and Middle East. But after returning to the Russian-
dominated Azerbaijani capital Baku at the turn of the century, Ağaoğlu became 
an ardent pan-Turkist and Azerbaijani nationalist. After his emigration to the 
Ottoman Empire in 1909 he then shared the ideology of the Young Turks and 
finally joined the Kemalists after the victory of Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia by 
promoting the idea of Turkish etatism.13
The Russian revolution of 1905, which was followed by a broad liberalization 
throughout the empire, made those activities possible. But in 1918–20 their 
political careers at the peripheries of the former Russian Empire reached their 
end. The Bolshevik occupation obliged them to leave for Europe, which became 
a new space for their political activities for the rest of their lives.
12 For more on the reciprocal influence of pan-Slavism and pan-Turkism, see Zaur Gasimov, 
“Vom Panslavismus über den Panturkismus zum Eurasismus. Die russisch-türkische 
Ideenzirkulation und Verflechtung der Ordnungsvorstellungen im 20. Jahrhundert,” in 
Post-Panslavismus, ed. Gąsior, Karl, and Troebst, 450–474.
13 See Ufuk Özcan, Ahmet Ağaoğlu ve Rol Değişikliği: Yüzyıl Dönümünde Batılı Bir Aydın 
(Istanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2010).
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There were numerous dimensions of the discursive levels within this group. 
Rasulzade, for example, traveled in the 1920s and 1930s between Turkey, Poland, 
and France, and wrote for Turkish, Polish, Russian, and French newspapers 
and journals in Paris and Berlin. Writing in Russian for an émigré journal in 
Paris he, along with Bammate, took part in a russophone debate in the emi-
grant community from the former Tsardom. Actually, their intellectual sojourn 
took place in a multi-dimensional and multicultural milieu of exiles.14
 Cafer Seydahmet’s Public Activities in Interwar Poland
Cafer Seydahmet was born in 1889 in the Crimea to a religious middle-class 
Tatar family. After attending a primary school in the Crimea and later a lyceum 
in Istanbul, Seydahmet was enrolled in the law department of Istanbul 
University (1909–11).15 Afterwards he continued his studies in Paris (1911–13) 
and St. Petersburg (1913–14).16 During the Russian revolution and shortly after-
wards Seydahmet engaged himself in local Crimean politics (1917–18),17 but 
after the peninsula was occupied by the Denikin Army and then by the Red 
Army he left for Istanbul in 1918 and then, in the early 1920s he moved to Le 
Retour, close to Geneva. He stayed in Poland throughout the 1930s. In the coun-
tries of his sojourn he wrote extensively for local newspapers and took part in 
debates of Russian and non-Russian emigrants from the former Tsardom.
In 1930, the Institute of Oriental Studies (Instytut Wschodni) at the 
University of Warsaw published Cafer Seydahmetʼs monograph on the history 
and current state of the Crimean peninsula. His cooperation with Polish intel-
ligence and scientific institutions, which were backed to a large extent by the 
Polish secret services and diplomatic circles, was particularly intensive and 
long; he returned to the so-called Promethean concept elaborated by the 
Polish authorities in the 1920s. The main target of the Promethean network 
was to combat Soviet Communism ideologically, and later it was aimed at the 
dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the restoration of the independent 
14 The third space, on the other hand, is merely a space of special encounter between the 
(former) empire and its (former) colony.
15 For more about Seydahmet, see Inci Bowman, “Cafer Seydahmet Kirimer (1889–1960).” 
Accessed 21 June 2013: http://www.iccrimea.org/historical/cskirimer.html.
16 In his memoirs Seydahmet describes this period in great detail. See Cafer Seydahmet, 
Bazı hatıralar [Some memories], (Istanbul: Emel, 1993).
17 For more detail on the political process in the Crimea, see Hakan Kırımlı, National 
Movements & National Identity among the Crimean Tatars (1905–1916) (Leiden: Brill, 1996).
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states of the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Ukraine.18 In accordance with the 
Promethean strategy, Polish intelligence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
organized a supranational and multi-confessional network of Polish politi-
cians, academicians, diplomats, and Caucasian (mostly Azerbaijani, Georgian, 
and North Caucasian), Ukrainian, Crimean, Kazan Tatar, and Central Asian 
émigrés who had escaped from Soviet Russia and settled in Europe. This net-
work consisted of Promethean clubs located in Warsaw, Paris, Istanbul, 
Helsinki, and Berlin. They published several journals in French, Russian, 
Turkish, and Polish that criticized Soviet policy and Communism. For centu-
ries Poland had enjoyed a special relationship with Muslims, and particularly 
the Turkish-speaking world and Turkey. In the fourteenth century, a sizeable 
Tatar colony settled in the territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: 
it was allowed to build mosques and possess its own religious infrastructure. 
The Ottoman Empire did not accept the divisions of Poland at the end of the 
eighteenth century and captured the sympathies of Polish intellectuals and 
elites. During the Crimean War, Polish politicians and intelligentsia frequently 
visited Istanbul and forged a common Polish-Ottoman front against Russia.
It was a Polish publishing house that published Seydahmetʼs monograph 
on  the Crimea and Crimean Tatars. It should be mentioned that the book, 
Krym. Przeszłość, teraźniejszość i dążenia niepodległościowe tatarów krymskich 
[Crimea. Past, present and independence aspirations of the Crimean Tatars] 
was a Polish translation of the original French book, La Crimée; passé-présent, 
revendications des Tatars de Crimée (published in 1921 in Lausanne by 
Seydahmet), which was aimed at making French readers aware of the histori-
cal background and political events in the Crimea. For the Polish edition, 
Seydahmet expanded the initial version and covered the period of the 1920s by 
elucidating the political and cultural activities of the Crimean Tatar communi-
ties in Europe and Turkey as well as the persecutions undergone by the Tatars 
in the Soviet Union. After prefaces by American,19 Swiss,20 and Polish intellec-
tuals, Seydahmet introduced readers to the basic geography of the peninsula 
and described its population. “This blessed country has been since ten centu-
ries populated by Tatars, which belong to a strong (Tatar-Mongol) race of 
18 For more about the Promethean movement, see Ruch prometejski i walka o przedbudowę 
Europy Wschodniej (1918–1940) [Promethean movement and the struggle to reshape 
Eastern Europe (1918–1940)], ed. Marek Kornat (Warsaw: Instytut Historii pan, 2012).
19 George Herron was an American socialist. He spent several years in Europe and cooper-
ated closely with Muslim intellectuals from Russia and the Soviet Union.
20 Eugene Pittard (1867–1962) was a Swiss professor of anthropology at the University of 
Geneva.
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Chingiz-Khan.”21 Further, he described the etymology of the word Tatar by 
analyzing the works of European orientalists and travelers. Seydahmet offers a 
great deal of information on Tatar folklore and customs in this sub-chapter but 
almost nothing on Islam.
In this context it is quite interesting how Seydahmet described Crimean 
architecture. “By analysing the Crimean architecture we see that Tatars shaped 
their own style by combining the Western influence with the Arab, Turkestani, 
and Istanbul architecture.”22 Furthermore, the author referred to the mosques 
Cuma-Cami in Eupatoria23 as well as Khan-Cami in the Crimean capital 
Bakhchi-Saray. Seydahmet added to his own reflections with quotations from 
the works of western historians and travelers like François Baron de Tott, 
Arthur Schnitzler, Louis de Soudak, and Peter Simon Pallas. In the sub-chapter 
on “Enlightenment and Literacy” Seydahmet mentions the “competence 
among the Tatars to read the Koran”24 from the sixteenth century and beyond. 
The history of the relations between the Crimean Khanate and Poland was a 
topic that he elucidates in a particular detailed way;25 because the book was 
published in Poland and in Polish, therefore Polish readers were his target 
group. However, the occupation of the khanate by the Russian Tsardom dur-
ing the second part of the eighteenth century was the main focus of the 
monograph, and in its core chapters Seydahmet touches to some extent on 
the topic of Islam. In the chapter about Russia’s “Hostile relations to the 
clergy” in the Crimea, Seydahmet describes the policy of the Russian authori-
ties on imams in the peninsula. He wrote that mistrust towards the Tatar 
population was characteristic for Russian authorities and their attitude 
towards the local imams, particularly those who graduated from theological 
high schools in Egypt and Turkey, as well as Kazan and Orenburg. Additionally, 
Seydahmet informs his readers about the Russian authoritiesʼ expropriation 
of land that belonged to mosques and Muslim foundations during the eigh-
teenth century.26
In the second part of the nineteenth century St. Petersburg suppressed 
the resistance of the mountaineers in the northern Caucasus and managed to 
21 Dżafer Sejdamet [Cafer Seydahmet], Krym. Przeszłość, teraźniejszość i dążenia 
niepodległościowe tatarów krymskich (Warsaw: Instytut Wschodni, 1930) 10.
22 Ibid. 37.
23 Eupatoria or Yevpatoria (Tatar: Kezlev) is a town in the Crimean peninsula with a pre-
dominantly Tatar and Karaim (Jewish) population, until the Russian conquest at the end 
of the eighteenth century.
24 Sejdamet, Krym, 41.
25 Ibid., 48–52.
26 Ibid., 55–74.
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consolidate the empire internally. This coincided with their efforts to homog-
enize the multi-national and multi-ethnic population of the empire. 
St. Petersburg was eager to promote Orthodox Christianity in the Protestant 
and Muslim regions within its own borders. Simultaneously, it cut off contacts 
of non-Russians to the border regions outside the empire. With regard to the 
Muslim regions, this policy meant the reduction of any cultural, economic, 
and political contacts between Russian Muslims and the non-Russian Orient.27
According to Seydahmet, in the nineteenth century the Russian authorities 
were reluctant to issue passports to the Tatars, as they wanted to reduce the 
number of pilgrims going to Mecca.28 In this passage about the Muslim com-
munity in Russia, and their interactions and the obstacles to mobility they 
faced, Seydahmet’s intention was not to promote pan-Islamic solidarity. 
Instead he tried to awaken the sympathies of Polish readers for the cause of an 
ethnic and religious community governed by a ‘hostile regime.’ Seydahmet, 
who spent almost a decade in Poland, had many Polish colleagues in Warsaw 
and was well acquainted with Polish history, their mentality, and the Polish 
image of Russia. Most of Polish society, particularly the representatives of the 
elder generation, had experienced the divisions of Poland and foreign rule, 
which finally ended in 1918 when the Polish republic was proclaimed. Because 
of this, Polish readers were particularly sensitive to the victim discourse of the 
non-Russian intellectuals.
 The Anti-communist Agitation of Hilal Munschi in Berlin
In 1919 the Azerbaijani government sent around one hundred students to Europe, 
mostly to Germany, France, and Italy for university studies by offering them 
scholarships.29 Hilal Munschi was among those young Azerbaijani students 
whom the government in Baku sent to Germany. After Azerbaijan was occupied 
by the Bolsheviks in April 1920, Munschi decided to stay in Germany. He began 
with vigorous anti-communist propaganda activities. From 1920 he headed the 
bureau of the Müsavat Party30 in Berlin and, from 1923, he coordinated the 
27 Daniel Brower, “Russian Roads to Mecca: Religious Tolerance and Muslim Pilgrimage in 
the Russian Empire,” Slavic Review 55, no. 3 (1996): 567–584.
28 Sejdamet, Krym, 66.
29 “Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyəti,” in Azərbaycan Xalq Cümhuriyəti Ensiklopediyası, ed. 
Yaqub Mahmudov (Baku: ea neşriyatı, 2004), 1:75–76.
30 The Müsavat Party was founded in 1911 in Baku by a group of Azerbaijani political activ-
ists. During the independence period from 1918 to 1920, Müsavat was among the leading 
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Azerbaijani Student Union. Still living in the German capital in 1930 Munschi 
published a monograph under the title Die Republik Aserbaidschan. Eine 
geschichtliche und politische Skizze [The Republic of Azerbaijan: A historical 
and political outline],31 in which he depicted the milestones of the Azerbaijani 
past and present by describing the history, national literature, and culture of 
Azerbaijan. The main aim of his writings was to present Azerbaijan as a coun-
try fighting for freedom and political sovereignty. He endeavored to generate 
sympathy and support for the Azerbaijani struggle for independence in Europe. 
In reaction to the ongoing nationalistic rhetoric in Germany, Munschi empha-
sized the particularistic and nationalistic character of the movement.32 
Religious aspects did not play a central role in his propaganda work. He 
described, for example, the Azerbaijani people as having a strong national con-
sciousness and compared them to non-Muslim societies such as Poland, 
Georgia, and other eastern European countries. He viewed them and Azerbaijan 
as advanced and civilized societies and described them as part of the family of 
“Kulturnationen.”33 In contrast, he characterized the Soviet Union as backward 
and absolutist.
In his attempt to place Azerbaijan on an equal footing with European coun-
tries, Munschi also decried the negative stereotypes of the Orient that he had 
witnessed during his stay in Berlin. In this sense he rejected the orientalism 
that he found, for example, in the book Öl und Blut im Orient [Oil and blood in 
the Orient] written by Essad Bey.34 But even in this context Munschi consid-
ered the German reader and stressed that this book attacked not only Islamic 
tradition but national tradition and the religious rites of various societies, 
including that of the Jews and Christian peoples such as the Georgians, the 
Armenians, or Russians. Moreover, Munschi points out that the historical truth 
about Germany was not respected in Essad Beyʼs book.35 Munschi was careful 
to avoid giving the impression that Islam was an important aspect of 
Azerbaijani culture; thus he distinguished the country in an essential way from 
other European cultures.
political parties in the several governments in Baku. After the demise of the republic in 1920, 
Müsavat continued its existence in the exile, mostly in Iran, Turkey, Poland, and Germany 
until World War ii. During the Perestroika (1985–1991), Müsavat was re-established in Baku.
31 Hilal Munschi, Die Republik Aserbeidschan. Eine geschichtliche und politische Skizze 
(Berlin: Neudeutsche Verlags- und Treuhand-Gesellschaft, 1930).
32 Ibid., 1.
33 Ibid., 2.
34 Ibid., 3.
35 Ibid., 4.
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Munschi pointed out that the important geopolitical position of Azerbaijan 
had motivated a variety of invaders in numerous conquests. In this context 
Munschi mentions the Arabs, who “occupied and devastated the country in 
the seventh century.”36 According to Munschi, the Arabs governed Azerbaijan 
for three centuries and spread Islam in the region. It is interesting that he states 
that “Azerbaijanis were partly Christian, partly Zoroastrian before, but the eth-
nicity of the population and their language remained throughout the whole 
period constant: they were and continued to be Turks.”37 It was not religion, 
but ethnicity and language that were considered the main factors defining 
Azerbaijani identity. On the one hand Munschi tried to show the ethnic and 
racial continuity of Azerbaijanis and their ancestors as Turkish, on the other 
hand he was also eager to adapt the Azerbaijani nation-building to European 
narratives. In this context he mentions intensive trade relations with European 
countries. On the other hand, the rule of Chingis Khan and Batu Khan, for 
example, is described as a yoke.38 About the Persian Shah Aga Mohammed 
Khan, Munschi writes that his cruel rule coincided with the development of 
“the Azerbaijani national consciousness that already at the end of the 18th cen-
tury began to overcome the religious fanatism.”39
In his account on Azerbaijani history Munschi mainly focused on the long 
struggle against Russian domination. Like the main anti-communist narratives 
of other Muslim intellectuals from the former Russian Empire Munschi 
describes in detail the Russian invasion of Azerbaijan in the eighteenth cen-
tury and the annexation of the Muslim khanates in eastern Caucasia during 
the nineteenth century. Russian rule is described as a violation of Azerbaijani 
national independence, a menace to peace in the region, and as a suppressive 
regime. Munschi analyzes social resistance among the Azerbaijanis against the 
Russian authorities in terms of Kulturkampf and the national struggle by using 
the example and the terms of nation-building in Central Europe in the nine-
teenth century.
The Tsarist government always aimed at the suppression of the intellec-
tual struggle of the Azerbaijanis. …The foundation of any cultural asso-
ciation, including schools in mother tongue [non-Russian], libraries and 
national theatre were forbidden. The oppression had no limits: even the 
36 Ibid., 9.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 11.
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mosques could be built only at an appropriate distance, fixed by law, 
from the Orthodox churches.40
Furthermore Munschi mentions the persecutions of the Muslim clergy by 
Russian authorities, the suppression of Islam, and the spread of Christianity 
supported by the Holy Synod. But he softened his argument by writing that 
even more or less liberal Azerbaijani theologians were persecuted.41 At the 
same time the author also points out that the Azerbaijani media was critical 
towards the “anti-progressive Muslim clergy” and “confessional discord” 
(i.e., between Shīʿī and Sunnī).42 The satirical journal Mullah Nasreddin,43 for 
instance, fought “against reactionary forces”44 and the religious fanatism of 
Persian Muslims. And another journal aimed at the “reform of the Arab alpha-
bet and the woman question.”45 Munschi states that “nearly all the press of 
Azerbaijan asked for the equality of women”46 and that until 1920 Azerbaijan 
was the first Muslim country with broad rights for women that were no differ-
ent than the women’s rights of their Christian neighbors.
An example of the transfer of European and particularly German cultural 
notions can be seen in Munschiʼs description of Azerbaijani culture. He writes 
of the great epoch of literary and intellectual development in Azerbaijan in the 
middle of the nineteenth century and comes to the conclusion that “die großen 
Dichter und Denker” [the great poets and thinkers]47 were the real leaders of 
the Azerbaijani people. Moreover, Munschi portrays the Azerbaijanis as one of 
the leading Kulturnationen in the Orient. The Azerbaijani intellectual Mirza 
Fathali Akhundzade (1812–78), is described as “the greatest dramaturge not 
only in Azerbaijan but of the whole Islamic Orient.”48 Munschi thus promotes 
the idea of a modernizing cultural mission of Azerbaijanis in the Orient.
40 Ibid., 15.
41 Ibid., 16.
42 Ibid., 23.
43 Mullah Nasreddin was a satiric journal published by Cəlil Məmmədquluzadə, an 
Azerbaijani writer, from 1906 till 1931. The language of the journal was Azerbaijani and 
was written first in Arabic, then in Latin, and finally in Cyrillic script. Mullah Nasreddin 
promoted the ideas of enlightenment among the Muslims of the Caucasus and was criti-
cal of the Muslim clergy and to some extent Tsarist policy in the region.
44 Munschi, Die Republik Aserbaidschan, 17.
45 Ibid., 19.
46 Ibid., 20.
47 Ibid., 15.
48 Ibid.
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At the same time Munschi emphasizes the political character of the struggle 
for independence by the Muslims in the Caucasus. Even with regard to Chechen 
resistance in the northern Caucasus under the leadership of Shaykh Shāmil, 
Munschi only speaks of a “political struggle against the Russians,” and does not 
mention his proclamation of jihad against the Russian occupier.49 Munschi 
deliberately used European ideas and categories to attract the attention of 
German readers to the Azerbaijani cause. He directly appealed to the reader’s 
solidarity and empathy and adapted himself to the German Zeitgeist of the 
Weimar Republic when he writes: “The loss of the home country awoke 
the deepest patriotic feelings among all Azerbaijani people. The old spirit of 
the Khanates disappeared. The [Azerbaijani] nation feels united in the struggle 
against the northern enemy.”50
Like Seydahmet, Munschi adapted his text to the public it was written for. 
The argumentation and the choice of symbols and codes were selected 
deliberately. Islam was mentioned as an important distinction between 
Azerbaijanis and Russians, and to some extent as a source of civilization, 
theological discourse, and architecture. At the same time, both authors 
affirmed their nations’ Europeanness and sense of belonging to the progres-
sive community by depicting their national past by using the narative of 
European history.
 Zeki Velidi Toğan’s Speech in Budapest
Born in central Russia, Zeki Velidi Toğan taught at a traditional madrasa in 
Kazan, accompanied Russian orientalists from St. Petersburg University as 
interpreter during their excavations in Central Asia, and finally graduated in 
1935 from the University of Vienna. He became an outstanding Turkish linguist 
and historian. Concurrent with his scientific work, Toğan was quite active as an 
advocate of Turkestani rights in Europe. In this context the presentation he 
delivered in Budapest in 1930 is of particular interest. His speech was published 
as a short brochure under the title Die gegenwärtige Lage der Mohammendaner 
Russlands [The present situation of the Muslims of Russia] in the same year. 
Zeki V. Toğan described the territories of Russian Tsardom and the Soviet 
Union inhabited by Muslims eastwards and westwards of the Caspian Sea, 
and pointed out that both Central Asia and Azerbaijan had been important 
49 Ibid., 14.
50 Ibid., 14.
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cultural centers of Asia even before the Russian conquest.51 Like Munschi and 
Seydahmet, Toğan demonised the Russians and called Bolshevism a “destruc-
tive and cruel ideology.” The narrative of Velidi Toğan was, however, quite 
ambiguous. On the one hand he sharply criticized Communist rule and its 
oppressive policy towards the Muslim community, on the other hand, he was, 
to some extent, optimistic about the future of Islam in the Soviet Union:
The fundament[als] of Islam as a religion and cultural power suffered a 
heavy strike under Bolshevik rule. The madrasas and the Sharia courts 
were closed. The fanatism of the clergy has suffered dramatically. 
Nevertheless the acceptance of a new religion or the revival of the pre-
Islamic religion in Muslim Russia and other countries of the Orient is out 
of the question. Islam experienced a crisis but this concerned only its 
clerical traditions. …Islam will only survive as a religion in a genuine 
spiritual sense. Perhaps it will be exactly the Bolshevik suppression that 
supports a new recovery of Islam. While Islam was suppressed, the 
Russian Muslims however hold on to their religion.52
Like Munschi, Toğan was quite critical of the Muslim clergy. At the same time 
neither the rituals of Islam nor the debate about its virtues were emphasized 
in his speech. The main aim of his presentation, delivered to an audience of 
orientalists and Turkologists, was to gain empathy among the Hungarians for 
the Turkestani cause. Toğan stressed the Turkishness of the Muslims in Russia 
and tried to instrumentalize the pan-Turanian ideas that were widespread in 
Hungary at that time.53
 Rasulzade’s Writing in Poland
Mehmed Emin Rasulzade was born and grew up in Baku during the oil boom 
at the turn of the century. Educated in a Russian-Tatar school in the Christian 
dominated, industrial metropolis of the Russian Caucasus, Rasulzade became 
an ardent socialist; he was soon persecuted by the Tsarist authorities for his 
political activities and had to escape to Persia in 1908. There he co-founded the 
51 Validi Ahmedzeki [Zeki Velidi Toğan], Die gegenwärtige Lage der Mohammendaner 
Russlands (Budapest: V. Ahmedzeki, 1930), 3.
52 Ibid., 16.
53 See Joseph Kessler, Turanism and Pan-Turanism in Hungary 1890–1945 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1967).
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socialist movement among Iranian intellectuals by editing the newspaper 
Irane-Nou. Rasulzade settled in Istanbul in 1911, again for political reasons, but 
was permitted to return to Baku after the amnesty in 1913. From 1918 to 1920 
Rasulzade headed the Azerbaijani parliament, until the republic was occupied 
by the Bolsheviks. In the early 1920s he was a political exile, first in Turkey, and 
then in Poland from 1929.
In 1938, the Warsaw-based publishing house Azerbejdżańskie wydawnictwo 
narodowe [Azerbaijani national edition] published Rasulzadeʼs monograph, 
Azerbajdżan w walce o niepodległość [Azerbaijan in struggle for independence]. 
The aim of the publication was to inform Polish readers about Azerbaijan, its 
geography, history, and culture. The author explains the etymology of the name 
Azerbaijan by analyzing the different theories of Russian and European orien-
talists, Arab and Azerbaijani historians. He describes the geography and popu-
lation of Azerbaijan. The latter consists of Azerbaijani Turks, Rasulzade wrote, 
who were Muslims, and made up 75 percent of the population.54
Like Hilal Munschi, Rasulzade emphasized that “Azerbaijanis played an out-
standing role in Persian and Turkish culture. Two of seven classic Persian poets, 
Nizami and Khagani, were originally from Azerbaijan, from Ganja and 
Shirvan,”55 noted Rasulzade. Next to this text the author included a photo of 
the Shirvanshah Palace in downtown Baku and the pre-Islamic Zoroastrian 
temple Ateshgah in the suburbs of the Azerbaijani capital. In his short over-
view on the history of Azerbaijan, Rasulzade mentions the Islamization of the 
eastern Caucasus and Persia only briefly, though historically, it had a huge 
impact on the development of Azerbaijani culture. Writing about the ancient 
states in the eastern Caucasus, like the pre-Islamic Caucasian Albania56 and 
Media, Rasulzade stressed that the elites of Albania and its Sassanid rulers 
were Christian.57 The Arabs who conquered and Islamized the region are 
54 Mehmed Emin Resul-Zade [Mehmed Emin Rasulzade], Azerbajdżan w walce o 
niepodległość (Warsaw: Azerbejdżańskie wydawnictwo narodowe, 1938), 26.
55 Ibid., 28.
56 Caucasian Albania was an ancient state and society of Caucasian and Iranian ethnic 
groups in the territory of modern Azerbaijan and northern Iran on the Caspian Sea shore. 
Albania was Zoroastrian and later Christian; after the invasion of Arabs to the Caucasus, 
some of its population became Muslim. In Persian and Arabic sources, Albania was called 
Arran. For more on Caucasian Albania see M.L. Chaumont, “Albania: An Ancient Country 
in the Caucasus,” accessed 19 December 2013: http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/
albania-iranian-aran-arm.
57 Resul-Zade, Azerbajdżan, 33.
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 mentioned in the same chapter,58 though Rasulzade did not write about the 
transfer of Islamic culture and religion. Like Toğan and Munschi, in several 
sub-chapters Rasulzade points to the animosity between Azerbaijanis and 
Russians, which he traces back to a twelfth-century Russian attack against the 
merchant city of Barda.59
Rasulzade uses Islam as the national and cultural identifier of the Muslim 
inhabitants of the Caucasus. “Muslims were seen in Russia always like ‘citizens 
of the second class.’ The population of Turkestan and the Caucasian Muslims 
were excluded…from military service, in order to prevent them from acquiring 
any warfare ability,”60 Rasulzade claimed. Their religious belonging became a 
national/ethnic category.
One chapter of the book is devoted to the history of Azerbaijani folk culture. 
Rasulzade describes popular songs and the oral poetry of Azerbaijanis and 
stresses their Turkishness, trying to integrate them into the “Turkish speaking 
world.”61 By analyzing the development of Azerbaijani national literature at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, Rasulzade argues that European 
national romanticism and to some extent national ideas were transferred from 
Turkey and became popular in Azerbaijan. As a result of these processes, “the 
press of Baku, which was initially under the religious-Islamic influence (religi-
jno-islamistyczny62), was able to elaborate the national-cultural motives.”63 
Again Islam is presented within a national context, not as part of a larger trans-
national religious idea.64 The forerunner of this book was Rasulzadeʼs article, 
“Rzeczpospolita Azerbajdżańska” [The republic of Azerbaijan], which was 
published in the Warsaw-based journal Wschód-Orient in 1930. This overview 
presented Azerbaijan by elucidating its culture, geography, past and present. 
“Azeris are a modern nation in the very sense of that word. Azerbaijan pos-
sesses its own literature, press, theatre, in sum everything that is called a 
national culture.”65
In his analysis of the resistance of non-Russian nations against Moscow, 
Rasulzade differentiated between three groups: the rebels struggling against 
58 Ibid., 31–36.
59 Ibid., 34.
60 Ibid., 45.
61 Ibid., 48–49.
62 The Polish notion islamistyczny can be translated into English nowadays as ʽIslamist.ʼ 
Rasulzade used it, however, as an adjective derived from the noun ʽIslam.ʼ
63 Resul-Zade, Azerbajdżan, 55.
64 M.E. Ressul-Zade, “Rzeczpospolita Azerbajdżańska,” Wschód-Orient 2 (1930): 26.
65 Ibid.
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the Bolsheviks, the emigrants outside the Soviet Union, and the opposition 
inside the Communist Party. Rasulzade emphasized the ethnic, cultural and 
religious differences between Russia and Azerbaijan. According to him the 
“Muslim and Turkish population of Azerbaijan”66 was against any ideology 
that had an all-Russian dimension, such as pan-Slavism or Bolshevism. He 
classified himself and his compatriots as not aligned with any Russian political 
party or movement.
 Haïdar Bammate’s Publishing Activities in Lausanne and Paris
Born in 1890 in the northern Caucasus to a turkophone Dagestani family, 
Bammate studied law at the University of St. Petersburg, and then worked for 
Tsarist authorities in Tbilisi and Kazan. After the Russian revolution he became 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of a short-lived North Caucasian Republic of 
Mountaineers. After the fall of the northern Caucasus, Bammate migrated to 
France and actively spread anti-Soviet propaganda. He was supported first by 
Polish intelligence, and later, throughout the 1930s, by German and Japanese 
intelligence.
In 1919 Haïdar Bammate published in Lausanne a book entitled Le Problème 
du Caucase.67 In the principal chapter of the book Bammate develops the idea 
of the importance of the Caucasus, and particularly the Muslim Circassians, 
for Europe, as they serve as a bulwark against Communism. He points out that 
the Circassians supported Europe in the past by hindering “Asian attacks” com-
ing from the East. In fact, Bammate repeats the arguments of many southeast-
ern European intellectuals at the beginning of the twentieth century; these 
intellectuals stress the bulwark position of their countries by presenting them 
as safeguards of Europe against Islam.
In Paris and Berlin from 1934 to 1939 Bammate edited the Russian language 
journal Kavkaz, which emerged in German and French translation after 1937. 
This journal critically elucidated the political process in the Soviet Union and 
therefore contributed to European anti-communist thought. Moreover, the 
Kavkaz attracted attention for its pro-Turkish and pro-Kemalist point of view, 
although the Kemalist government in Ankara maintained good relations with 
66 M.E. Ressul-zade, “Prądy narodowe w Azerbajdżanie Sowieckim,” Wschód-Orient 1–2 
(1935): 19.
67 Haïdar Bammate, Le Problème du Caucase. Extrait de La Revue Politique Internationale N 
de Novembre-Décembre 1918. Avec une carte ethnographique (Lausanne: La Revue politique 
interntionale, 1919).
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the Soviet Union. Haïdar Bammate wrote several editorials on the Near East 
and the historical and cultural bonds between the Caucasus and the Near East. 
Furthermore, Bammate was interested in the promotion of pan-Caucasian 
unity and integration. Being eager to involve Christian, especially Georgian and 
Armenian intellectuals, in his project of Caucasian confederation,68 Bammate 
abandoned other alternative ideas like, for example, pan-Islamic solidarity.
Throughout the 1930s and during World War ii, Bammate collected material 
for his long monograph on Islam. In 1946 his life’s work was published in 
Lausanne under the title Visage de l’Islam.69 The aim of his book was to offer an 
overview of “the spiritual and intellectual values of Islam and to recall his [i.e., 
Islamʼs] contribution to the Occident.”70 After elaborating on numerous works 
by French, Spanish, and Russian orientalists, Bammate delivers an interesting 
narrative of Islam’s evolution from the rule of the Umayyad dynasty to World 
War ii, paying particular attention to the development of Persian, Arabic, and 
Turkish literature, the sciences, and Islamic art. The chapter on art was written 
by his son Nadjmouddine (1922–85).71 While describing Persian and Arabic 
poetry, Bammate stresses their influence on European literature, mostly on 
Spanish and Provencal poetry. Quoting extensively from the works of Ernest 
Renan and other French orientalists, Bammate simultaneously criticizes some 
of the stereotypes about the Near East and Islam in their works. Bammateʼs 
500-page book offers a profound overview on the history of Islam, its contribu-
tion to world culture and civilization “au grand public,” for a broad public. 
Bammate pleads for Christian-Muslim dialogue. According to him, there is a 
strong similarity between the moral virtues and values of the Christian and 
Islamic civilizations. The expanded version of Visages de l’Islam was repub-
lished in 1959 and was well-received among Francophone Algerian72 national-
ists and by readers in Turkey.73
68 Gaidar Bammat, “Nashi zadachi,” Kavkaz (Le Caucase) Organ nezavisimoi natsional’noi 
mysli 1 (1934): 3–5.
69 Bammate, Visages de l’Islam.
70 “…il nous a paru utile de soumettre aux lectuers un apercu rapide mais assez varié des 
valeurs spirituelles et intellectuelles de l’Islam et de rappeler son apport à l’Occident.” 
Bammate, Visages de l’Islam, xiii.
71 The chapter was published in the same year as a separate booklet, also in Lausanne.
72 Sadek Sellam, “Le FLN vu par l’écrivain Malek Bennabi (1905–1973): Les relations malais-
ées d’un penseur non conformiste avec le pouvoir algérien naissant,” Guerres mondiales et 
conflits contemporains 4, no. 208 (Oct.–Dec. 2002), 136; doi: 10.3917/gmcc208.0133.
73 Throughout the 1960 and 1970s, two different translations of Visages de l‘Islam were pub-
lished in Istanbul and Ankara.
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 Conclusion
Cafer Seydahmet, Zeki Velidi Toğan, Hilal Munschi, Haïdare Bammate, and 
M. Rasulzade like many other Azerbaijani, north Caucasian, and Tatar intel-
lectuals living in exile in interwar Europe conducted anti-communist propa-
ganda activities in France, Poland, and Germany. They wrote for a variety of 
European media and published books on the history and the socio-political 
situation of their countries of origin. They were eager to make European 
readers aware of the culture, the recent developments, and the current polit-
ical problems in the Soviet Caucasus and the Crimea, and Islam played a 
significant role in their argumentation. Because they were based in Christian 
countries and addressing primarily Europeans, these non-Russian Muslim 
émigrés were quite cautious with regard to their contributions on Islam in 
the European media during the 1920s. Perhaps this was an attempt to avoid 
any impression of being ‘religious Muslims’ among European intellectuals 
and politicians. It can be freely assumed that these Azerbaijani and Tatar 
intellectuals presented themselves and their countries of origin as less 
Islamic than they were in reality. The aim of these anti-communist émigrés 
was to obtain European support in their confrontation with the Soviet Union; 
they clearly shared the impression that the West would be reluctant to sup-
port Islamic societies.
In this context it is useful to mention the similarities between the texts 
written by these Muslim intellectuals in exile in Europe and Turkey in the 
interwar period. Islam, its rituals, customs, traditions, and institutions were 
only depicted marginally, even in Turkish publications, which emerged in 
Istanbul during the 1920s and 1930s. This was because of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürkʼs rigorous secularist policies during this period. The differences 
in the Turkish texts written by Seydahmet, Rasulzade, and Zeki Velidi Toğan 
relates to their appeals to pan-Turkish solidarity and Turkishness, which 
were much less articulated in the texts they published in Polish, French, 
and German.
Islam was treated as an essential subject in the books and articles of 
Rasulzade, Bammate, Munschi, Seydahmet, and Zeki Velidi Toğan, 
though  they belonged to a secular generation of Eurasian intellectuals of 
Muslim origin, who shared the opinion that nationalism was much more 
important for the mobilization of their ethnic groups than the idea of a 
supranational Islamic community (umma). While the representation of Islam 
in interwar Europe was not a life vocation for these Muslim intellectuals from 
Russia living in European exile, this changed considerably after World War ii.
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